Routledge Advances in Translation and Interpreting Studies

RELEVANCE THEORY IN TRANSLATION AND INTERPRETING

A COGNITIVE-PRAGMATIC APPROACH

Fabrizio Gallai

Relevance Theory in Translation and Interpreting

This book illustrates the potential of Relevance Theory (RT) in offering a cognitive-pragmatic, cause-effect account of translation and interpreting (T&I), one which more closely engages T&I activity with the mental processes of speakers, listeners, writers, and readers during communicative acts.

The volume provides an overview of the cognitive approach to communication taken by RT, with a particular focus on the distinction between explicit and implicit content and the relationship between thoughts and utterances. The book begins by outlining key concepts and theory in RT pragmatics and charting the development of their disciplinary relationship with work from T&I studies. Chapters draw on practical examples from a wide range of T&I contexts, including news media, scientific materials, literary translation, audiovisual translation, conference interpreting, and legal interpreting. The book also explores the myriad applications of RT pragmatics-inspired work and future implications for translation and interpreting research.

This volume will be of interest to scholars in T&I studies and pragmatics.

Fabrizio Gallai is a research fellow and lecturer at the Università degli Studi Internazionali – UNINT in Rome. He is the author of a range of articles on translation and interpreting and cognitive pragmatics (Relevance Theory), including the chapter on "Cognitive Pragmatics And Translation Studies" in *The Routledge Handbook of Translation and Pragmatics*.

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To my dad, who taught me the meaning of the seasons

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Abbreviations

AVT	Audiovisual translation
BT	Back translation (a translation of a translated text, which retains the original structure and is used to explain the translation process for an audience that does not understand the target language)
CI	Conference interpreting
CORT	Competence-oriented research of translation
CSI	Consecutive interpreting
CTIS	Cognitive translation and interpreting studies
DI	Dialogue interpreting
DM	Discourse marker
FIT	Free indirect thought
IS	Interpreting studies
L2	Second language (a language that is not the native language of the speaker/writer)
MT	Machine translation
NT	Notation text (in consecutive interpreting)
RT	Relevance Theory or relevance-theoretic
SA	Source audience (the reader/hearer of the original text/utterance)
SC	Source text communicator (the writer/speaker of the original text/utterance)
SI	Simultaneous interpreting
SL	Source language (the language of the original text/utterance)
ST	Source text (the original text for translation/interpreting)
TA	Target audience (the reader/hearer of the translated text/utterance)
T&I	Translation and interpreting
TL	Target language (the language of the translation/interpreting)
TS	Translation studies
TT	Target text (the translated/interpreted text/utterance)

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My greatest intellectual debt is to Prof Diane Blakemore, my mentor in pragmatics and PhD supervisor. Thank you for making me appreciate the wonders of human communication.

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Finally, I would like to thank my friends and family in the UK and Italy, who have helped me keep my sanity in the very strange contexts of 2020 and 2021.

Conventions

I have tried to keep technical terms to a minimum, but some of these conventions were unavoidable.

Typographical conventions

- Linguistic expressions: when I refer to a linguistic item, I write it in *italics*, while (encoded or not encoded) concepts are written in LARGE CAPS.
- Interpretations and meanings in contexts: an utterance is between "inverted commas", a sentence is represented in *italics*, and a proposition in SMALL CAPS.
- Main terms: they are in bold within the text.

Transcription conventions in interpreted speech

- *(.)*: a short silence (micro-pause);
- *(..)* or *(. . .)*: untimed intervals of longer length;
- *colon (:)*: long vowel (multiple colons indicate a more prolonged sound);
- *((double parentheses))*: verbal descriptions of sounds or movements;
- *underscoring*: increased volume;
- *[square brackets]*: overlap.

Other conventions

- For ease of understanding, in examples with an unnamed communicator or hearer/reader, I shall refer to the communicator, the translator or the interpreter as 'he', and the audience as 'she'. Furthermore, I shall also distinguish:

    i. 'interpreting' or 'to interpret' (lower case), which indicates the activity of a (conference or dialogue) interpreter or an explanation or way of explaining (e.g., research findings);

ii. 'Interpretation' or 'to Interpret' (upper case), which denotes the metarepresentation of a communicator's thoughts recovered by an addressee.

- Implicatures are indicated as such: 'U +> I', which equals 'Language user producing utterance U implicates proposition I'. By contrast, +>> denotes explicatures. Thus, 'U +>> I' is equal to 'Language user producing utterance U is an explicature of proposition I'.
- The study of translation and interpreting inevitably presupposes knowledge of more than one language. The book has been designed for use by readers from any language background who have an advanced level of English. In the translation examples, English is always either the source language or the target language. The other languages covered are varied, including major European languages (such as German or Italian), Arabic, Japanese, and Russian. An English back translation of a source or target text is provided in square brackets – or in *italics* if within the text – to facilitate analysis. Transliterations of Arabic and Japanese are also to be found in square brackets.

All names, dates and locations in the transcripts are fictitious and do not relate in any way to any real events. Any resemblance is purely coincidental.

Preface

This volume is the outcome of a growing personal concern over the foundations of translation and interpreting, which began when I was an interpreting student in Trieste. Or, more specifically, during my Erasmus period at Heidelberg University Translation and Interpreting Department.

Browsing through its library shelves, something caught my eye. It was an oldish-looking booklet on conference interpreting by Patricia E. Longley (1968). In its Preface, the author states that her main aim is an appraisal of the skills it takes to be an interpreter, so I immediately set out to read it. Aside from the more obvious requirements of good language knowledge and general background, certain advantages struck me as peculiar (such as that of being a married woman). What struck me most, however, was a passage in which the author mentions a need "to find the 'naturals,' whom most practicing interpreters can recognize very quickly" (Longley 1968, 61). And if they failed to become professional interpreters, "they will probably make good translators" (ibid. 1968, 66). Was translation just the option of last resort in case I failed my interpreting exams? Do all interpreting trainees have to possess embryonic aptitudes capable of development and training?

Over the following years, as a professional interpreter working in the UK, I noticed that my colleagues' and my presence affected the interaction in ways that were both subtle and pervasive, sometimes leading to miscommunication undetected by the parties concerned. Individually, although these differences between the source and the target texts may have each affected the exchange locally, they did not alter the outcome overall. Cumulatively, however, each of the features modified in the renditions seemed to amount to a weight of evidence that – in spite of their treatment as identical texts – the two were in fact disparate. I remember singling out a particular component known as *discourse marker* or *connective*, and thinking, Is it okay to leave parts of the original text out altogether if they are extraneous to the 'meat and potatoes' of the sentence?

It was then that I decided to start conducting research, becoming what Gile (1994) would refer to as 'practisearcher'. And very soon did I realise that, beginning in the 1990s, views on testing, training, and the very

definition of translation and interpreting had drastically changed. I also realised that the analytical momentum of translation and interpreting studies had not been generated from within the disciplines' existing paradigms, but rather scholars had looked at other theoretical frameworks for relevant models and methods.

An obvious source of inspiration had been linguistics, and the core linguistic concerns – how to preserve meaning and recreate the same effects in the target language recipients – remain unaltered. In particular, these are questions about pragmatics, the study of meaning by virtue of (or dependent on) the use of language. Consequently, one would expect a pragmatic theory to be able to explain the processes involved in translation and interpreting, and to have practical implications for translators and interpreters.

If we assume that the purpose of translation and interpreting is indeed communication, and the work of professionals in this field is underpinned by linguistic *and* cognitive abilities, then an appropriate pragmatic framework for capturing these communicative acts must relate these activities to the *mental* processes a communicator and his audience engage in. It is no surprise, then, that over the past three decades Relevance Theory has become the most influential cognitive-pragmatic approach within translation and interpreting studies. Building on the work of Paul Grice (1961, 1989), Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995) have proposed a relevance-theoretic account of human communication, which is opposed to the classical code model, according to which information is encoded into a message, transmitted and decoded by another party, with another copy of the code. Their model offers an additional dimension to the analysis of interlingual communication as it aims to explain both how humans understand the world (cognition) and how we convey thoughts and understand each other (communication). They argue that utterance Interpretation is not achieved by identifying the semantically encoded meanings of sentences, but involves *inferential* computations performed over conceptual representations or propositions.

Almost 40 years have gone by since the publication of the Postface to *Relevance: Communication and Cognition* (2nd ed.), in which Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995, 278) express their hope that novel studies "will lead to revisions, new insights, and, perhaps more important, new problems to investigate". Around that time, Gutt's (1990, 1991) analysis of translation from a relevance-theoretical prospective was emerging, and has since then provoked a flood of research. This research – now also encompassing interpreting – has witnessed a steady departure from theoretical studies in favour of implementing various types of empirical research in order to gain further insight into the process of interlingual communication.

So, Relevance Theory has enjoyed increasing popularity in translation and interpreting studies, both in Europe and around the world. However, it has sometimes also been misapplied. This mostly happens when it is

presented as a training method to 'correctly' derive the intended message, or when the analysis fails to consider the special nature of interlingual communication.

This book aims to provide an authoritative, up-to-date, and yet accessible introduction to the interface between this theory and translation and interpreting studies. To investigate both the practice and the theory in an accessible and systematic way, I divided the book into three macro sections:

- Part I begins by giving a brief overview of technical terms used in linguistic semantics and pragmatics, as well as an introduction to Gricean pragmatics (Chapter 1). The main focus of Chapter 2, instead, is on the cognitive approach to communication taken by Relevance Theory; it revisits the axioms of the theory and expounds the way human communication and cognition are described.
- Part II shows how the application of the theory has shed light on key issues in translation (Chapter 3) and interpreting studies (Chapter 4); that is, on how relevance-theoretic ideas have been tested and applied to the study of mediated communication in various settings. In particular, we will discuss how Gutt's notion of translation and interpreting as an act of interlingual interpretive language use, based on the concept of interpretive resemblance, has been espoused and challenged over the years.
- Finally, Part III fleshes out the theoretical and methodological implications of Relevance Theory-informed approaches to translation and interpreting, as well as their applications in terms of training and practice (Chapter 5). Chapter 6 explores future avenues, with a view to sparking a debate and further investigations.

The discussion presented here reflects synchronous processes of dynamic expansion and emerging realignment within core areas of Relevance Theory-informed studies on translation and interpreting, as the reality that we attempt to capture both changes and yet, in some ways, remains the same. In particular, this book contains work that brings a variety of data types and methods, and new findings into relevance-theoretic research, thus providing a good cross-section of the field at present and demonstrating the broad scope and vigour of this domain at this point in its evolution.

By the end, you will have been introduced to the essential machinery of the theory and its applications to translation and interpreting, and be able to propose and test your own relevance-theoretic explanations of particular phenomena, as well as strategies needed to achieve a pragmatically successful output. In particular, you will be ready to look in more detail at specific components of the approaches presented here, and apply them to complex questions in a wide range of translation and interpreting contexts, across different languages and cultures.

I have tried to write with more than one audience in mind. It is hoped that this book will provide useful insights and examples both for readers – academics, students, and practitioners alike – with little or no prior knowledge of Relevance Theory, and for more advanced researchers who are looking to develop their understanding of the theory and its application to the world of translators and interpreters. Of course, the extent to which things can be perceived as simple (partly) depends on the nature of the topics at hand.

While the level of difficulty does vary from chapter to chapter, the chapters build on each other. The first four chapters end with a 'Food for thought' section, which includes a very focused further reading list, review questions, and exercises. These tasks are designed in such a way that they can be used either by readers working on their own, or in pairs or groups in a more formal teaching situation. There are a number of abbreviations and conventions adopted in the text, explained more fully on pages x and xiii–xiv, respectively. The volume ends with a detailed glossary covering the technical terms (highlighted in bold at critical points in the text), and a bibliography, containing all of the sources mentioned in the book.

In conclusion, studies at the crossroads between this inferential approach to communication and translation and interpreting studies have proved to be very useful for quality evaluation, guiding (meta- and cross-pragmatic) skills acquisition as well as assessing the results in translation and interpreting. On the other hand, oral and written translation practices continue to provide real-world data against which Relevance Theory can be tested. I sincerely hope that this mutually beneficial exchange will continue, and that this volume will meet the needs of its readers and provide support over many years.

F.G.

Florence and Rome, February 2022

Part I

1 Gricean pragmatics
Meaning more than we say

1.1 Introduction

Until the 1950s, most linguists assumed that communication was a purely linear process. In this code model, meaning is believed to be transmitted between sender and receiver by encoding and decoding, constrained only by the precision of the code, the degree of uniformity of senders' and receivers' 'codebooks', and the quality of the channel. The **information** is simply processed and stored, and then the receiver can encode her own signal to transmit (cf. Searle 1983, 68).

Yet, sometimes intuition is as valuable as logic, and everyone is able to realise that this idea of meaning is way too simplistic. For example, consider the Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian discourse marker *odnosno* (roughly, 'so', 'that is' or 'in other words') which appears to be a frequent stumbling block in war-related testimonies at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). This was especially the case during the trial of Enver Hadžihasanović and Amir Kubura, top commanders in the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s. On 10 March 2005, Judge Antonetti touched upon the issue of the translation of *odnosno*, which had been disputed by the prosecution and the defence:

> Judge Antonetti: I myself have noted that several witnesses have used this word, and I was tempted to ask them to explain the word, but that would mean entering a discussion on grammar, and that was not why the witness came. I noted that Madam Residovic also used the word very often. I was going to ask her to tell us what she means when she uses it.
>
> (IT-01–47 Hadžihasanović et al. Day: March 10, 2005, taken from Mišković-Luković and Dedaić 2012, 1356)

Ms Residovic, the Sarajevo-based attorney who represented defence in several cases brought to the ICTY, responded in a very evasive way:

> Ms. Residovic: the word "odnosno" is frequently used in different contexts with a different meaning, and the drafter of the document,

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> or the person who is speaking would be in the best position to explain then in what sense the word was used.
>
> (IT-01–47 Hadžihasanović et al. Day: March 10, 2005, Page Number: 17153, taken from Mišković-Luković and Dedaić 2012, 1361)

This small exchange from courtroom proceedings provides us with an insight into a pertinent metalinguistic discussion. A question arises: why is the meaning of words such as *odnosno* or *but* impossible to fit into a code model explanation, and how come these terms are so elusive (and hard to translate)?

In the 1950s and 1960s, ordinary language philosophers such as Wittgenstein (1953), Austin (1962), and Searle (1969) started reflecting upon these and other issues, and found an overarching answer. Far from easily encoding propositional information, they stated that natural languages vastly **underdetermine** the communicator's meaning, leaving a gap between what can be precisely encoded and what a speaker intends to convey. Explaining how this gap is bridged became the main aim of the new discipline of **pragmatics**.

The term *pragmatics* has been used in many ways and to cover a very wide range of aspects, but it can be broadly defined as "the systematic study of meaning by virtue of, or dependent on, the use of language" (Huang 2007, 2). Scott-Phillips (2014) argues that pragmatics is key to understanding language and its evolution. Linguistic systems are said to help make human communication more efficient, and their evolution follows from the development of the kind of communication which pragmatic theories aim to explain. At its heart lies the notion that language is not a logical product, but originates from the conventional practice of individuals, which hinges on the particular context of language use.

And if pragmatics is the study of meaning-in-context (Kasher 1977, Levinson 1983), then **cognitive pragmatics** can be broadly defined as encompassing the study of the cognitive principles and processes involved in the construal of meaning-in-context. Even though other cognitive-pragmatic theories have been developed in the last three decades,[1] Sperber and Wilson's (1986/1995) post-Gricean Relevance Theory (henceforth RT) is considered to be the main theoretical framework in the area of cognitive pragmatics (cf. Huang 2007, Schmid 2012), as well as the only cognitive-pragmatic approach adopted so far within translation and interpreting (henceforth T&I) studies.

Scholars in this field focus on the inferential chains necessary to understand a communicator's intention, starting from their utterance and the different mental **representations** underlying the comprehension of various phenomena as cognitive processes. Pragmatics is here understood as being about how we work out (or *infer*) what to write, say, and do when communicating, and how we *infer* what others intend to communicate to us.

We make **inferences** all the time, especially when communicating. For instance, consider this context: you are eating the dessert at the dinner table, and your sister Serena is sitting next to you. She suddenly turns around, and steals the last bite of cake off your plate. She then winks at you as she slips the last bite into her mouth, and you hear yourself utter the following words:

(1) You: Oi, I was eating that!

In order for your sister to process your utterance, she must recognise the following things (amongst others):

(2)

(2a) Linguistic form: *Oi, I was eating that!*

(2b) Linguistic meaning: the person referred to as *I* about to eat the thing referred to as *that* at some point after the time when he said it (also known as 'reference assignment');

(2c) Contextual assumptions: the brother is the speaker; the sister ate the last piece of cake; the brother is holding a fork in his hand and was about to eat that last piece;

(2d) What it directly communicates: the brother was on the point of finishing off the slice of cake on his plate when his sister ate the last piece;

(2e) What it indirectly communicates: the brother is unhappy about what his sister has done; he wanted to carry on eating his cake; he thinks his sister is insensitive or self-centred; he wants an apology; he was being ironic and does not actually care about his last piece of cake; etc.

An account of how utterances are understood in this way has always been at the heart of pragmatics. In the example (2), this area of study usually focuses on how the sister got from the linguistic meaning of what her brother said (2b) to an understanding of what he intended in this context. In other words, it studies how the brother's utterance led his sister to work out that he was saying (directly) that he was about to eat his last piece of cake (see 2d), and (indirectly) that he was upset that his sister had eaten it, etc. (see 2e). From the outset, pragmatics has focused on the latter – things which are communicated beyond the meanings of linguistic expressions used. These indirectly communicated assumptions are termed *implicatures*.

A key feature of *implicatures* is that they are worked out on the basis not only of what the communicator said or wrote, but also of assumptions about the context in which they were communicated. In another context, an utterance of the expression *Oi, I was eating that!* in (1) would not lead to any of the conclusions in (2e) – or would only lead to part of

them.[2] So, what counts as a (more or less strongly communicated) implicature, and what guides the sister to make inferences such as the ones in (2d) and (2e)?

Before we look at ideas on implicatures, we first need to look at some basic notions in linguistic **semantics** and **pragmatics** which continue to be at the heart of Relevance Theory-oriented research. Section 1.2 considers some issues about terminology, while Section 1.3 presents an outline of Grice's work on natural and non-natural meaning before discussing Grice's 'Theory of Conversation'.[3] Lastly, Section 1.4 mentions a number of aspects within Gricean pragmatics which have been object of critiques over the years.

1.2 What pragmatics aims to explain

1.2.1 Sentence, utterance, proposition

In current linguistics, *sentence*, *utterance*, and *proposition* are terms which have a slightly different meaning to their everyday usage. Let me begin with the distinction between sentence and utterance – a distinction that is key to both semantics and pragmatics.

An **utterance** (a sound or an image) is the (oral or visual) use of a particular piece of language, and is produced by a particular person on a particular occasion. According to this definition, "Oi, I was eating that!" in (1) is an utterance.

Sentences, instead, are more abstract entities or constructs defined within a theory of grammar which do not take account of properties such as who, when and where they were uttered. They are independent of their realisation in any concrete form. As a case in point, consider:

(3)
(3a) Let's do the time warp again!
(3b) **Again let's warp do time the!*

I uttered example (3a) this morning as I was singing *The Rocky Horror Picture Show* refrain. And it has surely been uttered by other people in other situations before – during a musical tour, for instance – and will no doubt be uttered again in the future. Yet, (3a) can also be considered a sentence which existed before I produced my utterance this morning. Example (3b), instead, is not a well-formed string of words according to the laws of grammar, therefore it is not considered a sentence.

The study of sentence-meaning – those aspects of meaning ascribed to a sentence – normally belongs to semantics. By contrast, utterance-meaning, or speaker-meaning – what a speaker intends to convey by uttering something – is normally analysed by pragmaticians.

We now move on to the term ***proposition***, which focuses on logical properties. A proposition is what is expressed by a sentence when that

sentence is used to make a statement – that is, to say something true or false – about some state of affairs in the outside world. In other words, when we utter a sentence to make a statement, this sentence is said to convey a proposition. For example, (4c) is the proposition underlying both sentences (4a) and (4b):

(4)
(4a) *Beautiful giraffes roam the savannah.*
(4b) *The savannah is roamed by beautiful giraffes.*
(4c) BEAUTIFUL GIRAFFES ROAM THE SAVANNAH.

The **propositional content** of a sentence is that part of its meaning which can be reduced to a proposition. This means that different sentences may share the same propositional content, even though they may be different in other aspects of meaning. For example, the interrogative sentence *Do beautiful giraffes roam the savannah?* has the same propositional content – namely, (4c) – as the active declarative sentence in (4a) and the passive declarative sentence in (4b).

If the same proposition can, on the one hand, be expressed by different sentences, the same sentence can on the other be used to convey different propositions on different occasions. Let us consider (5):

(5) *My sister got sick before she was able to get the vaccine.*

The sentence in (5) may imply quite different things about some state of affairs in the external world when uttered by different speakers. Luigi, who talks about his sister Maria, would mean something different from what Sally would mean if she had used it to talk about her sister Kelly. In this context, the use of the same sentence would express two distinct propositions.

To sum up, the relationship between sentence, utterance, and proposition may be represented schematically in the diagram in Figure 1.1 (adapted from Hurford and Heasley 1983, 23):



Figure 1.1 Relationship between sentence, utterance, and proposition.

Figure 1.1 shows that a proposition, being the most abstract of the three notions, can be expressed by different sentences. A given sentence can in turn be instantiated by utterances, which are the least abstract notions.

1.2.2 Truth value and truth condition

Propositions may be known, believed, doubted, asserted, or denied, and also held constant under paraphrase and translation. For instance, (6b) in Italian, (6c) in Japanese, and (6d) in German can be said to express the same proposition as the English (6a):

(6)
(6a) It hailed for about five minutes.
(6b) Ha grandinato per circa cinque minuti.
(6c) 雹が5分ほど降った。[hyō ga 5-fun hodo futta.]
(6d) Es hat etwa fünf Minuten lang gehagelt.

Further, a proposition may also be true or false depending on how and when the utterance is used. For instance, the proposition expressed by the sentence *The cat is on the table*, if uttered as a statement, is true in a context where the cat is in fact on the table, yet false in another situation where the cat is not on the table. However, on a particular occasion, a proposition has a definite **truth value** – that is, it is either true or false. It is true if and only if it corresponds to some state of affairs that obtains on that occasion, and it is false if and only if it does not.

On the other hand, a sentence has **truth conditions**, the conditions that the world must meet for the sentence to be true. An example is given in (7a), or in (7b) in a more abstract form:

(7)
(7a) *The candies are sweet* is true if and only if the candies are sweet.
(7b) *S* is true if and only if *p*.

Example (7a) tells us what set of conditions (*p* in (7b)) must hold for the world, for the proposition expressed by the English sentence *The candies are sweet* (*S* in (7b)) to be true. In other words, it tells us under what conditions (*p*) *The candies are sweet* (*S*) may be used to make a true statement about the external world.[4]

1.2.3 The notion of context

Context is one of those notions which is used very widely in linguistics, yet to which each theory gives a different definition.[5] Broadly speaking,

however, context may refer to any relevant features of the environment in which a linguistic unit is used, and can comprise three different sources:

1. the **physical context**, which refers to the spatio-temporal location of the utterance. For example, the Interpretation of utterance (8) depends on the information derivable from the physical context of the utterance:

   (8) *I*'m the one you should be talking to, not *him*!

2. the **linguistic** (or **co-textual**) **context**, which refers to what has been mentioned in the same discourse. For instance, the surrounding utterances play a crucial role in understanding Marco's utterance in (9):

   (9) Daniele: Who gave my cat Coco grapes? It's dangerous for her!
   Guglielmo: I did.

3. the **general (or real-world) knowledge context**. The knowledge computable from this type of context explains why utterance (10a) is pragmatically well-formed, whilst utterance (10b) is pragmatically anomalous – given most people's real-world knowledge:

   (10)
   (10a) Michelangelo's David is a true masterpiece of Renaissance sculpture, and I can't wait to go back to Florence.
   (10b) Michelangelo's David is a true masterpiece of Renaissance sculpture, and I can't wait to go back to Venice.

Now that we have analysed some of the most frequent terms in semantics and pragmatics, we can turn back to the big gap we left in our explanation on the brother's utterance in (1). So far, we have said nothing about what guides his sister to make the inferences in (2d) and (2e) – about how exactly his sister works out what his brother is communicating directly and indirectly. Grice's work is the first explanation of how humans manage to work out the specific, intended meanings of utterances or other communicative acts based on their underspecified initial meanings. The next section presents a brief summary of what Grice suggested.

1.3 Gricean theory of meaning and implicature

The domain of inferential pragmatics owes a lot of its existence to the pioneering work of H. P. Grice (1957, 1961, 1975/1989, 1989), who attempted to reconcile truth-conditional semantics with ordinary

language philosophy. In his career, the Oxford philosopher explored a wide range of topics, but is best known for his work in two areas: logic and conversation, and meaning.[6]

His work on meaning, in particular, precedes his writings on pragmatics. It also comes first logically because it attempts to discriminate between several types of meaning, one of which determines the scope of his pragmatic principles.

1.3.1 Types of meaning

It was thanks to Grice's (1957, 1969, 1989) contributions that we started exploring the different types of meaning mentioned in 1.2.1.

Grice established a distinction between 'natural' meanings (in the external world), and 'non-natural' meanings (linguistic meanings of utterances). **'Natural meaning'** is involved when we are able to infer from something in the world that something else must be the case (often because of a perceived causal relationship), while **'non-natural'** meaning (also, **meaning**$_{\text{n[on]n[atural]}}$ or **meaning**$_{\text{nn)}}$ is communication which is intended to be recognised as having been intended (i.e., a matter of expressing and recognising intention).

Grice (1957, 377) suggested that examples such as (11) were cases of 'natural meaning', whereas examples such as (12) were cases of meaning$_{\text{nn}}$:

(11) Those spots mean measles.
(12) Those three rings on the bell mean the bus is full.

Utterance (11) is an example of 'natural meaning': the presence of spots is taken to be a symptom of measles. In this context, it would be odd to conclude that the patient has measles because of the spots, and then to deny that the patient had measles.

On the other hand, a particular kind of *intention* is involved in 'non-natural meaning'. Example (12) dates back to a time when bus conductors rang a bell three times to indicate that the bus was full, and no one needed to get off, thus eliminating the need to get off at the following bus stop. In this context, the three rings 'mean' that the bus is full because the conductor wants us to infer this from his actions. It would not be odd to say that the conductor intended to communicate that the bus was full, despite the fact that he might not have had all of the details and might have missed the fact that there were still some seats remaining.

To conclude, we can tell that specific areas indicate measles merely by looking at them, while we must consider what a communicator *intended* and what would be sensible to express when considering non-natural meaning. This distinction is essential for several reasons, specifically

because Grice's rational principles of communication apply to non-natural, but not to natural meaning. In fact, his subsequent major step in the history of pragmatics is his further division of non-natural meaning into 'what is said' and 'what is implicated'.

1.3.2 Saying and implicating

A fundamental distinction proposed by Grice is between what an utterance *says* and what it *implicates*. The dichotomy is quite intuitive, as hinted at in (2) when I made the distinction between what we communicate "directly" (or 'say', for Grice) and "indirectly" (or 'imply').

The notion of ***what is said*** indicates the conventionally transmitted, truth-conditional, coded part of meaning – the particular aspect of the meaning that the hearer can arrive at mainly by using her linguistic knowledge. In addition to linguistic **decoding**, reference assignment and sense disambiguation are accepted into the notion of 'what is said'; thus, they seem to be possible without taking into account pragmatic principles or speakers' intentions.

Inferences only seem to play a role in deriving ***implicatures***, the implicitly communicated propositions of an utterance, and do not play a role in what is said.[7] It is because of the notion of *implicature* that Grice can suggest an account of how we can 'mean more than we say' (i.e., by implicating things).

The picture we have developed so far shows that linguistic communication involves both saying and implicating, and can be summarised as in Figure 1.2:



Figure 1.2 Grice's saying-implicating distinction.

We could add further information at the top of Figure 1.2, distinguishing different kinds of (linguistic and non-linguistic, intentional and unintentional) communication, but we will focus on other subdivisions proposed by Grice (1975/1989, 1989) with regard to implicature. In

particular, he distinguishes not only between *what is said* and *implicated*, but also:

> between what is part of the conventional force (or meaning) of the utterance and what is not. This yields three possible elements – what is said, what is conventionally implicated, and what is nonconventionally implicated.
>
> (Grice 1975/1989, 41)

These distinctions are illustrated in Figure 1.3:



Figure 1.3 Grice's view of linguistic communication.

As Figure 1.3 shows, he first distinguished two types of implicatures. The key similarities between conventional and conversational implicatures are that (a) neither contributes to the truth conditions of their corresponding sentence, and that (b) both are associated with speaker or utterance rather than proposition or sentence.

However, there are also fundamental differences, too. **Conventional implicatures** are not derived from the co-operative principle and its maxims (see 1.3.3), but rather follow from the meanings of the lexical items and/or linguistic constructions used. In other words, they are linguistically 'encoded' and do not depend on aspects of the context. Here is an utterance containing representations of two clauses, connected by the discourse marker *so*:

> (13) Marco is learning how to swim. So, his mom has bought him inflatable armbands. [*p* so *q* +> *p* provides an explanation for *q*]

In (13), the conventional implicature contributed by *so* is that the fact that Marco is learning how to swim explains why his mom has bought

him inflatable armbands. Other lexical items whose use is considered to trigger conventional implicatures in English include, amongst others, *also, anyway*, *besides*, *however*, *on the other hand*, *only*, *still*, and *too*.[8]

Conversational implicatures, on the other hand, arise from the co-operative principle and its maxims, and are thus non-conventional – they are motivated. Grice subdivided them into ***generalised* implicatures**, which usually arise without requiring any specific contextual conditions (unless specific contextual assumptions cancel them), and ***particularised* implicatures**, which only follow in a specific context. Let us look at the following examples:

(14) Most of Andrea's relatives have brown hair. [+> Not all of Andrea's relatives have brown hair]

(15) Fabrizio: How is Luigi getting on in his new volleyball club?
Giovanni: Quite well, I think. He likes his colleagues, and he hasn't been fined yet. [+> Luigi is the kind of person who is likely not to behave according to generally accepted rules of professional volleyball players]

Example (14) contains a generalised implicature which arises when a certain 'form of words' ('Most X are Y') is used, and its **Interpretation** will be triggered without needing any particular contexts. By contrast, the implicature in example (15) (adapted from Grice 1975/1989, 24) crucially depends on its linguistic context. Linguistic decoding, reference assignment, and possibly semantic disambiguation would deliver a truth-conditional content of Giovanni's answer that would demand quite a deal of work from a truth-conditional semantics or formal pragmatics scholar – and still, significant parts of Giovanni's intention would probably remain hidden.

The very first example (1) we have looked at in this chapter is also what Grice called a 'particularised conversational implicature'. Each of the suggested implicatures in (2e) only arises given that there are specific contextual assumptions which interact with what the speaker has said. In other words, we cannot guess much about what they are likely to implicate without any information on when and where these were uttered.

To sum up, Grice explored how differences in *sentence-meaning* and *speaker-meaning* may occur. In differentiating between these two types of meaning, Grice acknowledged that successful verbal communication requires not only the knowledge of some linguistic code, but also a general ability to draw inferences. And it is because of this ability that we manage to spontaneously communicate more than what we actually say in everyday interaction. In this context, particularised implicatures arise from the interaction of linguistic meanings and specific contextual assumptions, while generalised implicatures normally arise when a certain linguistic expression is used. These two conversational implicatures are directly derived from the co-operative principle and its maxims.

1.3.3 The co-operative principle and its conversational maxims

Imagine being at the fish counter in a supermarket in Scotland, which has long been renowned for its river salmon fishing. A typical interaction between the shopkeeper and a customer might occur as follows:

(16) Fishmonger: Customer number two!
Customer: Ah! Could I have two pounds of salmon, please?

Verbal exchanges like this tend to run more smoothly if all participants follow certain social conventions. If a fishmonger shouts a number associated to you, and you utter words that give them just the right amount of information and are relevant, truthful, and clear, then you are following Grice's co-operative principle.

Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995) highlight that Grice, in his 1967 *William James Lectures* (reprinted in Grice 1989), conveyed the fundamental idea that "once a certain piece of behaviour is identified as communicative, it is reasonable to assume that the communicator is trying to meet certain general standards" (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, 33). In particular, Grice introduced his notions about an underlying principle that determines the way in which language is used in order to communicate in an efficient and effective way. He called this the **co-operative principle** (Table 1.1, A) and subdivided it into nine **maxims of conversation** (Table 1.1, B), classified into four categories: Quality (Table 1.1, B1), Quantity (Table 1.1, B2), Relation (Table 1.1, B3), and Manner (Table 1.1, B4).

As shown in Table 1.1, the co-operative principle and its component maxims ensure that, in an interaction, the right amount of information is provided and that the exchange is conducted in a truthful, relevant, and perspicuous manner.

Here, it is worth singling out the maxim of relation, which simply says that we should be 'relevant' (cf. B3). Grice recognised that, in order for it to be meaningful and useful, we would need a relevant definition of the term. We must either assume a reasonably intuitive understanding, or come up with our own definition given that Grice never provided a more thorough explanation for this term.

Even without a clear definition, most would agree that we seem to expect utterances to be 'relevant' in some way. Consider this example:

(17) Claudio: How's your mom doing after the operation?
Sara: It's a gorgeous day, isn't it?

Sara's utterance has nothing to do with the question Claudio has posed. We may imagine what Sara is trying to express by producing an utterance

Table 1.1 Grice's co-operative principle and maxims of conversation.

A. **The co-operative principle**	**In more accessible terms. . .**
Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.	Be co-operative with the other interlocutor(s)
B. The maxims of conversation	
B1. Quality: Try to make your contribution one that is true. *i. Do not say what you believe to be false;* *ii. Do not say that for which you have inadequate evidence.*	Quality: Be truthful. i. Do not say what is false; ii. Do not say what lacks evidence.
B2. Quantity: *i. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange);* *ii. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.*	Quantity: i. Do not say less than needed; ii. Do not say more than needed.
B3. Relation: Be relevant.	Relation: Be relevant.
B4. Manner: Be perspicuous. *i. Avoid obscurity of expression;* *ii. Avoid ambiguity;* *iii. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity);* *iv. Be orderly.*	Manner: Be perspicuous. i. Avoid obscurity; ii. Avoid ambiguity; iii. Avoid long formulations; iv. Organise your speech.

Source: Adapted from Grice (1975/1989, 45–46).

that does not seem to follow the maxim of relevance – that she would rather not talk about her mom's surgery. So, what can a speaker do with regard to the maxims?

Assuming that the co-operative principle (and its maxims) are normally upheld by both the speaker and his addressee, Grice suggests that a conversational implicature can be produced from either strictly observing or failing to fulfil the maxims in a number of ways. In particular, speakers can:

1. *observe* the maxims;
2. *violate* a maxim (e.g., when a speaker tells a lie, violating the maxim of quality);
3. *opt out* of a maxim, e.g., when we make use of hedges in conversation, such as *by the way* (opting out from the maxim of relation);

4. be faced by a *clash* of maxims (i.e., where the speaker cannot observe one maxim without violating another);
5. ostentatiously *flout* or *exploit* a maxim (i.e., where a maxim is blatantly violated in order to give rise to an implicature).

(cf. Grice 1975/1989, 26–30).

In discussing what gives rise to implicatures, Grice identified three cases: cases where no maxim is violated (cf. 1), cases where a maxim is violated because of a 'clash' of maxims (cf. 4), and cases of 'flouting' (cf. 5).[9]

Firstly, Grice analyses examples of cases where no maxim is violated (cf. 1), for instance:

(18) Larzia: I'm out of petrol.
Michela: There's a garage just around the corner.

In utterances like (18), Grice suggests the implicature that that the garage is open and selling petrol (as far as Michela is aware). Grice acknowledges that one issue with (18) is that the implicature is not one that people normally notice or comment on. Nonetheless, I believe it is acceptable to infer that Michela's answer implies something like this.

As stated before, a tenet in Gricean pragmatics is that we generally assume that speakers are observing the maxims. If it seems that a speaker is not observing a maxim, we would have to look for reasons as to why they don't. Some of these reasons involve deriving implicatures so that the utterance as a whole is seen as following the maxims.[10] In (18), the reasoning is that Michela would be violating the maxim of quantity by not giving enough information if she thinks the garage is closed or out of petrol – and, thus, by being misleading. If challenged, Michela would have a hard time convincingly claiming that she didn't mean this.

Let us now move on to the case of 4, when maxims 'clash'. This occurs where observing one maxim involves the violation of another. Here is an example adapted from Grice:

(19) Danny: Where does Antonio live?
Sandra: Somewhere in Calabria.

Danny may believe that Sandra's utterance in (19) is insufficiently informative since she merely mentions an area (a region in southern Italy) without specifying a town where Antonio resides. He is likely to infer, however, that the information she has provided is incomplete since she is unaware of Antonio's specific whereabouts. By stating something for which she lacks enough proof, an adequately informed utterance would violate maxim B2, that of quantity.

Lastly, we have cases of 'flouting' (cf. 5), which are by far the most frequently mentioned when considering Grice's theory. A reason might be

that they are seen as fairly straightforward – as long as we consider cases where there is only one clear implicature or a small number of them. In these cases, the speaker utters something that violates at least one maxim at the level of 'what is said', expecting the hearer to derive an implicature that makes it as a whole consistent with the maxims.

Let us consider a case of a speaker who deliberately flouts the submaxims of quality. As already mentioned, Grice did not believe that individuals always speak the truth when interacting with one another – lies are a case in point. However, he did assume that we want to be taken as truthful and that our interactants expect that we are presenting what we say as truthful. We recognise when someone says something blatantly false and try to come up with an explanation (e.g., when the speaker is using irony or sarcasm):

(20) Sara: You do know that we're going to get an Oscar for our short film shot on our phone, right?
Mauro: Yes, and I'll move to Mars with Elon Musk within the year.

In (20), Sara is expected to notice that Mauro has flouted the maxim since the possibility of this prediction being true is remote. Yet, she has no reason to believe that Mauro is opting out from the co-operative principle altogether. As a result, she will seek an Interpretation that is consistent with the principle. The fact that Sara must assume Mauro does not truly trust in the accuracy of his own prediction, is probably meant to imply that Mauro ironically considers their chances of winning an Oscar to be equally remote. Sara is free to perceive this as the desired Interpretation as Mauro has done nothing to prevent her from engaging in this train of thought.

Now that it is clear how the co-operative principle, maxims, and conversational implicatures are intertwined, and how this might aid in determining the intended meaning of a statement, we analyse the main doubts and criticisms on Grice's influential contribution to pragmatics.

1.4 Critical voices on Grice's model

In general, responses to Grice's ideas have been very positive. At the same time, a number of issues have been identified (e.g., Davis 1998).

Wilson and Sperber's (1981, 155) first critique acknowledged the significance of Grice's insights, while also pointing out areas for improvement:

> Although specific proposals have been made for extending, supplementing or modifying Grice's machinery, it seems no exaggeration to say that most recent theories of utterance-interpretation are a direct result of Grice's William James Lectures.

In particular, Wilson and Sperber's (1981) paper – an early attempt at the development of RT – discusses three main aspects:

1. the maxims seem to be involved in recovering 'what is said' as well as 'what is implicated';
2. there is more to 'what is said' than recovery of linguistic meaning, **disambiguation**, and **reference assignment**;
3. the maxims do not all seem to be equally important, and some may not even be needed, in explaining Interpretations.

Suggestions 1 and 2 are about Grice's notion of 'what is said'. The division between semantics and pragmatics has been one of the most discussed topics in the study of linguistic meaning since Grice's work, and will be tackled under the RT perspective in the next chapter. The diagram in Figure 1.4 shows how Grice's approach drew this distinction:



Figure 1.4 The semantics-pragmatics distinction according to Grice (1975).

Broadly speaking, there is a sense that some of the ideas he suggested might be redundant (i.e., that more than one of the components of his model seem to be designed to have the same function). In particular, there has been considerable discussion of the notion of *generalised conversational implicatures*, with some theorists (e.g., Hawkins 1991, Horn 1989, Levinson 2000) developing the idea and others (including RT scholar Robyn Carston 2002) doubting the validity of the distinction between *generalised* and *particularised conversational implicatures*.

In terms of suggestion 3, the descriptions of the different maxims of conversation (and their violations) are not convincing enough. One question which has been raised is: are they social conventions which speakers learn or are they innate universals which develop as individuals mature?

A case in point here is the vagueness about what exactly being 'relevant' during communicative interactions might mean, as mentioned in 1.3.3. Grice (1975/1989, 46) recognised that: "Though the maxim itself is terse, its formulation conceals a number of problems that exercise me a

good deal . . . I find the treatment of such questions exceedingly difficult, and I hope to revert to them in a later work". However, he never returned to this issue.

Further, the overlap between the four maxims is seen as a major issue within the co-operative principle. It can be difficult to say which one is operating at any given moment, and two or more may be operating simultaneously. For example, consider the following interaction between two friends, A and B, who are talking about B's partner (Luca). Luca is in the room with them, and B is trying to exclude him from the topic of conversation:

(21) A: How's it going with Luca?
B: One of us thinks it's going well.

The meaning of this interaction lies in the flouting of the maxims of quantity and manner. Firstly, B intends A to infer that Luca was happy with the relationship, but that the speaker B was not. The expression *One of us* carries implicit information and is ambiguous, yet it is safe to assume that A thinks it is relevant to the question and understands that B is flouting maxims. So, the intended message gets through nevertheless.

Furthermore, the notion of co-operation between speaker and hearer is ambiguous, and it is unclear if it can truly be applied in a broad sense. The underlying assumption is that participants in interaction are guided in their communicative behaviour by knowledge of certain principles and conventions. Grice's conversational maxims presuppose a specific individual stance towards the communicative act (informativeness, truthfulness, relevance, etc.) in order for it to proceed effectively.

In this context, a key objection to Grice's model is that it is Anglo-American centred. For example, Baker (1992) has pointed out that Grice's conversational maxims "seem to reflect directly notions which are known to be valued in the English-speaking world" (Baker 1992, 237). In a cross-cultural perspective, the list of maxims may not be exhaustive, the maxims may not have the same value in other cultures, in specific contexts one or more of the maxims may not apply, and a maxim of politeness (cf. Leech 1983) may be added, which may override all other maxims (Baker 1992). Cross-culturally, different norms of politeness[11] – including areas of taboo (e.g., sexuality, religion, etc.) – exist, requiring specific application of, for example, the maxim of quality by speakers and writers. Further, different norms of discourse organisation seem to reflect differences in rhetorical preferences across cultures and hence the existence of culture-specific maxims, including different concepts of co-operativeness in communication (cf., e.g., Connor 1996, Connor et al. 2008).

For instance, some cultures value straightforwardness more than others, and some expect more flouting of the maxim of quantity than others

do. As an Italian visitor to Japan, I remember experiencing different conventions vis-à-vis this maxim. The first day I arrived in Japan, I relied on my B1 (intermediate) level of Japanese to ask for something in a shop, and was told, "今ちょっと . . ." [ima chotto. . .], literally translated as *Now, that's a bit*. . . I just assumed that the sentence was unfinished, and stood there waiting – and causing the shop assistant some anguish. In fact, it is a common (and very polite) set phrase in Japan, meaning *No, we don't have it in stock*.

Another example of intercultural breakdowns in communication due to cross-cultural differences in the observance of the maxim is related to the maxim of quality. In Italy, it would be generally acceptable to tell a distant relative (whom you have just randomly met on the street), "I'll call you in a couple of weeks", and then not call within a fortnight. Flouting the maxim of quality is the norm. Instead, that would be considered a violation of the maxim in, for instance, the UK or Germany.

1.5 Summary

Since its inception, the Gricean paradigm has revolutionised the world of linguistics. Grice was one of the first scholars to analyse the gap between the semantic representation of a sentence (linguistically encoded meaning) and the messages that are conveyed by the uttering of that sentence (the proposition expressed by an utterance), and stated that this gap is filled not by more language coding, but by *inferences*. The key contributions he has made are: (a) his discussion of different kinds of meaning (in particular, the identification of 'non-natural' meaning); and (b) the suggestion that understanding utterances is a rational activity in which we make inferences about the communicator's intentions.

To the British philosopher, utterances automatically raise certain expectations, which lead the addressee to the speaker's intended meaning. More specifically, Grice offered an analysis of these expectations in terms of a co-operative principle and a set of associated maxims of conversation. They are broad communicative norms recognised jointly – though tacitly – by the communicator and the addressee in order to communicate effectively and efficiently.

Grice's ideas have been highly influential. According to Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995, 38), his model "offers a way of developing the analysis of inferential communication, as suggested by Grice himself in 'Meaning' (1957), into an explanatory model". In particular, his ideas have been applied in a number of areas within and beyond pragmatics, including philosophy of language, linguistic semantics, second language acquisition, and stylistics. A number of theorists (Carston 2002, Levinson 2000, Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, among others)[12] have focused on how to develop these ideas more fully with a view to developing more successful pragmatic approaches. Most significantly, it was in exploring

and critiquing Grice's work that Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson came up with the insights that led to the development of RT in the 1980s.

In the next chapter, we will consider how exploring these issues led Sperber and Wilson to define *relevance* in a radically different way and to propose replacing Grice's account with something new. It is worth noting right away that subsequent discussions have made the mistake of seeing RT as an essentially Gricean approach in which the number of maxims has been reduced to one. This is incorrect. RT is broadly Gricean in assuming that general pragmatic principles guide Interpretations, and that the principles involved are broadly rational. However, as we shall see, the principles of relevance are not maxims which communicators aim to follow, but generalisations about what communicators actually do.

1.6 Food for thought

1.6.1 Further reading

Grice's ideas about pragmatics can be found in his writings *Meaning* (Grice 1957) and *Logic and Conversation* (Grice 1975). For more on Grice's model, see his later collection of articles (Grice 1989; *Part I* and *Retrospective Epilogue*), while for a thorough overview and a biography of Grice, see Chapman (2005).

Useful discussions of basic terminology in pragmatics and of Grice's approach can be found in introductory pragmatics textbooks, such as (in chronological order):

- Huang 2007;
- Chapman 2011;
- Birner 2012;
- Cummins 2019;
- Grundy 2019;
- O'Keeffe et al. 2019.

It is also worth checking the following discussions on Grice, although they are not as recent as the ones I have just mentioned:

- Levinson 1983 (chap. 3);
- Thomas 1995 (chap. 3);
- Peccei 1999 (chap. 4).

Lastly, Schmid's (2012) edited book *Cognitive Pragmatics* is the first to take a comprehensive look at cognitive pragmatics from a variety of angles. It brings together cutting-edge contributions from world-renowned experts in pragmatics, psycholinguistics, **cognitive linguistics**, clinical linguistics, and historical linguistics.

1.6.2 Review questions

Here is a list of questions for review, either in class or at home:

- What are the differences between sentence and utterance?
- What is context, and why is this notion so important to pragmatics?
- What are the essential properties of, and the similarities and differences between conversational and conventional implicatures? Discuss with illustrations.
- What are the main criticisms of Grice's model according to RT?

For this chapter, the main aspect to focus on is how things – other than linguistic meanings – are involved in interaction and the types of inferences you think have been made by participants in the interaction.

My suggestion is to make notes of any interesting examples you come across – in movies, novels, adverts, etc. – which reveal something about (mis)communication, and see if you can suggest an account of them with reference to Grice's ideas. Look at utterances and consider:

- what they say and what they implicate;
- what kind of implicatures you identify there are;
- how to explain the implicatures;
- if you encounter conversational implicatures, try to understand which maxims are at play. Is it easier for some maxims to be violated than others? If so, why?

For instance, researchers have suggested that song lyrics can be analysed using pragmatic approaches, especially in terms of reference assignment and deixis (see, for instance, Kurniati and Haryudun 2021, for a deixis analysis of *Hello* by Adele).

Translated texts are also full of fascinating examples. An analysis of a translated (or interpreter-mediated) text under the lens of Gricean pragmatics would imply deciding whether assumptions you take to be communicated in the source and target text are conventional implicatures, generalised conversational implicatures, or particularised conversational implicatures. If they are conventional, you will need to identify the linguistic expressions which give rise to them. For both kinds of conversational implicatures, instead, you will need to consider how the maxims play a role in how readers or hearers arrive at them. This would trigger the following questions:

- Do the implicatures in the target texts correspond to the ones in the source text? Consider some alternative options and their effects.
- Look at examples where machine translation engines have been used. What did the machine do differently from what you would have done pragmatically?

- Look at examples of interpreter-mediated texts and compare them with written translations. How are they different from each other? In written language, do writers and their translators aim to perform functions similar to extraverbal aspects, such as intonation, eye contact, or body language?
- How can you define equivalence in a pragmatics-informed T&I theoretical framework?
- Can pragmatics be used in an integrated T&I theory?

Make a note of any problems you have in applying Grice's ideas and of any issues you think these examples raise for Grice's approach.

1.6.3 Exercises

(1) What is the propositional content of the following English sentences? Would you be able to keep the same propositional content in a translation?

(a) My grandma had mended the frayed thread in my jeans.
(b) It was my grandma who had mended the frayed thread in my jeans.
(c) The frayed thread in my jeans had been mended by my grandma.
(d) It was the frayed thread in my jeans that my grandma had mended.
(e) Had my grandma mended the frayed thread in my jeans?
(f) Had the frayed thread in my jeans been mended by my grandma?
(g) If only the frayed thread in my jeans had been mended by my grandma!
(h) If only my grandma had mended the frayed thread in my jeans!

(2) What are the conventional implicatures of the following English utterances? Would you be able to keep the same implicatures in a translation?

(a) Michele managed to save for his new apartment, *too*.
(b) The groom has *still* not arrived.
(c) I haven't finished eating my pudding *yet*.
(d) *Actually*, I didn't like his new movie at all.
(e) *Even* my little niece knows that average global temperatures have been increasing.
(f) Hungarian is considered an agglutinative language. *On the other hand*, Vietnamese is an isolating language.
(g) [Ex. in Italian] Passerby A: Scusi, *può* dirmi che ore sono? Passerby B: Certo, mezzogiorno! [A: *Could* you tell me the time, please? B: Sure, it's 12 o'clock!]

(3) Of the following two conversational implicatures (a) and (b), which is the generalised one and which is the particularised one?

A: How was dinner at your house last night? B: Some of the guests decided to leave before midnight . . .

(a) +> Not all of the guests left before midnight.
(b) +> Dinner didn't go as planned.

(4) Try to explain how A might understand B's utterance in each of the following exchanges:

(a) A: The metro line I use to get to work is down today. B: My car's still out of action, sorry.
(b) A: How did you manage to get here in such a short time? B: I called a taxi and paid the driver.
(c) A: Do you think you could go buy some milk while I'm picking up the children? B: I will, although I can't say I'll have fun . . .
(d) A: Do you think the new Kazuo Ishiguro book is any good? B: My boyfriend's been recommending it.
(e) A: I bought you this sandwich for your trek on Sunday. B: But I hate whole wheat bread!

In each case, you should be able to say 'what is said', 'what is implicated', and how the hearer works out what is implicated.

(5) In the following examples, B's utterances might be seen as faulty in terms of how closely they follow maxims B1, B2, and B3 (cf. Table 1.1):

(a) A: What did you order last night at Luca's? B: A lot of different stuff.
(b) A: How was Serena's guacamole at the party last night? B: One of the worst I've ever tasted! I don't understand – it's so easy to make . . . I have some tips for making the best guac recipe! The ideal guacamole should taste fresh and like a perfectly ripe avocado. But it also needs more than just avocado flavour . . . Onion, tomato, lime, garlic, salt, and cilantro are all welcome to the fiesta in good measure! And, don't forget, a good guacamole should have a bit of texture to it, too!
(c) A: What were your New Year's resolutions? B: I don't understand why my boyfriend is being so annoying today.
(d) A: What do you reckon of your new colleague at work? B: Oh, she's a sloth.

For each of these utterances, suggest (a) how they depart from the expectation that they will be informative, truthful or relevance, and (b) possible implicatures which the addressee is likely to derive in order to preserve the assumption that Grice's maxims are being observed.

(6) Now, translate utterances in exercises (4) and (5) into another language. Would you say that the possible implicatures which the addressee of the translated text may derive are the same as (or similar to) the implicatures derived in English? Are Grice's maxims B1, B2, and B3 being observed (or not) in both source and target texts in a similar way or are there sociocultural differences?

Notes

1 They include: a theory of the cognitive processes underlying human communication known as the 'Cognitive Pragmatics theory' (Airenti et al. 1993; Bara 2010), cognitive semantics or experientialist realism (Lakoff and Johnson 1999), Graded Salience Hypothesis (Giora 2003), as well as the cognitive-pragmatic theory of abductive reasoning (e.g., Hobbs 2004).

2 For instance, we can imagine the brother producing an ironic response by mocking/imitating his sister's voice and/or gestures (i.e., using prosody and non-verbal behaviour). This may be due to the fact that his sister is well-known within her family as the one who does not let anyone near her plate. Thus, his brother's ironical utterance can be understood as (indirectly) communicating that his sister's usual behaviour at the table is annoying.

3 The quotation marks reflect the fact that Grice's approach was misnamed for mainly two reasons: (a) it was not a fully fledged theory; (b) it was not only about conversation (cf. 1.3).

4 There are aspects of meaning that cannot be accounted for in terms of truth conditions. For example, we will see in 1.3.2 that the meaning expressed by the use of *but* or *so* (called a *conventional implicature*) is not captured by the notion of truth condition.

5 Cf. Cutting and Fordyce (2020, 4–10) for further discussion, and Section 2.2.1 for a definition in RT.

6 In Chapter 2, we will see how RT builds on Grice's approach both with regard to understanding the nature of different kinds of meaning, including intentional communication, and in developing an account of the pragmatic principles which guide interpretation.

7 Note that recognising the role of pragmatics in working out 'what is said' is one significant development in approaches (such as RT) which build on Grice's work. We will expound this argument in 2.3.3.

8 While it seems clear that items like this do have unusual linguistic meanings, there has been extensive discussion about exactly what they mean and how, as well as about the notion of conventional implicature itself. Even Grice (1989, 46) warned that "the nature of conventional implicature needs to be examined before any free use of it, for explanatory purposes, can be indulged in". We will discuss in detail how they have been reduced to procedural meaning in Blakemore's (2002) RT account in 2.4.

9 It is worth noting that it is also possible to violate maxims without giving rise to implicatures. This happens when it is not clear to addressees that a maxim is being violated.

10 While much of the discussion of Grice's ideas focuses on examples where an implicature follows from a violation of one or more maxims at the level of what is said (whether a flouting or because of a clash of maxims), it is not the case that every violation of a maxim gives rise to an implicature and neither is it that every implicature follows from the violation of a maxim. There are

a number of cases, not all discussed by Grice, where a maxim is violated but that does not give rise to implicatures (see Thomas 1995, chap. 3).

11 With reference to politeness and cultural conventions, it must be noted that not everyone in a given culture communicates in the same way: social variables – such as region, age, and relationship – do affect the choice of expression.

12 This volume cannot dwell on the range of alternative approaches to RT which have been developed so far. Researchers working after Grice are often divided into 'neo-Gricean' pragmaticists, who maintain many of the assumptions of Grice's approach, and 'post-Griceans', who diverge more significantly from Gricean pragmatics. For a further insight on these models, see Chapman (2011, chap. 5) and Clark (2013, 356–360).

2 Relevance Theory

A cognitive approach to pragmatics

2.1 Introduction

Relevance Theory was originated in the 1980s by linguist Deirdre Wilson and anthropologist Dan Sperber, and since then many other scholars have contributed to its development. What relevance theorists have elaborated has turned out to be one of the most influential contributions from inferential pragmatics to the study of human cognition and communication.

The main ideas of RT are presented in Sperber and Wilson's (1986/1995) book *Relevance: Communication and Cognition*,[1] and updated in Wilson and Sperber (2004). Some aspects and theoretical commitments can be traced back to the classical Gricean pragmatic theory (cf. 1.3), most notably the notion of a semantics-pragmatics distinction and the assumption that pragmatic Interpretation is grounded in rationality. RT is, however, much less close to Grice than neo-Gricean pragmatics, not least because it is the most reductive of post-Gricean models. Sperber and Wilson's (1986/1995) main claim is that a principle of relevance, which has both a communicative and a cognitive aspect, can fulfil the task of all of Grice's maxims. In this context, the notion of ***relevance*** is no longer a question of communicators following, violating, or flouting a maxim, but rather a generalisation about human cognition and communication which applies without exceptions.

Since the 1980s, RT has been pursued and professed by many linguists, anthropologists, psychologists, and philosophers in the description and explanation of a wide array of phenomena.[2] In particular, the cognitive and communicative principles of relevance have been efficient to deal with complex inferential issues, ranging from the Interpretation of oral or written texts to coded inputs such as images, non-verbal communication, or multimodal arrangements – from offline to online communication, from lexical to discursive matters, and so on.

This chapter aims to give an outline of Relevance Theory at the interface between pragmatics and cognition. It starts with the very definition of the term *relevance* (2.2.1), and a discussion of the two principles

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which guide the processes of utterance Interpretation (2.2.2). Section 2.3 looks at the ways in which RT deals with the question of how we communicate, and how inference is seen as a phenomenon that appears on both the explicit (2.3.2) and implicit (2.3.3) levels of communication. The topic of Section 2.4 is the distinction between conceptual and procedural meaning in RT, while 2.5 deals with the dichotomy of descriptive versus interpretive utterances. As was the case with the previous chapter, Chapter 2 ends with a discussion on a number of criticisms levied against RT, as well as suggestions for further reading, questions, and exercises.

2.2 Relevance, cognition, and communication

Let us start with two examples, which express the same concept but in different ways:

(1)

(1a) Mrs. Dalloway said she would buy the flowers herself (Woolf 1925/1990, 3).

(1b) In the opening lines of *Mrs Dalloway*, a novel by Virginia Woolf published in 1925, Clarissa Dalloway (a middle-aged, upper-class socialite who has little to show for herself) is going around London in the morning, getting ready to host a party that evening. On her way home, she suddenly remembers that she must stop off at a shop to buy flowers. Clarissa is rich enough to afford fresh flowers, symbolising her love of life, and normally has maids to do the errands for her. Yet, beautiful as they may be, freshly cut flowers are cut nevertheless – their days are numbered. Mrs Dalloway represents the world that the author's mother imagined for her – a conservative, shallow world that Woolf left behind for art and feminism. In asking us to empathise with Clarissa, Woolf returns to all she rejected and finds the possibility that even the people she most rebelled against have souls, regrets, and some form of courage in their way of living.

Throughout Woolf's complex novel, the author paints a vivid picture of Clarissa Dalloway, who struggles to maintain an identity while being subject to a complex field of forces in a "society which works powerfully on people, squeezing them into the required shapes, training their emotions, punishing their misdemeanours, and eliminating the failures, those who cannot conform to the required conventions of selfhood" (Mepham 1991, 94). It is fair to assume that, if readers already know what is significant about the choice of flowers and its 'relevance' between Clarissa

and post-WWI society, they would find (1b) excessively long. Now, how can the notion of *relevance* be defined more technically?

2.2.1 Relevance as a psychological property: effects and effort

As mentioned in the Introduction, despite sharing Grice's conviction that inference is key in a theory of communication, Sperber and Wilson do not build their argumentation on specific norms of (co-operative) conversational behaviour. Instead, they focus on the **mental processes** that enable us to communicate, particularly those that mediate the addressee's Interpretation of a communicative input. This outlook gives Relevance Theory a primarily cognitive perspective, as opposed to the philosophical one adopted by both Grice and the neo-Griceans:

> What is needed is an attempt to rethink, in *psychologically* realistic terms, such basic questions as: What form of shared information is available to humans? How is shared information exploited in communication? What is relevance and how is it achieved? What role does the search for relevance play in communication?
>
> (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, 38; my emphasis)

Sperber and Wilson state that **relevance** can be viewed as a psychological property exhibited by an ostensively communicated input (called ***ostensive stimulus***, e.g., a sight, a sound, an utterance, a memory) to mental processing. In particular, it is a trade-off between the effects we can obtain from an input, and the effort we put into deriving them. They discovered that we have intuitions about the effects we derive from an input, and how much work it takes to get them, and that these intuitions are linked to beliefs about how worthwhile it is to Interpret an utterance.

Let us go back to example (1), with a focus on the first part of Sperber and Wilson's definition of *relevance*: the more effort involved in computing an input, the less relevant it is, while the more effects it gives rise to the more relevant it is. So, I expect that (1b) would be less significant ('relevant') than (1a) for an **audience** who already knows quite a lot about post-WWI Londoners' struggle for identity. On the other hand, those who are unaware of the social and cultural forces at play in London a century ago, are likely to say that (1a) is confusing, and that understanding the input being communicated in (1b) can lead to many more effects with less effort.

Putting these ideas together, 'relevance' is a function (or measure) of two factors:

1. **cognitive effects** (i.e., reward) are (a) the outcome of an interaction between incoming information, and (b) a subset of contextual

assumptions (which are already established in a cognitive system). In particular, a **positive cognitive effect** is a worthwhile difference to the individual's representation of the world – a true conclusion, for example (cf. Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, 263–266);[3]

2. **processing effort** (i.e., cost) is the effort a cognitive system must make in order to yield a satisfactory Interpretation of any incoming information processed.

Thus defined, relevance is a matter of degree. Specifically, the degree of relevance is a balance (or trade-off) between the reward and the cost of Interpreting an input:

> (2) *Relevance of an input:*
> (2a) Other things being equal, the greater the positive cognitive effects achieved by processing an input, the greater the relevance of the input to the individual at that time;
> (2b) Other things being equal, the greater the processing effort expended, the lower the relevance of the input to the individual at that time.
>
> (adapted from Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, 252)

From the RT perspective, an input generates **cognitive effects** when it manages to bring about a non-trivial change in an individual's system of beliefs. For such a change to be non-trivial, it needs to come in one of three forms:

1. generating a conclusion derivable from new and old information together, but from neither new nor old information separately (called a ***contextual implication***);
2. **strengthening** an existing assumption (by backing it up with further evidence); and
3. **contradicting or cancelling** an existing assumption.

These assumptions can come from perception, linguistic decoding, encyclopaedic memory, or can be transferred to our memory as a result of the deductive process itself (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, 137–138).[4]

Consider the following scenario (adapted from Blakemore 2002, 60–61), which focuses on a bus driver leaving from a bus stop. In his rear-view mirror, he notices an anxious-looking woman attempting to cross the road behind him and waving a bus pass (ostensive stimulus). The bus driver's overall representation of the context can be enhanced in three ways, each of which corresponds to one of the three types of effects:

1. The bus driver will deduce a new assumption (or contextual implication) that the lady plans to get on his bus;

2. This existing assumption may be strengthened by the fact that she is carrying a bus pass;
3. However, when the bus driver sees the woman walk the other way after presenting the bus pass to someone on the pavement, he knows that is the existing assumption is now contradicted and eliminated.

Lastly, given the cognitive orientation of the theory, their definition of **context** is psychologically oriented:

> A psychological construct, a subset of the hearer's assumptions about the world. It is these assumptions, of course, rather than the actual state of the world, that affect the interpretation of an utterance. A context in this sense is not limited to information about the immediate physical environment or the immediately preceding utterances: expectations about the future, scientific hypotheses or religious beliefs, anecdotal memories, general cultural assumptions, beliefs about the mental state of the speaker, may all play a role in interpretation.
>
> (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, 15–16)

RT's approach to the notion of context as a cognitive construct challenges the more traditional views based on notions such as mutual knowledge (assumed in the code model; e.g., Schiffer 1972). In order to explain how information sharing happens in this context, Sperber and Wilson propose two concepts: ***manifest*** and ***cognitive environment***. They provide the following definitions:

> A fact is manifest to an individual at a given time if and only if he is capable at that time of representing it mentally and accepting its representation as true or probably true.
>
> A cognitive environment of an individual is a set of facts that are manifest to him.
>
> (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, 39)

A person's cognitive environment is not limited to facts that are part of general, background knowledge. Rather, it consists of a set of background **assumptions** (rather than true facts about the world), which need to be considered in order to reach this meaning. These assumptions comprise: (a) immediately observable information, and (b) general beliefs about the world as well as dispositions towards the communicator in that particular instance. Further, they are manifest to the addressee, who is capable of mentally representing them and accepting them as true at a given moment – whether they are indeed true or not (cf. Assimakopoulos 2017).

Therefore, **mutual manifestness** is key for any type of communication to take place. Mutual manifestness, unlike mutual knowledge, does not restrict communication to two people who share the same information. Rather, it assumes that in order for communication to take place, two (or more) cognitive environments of the individuals engaging in an act of communication have to interact and become shared. Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995, 41) explain that "to say that people share a cognitive environment does not imply that they make the same assumptions: merely that they are capable of doing so".

Lastly, RT argues that contexts for Interpretation are selected during the Interpretation process itself, rather than being decided beforehand, as is the case within other theories. The idea which emerges is one of a constantly changing context, which is determined online by the expansion of the original context (cf. 2.3.4). The next step in understanding RT is to see how this notion of *relevance* plays a role in acts of communication and, before that, in cognition in general.

2.2.2 Two principles: maximising and optimising relevance

The notion of *relevance* is embodied in two tenets of relevance put forward by Sperber and Wilson in the 1995 Postface to *Relevance*: a first principle, pertaining to the nature of human communication, and a second one, pertaining to human cognition.[5]

Following mainstream research in evolutionary psychology,[6] relevance theorists (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, 262) maintain that human cognitive systems automatically aim at 'maximal' relevance – that is, the achievement of the greatest possible amount of positive cognitive effects for the smallest possible amount of processing effort. This generalisation is spelled out in the ***First*** or ***Cognitive Principle of Relevance***:

> (3) *Sperber and Wilson's Cognitive Principle of Relevance*:
> Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximization of relevance.

In our daily lives, our minds are on the lookout for things that are relevant (in that they give rise to effects), yet they don't like to expend too much effort searching for them. Let us consider the case of someone having a stroll downtown. There are many things they may pay attention to. A puddle on the ground, for instance, may be worth noticing as there is a contextual implication that their shoes would get wet if they don't move around it. Or they may notice in which direction passers-by are moving, and try to change their direction as soon as they realise they are about to bump into them. We would not expect them to make eye contact with each and every passer-by, just in case they had met any of them before.

However, we expect that someone may study each face carefully if they are at a large family reunion – as they know that their effort is likely to reward them with cognitive effects. (They know them well, and might want to talk to them face to face.)

The implications of the RT view on cognition are far-reaching – both in terms of how our cognitive resources are organised, and the way in which mental computations occur. But one particular area in which this rationale finds a straightforward application is that of inferential communication. This is known as the ***Second*** or ***Communicative Principle of Relevance***:

> (4) *Sperber and Wilson's Communicative Principle of Relevance*: Every ostensive stimulus conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance.

The RT notion of ***ostensive stimuli*** develops from Grice's ideas about meaning. As pointed out in 1.3.1, 'non-natural meaning' or 'meaning$_{nn}$' is, essentially, communication which is intended to be recognised as having been intended. That is to say, it is not enough simply for somebody to intend somebody else to understand something. A communicator provides evidence of his intention to convey a certain meaning, which is then to be inferred by his audience on the basis of the evidence presented (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, 63).[7]

Both the Gricean Theory of conversational implicature discussed in 1.3.2 and RT fall under this model. And, even though Sperber and Wilson's notion of ostensive communication is not identical to Grice's non-natural meaning,[8] the key idea for RT is still that any ostensive behaviour is intended to be understood as communicating something, and this activates the Communicative Principle of Relevance. For instance, a male customer in a restaurant may decide to move a chair in such a way that a female waiter can see spilled soy sauce, intending her to notice the sauce (and clean it up) without meaning to tell her. If, on the other hand, he tells the waiter, 'Someone spilled some soy sauce under this chair', then he is intentionally communicating with the waiter, and she must recognise that his utterance is purposefully communicative in order to understand him.

Let us now identify what "conveying a **presumption of optimal relevance**" entails. Briefly, when we notice that people intend to communicate with us, this gives rise to specific expectations of relevance. We assume that the communicator believes that we can come up with an Interpretation of what they are communicating which will be relevant enough (i.e., provide enough effects to be worth the effort involved).

If our cognitive system is oriented toward maximum relevance, then it should not automatically engage in the processing of ostensive

stimuli – unless it had evolved to see their processing as worthwhile in all situations. According to RT, this suggests that such stimuli always come with a manifest guarantee that they will yield enough cognitive effects to offset the effort necessary to compute them.[9] This establishes the first prerequisite for the processing of a communicative stimulus, namely that once a stimulus is recognised as ostensive, it will always be treated by our cognitive system as at least relevant enough to be worth our processing effort. To put it in terms of language use, the speaker attracts the hearer's attention to the fact that he intends to behave informatively, leading her to believe that it will be worth his while to pay attention.

The addressee's trust in the communicator's stimulus selection is the second condition that underlies the presumption of optimal relevance. When the human cognitive system spontaneously comprehends an ostensive stimulus, it does not pause to reflect whether that particular stimulus was the best one the communicator could have chosen for his purposes, but instead proceeds to uncover his intended meaning (called ***informative intention***) right away. According to relevance theorists, this suggests that, once our cognitive system recognises a stimulus as being ostensively communicated, we have no choice but to engage in the comprehension of the communicator's informative intention automatically – assuming that it is an optimally relevant one, compatibly with the communicator's abilities and preferences. Aside from the informative intention (the intention to inform an audience of something), ostensive-inferential communication also comes with a ***communicative intention*** (the intention to inform the audience of one's informative intention).

The ostensive stimulus gives rise to an expectation of a particular level of relevance which Sperber and Wilson call *optimal relevance*. The notion of *optimal* relevance – contrary to that of *maximal* relevance – signifies the search for cognitive effects which can adequately substantiate a communicator's informative intention for no unjustifiable processing effort on behalf of the addressee. Another aspect of optimal relevance, though, is that what a communicator intends has to be consistent with what they are able to communicate (their abilities) and what they prefer to communicate (their preferences). In other words, it is always dependent on a specific context, and on the cognitive state of the addressee, as summarised in (5):

(5) *Presumption of optimal relevance:*
(5a) The ostensive stimulus is relevant enough to be worth the audience's processing effort;
(5b) It is the most relevant one compatible with the communicator's abilities and preferences.

Let us go back to our example at the restaurant – this time from the waiter's perspective. The customer (whom the waiter doesn't know personally) has now moved a chair and then told her, 'Someone spilled some soy sauce under this chair'. As we stated, this counts as an ostensive stimulus characterised by an informative intention. However, the waiter also notices that the spilled soy sauce comes from a bottle of her boyfriend's favourite soy sauce brand, and might start wondering what her boyfriend would think of that scenario. But the stranger is likely not to know anything about her boyfriend (or even that soy sauce brand), so they can't communicate this. Further, the waiter may not be a native English speaker, and in that case, she knows that she will have a hard time replying to the customer's utterance.

We have so far described relevance as a balance between effort and cognitive gain, and identified the two generalisations, or 'principles of relevance' (cf. (3) and (4)). It is now time to describe the relevance-guided comprehension heuristic, a process which follows from these generalisations and which humans automatically follow whenever they recognise an ostensive act.

2.3 The relevance-guided heuristic in (language) comprehension

This section will examine what people actually do when Interpreting a communicative act.

Before we start, I must make a general note. Not all types of ostensive stimuli are capable of revealing our communicator's informative intention with equal precision. For example, waiving at a passer-by at the traffic lights from my car may not be as effective in conveying that the passer-by is a former student of mine, as it would be if accompanied with the utterance "I'm your interpreting lecturer!" As Sperber and Wilson point out, **linguistic or verbal communication** "gives rise to the strongest possible form of communication" (1986/1995, 60), especially because it is nearly impossible to disregard an utterance (spoken in a language one masters) once the addressee recognises that it is directed towards her. In light of this – and given the main purpose of this volume – I will focus on the study of linguistic communication as a fruitful ground for exemplifying RT.

2.3.1 A path of least effort and then stop

To begin, Sperber and Wilson argue that a dedicated mental **module**, called **ostension processor**, is responsible for the inferential comprehension of stimuli. The detection of ostensive stimuli in our environment

automatically triggers this module; for instance, a body gesture, a wink, or the utterance "Someone spilled some soy sauce under this chair".[10] We may choose to ignore a communicator before his communicative act; but if the addressee doesn't, she will have no choice but to process what he is trying to communicate to her. According to RT, the perception of a communicative purpose immediately triggers the ostension processor, which then automatically begins forming hypotheses about his informative intention based on the stimulus the addressee has selected.

This brings us to the way in which the ostension processor goes about recovering the speaker-intended meaning (i.e., by means of a heuristic):

(6) *Sperber and Wilson's (1986/1995) Relevance-Guided Comprehension Heuristic:*

(6a) Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects: Test interpretative hypotheses (disambiguation, reference resolutions, enrichments of the decoded logical form, identification of implicated premises and conclusions, etc.) in order of accessibility;

(6b) Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied (or abandoned, as in the case of miscommunication).

This procedure is not to be understood as something like a Gricean maxim which we are expected to follow. Rather, it is a generalisation about what we actually do in communication, and RT no longer assumes a step-by-step reasoning process like the one suggested by Grice. Further, it can be shown to follow directly from the generalisations discussed in 2.2.2.

Firstly, if our cognitive system is characterised by a proclivity toward maximum efficiency (cf. first principle in (3)), we must suppose that, during Interpretation, we need to explore all possible interpretive routes before deciding which one to follow.

Secondly, since ostensive stimuli are automatically treated as capable of yielding the desired cognitive effects with no unjustifiable efforts (cf. second principle in (4)), it makes sense for the ostension processor to use the best strategy during the processing phase. The evaluation of possible Interpretations – in the order in which they become available – is the most obvious way of doing this. This processing will come to a halt once the addressee's expectations of relevance have been met; that is, when she has arrived at the first set of cognitive effects that can be acknowledged as the one that the communicator wanted her to derive in the first place.

We can illustrate this with reference to this example of a workplace interaction, held in the early hours of the morning:

(7) Checco: Have you been to the new Thai restaurant yet?
Marta: No. I need cleansing in this period of my life.

In (7), Checco will start by looking for a referent for *I*, and Marta would be a strong contender. Next, he must determine which meaning of CLEANSING is intended (due to lexical ambiguity). In this context, the 'detox' sense of CLEANSING is extremely accessible. This will yield positive cognitive effects as Checco can now infer that Marta is not willing to go to the newly opened restaurant because she is willing to go on a detox diet. This also implicates that if Marta does not intend to go to the new Thai restaurant, he would have to try it by himself (or wait for his opportunity when the diet is completed.)[11]

To conclude, RT pragmatics portrays verbal comprehension as an intricate and incredibly fast process, which is contingent on interpretative hypotheses about the explicitly and implicitly communicated content. The question arises: how do we test interpretative hypotheses, and what does implicitly (or explicitly) communicated information mean in RT?

2.3.2 Explicatures

RT proposes a different way of thinking about what can be directly or indirectly communicated. Recall that in 1.3.2, I pointed out that, according to the Gricean account, meaning$_{nn}$ is divided into 'what is said' and 'what is implicated'. Simply put, 'what is said' is generally taken to be (a) the conventional meaning of the sentence uttered (with the exclusion of any conventional implicature), and (b) the truth-conditional propositional content of the sentence uttered. Further, 'what is said' is supposed to provide the input to deriving what is 'conversationally implicated'. In order to work it out, however, addressees are called upon to resolve references, disambiguate expressions as well as fix **deixis** (Grice 1989, 25). So, the **explicit/implicit** distinction refers to the difference between an utterance's truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional content, and the latter depends solely on pragmatics.

The RT framework assumes quite a different position. What Grice failed to understand, according to Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995),[12] is that pragmatics also contributes to 'what is said'. Without pragmatic enrichment, decoding cannot produce a full propositional meaning. In fact, Sperber and Wilson go much further. They state that, even once references have been resolved and disambiguation completed, further enrichment is usually required before there is a truly propositional meaning. Let us examine the following example:

(8) Marco's bat is black.

Even after establishing the identity of *Marco*, the meaning of *bat* (in zoology or in sports?), and the time alluded to by the use of the present

tense *is*, Sperber and Wilson would argue that the meaning of (8) is still not complete enough to be fully propositional. The relationship between *Marco* and *bat* is ambiguous; utterance (8) may well refer to a bat that Marco owns, but it could also be a bat that Marco has selected, broken, destroyed, and so on. Sperber and Wilson rule out the argument that the genitive form is merely linguistically confusing, and state that "contextual information is needed to resolve what should be seen as the semantic incompleteness, rather than the ambiguity, of the genitive" (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, 188).

A meaning that is reached by a process of developing the incomplete linguistic semantic form is known in RT as an **explicature**. Its purpose is to flesh out this linguistically given, context-independent, incomplete **conceptual** representation (called ***logical form***), yielding fully propositional content. For instance, the details of the relationship between Marco and the bat in (8) are explicatures, derived from decoded meaning in accordance with the first principle of relevance (cf. (3)).[13]

Since logical form is not yet fully propositional and truth-evaluable, it needs to undergo a series of pragmatic enrichments. In particular, explicatures complete and enrich conceptual representations forms into **propositional forms** in a number of areas, such as saturation, reference resolution, and disambiguation (cf. Carston 2004):

1. **Saturation**: process whereby a given slot, position, or variable in the linguistically decoded logical form is filled or saturated. Consider (9):

   (9) Sperber and Wilson's notion of explicature is different. [from what?]

   Here, the bracketed questions are the slots in the incomplete logical forms of the utterance in (9). These slots need to be explicitly completed so that their full propositional forms can be obtained. Saturation in (9) may yield such an explicature as 'from Grice's notion of implicature'.

2. **Reference resolution**: referent assignment to deictics, overt indexicals, and referential expressions. Consider (10):

   (10) Jane stormed into the concert hall. The piano was made in the sixteenth century. [+>> There was a piano in the concert hall Jane stormed into.]

3. **Disambiguation**: the selection of sense for lexical items and sentential constituents (cf. *bat* in (8)), the candidates being supplied by the linguistic system itself.

These enrichments are all linguistically mandated, as they are enacted by specific elements (Carston 2000). In contrast, other enrichments are non-linguistically mandated because they are automatically performed

as a prerequisite to turn the logical form into a fully propositional form. Known as **free enrichment**,[14] they include:

4. **Supplying** the non-verbalised constituents necessary to get a meaningful proposition, such as the location and/or time of an event (Carston 2000). Consider (11):

   (11) I haven't had a shower yet! [The utterance contains the idea of *today*, that comes through free enrichment]

5. Lexical adjustment or **ad hoc concept construction**: the pragmatic adjustment of a lexical concept (open-class words like nouns, adjectives, verbs, and adverbs) in the linguistically decoded logical form. This can be: narrowing or strengthening, a broadening or loosening, or a combination of both (cf. Carston 2004, Wilson and Carston 2007). As regards point 5, consider examples (12) and (13):

   (12) Michela is depressed. [The general concepts expressed by the lexical item *depressed* can access a large number of subconcepts indicating different types, degrees, and qualities of the emotion *depression* – from *low* to suicidal – and explicatures serve to recover the narrower, more specific concepts in the logical form.]
   (13) There is a rectangle of lawn at the back. [The lexical concept *rectangle* is likely to be approximately rectangular, hence what is expressed is not the encoded concept RECTANGLE, but a broadened or loosened concept RECTANGLE.]

Moving beyond an utterance's **basic explicature** (Wilson and Sperber 2004), mention should be made of a sub-type of explicature, called **higher-level** or **higher-order explicature**, which embed other propositions within them. The higher-level descriptions include **propositional attitude** parentheticals,[15] **speech act** descriptions, and certain other comments such as evidentiality markers on the embedded propositions. By way of illustration, consider (14):

(14) Michele to Ariele: Bring me a glass of wine, please. [+>> (14a) Michele is telling Ariele to bring him a glass of wine. (14b) It is moderately desirable to Michele (and achievable) that Ariele bring him a glass of wine. (14c) Michele is requesting Ariele to bring him a glass of wine.]

The uttering of (14) by Michele performs the speech act of requesting, and gives rise to the higher-level explicatures.[16]

I turn next to what is taken as implicit content, or implicature, a type of communicated meaning traditionally addressed in Gricean pragmatics.

2.3.3 Only one type of implicature

In RT, the recovery of an implicature differs from that of an explicature in that while the latter involves both decoding and inference, the former involves only inference. Further, the RT approach to the implicit side of verbal communication departs considerably from the original Gricean description, as well as its neo-Gricean versions.

Relevance theorists argue that the difference between generalised and particularised conversational implicatures (cf. 1.3.2) is arbitrary. In their view, implicatures of the first kind are treated as context-driven, much in the same way as implicatures of the second kind are (cf. Carston 1995).[17] Instead, RT postulates two categories of implicatures: implicated premises and implicated conclusions. On the one hand, an **implicated premise** is a contextual assumption intended by the speaker and supplied by the addressee. On the other, an **implicated conclusion** is a contextual implication communicated by the speaker; that is, an inference derived from the unification of an utterance's explicitly expressed meaning with the contextual assumptions selected for its processing. As an illustrating example, consider (15):

(15) Furniture salesperson: Are you interested in test-driving this Norell?
Michele: I'm afraid I'm not interested in test-driving any expensive sofa.

Michele's reply is likely to yield the following implicatures, of which (16b) follows deductively from (16a) combined with (15):

(16) +> (16a) A Norell is an expensive sofa. [implicated premise]
+> (16b) Michele isn't interested in test-driving a Norell. [implicated conclusion]

Another feature of the RT account of implicatures is the concept that communicated assumptions can be more or less strongly communicated (**strong** vs **weak implicatures**). Assumptions are not seen as either communicated or not; rather, an utterance provides more or less evidence for specific conclusions. Let's return to Michele's utterance in (15). So far, we have focused on implicatures which this utterance supports very strongly, in particular the assumption that Michele isn't interested in test-driving a Norell. Notice, however, that his utterance provides evidence for a range of conclusions, arguably including the following:

(17) +>
(17a) Michele will not want to buy any of the expensive furniture the salesperson is trying to sell.

(17b) Michele will not want to buy any piece of furniture designed in Sweden.
(17c) Michele will not want to use pieces of furniture whose production has affected Swedish forests.
(17d) Michele cares about the planet.
(17e) Michele has a strong moral compass.

Some of the assumptions are more likely to have been communicated to the salesperson than others. Thus, the strength of an implicature may vary along a continuum, depending on the confidence with which an addressee can assume that they form part of the communicator's informative intention. So, it may be the case that Michele only intended his response to lead the salesperson to the implicatures in (16), (17a), and (17b), but the salesperson could also derive the weaker implicatures in (17c), (17d), and (17e) and still assume that they were part of Michele's original informative intention; perhaps because, a moment before, the salesperson asked Michele whether he ever shops at IKEA, and he seemed offended by the question. The fact that we can be more or less sure about whether particular implicatures are intended is a key idea in RT, which plays a role in accounts of range of kinds of Interpretations, including metaphorical Interpretations[18].

Lastly, the difference between explicatures and implicatures has implications for the interface between semantics and pragmatics, and for the theory of meaning as a whole. Everyone agrees that there is a level of semantic representation, or linguistic meaning of a sentence, and this level belongs to semantics. However, we have seen that RT believes that at least part of the original Gricean notion of 'what is said' (cf. 1.3.2) has to be understood as involving much more of a pragmatic contribution than envisaged by Grice. Further, there is substantial **pragmatic intrusion** into what is said, and the pragmatic inference in question is of a special kind (which differs from conversational implicature). Thus, we can revisit the semantics-pragmatics distinction drawn in Figure 1.4, according to RT in Figure 2.1:



Figure 2.1 The semantics-pragmatics distinction revisited following Wilson and Sperber (1981).

The general conclusion is that semantics and pragmatics constitute two different domains, but they are interlinked in such a way that the boundary between them is not easy to draw (Table 2.1):

Table 2.1 The interface and 'division of labour' between pragmatics and semantics according to Grice and RT.[19]

	Semantic representation	*Deixis and reference resolution*	*Enriched proposition*	*Additional proposition*
GRICE		What is said		
RT				

2.3.4 Overall comprehension heuristic

Having discussed the various tasks of the ostension processor, we are now in a position to see how they form part of the overall comprehension process discussed in 2.3.1.

Sperber and Wilson posit that cognition and communication as relying heavily on 'fast and frugal' (cf. Gigerenzer et al. 1999) heuristics, which make it possible to pick out potentially relevant inputs to cognitive processes, and then process them in a way that enhances their relevance. In this context, an utterance's decoded logical form is typically an incomplete (underdetermined) propositional schema which needs to be inferentially enriched in order to gain full propositional status. It is only this enriched proposition – which (by analogy with implicature) is called *explicature* – that can be evaluated for its truth or falsity in the context of the communication at hand, and can thus be of genuine service to the addressee during their Interpretation of the utterance (Carston 2004, 635, citing Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995).

During the inferential process, the ostension processor takes the output of decoding and performs the tasks of: (a) developing it into a full proposition (that corresponds to the one the speaker intended to communicate); (b) selecting an appropriate set of contextual assumptions against which it will calculate the speaker-intended cognitive effects; and (c) calculating the positive cognitive effects. In particular, the logical form encoded by the utterance is treated in the inferential process in three ways (see Wilson and Sperber 2004, 615):

(18) *Subtasks in the overall comprehension process*:
(a) Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about explicit content (*explicatures*) via decoding, disambiguation, reference resolution,

and other pragmatic enrichment processes (e.g., disambiguation, free enrichment, ad hoc concept construction, etc.);

(b) Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual assumptions (*implicated premises*);

(c) Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual implications (*implicated conclusions*).

Despite what this step-by-step description might appear to suggest, relevance theorists do not take the three sub-tasks involved in utterance comprehension to be sequentially ordered. Comprehension is an online process, and the sub-tasks in (18) take place in parallel, and the resulting hypotheses are, if necessary, revised or elaborated as the utterance unfolds. Therefore, explicatures and implicatures are constructed by a process of "***mutual parallel adjustment*** with hypotheses about both being considered in order of accessibility" (Wilson and Sperber 2004, 617; my emphasis).

By way of an illustration, let us look at an example of step-by-step description (cf. (20a–h)) of how Lucia manages to understand Eleonora's utterance in the following exchange:

(19)

(19a) Lucia: Will your boyfriend join us for dinner tonight?

(19b) Eleonora: He's all black and blue because of last night's match.

(20)

(20a) Utterance (19b) is decoded into a logical form. This form, however, is incomplete, since at least the referent "he" must be identified and "black and blue" must be disambiguated between BLACK AND $BLUE_1$ (= colours) and BLACK AND $BLUE_2$ (= hurt, either bodily, emotionally, or psychologically).

(20b) Utterance (19b) will be automatically processed as optimally relevant by Lucia. This expectation is raised by the recognition of Eleonora's communicative intention (cf. second principle of relevance).

(20c) Utterance (19b) will achieve relevance by providing an answer to Lucia's question. This is a more specific expectation than (20b), together with the fact that questions typically call for answers.

(20d) Implicated premise of utterance (19b): the fact that one is BLACK AND $BLUE_2$ is a good reason for not wanting to dine with other people. This highly accessible contextual assumption may help satisfy expectation in (3).

(20e) Basic explicature of utterance (19b): Eleonora's partner is BLACK AND $BLUE_2$ because *of the result* of last night's

rugby match. This enrichment of the logical form of utterance (19b) may combine with (20d) to lead to the satisfaction of (20c).

(20f) Implicated conclusion of utterance (19b): Eleonora's partner will not join them for dinner that night. This conclusion is inferred from (20d) and (20e), satisfying (20f).

(20g) Further implicated conclusion of utterance (19b): the reason for Eleonora's partner not joining them is that he is BLACK AND BLUE$_2$ because of the result of last night's rugby match. This conclusion is inferred from (20d) and (20e), satisfying (20b) alongside (20f).

(20h) Further implicated conclusions: Eleonora's boyfriend has no personal issues with Lucia or Eleonora, Eleonora's boyfriend still enjoys Lucia's cooking, etc. They are inferred from (20g), plus background knowledge, which also contribute to satisfy (20b).

In Gricean pragmatics, inference was assumed to generate conversational implicatures on the basis of 'what is said', and only after this has been fully recovered. In RT, the communicated meaning of utterance (19b) is taken to be simultaneously processed at both the explicit and the implicit level, while the context of Interpretation gets updated with new assumptions as required in a process of mutual parallel adjustment.

In our exchange, implicatures in (20f), (20g), and (20h) are not calculated by Lucia only after the explicitly expressed meaning has been determined, nor does Lucia's ostension processor wait for the relevant module to finish decoding the logical form before beginning to construct the explicature in (20e). For instance, before Lucia finishes decoding and inferentially developing utterance (19b) – most likely by the time she has disambiguated the intended meaning of BLACK AND BLUE – she will have derived the implicature in (22f). Furthermore, if Eleonora had said, "He's all black and blue because of last night's match, but I'm sure he will come", the implicature in (20f) would have been derived, but then eliminated.

Miscommunication can happen in our daily interactions. The inferences used in this calculation indeed (in (20f), (20g), and (20h)) are non-demonstrative (i.e., they are best described as "suitably constrained guesswork" by Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, 69) – rather than a reliable logical process. This type of "guesswork" involves forming and evaluating hypotheses about the meaning that is communicated through: (a) the use of some particular ostensive stimulus (i.e., utterance (19b)); and (b) the right set of background assumptions (i.e., the context; cf. 2.2.1) against which the content of utterance will be processed with a view to recovering Eleonora's informative intention). In exchange (19), Lucia can only reach the conclusion that Eleonora's partner will not join them for dinner if she combines Eleonora's explicitly expressed message in (20e)

with the contextual assumption that 'People who play rugby can get hurt during a match'.

Lastly, due to the presumption of optimal relevance, it is reasonable for Lucia to follow the path of least effort, because Eleonora is expected (within the limits of her abilities and preferences) to make utterance (19b) as easy as possible to understand (Wilson and Sperber 2004, 613). This idea was honed by the conceptual/procedural distinction.

2.4 The distinction between conceptual and procedural encodings

We finally come to the dichotomy between conceptual and procedural meaning in RT, a dichotomy developed largely by Blakemore (1987, 2002).[20] Since a communicator is not expected to make his addressee's task of obtaining the most relevant Interpretation more difficult than necessary, the utterance he chooses to formulate may contain conceptual and procedural types of information. What does it mean?

2.4.1 Procedural constraints on the inferential phase of comprehension

There are elements of speech which encode **concepts**, that is constituents of **propositional representations** undergoing an inferential computation. Conceptual meaning contributes concepts to the logical form of a sentence, that is, it enters into the semantic representation. So, in conceptual encoding, linguistic forms encode conceptual information. (For example, *lion*, *eat*, and *happy* are lexical items which encode conceptual information.)

These denotational mental entities comprise three types of entries (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, 88–89):

1. logical entry, which includes the defining properties of what the concept denotes;
2. lexical entry, which subsumes data about the natural-language word needed to verbalise it and its pronunciation;
3. encyclopaedic entry, which groups personal and/or cultural information about what it refers to.

On the other hand, there are linguistic expressions which "encode ***procedural constraints*** on the inferential phase of comprehension" (Wilson and Sperber 1993, 12; my emphasis). Procedural meaning does not contribute any concept, but rather provides a constraint on, or guidelines on the way in which certain aspects of pragmatic inference should proceed; that is to say, it indicates particular computational processes. In other words,

in procedural encoding, linguistic forms encode procedural information. Overall, such features of utterances contribute to relevance by decreasing the amount of processing effort required, and these procedural constraints are directly encoded in the linguistic form of what is uttered.

The type of procedural meaning that has received most scholarly attention has been that encoded by linguistic devices known as ***discourse markers*** (hereafter DMs; e.g., *but*, *so*, *well*, and *now*). This disparate group of expressions (Blakemore 2004, 221)[21] can be said not to contribute to the information conveyed by an utterance that contains them, but rather to illustrate "the ways in which linguistic form may contribute to the inferential process involved in utterance understanding" (Blakemore 2002: 185). Let us consider the sequence in (21) (cf. Wilson and Sperber 1993, 12):

(21) a. Sauro isn't stupid. b. He can find his own way home.

As we have seen, within a RT account in order to understand sequence (21) a hearer is encouraged to recover the intended explicit content in both segment (21a) and (21b) (explicatures) and the intended implicit content (implicatures). Such a recovery of explicatures and implicatures is an inferential process constrained by the principles of relevance and consists of an online, "mutual adjustment" of hypotheses about context, explicit content, and cognitive effects. The Interpretation the addressee derives depends on the contextual assumptions used in its derivation and on the type of inferential computations she performs.

For instance, the sequence in (21) might be Interpreted in two ways, depending on whether (21b) is understood as a premise in an inference which has (21a) as a conclusion or it is understood as a conclusion derived from (21a):

(22) Sauro isn't stupid. After all, he can find his own way home.
(23) Sauro isn't stupid. So, he can find his own way home.

In (22), the linguistic expression *after all* involves making an inference in which segment (21b) is a premise in a deduction which yields (21a) as conclusion:

Sauro can he can find his own way home ((21b) premise, new information)
If Sauro can he can find his own way home, then he isn't stupid (contextual premise)
⊢ Sauro isn't stupid ((21a) conclusion)

Note that the independent evidence provided here is for an assumption the hearer already holds, therefore the evidence has the effect of strengthening that assumption. In contrast, (23) involves an inference in

which (21b) is a conclusion derived from premises which include (21a) as follows:

> Sauro isn't stupid (premise, (21a))
> If Sauro isn't stupid, then he can find his own way home (contextual premise)
> ⊢ Sauro can find his own way home

The DMs in (22) and (23) indicate two entirely different inferential routes, which lead to a different sort of contextual effect intended by the speaker and are consistent with the first principle of relevance (cf. (3) in 2.2.2). However, both expressions contribute to the inferential phase of comprehension by narrowing down the hearer's search space by helping him identify the intended context and contextual effects, or, as Jucker (1993, 438) says, they are similar to "signposts directing the way in which the following utterance should be processed by the addressee".

Since the distinction between conceptual and procedural encoding is the result of a move away from the assumptions underlying truth-conditional semantics, there is no reason why it should be co-extensive with that between truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional meaning.[22] Decoding the linguistic form does not give a truth-conditional meaning, but merely a conceptual representation that can be developed by pragmatic inferencing to something that is truth-conditional, namely an explicature. DMs do encode semantic meaning, yet the meaning they encode is not conceptual, but procedural.

Wilson (2011, 12) states that "there is a fairly widespread view that the conceptual-procedural distinction is intended to be mutually exclusive, so that a single word cannot encode both types of meaning". She argues, however, that there is little textual evidence to support this interpretation of Relevance Theory and advocates that conceptual and procedural meaning should not be treated as mutually exclusive.

Blakemore (2002, 82–88) points out a number of properties which we might expect an expression with procedural meaning to have. She states:

> If we recall what has been said about procedural encoding so far, we will see that we seem to know more about what procedural meaning is not than what it is. . . . However . . . we can draw certain conclusions about what properties we can expect an expression which encodes procedural meaning to have.
>
> (Blakemore 2002, 82)

The properties which Blakemore identifies as likely to be associated with procedural devices are:

1. They are difficult to paraphrase;
2. They are difficult to translate;

3. They are not compositional (i.e., they do not combine with each other to form constituents of propositions, whereas conceptual expressions do);
4. They lack synonymous conceptual counterparts;
5. They are Interpreted differently from conceptual expressions in fragmentary utterances.

Let us consider point 2. In some cases, it is fairly straightforward to identify a procedural equivalent in another language – for example, Italian *ma* can be easily translated with the English *but* in many instances. In others, it is much less clear, such as in (24):

(24) Ma sì, dài! [Lit. BT: *But yes, come on!*]

In **translations**, it is overall harder to formulate the nature of the issue when discussing procedural expressions, than when discussing conceptual expressions.

Over the last two decades, there has been growing interest not only in establishing such discriminatory features of procedural information, but also in applying the distinction to the analysis of a range of linguistic devices (tense, illocutionary-force indicators, pronouns, natural signals, and so on) in a variety of languages (e.g., Italian, Japanese, and Sissala). In light of this research, the RT category of procedural meaning is no longer co-extensive with that of non-truth-conditional meaning that motivated the postulation of conventional implicatures by Grice in the first place.[23] Further, many authors[24] have highlighted that the use and distribution of procedural devices varies across languages since such devices must exploit linguistic resources. In particular, in different languages DMs can encode different distinctions and different aspects of the pragmatic inference system are linguistically encoded. Yet, Blakemore's (2009, 2010, 2011) analysis of discourse markers in free indirect thought (FIT) representations shows that what we have seen so far is only part of the story of procedural meaning.

2.4.2 Discourse markers and perspective dependence

Departing from Sperber and Wilson's account of FIT as an example of attributive use in which the speaker is communicating her thoughts about someone else's thoughts, Blakemore (2009, 2010, 2011) provides an account of FIT representations by drawing from Banfield's (1982) and Fludernik's (1993) no-narrator approach to **free indirect speech**.

According to the RT framework, the evidence provided by the author in FIT texts and used to derive metarepresentations of the character's thoughts is indirect in the sense that the reader must infer or work out the character's thoughts from the linguistic properties of the utterances

together with contextual assumptions (Blakemore 2010, 2011). The reader is said to invest her effort in processing FIT representations because she has recognised the author's act of ostensive communication. In this sense, the communicative intention in FIT texts must be attributed to the author who represents the character's consciousness.

Although the author is an intermediary between the character and the reader, the effort expended in Interpreting FIT texts does not seem to lie in the resulting relationship between reader and author, but rather in a sense of 'affective mutuality' between reader and character. The reader is not intended to recover metarepresentations of the author's thoughts about the character's thoughts, but is given the illusion that he is being given evidence for the character's thoughts or state of mind – that he is "participating in her thought processes" (Blakemore 2010, 19). The idea underlying this analysis is that such representations are perceived to be *unmediated* representations of another person's thoughts. An author is not present 'in the text' as communicator and the result of communication is not a sense of mutuality between reader and author, but rather between reader and character.

Blakemore's (2010) analysis of examples from fiction suggests that the use of "mimetic" elements[25] contribute to this **illusion of absence of mediation** by imposing "a constraint on the relevance of the thought representation which contains it" (Blakemore 2010, 19), which leaves the reader with the responsibility for the recovery of assumptions which are not represented by the author in the text but which can be attributed to the character whose thoughts are being represented. Here is an example provided by Blakemore (2010, 17), taken from Katherine Mansfield's *Collected Short Stories* (1981, 223):

> (25) And what made it doubly hard to bear was, she did not love her children. . . . Even if she had had the strength she never would have nursed and played with the little girls. No, it was as though a cold breath had chilled her through and through on each of those awful journeys; she had no warmth left to give them. As to the boy – *well*, thank Heaven, mother had taken him.
>
> (emphasis in the original)

In Blakemore's analysis, the use of *well* in the main character's (Linda's) FIT text imposes a constraint on the Interpretation of the thought representation which it introduces, and the reader has the responsibility to access the contextual assumptions needed in order to derive an Interpretation of the thought which is consistent with the constraint it encodes – in order words, any contextual assumptions the reader thinks the main character would believe would justify this use of *well*. In this particular case, these contextual assumptions would have to "derive from the need

to demonstrate that . . . the answer to the question 'what about the baby?' is indeed relevant" (Blakemore 2010, 19). However, readers are free to access these contextual assumptions, thus being under the illusion that they have accessed the same assumptions which are accessed by Linda as she has these thoughts or, in other words, that they are participating in her thought processes.

Other features of FIT representations have been shown to contribute to an increased sense of mutuality between reader and author or a corresponding impression of distance between reader and character, while others (such as parentheticals) play both types of role (Blakemore 2009). An example of this latter case is the use of parenthetical interruptions, such as the one in the opening page of *Mrs Dalloway* by Virginia Woolf (1925/1990, 3, as quoted in Blakemore 2009, 144; emphasis in the original):

> (26) It was his sayings one remembered; his eyes, his pocket-knife, his smile, his grumpiness and, when millions of things had utterly vanished – *how strange it was!* – a few sayings like this about cabbages.

Again, the interruption in FIT representations (cf. "how strange it was") is argued to increase the sense of mutuality between reader and character, and encourage the reader to create metarepresentations of thoughts not actually revealed by the author.

In conclusion, Section 2.4 has focused on the notion of procedural encoding derived from a cognitively grounded distinction between linguistic encoding and pragmatic inference and first put forward by Blakemore (1987). I have shown that the RT conceptual-procedural distinction emerges from the claim that semantics should be viewed as a means to relating sentences and thoughts – rather than as a means to relating sentences and state of affairs in the world. But, what is the relationship between utterances and thoughts?

2.5 Descriptive vs interpretive utterances

The distinction between descriptive and interpretive use is key to understanding how thoughts and utterances can be relevant. Consider the utterance "This studio is a proper mess" in the following three examples:

> (27) This studio is a proper mess.
> (28) Francesca: What did Daniele say?
> Giulio: This studio is a proper mess.
> (29) (*Daniele walks into Giulio's recording studio, and notices that he is looking desperate.*)
> Giulio: I know what you're thinking. This studio is a proper mess.

It is clear that utterance (27) states the communicator's own belief about his recording studio. However, in other circumstances, it could be used to report what someone else has said in a different context (cf. utterance 28) or to suggest the thoughts formed by someone else (cf. utterance 29). Within RT, this prompted a distinction between *descriptive* and *interpretive* (or *attributive*) uses of language (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, 231 ff.):

1. a **descriptive** utterance (e.g., (27)) is an Interpretation of a thought which describes an (actual or desirable) state of affairs by expressing propositions which we can judge as true (or not). For instance, if I think that supernovae are stars, then I am entertaining a thought expressing the proposition that the set of supernovae is included in the set of stars, and treating it as true in the world which I live in
2. an **interpretive** utterance (e.g., (28) and (29)) is an Interpretation of a thought which is an Interpretation of another thought or utterance, that is a thought or utterance attributed to another person or to the communicator at another time.

In the latter, it must be pointed out that an utterance can represent another utterance not only by resembling it in propositional content – to some degree – but also in phonetic or phonological, lexical, and/or syntactic form (cf. mimicry, direct quotation, or parody). Interpretive uses represent thoughts or utterances by sharing logical or contextual implications with those thoughts or utterances, which means that we can judge them by how closely they resemble the thought or utterance they represent – or, in other words, how **faithful** an Interpretation they present. So, an utterance can only be said to be more or less *faithful*; the degree of *faithfulness* varies and is governed by the first principle of relevance (cf. 2.2.2).

Against this background, Sperber and Wilson do not believe that an utterance must be completely identical to the speaker's thought (i.e., usually not all of the utterance's implications need to coincide with those of the original thought). In RT, this utterance would be called a literal utterance. This notion of ***literalness*** – equivalence between the proposition of the utterance and that of the thought – is an interesting one as, in most cases, there is no real need for *literal* truth. In interaction, an utterance is often more relevant when its implications are not exactly the same ones as those of the original thought. This case occurs, for example, whenever we can gain all the relevant information from a less than literal utterance at lower processing cost. Sometimes, we are unlikely to discover a literal expression for a complex thought we wish to communicate. As a result, we frequently use **loose** – rather than literal – language. The qualitative difference between literalness and a very small resemblance between two propositions, is seen as a continuum.[26]

This dichotomy is well summarised in Figure 2.2, adapted from Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995, 232):



Figure 2.2 Descriptive and interpretive representations in RT.

The most striking aspect of this diagram is that it shows that all utterances are Interpretations of a communicator's thought. And they all resemble a communicator's thought by sharing conceptual and logical properties with that thought. So, a communicator may choose to represent his thought about his studio by uttering (27) or by uttering (30) or (31):

(30) Good heavens!
(31) Aaarrgh!

Utterances (27), (30), and (31) can be viewed as three ways of interpreting the same thought. Given that all utterances are Interpretations, it is in distinguishing two kinds of mental representation that this distinction between description and Interpretation becomes key.

At the bottom of Fig. 2.2, we see how an interpretive use of language use may either be: (a) a thought as an Interpretation of an actual representation (that is, an actual thought or utterance); or (b) a thought as an Interpretation of desirable (e.g., relevant) representations. As an example of (a), let us take the case when we think about what our interlocutor is thinking (i.e., an Interpretation of a thought attributed to someone else). Suppose, for example, that I am around shopping with my boyfriend, and I notice that he keeps glancing at a shirt in a clothes

shop. I might decide that he would like me to buy it for him. If so, I am representing thoughts which I think he might be having. Examples in speech include cases where the communicator is understood to be reporting what someone else has said or thought, such as Giulio's utterance in (29).

An important distinction made within the interpretive domain is also between **attributive uses of language indicated by the linguistic form** and **tacitly attributive** uses. Consider the following examples (based on Wilson 2006, 1734):

(32) a. I thought I had cooked a nice dinner. b. But according to Alessandro, it was very heavy.
(33) a. The Italian Chamber of Deputies had come to a decision. b. The government's plans to increase taxes will be approved.
(34) a. The students spoke up. b. If they didn't act immediately, it might be too late.

Example (32b) is a case of attributive interpretive use of language indicated by the linguistic form *according to*. On the other hand, **free indirect speech** and FIT – as in (33) and (34) – are a well-known type of tacitly attributive use of language. An Interpretation of (33) is that the thought that the government's plans will be approved – or an appropriate summary thereof – is being tacitly attributed to the members of the Chamber of Deputies. The same can be said of example (34): a plausible explanation is that the claim that if the students didn't act immediately it might be too late is being tacitly attributed to the students. In both (33b) and (34b) the speaker "does not take responsibility for their truth, but is metarepresenting a thought or utterance with a similar content that she attributes to some identifiable person or group of people" (Wilson 2006, 1734).

A much-debated sub-type of tacitly attributive use of language is **verbal irony**. In particular, the notion of *dissociative echoic use* plays a key role in the RT analysis of verbal irony (cf. Wilson 2006).[27] Ironic utterances are seen as presenting some of the lower-level propositions as ones which speakers attribute to others and dissociate themselves from. In other words, utterances are ironic when the speaker is understood as attributing the thought their utterance represents to others and dissociating themselves from it. The 'others' to whom the thought is attributed might not be easy to identify. In some cases, they can be representing thoughts which people might generally want to express, rather than echoing any specific person's thought or utterance. A case in point is a classic utterance about the weather as in (35):

(35) [During a blizzard] What lovely weather!

To sum up, there are two types of propositional attitude, which are in turn based on two types of representation (or two ways of using a representation) – the descriptive and interpretive dimensions of language and thought. On one hand, a thought or utterance is used *descriptively* when it is used to represent the state of affairs that makes it true. On the other, they can be used to represent another thought or utterance by virtue of a resemblance between the two propositional forms. A propositional form resembles another when they share some or all of their logical and contextual implications. At a more fundamental level, RT claims that the propositional form of an utterance is an Interpretation of a thought of the speaker. The final question is whether this thought is itself entertained as a description of a state of affairs or as an Interpretation of another thought or utterance (e.g., an attributed or relevant thought).

2.6 Criticisms

The applicability of RT to the study of communication has been an object of intense discussion.

The first point of criticism is the unclear distinction between the notions of mutual knowledge and mutual manifestness (2.2.1). Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995) rejected the appropriateness of the concept of mutual knowledge, derived from the code model. However, critics argue that the RT scholars rely on the assumptions of mutual knowledge while introducing the concept of mutual manifestness. For instance, mutual manifestness is said to be as recursive as mutual knowledge; as Yus Ramos (1998, 309–310) stated, "A knows p; B knows that A knows p; A knows that B knows that A knows p; ad infinitum". Therefore, it can be argued that mutual knowledge and mutual manifestness are so similar that one cannot truly differentiate them.

In addition, RT has been criticised for lacking specificity, and this raises the larger issue of whether it can be falsified or not. In principle, it should be possible to falsify any theory through developmental, clinical, or neural data. And, indeed, developmental pragmatics, clinical pragmatics, and neuro-pragmatics are areas where RT has been **empirically** tested.[28] Nevertheless, RT has been met with scepticism in linguistics. For example, Levinson (1989, 456) contends that Sperber and Wilson's (1986/1995) theory on the following grounds:

> relies on improbable presuppositions about human cognition; it underplays the role of usage in pragmatic theory; it ignores many current developments in semantics, pragmatics and the study of inference; it is too ambitious and globally reductive; and anyway the theory is obscure and it is not clear how it could be made to have clear empirical application.

He further argues that the theory is not "data-driven" and that "the new paradigm offered here exists largely as manifesto" (Levinson 1989, 469).

Other critics (e.g., Mey 1993, 81) have stated that the notion of *relevance* and its principles are not defined well enough to be measured. They believe that, given that the first principle encompasses all of Grice's maxims and that it is without exception and irrefutable, the notion of *relevance* has become so broad that it is immune from any possible counterexamples and has lost its explanatory power. As we have seen in 2.2, relevance is seen as a trade-off of effects and effort, and is thus a comparative – rather than quantitative – notion. This leads to one of the most common critiques levelled about RT; that is, it fails to explain how to objectively measure contextual effects and processing effort, how to make them commensurate with each other, or why there is always a unique method to satisfy the first principle of relevance (e.g., Bach 1999, Huang 2000, Levinson 1989; see also Wilson and Sperber 2004 for a counterargument).

Other criticisms include that the theory is too reductionist to account for the large variety of pragmatic phenomena. First, RT is said to lack tools for categorising intended meaning. Because every speech is based on associations and background knowledge, many utterances appear to have several possible Interpretations. "What's the time?" might indicate anything from "Don't you think it's time to be getting ready?", to "What a bore you are", to "Remember I no longer own a watch!" Burton-Roberts (2005), in particular, takes issue with Carston's account of many types of meaning previously taken to be generalized conversational implicatures in terms of basic-level explicatures.

Internet-mediated communication puts RT to the test. Yus' (2016a) study of contextual constraints and non-propositional effects in WhatsApp communication serves as an example. The author (2016a, 70) claims that mixed-up threads in WhatsApp conversations may be a potential source of misunderstanding or increased processing effort and that relevance is generated from non-propositional effects – rather than from explicatures and implicatures.

As a way to illustrate this, Yus (2016a, 17) reproduces the following real WhatsApp conversation in Spanish, which took place between a female (A) and a male (B) user:

(36) A: La voy a facturar en el aeropuerto. [I'm going to check her in at the airport.]
B: Eso. [That's it.]
A: Egipto, que allí los idolatran. [To Egypt, since they idolise them there.]
A: O a Marruecos pa q aprenda lo que vale un peine. [Or to Morocco, so that she learns the tough way.]
Q está muy mimadita. [Because she's too spoiled.]
B: Yeah.

A: Yastan aqui mis padres. [My parents are here already.]
B: Que vea que la vida no es solo hacer trastadas. [She has to realise that life is not all about playing tricks.]
A: ['*Anguish*' *emoji*.]
B: Ohhhh. Planazo. [Great plan.]

In the social media interaction in (36), the initial topic is A's anger with her naughty cat. Half-way through this dialogue, A informs B that her parents have arrived, but B's next message is still about the naughty cat, since WhatsApp reproduces messages in order of arrival to the system. Similarly, A's next message – an emoji of anguish which codes a whole proposition ("my parents' visit depresses me") – does not refer to the cat either even if it follows B's cat-related message.

A related issue which is said not to be addressed in RT has to do with communication that is *intentionally* misleading. It has been pointed out that we cannot be sure that communicators are intending their communication to have relevance, and RT seems to have little to offer in terms of understanding communication that is intentionally irrelevant yet pretending to be relevant.

Even the notion of *procedural meaning* (cf. 2.4), which has shown to be a useful tool in analysing a number of challenges at the semantics-pragmatics interface, has not been without criticism. Critics stated that this distinction does not allow for a clear-cut classification of linguistic devices since most items appear to include a combination of both conceptual and procedural meaning (see Espinal 1996a, 1996b, Fraser 2006). In this context, procedural 'guidelines' are said to have certain conceptual elements in them, too. In fact, when we express how two pieces of information are to be combined together, we tend to require the use and manipulation of concepts (Espinal 1996a).

Another much-discussed limitation of RT is that it says little about interaction as it does not include cultural or social dimensions such as age, gender, status, and nationality; this objection was also discussed with reference to Grice's co-operative principle model (cf. 1.4; see also Wierzbicka 1991). As stated in 2.2.1, RT has this notion of *context* at its centre, but does not thoroughly discuss how these contextual aspects interact with intended meaning. This notion is viewed as a "psychological construct, a subset of the hearer's assumptions about the world" (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, 15) which derive from memory, perception, knowledge of the world, current discourse, etc. Therefore, the RT framework is heavily grounded in cognition and recognises "aspects of the world, intentionalities and meaning in language only through evidence of their mental representations" (Setton 1999, 267). In contrast, context in a sociolinguistic perspective is grounded in the nature of social and cultural interaction, rather than cognition. In particular, Mey (1993) argued that in abstracting away from the social factors which govern

communication, RT has portrayed human beings as mindless automatons, instead of 'social' beings who interact in "pre-existing [socially determined] conditions" (Mey 1993, 82).

In their Postface to *Relevance*, Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995, 279) are the first to recognise that communication is also comprised of complex sociological factors. Further, as Blakemore (2002) points out, a theory which abstracts away from the socially determined conditions which affect interaction does not necessarily assume that people do *not* operate in socially determined conditions or that human assumptions or beliefs *cannot* be culturally or socially determined.[29] The question raised by RT is whether one can have a personal-level explanation of communicative behaviour of people in socially determined conditions without first having a sub-personal explanation of the cognitive systems that enable people to behave in such conditions. Thus, one can argue that while it is true that "the social character and context of communication are . . . essential to the wider picture" (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, 279), it is also true that "in communicating in a social context people are enabled by various sub-personal systems – grammatical competence, an inferencing system, the visual system" (Blakemore 2002, 8). In other words, communication in socially determined conditions (as described by sociolinguists) is said to be enabled by a sub-personal inferencing system as described by RT. Wharton (2009) also maintains an interest in how inferential theories such as RT might be extended to the sociolinguistic and anthropological domains, and throws down the following challenge:

> Much work in discourse analysis and sociolinguistics centres on social notions such as power relations and inequality, and examines how they are manifested, reinforced and even constructed by discourse. Approaching the sociolinguistic domain from a different perspective – that is, starting with the minds of the individuals who create the discourse, and treating macro-level sociolinguistic phenomena as resulting from an accumulation of individual micro-level acts – may yield interesting and worthwhile results.
>
> (Wharton 2009, 193)

Further, Saul (2002) comments on recent renewed interest in Grice's 'what is said', arguing that unlike RT Grice never aimed at psychological plausibility, and therefore that the two types of pragmatic theory are not necessarily in conflict.

Horn (2007) suggests that, despite claims to reduce Grice's maxims to a single principle, RT, like his own form of pragmatics, relies essentially on a balance between effort and effect. Ariel (2002) discusses the minimal meaning of utterances, or what she calls 'privileged interactional interpretations', which speakers are taken most centrally to be committed

to, and argues that these don't necessarily correspond either to Gricean 'what is said' or to relevance theorists' explicatures.

Lastly, any theory which assumes that pragmatic principles are universal should be expected to develop an account of how these pragmatic systems and abilities are acquired. In other words, if RT generalisations are 'on the right track', critics state that we should expect to be able to investigate some of the details of how these biological systems develop as humans grow. In recent years, a number of studies have started to shed some light on this issue (cf., for instance, Origgi and Sperber 2000).

2.7 Summary

Sperber and Wilson's (1987/1995) RT is an attempt "to shift the whole centre of gravity of pragmatic theorizing away from the study of [Grice's] usage principles to the study of cognitive principles" (Levinson 1989, 456). The central thesis is that human communication is driven by the search for relevance and is **ostensive-inferential**: a communicator signals his communicative intent by an act of ostension, creating a presumption of relevance that justifies his addressee's effort in processing the stimulus to derive positive cognitive effects that may enrich her cognitive environment. According to the second relevance principle, every act of ostensive communication is further said to transmit a presumption of optimal relevance. In order to optimise relevance, communicators must look for enough effects to justify the processing effort involved in deriving them, and to assume that the communicator is being as relevant as possible given their abilities and preferences.

During verbal communicative acts, the addressee's task is to identify the informative intention. To do so, the addressee has to accomplish a series of sub-tasks, determining the logical form of an utterance (by decoding), its propositional form (by inference) or (basic) explicature, the communicator's propositional attitude or (high-order) explicature, as well as his most relevant implicature.

Conceptual and procedural meanings play a role in performing these sub-tasks. Conceptual information is treated at the level of explicatures by way of pragmatic enrichment processes (such as narrowing or broadening), whereas procedural elements activate computational processes and guide hearers to inferences. Pragmatic Interpretations are recovered by general inferences, rather than triggered by linguistic expressions, and can thus be localised at the level of implicatures. Yet, while deductive inferences are assumed to play a role in this, the process overall is seen as non-demonstrative, and so leads to conclusions which are plausible, but not totally guaranteed.

This account is consistent with the computational-representational model of mind in cognitive science and, thus, with the aim of establishing

cognitive pragmatics. What's more, the 'fast and frugal' comprehension heuristic has opened up the way for the fruitful interaction of philosophical and psychological research. After all, relevance theorists have through the years made a number of testable predictions (cf. van der Henst and Sperber 2004), some of which have been instrumental in the increasing growth of the field of experimental pragmatics.

Lastly, the idea of representation by resemblance and, in particular, interpretive use have proved tools with great explanatory value for a wide variety of issues, which are not restricted to irony and other tropes (e.g., see Pilkington 2000). Quotation, parody, paraphrase, as well as a number of linguistic topics - such as interrogatives, exclamatives, metalinguistic negation (e.g., Carston 1996, 2002), echo questions (e.g., Noh 2001), and hearsay particles (e.g., Ifantidou-Trouki 2001, 2005, Itani 1998) - have been analysed as cases where a linguistic representation is used to exploit its resemblance to another representation.[30] As, we shall see in the next chapters, T&I also fall into this category.

2.8 Food for thought

By now, you should know enough about RT to be able to apply it yourself in explaining examples, and to understand relatively sophisticated current debates about RT.

2.8.1 Further reading

The classic source for RT remains the book *Relevance* (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995), which presents the foundations of RT and grounds it within the disciplinary framework of pragmatics. The up-to-date version of the theory is presented in the Postface to the second edition (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, 255–279).

Discussions of key ideas from RT are to be found in textbooks and articles written by RT scholars:

- Blakemore 1992 (a simple introduction to RT);
- Blakemore 2002 (for more advanced readers);
- Carston 2002 (for more advanced readers);
- Clark 2013 (comprehensive, state-of-the-art overview of the theory);
- Sperber and Wilson 2005 (entry in the *Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language*);
- Wilson 2017 (entry in *The Oxford Handbook of Pragmatics*);
- Wilson 2019 (entry in the *Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of Linguistics*);
- Wilson and Sperber 2004 (entry in *The Handbook of Pragmatics*);
- Wilson and Sperber 2012 (collection of papers which have helped to develop RT in recent years).

There are further, useful discussions on RT in textbooks on pragmatics. Good starting points are the following:

- Ariel 2008 (chap. 3);
- Barron et al. 2017 (chap. 24);
- Cummings 2005 (chap. 4, for a critical approach);
- Grundy 2008 (chap. 6);
- Huang 2007 (chap. 6).

On Grice and meaning within the RT perspective, see discussions in *Relevance* (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, 21–24) and Wharton's (2009, 18–37) *Pragmatics and Non-Verbal Communication*.

The relevance theoretic approach to the dichotomy of 'conceptual versus procedural' meaning has been developed largely in the work of Diane Blakemore (see Blakemore 1987, 2002, 2004), while the distinction between descriptive and interpretive representation is presented in the Postface to *Relevance* (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, 217–243). For a discussion on how the notion of procedural meaning might be broadened to include natural signals, such as facial expressions, see Ifantidou-Trouki et al. (2021), Wharton (2003a, 2003b, 2009), and Wilson and Wharton (2006). In the context of interpretive representations, there is also a wide range of publications on figurative language; see Carston (2002) and papers collected in Wilson and Sperber (2012).

There are a number of useful web-based resources. The most comprehensive list of sources which discuss or apply RT ideas is maintained and regularly updated by Francisco Yus (2022) at the University of Alicante: https://personal.ua.es/francisco.yus/rt.html. The Relevance Researchers' Network website was set up by Ryoko Sasamoto and Kate Scott in 2021, and now organises online seminars which address topics relevant to RT: https://relevanceresearchers.com (Sasamoto and Scott 2022).

2.8.2 Review questions

Here is a list of questions for review:

- What are the main differences between RT and Gricean theory?
- What is relevance? Can they be measured?
- What are the principles of relevance, and what is the relationship between them?
- Does pragmatics play an important role in enriching the incomplete logical form of an utterance into an explicature?
- What are the main differences between conceptual and procedural meaning?
- Can you give a RT account of irony?

Again, I suggest you look out for and make notes of examples which can help explain communicative acts. (Better still, to look at the examples discussed in 1.6.2, and consider how the Gricean and RT approaches would account for them.) In RT, this will mean having to decide whether they are explicatures, implicatures, or non-communicated implications. Next, you can try to explain them with reference to the relevance-guided comprehension heuristic, that is to show how addressees follow from a search for effects following a path of least effort (cf. example (20) in 2.3.4). Lastly, can you spot any procedural elements, such as pronouns or DMs, or interpretive utterances, such as echo questions?

Aside from considering how RT might account for aspects of Interpretation, you might also reflect upon whether there are gaps in the theory – and, if that is the case, how RT could be changed to address them. As discussed in 2.6, a major criticism which has been levelled against RT is that it focuses mainly on what addressees do and does not say much about the role of communicators or how they co-operate in order to create meanings and Interpretations.

2.8.3 Exercises

(1) What are the higher-order explicatures of the following?

   (a) [A mother to her daughter] Please pick up your clothes from the floor.
   (b) [A woman to her colleague] Honestly, I don't like him.
   (c) [A man to his partner] I won't drink this heavily any more.

(2) What are the implicated premises and the implicated conclusions in the following exchanges?

   (a) A: How about nipping out to the beach later? B: It's pouring down!
   (b) A: Sandra doesn't seem to have much time for herself these days. B: She's been constantly jetting around for work lately.
   (c) A: I've run out of soy sauce. B: There's a small Chinese supermarket just around the corner.
   (d) [In front of a cinema] A: Let's go watch the last Star Wars movie. B: Sci-fi blockbusters are boring.
   (e) [At work] A: Sorry I'm late. Am I still in time for that meeting? B: They've all left.

(3) Look at the concept of implicature suggested in 2.3.3, and consider which possible conclusions A might derive from B's utterance in the following exchanges:

   (a) [At a barbecue] A: Any pork? B: I'm a vegetarian.
   (b) [Before an endurance race event in a track and field competition] A: Are you nervous? B: My legs are like jelly.

For each one, analyse how B might have adjusted her utterance to make that conclusion more or less likely to be derived as an implicature. Lastly, consider how the relative strength of implicatures varies according to which contextual assumptions are accessible in particular situations (and other sociocultural contexts, when translated into a different language).

(4) Suggest an interpretation for B's utterance in each of the following exchanges:

   (a) A: Have you seen the hair dryer? B: Your sister was having a shower earlier.
   (b) A: Valentina's in town for the evening. B: I'm sure she'll be exhausted, though.
   (c) A: That's the worst gig I've ever been to. B: You haven't been to many, then.
   (d) A: Antonio seems happy enough playing with the kittens, while we're all moving heavy stuff around here. B: Don't get me started.
   (e) A: Did you put the rubbish out? b: What if I didn't?

How will A go about finding an Interpretation? What makes the Interpretation they have arrived at consistent with the presumption of optimal relevance? In each case, also suggest an Interpretation which is likely to be less relevant because it would not give rise to enough effects, and one which is likely to be less relevant because it would not be accessed first.

(5) Again, suggest an interpretation for B's utterance in each of the following exchanges:

   (a) A: Do you want me to pop around to the shops? B: But you can't walk it!
   (b) A: Guilherme and António asked me if that cheese on top of the pizza is mozzarella or São Jorge cheese. B: I'm from Naples, man.
   (c) A: Will it be snowing tonight, you reckon? B: Sun's shining now. Gosh!
   (d) A: I can't stand Madonna's latest hit. B: Well, everyone's raving about it.
   (e) A: Do you want to go and see your dad? He's out working on the garden. B: In this rain? I don't think so.
   (f) A: I've put on the coffee machine. B: Yay! I was dying for a cup!

Can you identify expressions you think have procedural meanings? If so, how do they affect A's Interpretation of B's utterance?

(6) Consider B's utterances in each of the following exchanges, and decide whether the utterance is likely to be understood as representing a thought which is a description or an interpretation (or both):

(a) A: That singer who was on TV last night has just quit showbiz to follow a spiritual path. B: It's hard work being in the limelight all the time.
(b) A: Did you just say Iacopo's refusing to give us a hand? B: He's knackered after his Tai chi session.
(c) A: They're saying I'm ready to move up the career ladder now. B: Fantastic. What a marvellous thing.
(d) A: What did your girlfriend say when you told her they'd asked you to work overtime again? B: Not to go for it.

Explain what makes each utterance likely to be descriptive, interpretive, or vague between the two.

(7) Propose a RT-informed account of B's utterance in each of the following exchanges, assuming that it is taken to be an ironic utterance and that irony involves interpretive use which is implicitly attributive:

(a) [A has just knocked over one priceless Ming dynasty vase at B's house.] A: I'm really sorry. I hope you're not too angry about it. B: I'm not angry at all. I'm almost delighted.
(b) A: You're not offended that I didn't come to your daughter's wedding, right? B: Not at all. It really shows how much you love my family.
(c) A: I'm going to make myself an espresso. Capsules are over here, if you want one, too. B: Wow! Hospitality at its best, really.
(d) [A is talking to his partner about Daniele, who is B's grumpy accountant.] A: What if I invite Daniele for dinner on Friday? B: A good plan if I ever heard one!

(8) Translate B's utterances from exercise (5) into your working language. A number of scholars state that a translator's (or interpreter's) aim is to produce a text which is intended to resemble the original closely 'enough' for their audience to be able to get an 'accurate' enough idea of what it said (or implied) in the source text.

A series of questions arises: how do you define *accuracy* or *closeness*? Do you think your translation should aim to make the Interpretation your hearer arrives at, consistent with the presumption of optimal relevance? Should a reader of that language be able to derive *exactly* the same explicatures and implicatures as the English-speaking hearer of the source utterance? If so, would you 'adjust' certain aspects of your translated text (e.g., the procedural elements) to achieve 'the same' relevance?

Notes

1 It was first published in 1986; yet, important developments in the theory are to be found in the 1995 Postface to the second edition of the book.
2 See Padilla Cruz's (2016) and Wilson and Sperber's (2012) collections, to name just two.
3 The addition of the term 'positive' in the 1995 Postface was designed to recognise the likelihood that some effects derived on the basis of false assumptions might lead to an ostensive stimulus being less (rather than more) relevant. In particular, Sperber and Wilson posit that the human cognitive system is fallible, and that what seems to us like a relevant update to our system, may in fact turn out to make it correspond less well to how the world actually is. In that case, it will have seemed relevant to us without actually being relevant, since it does not bring about an improvement in our representation of the world.
4 Sperber and Wilson (1998) point out that what is retrieved from encyclopaedic memory and transferred to the memory of the deductive device are not individual assumptions, but chunks of information (also named *schemas*, *frames*, or *scripts*). Assimakopoulos (2017, 230) further explains that these chunks of information "can either provide ready-made contextual assumptions or skeletal schemas (scripts), which, together with new information derived from the utterance, create fully articulated assumptions".
5 The latter was dubbed 'the principle of relevance' in early presentations of RT, and can be seen as referred to as such in publications until the mid-1990s. In later revisions, Sperber and Wilson suggested that two ontologically distinct principles of relevance were necessary.
6 As Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995, 162) noted,

> Communicators and audience need no more know the [communicative] principle of relevance to communicate than they need to know the principles of genetics in order to reproduce. Communicators do not "follow" the principle of relevance; and they could not violate it even if they wanted to.

7 See also Recanati (2004).
8 Cf. 2.3.
9 Again, this promise is conveyed not because of some shared understanding between speaker and hearer, or some general norm of human conversational behaviour (cf. Grice's maxims in 1.3.3), but in the speaker's very act of communication itself.
10 A discussion on the relevant-theoretic shift from treating pragmatics as a Fodorian central, inferential process (Fodor 1983) to the view that it is a submodule of the '*theory of mind*' is beyond the scope of this volume. For further discussion, see Carruthers (2006), Huang (2007, 198–201), and Sperber (2005). We will return to the notion of *ostension processor* in 2.5.
11 Other plausible Interpretations for this utterance exist, and some would be more likely if Checco accessed different contextual assumptions. Assume Checco is aware that Marta is generally unreliable, or frequently makes excuses. In this case, Checco may access assumptions about Marta's general unreliableness and decide that she is producing another excuse and being disappointing again. Checco will reach this Interpretation if these assumptions are accessible, and both Checco and Marta are aware that they share them.
12 Since then, and following further research on the matter, most notably by Carston (cf. 1988, 2002), relevance theorists have not only stood their ground, but have also strengthened their position, eventually adopting a strong version of the **linguistic underdeterminacy thesis**, according to which,

"linguistically encoded meaning *never* fully determines the intended proposition expressed" (Carston 2002, 49; emphasis in the original).

13 In Gricean pragmatics, the type of meaning represented by explicature in RT has no equivalent. It is generated from linguistically encoded meaning, but it will vary from one context to the next (unlike Grice's 'what is said').

14 The process of free enrichment is 'free' because it is pragmatically (rather than linguistically) based.

15 Evidentials make clear the source or reliability of the evidence on which a statement is based. For instance, the utterance 'Fortunately, Sara found her missing dog' contains both a basic explicature (+>> 'Sara found her missing dog'), but also the higher-level explicature that 'the speaker finds it fortunate that Sara found her missing dog'.

16 The notion of higher-level explicature also plays a role in the RT account of irony, which we will discuss in 2.5.

17 As Carston (2002, 142) points out, all conversational implicatures fall into a "continuum of cases from the very frequent to the one-off", a statement backed up by experimental research on the processing of scalar inferences (cf. Noveck and Sperber 2007, and 6.2).

18 In particular, particularly creative metaphors do not communicate a strong implicature, but only a series of weak implicatures. The relevance of this loosely used expression depends solely on the recovery of at least some of these weakly communicated implicatures, and the expression thus achieves a 'poetic' effect. However, it is important to note that Sperber and Wilson (2008) state that not only metaphors can create poetic effects. Cf. also Wilson and Carson (2006).

19 The domain of semantics is indicated in light grey, while that of pragmatics in dark grey.

20 See also Jucker (1993), Wilson and Sperber (1993), and Wilson (2016).

21 RT does not offer a taxonomy of discourse relations, but rather it assumes that hearers are looking for cognitive effects. So, a number of DMs have been linked to particular cognitive effects and can therefore be classified corresponding to the three types of cognitive effects: (a) allowing the derivation of particular contextual implications (*so*); (b) strengthening previous assumptions (*after all*); (c) contradicting or eliminating previous assumptions (*but*, *however*).

22 Research which followed Blakemore's (1987) original proposals has shown that the two distinctions are not co-extensive. On the one hand, there is truth-conditional meaning which is procedural (e.g., pronouns) and non-truth-conditional meaning which is conceptual (e.g., sentence adverbials).

23 Procedural information constrains not only the derivation of implicated premises and implicated conclusions, but that of (basic and higher-level) explicatures as well (cf. Wilson and Sperber 1993; Blakemore 2002). Further, there is truth-conditional meaning which is procedural (e.g., pronouns) and non-truth-conditional meaning which is conceptual (e.g., sentence adverbials).

24 See, for example, Escandell-Vidal et al.'s (2011) collective volume, and Sasamoto and Wilson's (2016) Special Issue.

25 Also known as 'subjectivity markers'; e.g., repetitions, DMs, interjections, and so on (cf. Fludernik 1993).

26 Metaphor as *loose* use is situated on this continuum (cf. also 2.3.3).

27 This view differs from Grice's account of ironic utterances, which he sees as examples of the way in which a speaker may deliberately violate the quality maxim in order to communicate something other than 'what is said' (cf. 1.3.3).

28 This has been the case for several aspects of the theory. Cf., for instance, work in experimental pragmatics (e.g., Noveck and Sperber 2004, in particular van der Henst and Sperber 2004).
29 Mercier and Sperber (2017), for example, argue that intentional communication and the pragmatic principles which govern interaction arose for social reasons.
30 Cf. Wilson and Sperber (1992), and, for a full list of references, see Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995, 259).

Part II

3 A relevance-theoretic model of translation

3.1 Introduction: pragmatics and translation (and interpreting) studies

In the wake of World War II, the institutionalisation of **T&I** studies as a new academic field, expressly devoted to research and training, was a key consequence of the expansion of T&I as professional activities.

In the 1960s, the notion of *theory* as an idealised form of lawgiving that could discipline these subjects – and legitimate their professional fields – began to find fertile ground in the promises of objectivity given by post-Saussurean linguistics (Arrojo 2013, 122). Hailed as an **empirical** approach that would finally provide an understanding of communicative acts, modern linguistics led to a shift in focus from isolated sentences to the structure of whole utterances and texts, seen as responding to communicators' intentions. It seemed to offer T&I scholars the opportunity of formulating theories or – better still – a single, unified theory. According to Newmark (1988, 19), the ultimate goal of translation theory is "to determine appropriate translation methods for the widest possible range of texts or text-categories [in order to provide] a framework of principles, restricted rules and hints for translating texts and criticizing translations, a background for problem-solving".

In the 1970s, an increasing desire to provide greater academic space for the study of T&I manifested itself in the shared project of creating an entirely independent discipline devoted to the subject. Since then, the "**process** and **product**" (Mossop et al. 2005) of T&I have been studied under the lens of linguistic methods informed by a number of approaches, which all recognise the important function of language as a bearer of *meaning* in communication.[1] Amongst them are systemic functional linguistics, structural linguistics, and pragmatics.

Generally, if T&I are defined "in terms of sameness of meaning across languages" (Malmkjær 2011, 109), we can then easily see how T&I theory, practice, and research have been inextricably linked to pragmatics, and in particular the pursuit of central pragmatic questions, such as: where does meaning reside? What types of (implicit, explicit, intended, unintended, etc.) meaning(s) are there and how do we infer and Interpret them? Are

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some or all aspects of meaning(s) universal or language-specific? Can linguistic relationships of form and function be comparable cross-culturally?

Pragmatic principles and theoretical frameworks were first spotted in translation studies (henceforth, TS) in the 1970s, mirroring developments in linguistics in an attempt to find an adequate description and explanation of phenomena in translation (cf. Catford 1965, House 1981). Over the years, TS scholars have discovered that what is meant in any language is frequently different from what is said or written, and the communicator's intended effect on their addressee and the actual effect on them may have no direct relationship to the original text. So, when translators aim to recreate this link between language and meaning in a different language – and for the benefit of a 'different' addressee – they must bear in mind that they are working under the condition that the source texts (STs) and target texts (TTs) are bound to differ both linguistically and culturally. In particular, Hatim and Mason (1990, 92) claim that "as a text producer, the translator operates in a different socio-cultural environment, seeking to reproduce his or her interpretation of 'speaker meaning' in such a way as to achieve the intended effects on TT readers".

The strategies adopted to achieve '**equivalence**' between ST and TT, however, differ greatly according to the pragmatic framework scholars work within. The main areas of pragmatics that have influenced – and continue to do so – T&I research are speech acts, conversational implicature (cf. Chapter 1), politeness theory, and Relevance Theory. The overall assumption is that we do not translate between language systems, but between speakers of languages, in their different situational and cultural contexts. Therefore, increased attention to **context** is required in the production and the reception of both translated texts and interpreted utterances (cf. Baker 2006, and House 2016, 60, 63).

Context can be regarded as either the external, situational context and the wider cultural context in which it is embedded (cf. sociocultural pragmatics, most notably Austin 1962; Searle 1969, 1975) or the **internal, cognitive** factors that can influence one another in communication (cf. cognitive T&I studies or CTIS).[2] In the former case, translation is understood as a communicative act, not a mere linguistic act, and occurs in a social context (e.g., Hatim and Mason 1990). In the latter, translation is seen as a cognitive activity, in which a translator performs a complex mental process that consists of comprehending the meaning of a text and subsequently formulating it using the resources found in another language, all while considering the needs of the TA (Hurtado Albir and Alves 2009). In other words, while sociocultural pragmatics-informed approaches in TS focus on how situational and sociocultural factors affect the contextual constraints on a text and its appropriateness, CTIS look at how cognitive principles govern both the linguistic formulation by the sender of the text and the inferential processes leading to the final Interpretation of its meaning by the addressee.

Both approaches have been of great relevance for T&I as **cross-cultural** communication. CTIS – in particular, **cognitive pragmatics** – have become

an established area within TS (see Xiao and Muñoz Martín 2020, 6; Sun et al. 2021, 4). In CTIS, successful pragmatic 'equivalence' between the ST and the TT depends on the translator or interpreter's handling of two cognitive factors: (a) the ST producer's informative intention, and (b) the inferential processes leading to the correct Interpretation of meaning by the TT receiver. At the level of the text, these two pragmatic factors govern the notion of *implicature*.

As discussed in 2.2.1, the notion of context is also central in RT, and is described here as a set of premises used in Interpreting utterances. A communicator (a translator or interpreter) who intends an utterance to be interpreted in a particular way must either expect his audience to be able to supply a context that allows the intended Interpretation to be recovered, or else must supply this context themselves, because a mismatch between the context envisaged by the communicator and the one used by the audience may lead to misunderstanding. However, the notions of 'common knowledge' or 'mutual knowledge' should be replaced by the more accurate 'assumptions'. Communicators' behaviour is influenced by their assumptions about the world, as well as by their assumptions about other people's assumptions.

In this chapter, we will start by exploring the work of Ernst-August Gutt, who proposed the first RT-informed approach to TS, spearheaded by the publication of *Translation and Relevance: Cognition and Context* in 1991 (followed by a second edition in 2000). First, we will look at how Gutt (1991/2000) defines translation (3.2) and how Gutt's model has been used by other scholars to describe translator decision-making processes (3.3). Then, we will move on to explore how his notion of translation based on the RT model of human cognition has been used by several scholars to analyse various translation-related issues in different interlingual contexts (3.4). Section 3.5 focuses on interdisciplinary methods of analysis, while Section 3.6 surveys the critiques put forward by scholars about the applicability of RT to TS. We will end this chapter as always, with some food for thought (3.8).

3.2 Gutt's approach to translation

The most comprehensive model of translation developed within the RT framework is Gutt's (1990, 1991/2000, 2004b) approach, which considers the translator's task with reference to a model of the cognitive environments of original author, translator, original target audience, and translator's target audience. Using RT, Ernst-August Gutt (1990) suggests that there is no need for a separate translation theory as the act of translating (or interpreting) is just another act of communication.

3.2.1 Translation as an act of interlingual interpretive use

According to Gutt, the principal aim of a translator is to achieve optimal relevance, which – as seen in 2.2.1 – is the cost-benefit relation of

processing effort spent versus contextual effects obtained. Clearly, translators achieve relevance by communicating to their audience what the ST author wrote. TT readers are not confronted with the original content, but with that produced by the translator, thus Gutt (2000, 213) states that "*de facto* translation is an act of communication between translator and target audience only" (original emphasis).

Gutt summarises his account of translator decision-making as follows:

> Thus if we ask in what respects the intended interpretation of the translation should resemble the original, the answer is: in respects that make it adequately relevant to the audience – that is, that offer adequate contextual effects; if we ask how the translation should be expressed, the answer is: it should be expressed in such a manner that it yields the intended interpretation without putting the audience to unnecessary processing effort.
>
> (Gutt 2000, 107)

Gutt (1991/2000) argues that RT is applicable to many types of translation, from poetry to simultaneous interpreting.[3] The translator's task is then "to understand at each point what contextual effects were inferred in the original context and thereby form a comprehensive hypothesis of the intended interpretation of the original, consisting of both explicatures and implicatures" (Gutt 2000, 233).

In contrast with scholars before him,[4] Gutt draws on the distinction between *descriptive* and *interpretive* use of languages (cf. 2.5) to define translation as a case of "**interlingual interpretive use**" (Gutt 2000, 105), as represented diagrammatically in Figure 3.1:



Figure 3.1 Gutt's (2000, 214) account of translation.

Source: Based on Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995, 232).

According to this diagram, a translation text is an Interpretation of the author's or speaker's thought, which in itself is an Interpretation of a thought attributed to someone who expressed it in a different language. In other words, it involves a further level of metarepresentation and is relevant as a thought about a thought (cf. also 3.2.6).

Following RT tenets, Gutt considers the TT as an ostensive stimulus (cf. 2.2), which signals to its readers the translator's intention to convey relevant information. Information is relevant when its meaning can be inferred by the TT readers without unnecessary processing effort and when the inferential process yields cognitive benefits in the form of context modifications (e.g., new contextual implications or the strengthening or cancelling of previously held assumptions). The task in translation is, thus, to reproduce the ST's ostensive stimuli in order to achieve in the TL addressees the same contextual effects the original stimuli have in the ST recipients. The ostensive stimuli of the SL and TL texts, however, need not be – and, indeed, cannot be (due to differences between linguistic systems) – fully identical.

To sum up, the translator mediates between the intentions and evidences of the ST and the TT, which is an ostensive stimulus defined as a case of interlingual interpretive use. Translators achieve relevance by communicating the SC's intentions to a TA.

3.2.2 Indirect vs direct translation

Gutt (1989) differentiates between two types of translation. In **indirect translations**, there is no need to refer to the context of the ST. They are designed to function on their own and allow the translator to be more flexible as the TT only needs to resemble the ST in its most relevant aspects. In other words, they may be freely modified by making implicit information explicit in order to achieve maximal relevance for its intended readers. A **direct translation**, on the other hand, requires the audience to be familiar with the cognitive environment of the ST in order to interpret it. The exact definition of direct translation is given by Gutt (2000, 171):

> A receptor language utterance is a direct translation of a source language utterance if and only if it purports to interpretively resemble the original completely in the context envisaged for the original.

In other words, direct translation seeks complete, **interpretive resemblance**, and it results from the assumption that the audience of the TT has to be familiar with the cognitive environment of the ST. This implies that the product of direct translation may require more effort to process. TS scholars should focus on this type of translation because of this (explicit or implicit) presumption of interpretively resembling original content.

If the aim of a direct translation is to achieve interpretive resemblance – in terms of shared explicatures and implicatures – translators must choose

the degree of resemblance. In this context, translators are constrained by the notion of **faithfulness**, which is conceived of as the belief that the translation is a "faithful enough representation of the original" (Wilson and Sperber 1988, 137; cf. 2.5).[5] The development of this universal definition of faithfulness, which has always been a problematic issue in TS, may be seen as the greatest achievement of Gutt's approach.

To understand this dichotomy[6] in practical terms, let us consider the translation of two different texts: (a) a tourist brochure, which aims to help tourists navigate around a city, and (b) an advert, used for marketing purposes. While the translated brochure may be composed without reference to the ST, the translation of the ad would be completely dependent on the ST. The tourist brochure would be the product of direct translation – in that the TT is intended to achieve relevance in its own right – whereas the translation of the ad could achieve relevance only in virtue of its interpretive resemblance to the SL original. This indicates a greater freedom enjoyed in the case of the brochure translation task. The production of an advert, conversely, can only work interpretively (surrendered to the constraints of the translation).

It must be noted that there is no clear boundary between these two modes of translation. The Interpretations of translations will always be different from the Interpretations of the ST to the extent in which the TL and the SL contexts make complete interpretive resemblance impossible. Translators (and post-editors) must seek to achieve optimum relevance in situations where the translation cannot preserve contextual implications. While "direct translation strives for complete interpretive resemblance, indirect translation settles for interpretive resemblance in relevant respects" (Smith 2002, 110).

Furthermore, direct translation has been likened to direct quotation, but with one important difference; while quotations preserve both form and meaning, enormous formal differences between languages make complete interpretive resemblance untenable in the case of translation (Gutt 1998, 42). 'Extreme' direct translations and 'extreme' indirect translations are rare, but they may occur, sometimes with reason and within the same TT. In promotional literature, for instance, we sometimes identify examples of some of these extreme cases: from cases of transliteration to cases of rewriting, etc.

3.2.3 Shared communicative clues

In RT, the notion of "**shared communicative clues**" (Gutt 1991, 127) is proposed as a possible solution to the problem of inter-linguistic disparity. Even though Gutt (1991, 162–164) shows that it is not the sharing of all communicative clues that defines direct translation, but the claim of complete interpretive resemblance – the reason being that the notion of communicative clue "does not have any theoretical status of its own but

is, in fact, derived from the notion of 'interpretive use'" – "it may well be that the concept 'communicative clue' will prove of some value in the practice of translation" (Gutt 1991, 164).

Just as a communicator in a monolingual context gives his hearers "clues" that enable inferential processing, translators are required to provide communicative clues arising from a variety of properties, such as "semantic representations, syntactic properties, phonetic properties, discourse connectives, formulaic expressions, stylistic properties of words, onomatopoeia and phonetic properties that give rise to poetic effects" (Gutt 1990, 140).

Communicative cues can be found in any domain and at any level of linguistic analysis. For instance, focal (i.e., semantically or syntactically marked) effects may be achieved by using prosodic stress in some languages, and not in others. If stress cannot be used as a communicative cue in the TL, it may be replaced by other crucial communicative clues such as syntactic means (e.g., clefting in Italian: "È lui che . . .", *It is him who* . . .) or propositional elements (cf. 2.4).

We must, however, note that languages differ both in the patterns of structure employed, and in the values assigned to what could be a similar pattern. Cumulative effects conveyed by sequences of elements also tend to vary across languages.[7] In addition to this factor of complexity, translators must consider the frequency of use in the TL. Let us consider the case of repetition or parallelism. From a RT perspective, the effect of these structures is seen in terms of "the cost-benefit correlation between the effort needed to process a stimulus and the contextual effects to be expected as a reward" (Gutt 1991, 140). With repetition or parallelism being frequently used in a range of Eastern languages, will such a structure be as 'noteworthy' in these languages compared, say, to English?

Gutt puts forward the following tenet which accounts for both complexity and frequency of use:

> if a communicator uses a stimulus that manifestly requires *more* processing effort than some other stimulus equally available to him, the hearer can expect that the benefits of this stimulus will *outweigh* the increase in processing cost – otherwise the communicator would have failed to achieve optimal relevance.
>
> (Gutt 1991, 148)

Thus, if focalisation in English, for example, has stress as a common realisation (thus requiring minimal processing effort), the alternative solution of clefting in a TL such as Italian would only be adequate if clefting is also commonly used in this language. Imbalance would otherwise set in, and the interlingual disparity between cost and benefit would become too much to handle.

3.2.4 Cognitive environments

According to Gutt, the focus in TS should not be on the comparison of textual matters, but on the comparisons of Interpretations given that texts are "complex pieces of evidence designed to lead the audience to the intended interpretations in certain **cognitive environments**" (Gutt 2004a, 157; cf. also 2.2.1). Readers infer the meaning intended by translators by relating the TT to that subset of their assumptions about the world which is assumed to be the context of meaning Interpretation intended by the speakers.

This cognitive environment is the **context** of the text.[8] Contexts may differ in the facts that are cognitively available for text Interpretation. The translator has to assume different cognitive environments between the original and the newly addressed readers, which make it necessary to help the audience along in TT Interpretation by providing information that widens their contextual assumptions. As a result, more of the original context is available to the TT reader, reducing her processing effort throughout the inferential processes. However, it is the responsibility of the TT addressee to familiarise herself with the context assumed by the original communicator, even if this may not be easy (Gutt 1991, 166).

Let us examine the following example, taken from Hatim and Munday (2004, 55). This quote is taken from an interview between a Newsweek journalist and Ridley:

(1) NEWSWEEK: It is a bid [sic][9] odd, *isn't it*, that a journalist who was held captive by the Taliban would, several months later, be converting to Islam?
RIDLEY: I know, *you couldn't make it up*. It is strange.
(*Newsweek* 26 August 2002 [italics added])

Focusing on the question tag "isn't it", we can say that this propositional element suggests 'surely', and (as all propositional meaning) cannot be straightforwardly rendered into any language, certainly not into Arabic. For example, Arabic-English translators may need to gloss it by rendering it as "أنا متأكد من أنك ستوافق" [ana muta'akkid min 'anaka satuafiq], *I am sure you will agree*. Similarly, they may need to complement the idiomatic expression "you couldn't make it up" by something like "حتى لو أردت ذلك" [hataa law 'aradta dhalika], *Even if you wanted to*. These pragmatic glosses are fundamental in any meaningful rendering of the utterances in (1), otherwise the translation may compromise relevance when it could not guide the TT reader properly towards making the appropriate inferences. Here, we have two different cognitive environments yielding different contextual assumptions, and consequently different Interpretations. A 'literal' kind of rendering, without the proper

communicative clues, would indeed establish relevance, but of the wrong kind.

To sum up, direct translations are those cases of **interlingual interpretive use** in which the translator makes choices in such a way that the TT interpretively resembles the ST. This resemblance or closeness is a requirement which is not strictly complied with in indirect translations, and which, when responding in direct translation, entails that we identify and preserve communicative clues.

3.3 Translator decision-making processes

Having looked at Gutt's RT-based approach, we shall now examine in more detail how translators form or decide on the intended Interpretation of their translation.

3.3.1 Assessing communicability

A translator's task is to form a communicative intention, and then decide whether this communicative intention can in fact be communicated:

> Thus, the translator is confronted not only with the question of *how* he should communicate, but *what* he can reasonably expect to convey by means of his translation. The answer to this question will be determined by his view of the cognitive environment of the target audience, and it will affect some basic decisions. It will, for example, have a bearing on whether he should engage in interpretive use [translation] at all or whether descriptive use [non-translation] would be more appropriate.
>
> (Gutt 1991, 180–181; emphasis in the original)

So, while most TS models focus on how to express the ST meaning in the TT language, Gutt's model alerts the translator to the fact that this is preceded by a crucial step, whereby the translator is called upon to determine *what* to communicate in his translation.

If the translator believes that it is relevant to his audience to recognise that the TT is presented in virtue of its resemblance to an original in another language, then he will have to consider what degree of ST-TT resemblance he should aim for, being aware that communicability requires that the TL text resemble the original at least "closely enough in relevant respects" (Wilson and Sperber 1988, 137). To determine what is a "close enough" resemblance "in relevant respects", the translator needs to gauge both the contextual effects and the processing effort involved for his audience.

Let us now give an example by way of illustration. In a monolingual exchange, my intention is to ask my friend Claudio to fetch my glasses

from a table which is far from me, but close to him. I may utter any of the following utterances:

> (2) Per favore, mi potresti prendere gli occhiali sul tavolo? Grazie. [Could you fetch me my glasses from the table, please?]
> (3) Guarda, mi prendi gli occhiali sul tavolo? [Go and fetch me my glasses from the table, will you?]
> (4) Accidenti, mi son scordato gli occhiali! [Damn, I forgot my glasses!]
> (5) Già che sei là . . . [While you're over there?]

My choice between utterances (2), (3), (4), or (5) depends on my expectations of what my friend will make of each of them, which in turn are contingent on the range of assumptions my friend is likely to access when Interpreting my utterance. The range of choices here go from a polite request in (2) to a casual and more indirect one in (5), which relies on a high level of understanding between the communicator and his addressee. The latter would be the most appropriate given the context: my friend is aware that I like reading, and cannot do it without my glasses, which are usually on that table. In other contexts, this might not be the most appropriate choice, and communicators might have to resort to utterance (2). Differences in accessible assumptions will impact not just whether the hearer understands that this is request for glasses, but also a variety of aspects of the social relationship at hand.

When writing for a big audience, as is the case for a newspaper article or a translation, the issue becomes much more daunting. In this case, the writer must convey a set of assumptions shared by a large number of people. Assumptions will differ substantially, so the writer will have less control over how his words are perceived than he would in a face-to-face conversation (such as in (1) to (5)). According to Gutt, translators must first model the assumptions of the ST writers and the ST readers, and then model the TA's assumptions in order to translate them. At each stage, aside from the choices linked to the linguistic differences between ST and TT, translators are therefore called upon to determine how closely the TT readers' assumptions will resemble the ST readers' assumptions. It is an issue of **communicability**. As Gutt (2004a, 169) states:

> Just as prior to interpreting the original the translator has to assess his own cognitive environment in order to ensure his correct understanding of the original, so now prior to the translation process the translator needs to assess the cognitive environment of the receptor audience, trying to determine whether the meaning he is intending to convey will be communicable in that environment.

We can illustrate how this applies to a specific case by considering utterance (3), which we can consider here as taken from an Italian contemporary

novel. When translating this utterance into English, the translator must think about the contextual assumptions available to the ST addressee and how the ST writer imagined them when choosing how to formulate the utterance. Specifically, he needs to think about how utterance (3) will be understood by members of its SA, knowing that not all members of that audience will interpret it in the same way. Simplifying greatly, assumptions the translator makes might include:

a. This is a rather informal way in Italian of asking for an object to be fetched.
b. This is the kind of utterance which is appropriate between people who have a close relationship.
c. Not every member of the SA may be familiar with the meaning of "Guarda" in utterance (3).

So, the translator's task might be seen as to find a formulation in English which is similar in its level of informality and suggestion of a close relationship, while also being one which not all members of the audience will be familiar with.[10]

Nevertheless, translation always involves compromise. People who speak the same language may differ greatly in their cognitive environments, especially in larger language groups with significant degrees of sociocultural variety. In the case of utterance (3), the translator may find a form which is consistent with assumptions 1 and 2, but which is likely to be known to everyone in the TA, were he to prioritise implications about the relationship between the characters over the possibility of some audience members being confused by the utterance. Other translators, instead, will find a form that is slightly less familiar, yet shares the property of not being known to everyone in the TA.

3.3.2 Adjusting the content or the Interpretation?

So far, we have stated that the translator is required to examine whether the contextual assumptions needed for deriving the intended meaning are accessible to the TA. If they are, he can begin the translation task with reasonable expectations of success. If that is not the case, the translator must consider alternative solutions to this communicability issue before proceeding with his work.

Let us consider the following example from Gutt (2004a), which concerns the rendering of the Gospel of Matthew[11] for the Silt'e people in Ethiopia. Here, it is reported how Jesus called his first two followers:

> (6) 18. As Jesus was walking beside the Sea of Galilee, he saw two brothers, Simon called Peter and his brother Andrew. They were casting a net into the lake, for they were fishermen. 19. "Come, follow

> me," Jesus said, and I will make you fishers of men." At once they left their nets and followed him.
>
> (Matth. 4:18–20, New International Version, as quoted in Gutt 2004a, 169–170.)

The majority of Silt'e people are unlikely to have heard of the Sea of Galilee, nor, possibly, of fishing (as they live on Ethiopia's highlands). Thus, the passage considered would require processing effort, but would yield few, if any, contextual effects. In other words, if the readers could make sense of these ideas at all, the passage would still be of quite low, if any relevance, to them. So, what can translators do?

In Gutt's approach, there are two different answers to this question:

1. The first one would be to strive for **high interpretive resemblance** with the ST, and expect the TT readers to adjust their cognitive environment in ways that are required for effective Interpretation.
2. The alternative option is to take the cognitive environment of the TT readers as given and adapt the intended TT meaning to it, resulting in adequate contextual effects in that environment at the cost of a **reduced degree of interpretive resemblance**.

In the case of (6), Gutt shows that both solutions were pursued. In the case of the rendering aimed at higher interpretive resemblance, the translator sought to retain as much of the information expressed in the original as language differences allowed:

> (7) 18. One day Jesus was walking along the side of a sea called "Galilee". While walking there he saw two men, an older and a younger brother, throwing their net into the water in order to catch fish. The older brother's name was first "Simon"; later he was called "Peter." The younger brother's name was "Andrew." 19. Then Jesus said to them, "Come and follow me as my disciples; instead of you catching fish I will make you bring people back to God." 20. They immediately left their net and followed him.
>
> (BT, as in Gutt 2004a, 170)

Most of the Silt'e readers would need adjustments in their cognitive environments before one could expect their Interpretations to come close to the ST's informative intention. As a result, the reader's ability to understand the TT will be contingent on further material being made available (cf. the explicitations of *Galilee* and *net*). With such background information available, the rendering in (7) would lead them to an Interpretation with high interpretive resemblance with the ST.

On the other hand, the alternative solution given by Gutt is a rendering which seeks to achieve (an acceptable degree of) relevance in the

unadjusted cognitive environment by lowering the degree of interpretive resemblance to the original:

> (8) One day Jesus met an older and a younger brother, called "Simon" and "Andrew", as they were doing their work. Jesus told them, "Come with me as my disciples! I will teach you (God's work)." Simon and Andrew left their work right away, and from then on they went with Jesus.
>
> (BT, as in Gutt 2004a, 171)

The translation in (8) shows a reduced degree of interpretive resemblance to the meaning of the ST. Simultaneously, resemblance is preserved in certain essential features of this story: that Jesus summoned Simon and Andrew from their work to teach them how to work for God, and that they immediately obeyed, demonstrating Jesus' authority. In this rendition, understanding the intended meaning would not require unfamiliar contextual knowledge, and yet it would result in enough contextual effects.

In this section, we have analysed the tasks of inferring the intended meaning of the ST and of designing the intended Interpretation of the TT. The next section will look more closely at how interpretive resemblance relations can be managed in the last steps of the translation process, with a view to achieving successful communication.

3.3.3 Monitoring resemblance relations

Although comparing the two Interpretations to monitor interpretative resemblance is an important aspect of the TT production, translators should consider doing it also when reviewing the quality of the TT once their first draft is complete.

We shall again look at a passage (9) from Woolf's (1925/1990, 8) *Mrs Dalloway* – very different from the opening *in medias res* discussed in 2.2. This passage is one of the novel's most lyrical passages, investing the reader with the feeling of unease inherent in Clarissa:

> (9) She had a perpetual sense, as she watched the taxi cabs, of being out, out, far out to sea and alone; she always had the feeling that it was very, very dangerous to live even one day.

Clarissa is still on her shopping expedition in Piccadilly when she takes a break to look at the omnibuses, and explore her underlying feelings of alienation, inadequacy, and danger even when wandering through bustling metropolitan streets. London's hustle and bustle, just as the continuous movement of water, can be fascinating at times, but it can also threaten to drown those who are unable to withstand the pressure. Fear

of failure, of being overwhelmed by – or even drowning in – the stresses of life, are all too common in her age. She is 52 years old, has lived through a war, thus her life experiences have heightened the perils of living and facing the world and other people. The language is simple, and the author relies on rhythm – "out, out, far out to sea" – as iteration, one of Woolf's most- and best-used tools.

Let us now analyse Linati's (1927) translation in (10), which was the first ever to be published in the Italian language:

> (10) E mentre guardava i taxi cabs ebbe la sensazione infinite di essere via, lontana, sola, sopra il mare. L'impressione che vivere, anche per un giorno soltanto, fosse cosa assai difficile, l'aveva sempre avuta. [BT: And as she watched the *taxi cabs* [*in English*] she had the endless feeling of being away, far out, alone, at sea. The impression that to live, even for one day, was a very difficult thing, she had always had.]

We immediately notice that Clarissa's sense of unease is toned down in Linati's TT. But why? The first element to highlight is the shift of the sight of cabs from the second position in the ST to the forefront of the TT. In (9), a key element was Clarissa's continuous impression of being far away and lonely, and the author tells her readers that this feeling occurs while Clarissa is looking at taxis, as to depict her with a somewhat absent look on London's busy life.

Secondly, "of being out, out, far out to sea and alone" is translated as "the endless feeling of being away, far out, alone, at sea". Woolf's iteration ("out, out, far out to sea") is lost in the TT, replaced by an adverb and two adjectives ("via, lontana, sola"). In (10), Clarissa's feelings of alienation and inadequacy somewhat become pleasant; there is almost a sense of adventure in that infinite feeling of being far away, alone at sea. It almost lets readers' imagination fly to a fantastic, poetic dimension. That the sense of bewilderment contained in Woolf's words was probably not too clear to Linati can also be perceived in the translation of the following sentence, "she always had the feeling that it was very, very dangerous to live even one day". The dramatic nature of her feelings is revealed by the use of the adverb "always", which makes it clear that Clarissa has felt that way all her life, but which is moved to the very end of Linati's sentence.

Here, it is worth dwelling on the use of the adjective *dangerous*. This lexical choice, which accompanies the verb "to live", is interesting for a woman like Clarissa, who has probably never perceived *danger* in the common sense of the term. The feeling of danger is certainly given by that sense of bewilderment. To her, life becomes dangerous because it forces her to act, to overcome her uncertainty and insecurity by facing a difficult and risky undertaking that implies great courage – to live.[12] Once

more, Linati's translation conveys a sense of serene reflection. "Very, very dangerous" in the ST is here rendered as "a very difficult thing", again not rendering the iteration in the original text.

There seems to be a causal relation between the syntactic and rhetorical shifts in the TT and the loss of the interpretive intention of the ST – selected by RT's comprehension procedure – that is, Clarissa's underlying feelings of alienation and inadequacy in life prompted by her observation of London's public life. In fact, this intention is further supported in that it explains why Woolf kept seemingly unnecessary redundancies (the iterations of *out* and *very*) that would increase processing effort. These redundancies are well motivated as they are optimal in leading to the correct Interpretation. Here, thus, lies the main issue with the Italian translation; it makes it much harder to arrive at the interpretive meaning as it requires a more complex, hence more costly process of Interpretation. On the contrary, Linati's text seems to lead us on a completely different path, conveying a sense of serene observation.

One important point to be made here is that, according to Gutt, there is no particular linguistic property that would per se give rise to this interpretation. Neither the same juxtaposition of sentences nor the choice of the same lexical items do – in and of themselves – signal these poetic effects. In other words, the poetic effects are not linguistically encoded. Rather, a number of linguistic properties and contextual factors conspire to yield this rich, rewarding Interpretation, following the relevance theoretic comprehension procedure. This leads to the further point that, during his last checks of the TT, the translator has to consider the resultant Interpretation in order to determine whether or not a particular property of a text is fundamental for the communicative event: if it serves to provide a communicative clue (cf. 3.2.3). Communicative clues cannot be identified by a straightforward lexical or syntactic analysis alone, but only in relation to the contribution they make to the intended Interpretation.

As a result of its explicitness concerning the comprehension procedure, RT is of great assistance to the translator when analysing the subtle nuances of Interpretation. However, improving the translator's ability to identify resemblances and differences between the ST and TT does not fully address the issue posed in 3.2.1: what *degree* of resemblance should the translator strive for in order to ensure successful communication?

3.3.4 Coordinating intentions and expectations of resemblance

We have seen that translators are faced with a similar situation to a 'normal' communication and, thus, have several responsibilities. They are called upon to decide whether and how it is possible to communicate the informative intention, whether to translate descriptively or interpretively,

and what degree of resemblance to the source text there should be. All these decisions are to be based on the translator's evaluation of the cognitive environment of the TA. To succeed, the translator and his readers need to share basic assumptions about the resemblance that is sought, and the translator's intentions must agree with the reader's **expectations of resemblance** (Gutt 2000, 192).

Expectations of adequate interpretive resemblance – just like expectations of adequate contextual effects – are strongly context-dependent. This context-dependence also applies to translation; however there is one specific issue that does not appear to have the same impact on intralingual interpretive usage. The subtleties emerging from the inferential nature of translation are frequently lost on TT readers. Most people (including clients) have a notion of translation which appears to be based on the code model (cf. 1.1); if language encodes meaning, then all translators need to do is to re-code that meaning into the TL. There is frequently minimal understanding of how much the act of translation relies on specific cognitive environments and communicability conditions (cf. 3.3.1) that must be met for a translation to be successful. Moreover, there is hardly any awareness at all that expectations of resemblance may actually be in conflict with communicability conditions (cf. examples (7) and (8) in 3.3.2).

Gutt's (2004a) short-term solution is that the translator himself raises awareness with his clients and/or readers as much as is possible, explaining the issues, giving different options, and, lastly, negotiating a good solution that satisfies both parties. As a long-term solution, a suggestion would be that the education system "included teaching on the cognitive foundations of communication and translation, replacing naive and often wishful ideas of translation by scientifically valid concepts" (Gutt 2004a, 177).

3.3.5 Modelling translators' competence

From a RT perspective of translation, it is clear that a high level of **metarepresentational skills** (cf. 3.2.1) are required to manage these different Interpretations and cognitive environments.

Gutt's research is based on the observation that human beings have the exceptional "ability to tell in one language what was first told in another language" (Gutt 2000, 205). In this context, Gutt defends a **competence-oriented research of translation** (CORT) that "seeks to understand translation through understanding the communicative competence that makes it possible, for both the translator and his/her audience" (Gutt 2000, 205). In other words, the aim of CORT is to understand and explicate the mental faculties that enable human beings to translate in the sense of expressing in one language what has been written in another.

The recognition of informative intentions depends on specific abilities, such as inferring and predicting the content of mental states – in other words, metarepresentation. As Wilson (2012, 231) states, metarepresentation is seen as "the ability to identify speaker meanings is nothing but the general mindreading ability applied to a specific communicative domain". According to RT, texts or utterances are interpretive representations of a SC's thoughts, which necessarily involve at least one level of metarepresentation to allow the recognition of informative and communicative intentions.

Drawing on this notion of *metarepresentation*, Gutt (2004b) discusses translation competence, and investigates translations as a **higher order act of communication**. He postulates that the main concern of translators is not the representation of states of affairs, but the metarepresentation of bodies of thought. Thanks to metarepresentation, translators can achieve interpretive resemblance by drawing on cognitive environments of both SCs and TA. Accordingly, the translator must focus on the cognitive environment of the parties concerned – not just on external contextual factors. In principle, the communicator, the translator, and the reader can have a different cognitive environment. However, Gutt points out that "as soon as one recognises the need to deal with different cognitive environments, it becomes clear that ***metarepresentational skills*** must be a core component of translation competence" (Gutt 2004b, 78; emphasis added).

Gutt (2004b) reiterates the notion of CORT, suggesting that higher order acts of communication can be applied to a situation where an SC and his audience do not share a mutual cognitive environment. In such cases – known as "secondary communication" (c.f. Smith 2002) – Gutt argues that additional sophistication at the cognitive level is needed for communication to ensue (i.e., the ability of individuals to metarepresent what has been communicated to them).

In conclusion, Gutt builds on RT to formulate a new account of translation, seen as a case of interlingual interpretive language use. This results from the relationship between processing effort and cognitive effects, mediated by higher-order representations. Gutt (2004b) further claims that a translator's capacity to metarepresent is a cognitive prerequisite for the ability to translate.

Several TS scholars have enthusiastically embraced Gutt's model, focusing on aspects of translation process, translation competence, and explicitation, amongst other topics. We shall refer to these works in more detail in the following sections of this chapter.

3.4 Applications of Gutt's model in translation studies

Gutt's (1991/2000) view on translation as attributed thought is shared by Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995) as well as a wide array of other

TS scholars, the majority of whom share Gutt's claim that translation as communication can be explained using RT concepts alone and that "there is no need for developing a separate theory of translation, with concepts and a theoretical framework of its own" (Gutt 2000, 235). Thanks to their research, aspects of Gutt's model have now been validated **empirically**.

In this section, I can only present a relatively small segment of these studies, with a focus on a number of prominent issues discussed within the RT-oriented literature in TS.

3.4.1 The effort-effect relation

As shown by the example of the family reunion in 2.2.2, human cognition is designed to maximise the generation of cognitive effects at the minimal cost of processing effort. This relation between processing effort and cognitive effects is of paramount importance to an investigation of the role of effort and effect in translation.

Following this axiom, Fábio Alves (1995) developed a cognitive model of the translation process. Alves maintains that translators search for optimal interpretive resemblance between propositional forms – each one in the respective working language. His model was driven by **empirical** data obtained from **think-aloud protocols** of Portuguese and Brazilian translators and tested for the language pair German-Portuguese.

Further, Alves (2007) conducted an empirical research to evaluate the relation between processing effort and cognitive effects, analysing translation process data collected using keylogging in conjunction with retrospective verbal protocols. The analysis compared keylogged data with metarepresentations of the task at hand, obtained through the protocols, to explore segmentation patterns in terms of time spent on the task (including deletions and regressions). According to this study, professional translators worked faster and more purposefully by assessing verbally justified reasons for the output rendered by participants. This shows there are meaningful correlations between the type of processing effort undertaken and the corresponding cognitive effects yielded in the TT, and their corresponding metarepresentations conveyed through retrospection.

As a result, Alves (2007) was able to corroborate the validity of the first or cognitive principle of relevance (cf. 2.2.2) – human cognition is designed to maximise the creation of cognitive effects with the least amount of processing work – in the case of translation tasks performed by expert translators. Nonprofessional translators, on the other hand, displayed a type of processing effort that showed a linear pattern of segmentation, with little meaningful processing effort and almost no justified retrospection for their output. This indicates weak cognitive effects,

pointing to a type of cognitive behaviour that reveals a lack of ability to carry out the translation task effectively.

3.4.2 The role of conceptual and procedural encodings

As discussed in 2.4, Blakemore (1987, 2002, 2004) introduced the distinction between conceptually encoded information and procedurally encoded elements of speech. The former can be both extended in propositional terms and enriched, while the latter is not propositionally extendable, and only contributes to the processing of an utterance by imposing procedural constraints on the inferential phase of comprehension. In particular, procedural meaning seems to be of importance to TS (see Unger 2000).

Grisot and Moeschler (2014) and Grisot et al. (2016) address this distinction from both theoretical and empirical perspectives following a multifaceted methodology: work on parallel corpora, contrastive analysis methodology, and offline experimentation with natural language processing applications. They argue that the conceptual/procedural distinction should be investigated under the aegis of empirical pragmatics. In the 2014 case study, for instance, they bring evidence from offline experiments – consisting of linguistic judgement task that resulted in human annotated data – for the procedural and conceptual contents of the English Simple Past in order to improve the results of a **machine translation** (MT) system.

The results of the annotation experiment showed that verb tenses encode procedural elements that instruct the TA to look for other eventualities that are related to the eventuality considered, namely the [_ narrativity] procedural feature. The pragmatic feature identified as procedural information – and then validated through human annotation experiments – was used as a label for discourse tagging with an automatic classifier. Moreover, a MT system trained on the annotated **corpus** was shown to have better results for translating verb tenses than if it had not made use of the [_ narrativity] pragmatic feature.

According to Alves and Gonçalves' (2003) study on 16 translation students, the conceptual-procedural distinction assumed in RT can be useful in accounting for processing effort in translation. They used key-logged data from four nonprofessional translators (English into Portuguese) to define micro translation units, which they then annotate and analyse in terms of the linguistic complexity and relative distance of editing procedures in related units. The initial hypothesis was that procedurally encoded information in the ST would be easier to recognise. As a result, similar inferential processing would be yielded across subjects, and translation strategies would be more structurally oriented. Further, they postulated that conceptually encoded elements would be handled based on the contextual assumptions that were available to each translator. Consequently, translation solutions would be inferentially supported

by contextual assumptions – generated from the cognitive environments of the translators – and randomly vary among subjects.

Alves and Gonçalves' (2003) results suggest that considering processing effort from a RT perspective not only offers insights into translation, but also contributes to validating some of the RT claims. As the authors state, "it becomes difficult to arrive at any instance of interpretive resemblance if procedurally and conceptually encoded information is not handled adequately by translators" (Alves and Gonçalves 2003, 21). In particular, procedurally encoded information need contextual support to be processed effectively. Difficulties in retrieving the communicative clues (cf. 3.2.3) conveyed by procedurally encoded information hindered the generation of positive cognitive effects, validating RT assumptions about the hybrid nature of the conceptual-procedural distinction for the performance of translation tasks.

Drawing on Gutt's work, Alves and Gonçalves (2013) have looked at keylogged data of expert translators when executing direct and inverse translation tasks. Translators' behaviour that indicates a return to previously translated material and its subsequent modification can be one way to observe how much effort was exerted. Using instruments such as Translog and a Tobii T-60 eye tracker, and retrospective verbal protocols, the authors count the number of edits made in conceptual and procedural encodings during the translation process.

To annotate these revisions, Alves and Gonçalves establish a taxonomy to classify edits made in macro translation units. In this study two classes of annotations are used, using the following tags:

- Translation phases annotation are made with tags [P0], [P1], [P2], and [P3], which indicate when or in which translation phase edits may occur.
- Linguistic edits are annotated with tags such as [l], [m], [p], [t], or [c], in order to record the conceptual and procedural encodings.

According to their findings, the effort translators required in rendering procedurally encoded information is greater than in segments rendering conceptually encoded information. Hybrid encodings, which include conceptual elements with a procedural function, have an effect on the performance of the translation task, requiring additional processing effort in both direct and inverse translation tasks. One particular behaviour that can be observed is editing; the effort to produce a final text in order to facilitate readers' inferencing by providing adequate contextual clues.

Lastly, Alves et al. (2014) used keylogged and eye-tracking data to study processing effort in translation task performance, on the basis of Blakemore's distinction. When conceptual and procedural information is compared in specific areas of interest, they found statistically significant differences. In particular, instances related to procedural encoding seem

to require more processing effort to be translated. In both Alves et al. (2014) and Alves and Gonçalves (2013), effort was assessed in terms of the number of edits (replacement of incomplete segments, substitutions, deletions) and the distance of those editing processes from the first rendering of a given section, and not measured temporally in terms of time spent on a given segment.

In conclusion, the work by Alves and his colleagues shows that contextual assumptions play a role in handling procedurally and conceptually encoded elements, and highlight that a RT view of translation can account for how implicatures and explicatures are expressed in different cognitive environments – and, thus, in different TTs.

3.4.3 Translation competence acquisition: the role of metacognition

Drawing on Gutt's (2004b) analysis illustrated in 3.3.5, Alves (2007) shows that translators tend to regulate the relation between processing effort and cognitive effect on the basis of a multi-level process mediated by the metarepresentations they create. Pause analysis and retrospective data reveal that the relation between processing effort and cognitive effect is also conditioned by the translator's degree of **metacognitive** monitoring.

Alves and Gonçalves (2007) take into consideration proposals from connectionist approaches and RT to develop Gonçalves' (2003) cognitive model of translation competence, assessed in various **empirical** studies carried out with a range of subject types: four students of English, eight translation students, and four professional translators.

Firstly, the authors makes a difference between *general* and *specific* translation competence. General translator competence is defined as background knowledge, abilities, and strategies a successful translator needs to master, and which lead to adequate translation task performance. Specific translator competence, on the other hand, operates in coordination with other sub-competences, and works mainly through conscious or metacognitive processes, being directly geared to the maximisation of interpretive resemblance.

Further, they see the acquisition of translation competence as a gradual, systematic, and recurring process of expanding neural networks between various units of the translator's cognitive environment. They propose a scale of evolution, and differentiate between two cognitive profiles – that is, between translators with lower or higher levels of metacognitive activity:

- "**narrow-band translators**", who tend to work on the basis of insufficiently contextualised cues (i.e., dictionary-based meaning of words), failing to combine procedurally, conceptually, and contextually encoded information;

- "**broadband translators**" (that is, expert translators), who work on the basis of communicative cues provided by the ST and reinforced by the contextual assumptions derived from their cognitive environments. As a result, they are able to bridge the gap between procedurally, conceptually and contextually encoded information into a **coherent** TT to encompass higher levels of metacognition.

To sum up, Alves' (2007) and Alves and Gonçalves' (2007) studies emphasise the central role played by metarepresentation and metacognition in the development of translation competence. Similarly to Gutt's approach, their model embeds translation competence in a comprehensive cognitive theory, claiming that the ability to translate requires highly complex metacognitive skills.

3.4.4 Explicitation and explicitness

Another debate in TS revolves around the issue of explicitness vs implicitness of meaning. If we assume that the encoded meaning in a text is only a part of its overall meaning (cf. 2.3.2), then translators must strive to make choices as to how much of the overall meaning they wish to encode explicitly, or else leave to inferencing. After all, the overall meaning underlying the TT is found in the relationship between encoded meaning, implicit meaning, and contexts.

From a **corpus linguistics** approach, Hansen-Schirra et al. (2012, 59) describes ***explicitation*** as follows:

> We assume explicitation if a translation . . . realizes meanings . . . more explicitly than its source text – more precisely, meanings not realized in the less explicit source variant but implicitly present in a theoretically-motivated sense. The resulting text is more explicit than its counterpart.

Hansen-Schirra et al. (2007) thus focus on ***explicitness*** rather than explicitation. According to the authors, explicitness is measured as a property of the encoding, rather than as a feature of the communicative act as a whole (which they considered to be in the domain of *explicitation*). Although explicitation is seen as fundamental for any approach to communication, Hansen-Schirra et al. (2007) point out that textual encoding is a necessary prerequisite for research on translation as a communicative act.

Over the last four decades, explicitation has been explored as a translation-specific phenomenon by many authors (e.g., Baker 1993; Blum-Kulka 1986; Olohan and Baker 2000) – none of whom, however, were concerned with implications of explicitation for **cognitive pragmatics**. Gutt's model was the first to fully integrate explicit and implicit meaning in translation under a cognitive-pragmatic perspective. This necessity

emerged not just to empower translators, but also because he aimed to describe how translators constantly have to make decisions about implicitness/explicitness, even though these decisions are often unconscious.

From a RT standpoint, Englund-Dimitrova (2005, 236) proposed a difference between norm-governed and strategic processes when approaching explicitation. She maintained that norm-governed processes of explicitation are determined by the constraints inherent in linguistic systems in contrast, and are not cognitively relevant in TS research. In contrast, strategic explicitation arises from the translator's difficulties in solving translation-related issues that go beyond those constraints. Englund-Dimitrova (2005), however, did not examine cases of explicitation as renderings constrained by inferential processing.

Further, Alves (2009) combined translation process data with **corpus linguistics** annotations to assess the concepts of *norm-governed* and *strategic explicitations* proposed by Englund-Dimitrova (2005), using the RT approach to research on translation task execution. He examined the discrepancies between processes of explicitness and explicitation proposed by Hansen-Schirra et al. (2007), and proposed a process-oriented inferential account of explicitation in translation. The latter showed that instances of explicitness in translation are mostly related to norm-governed issues, whereas instances of explicitation in translation are mostly strategic.

3.4.5 Style and figurative language

Another strength of Gutt's model is that it does not require separate accounts of processing for literal-figurative language, or for the notion of stylistic and poetic elements (cf. Piskorska 2020). As we have seen in 3.2.3, the essential relationship between ST and TT will rest not in the formal features serving as stimuli or communicative clues, but in the resemblance of their intended Interpretation. Stylistic features are extremely important, not so much in themselves as in the functions they serve while guiding the text receiver towards the intended Interpretation (Sellevold 2012).

The style of a text is of key importance (cf. Boase-Beier 2011, 12), and has been studied at least since Roman times (Boase-Beier 2006, 10–12). Yet, **stylistics** has only been a recognised discipline since about the 1960s (see Wales 2001, 269), and translation and style have been linked since the 1970s. In recent years, stylistics has been argued to be primarily the study and analysis of reading and reception; that is, how what we find in the text makes us read the text in the way we do (see Stockwell 2002, 2). This holds true for the original writer's as much as a translator's choices and motivations, which must be concerned with how these choices relate to what the translator assumes about the TA. In RT-informed TS, in particular, this has led to a greater emphasis on the reader's engagement with

the stylistic detail of the translated text and on how the reader's engagement with the source text differs.

Boase-Beier (2006, 31–43, 2015, 2019) frequently draws on Sperber and Wilson's (1986/1995) work in her discussion of cognitive stylistics and translation. She affirms that a pragmatic theory helps to address serious issues in translation, which are raised by different stylistic forms of literary[13] (as well as non-literary) texts and are about the intentions of communicators and how particular formulations will be understood by particular audiences. For instance, the author (Boase-Beier 2019, 201) discusses an example from a 1947 novel by Fallada (1947/2011) and its translation by Hofmann (Fallada 2007), in which a postwoman, Eva Kluge, is delivering letters in Berlin during WWII:

(11)

(11a) Sie ist politisch gar nicht interessiert, sie ist einfach eine Frau, und als Frau findet sie, daβ man Kinder nicht darum in die Welt gesetzt hat, daβ sie totgeschossen werden. (Fallada 1947/2011, 9)

(11b) Not that she's a political animal, she's just an ordinary woman, but as a woman she's of the view that you don't bring children into the world to have them shot. (Fallada 2007, 3)

Boase-Beier (2019, 201) states that "German and English texts are semantically quite similar, but there are many differences of style, especially in the representation of thought". For example, "politisch gar nicht interessiert" [not at all interested in politics] does not contain an idiom and might represent the way the postwoman would characterise herself. On the other hand, "not . . . a political animal" is an idiom, and suggests that the narrator is a speaker of contemporary English. This changes the perspective from 1940s Berlin to that of the present day, in which a narrator is describing the woman without taking the woman's point of view.

From this brief comparison, Boase-Beier (2019) suggests that the ST author is 'inside' Eva Kluge's head, and is thus able to 'give' us her thoughts. The TT author is not, and so the readers of the English version are aware of an extra layer of storytelling. In this regard, Hermans (2014) stated that translation can always be seen as a type of *echoic report* on something said, whereby an echoic utterance is one which communicates to the reader the attitude of the speaker to what is being said (cf. 2.5). Using concepts such as *echoic utterance* or the categories of indirect speech (cf. 3.2.1), we gain a better sense of how a reader will process a translation such as (11a), in which the TS expert may note a change in register between ST and TT, but the TA will not normally have access to the original.

A stylistically aware translator, on the other hand, is familiar with the following aspects (cf. Boase-Beier 2006, 112–113):

- the importance of *context* in influencing meaning;
- the fact that stylistic features in the ST reflect choices;
- the importance of '*mind-style*' and its influence on translator decision-making processes;
- the importance of distinctions between a narrator, an author, and the inferred author that the reader of a text constructs (cf. example (11)). They are essential to the translator in deciding which voice and perspective to take;
- how we represent speech and thought (cf. example (11));
- awareness of common stylistic figures, such as repetition, indirect speech, and iconicity.

It is true that a translator might make some of these decisions without being familiar with what stylisticians mean by 'mind-style' or 'iconicity'. But such awareness can go to great lengths to allowing the translator to realise what is happening in the ST. Translators will also have a basis for determining the extent to which such stylistic aspects represent the SC's choices.

If RT indeed has an important part to play in the training of translators in stylistic matters, we further noted in 2.3.3 that the RT model of communication is also capable of representing the Interpretation of literal-figurative language, notably metaphors and onomatopoeia. While in Grice's framework, figurative expressions would be seen as a violation of the maxim of truthfulness – thus triggering a conversational implicature – RT explains them in terms of weak implicatures (also called *poetic effects*). The main difference between a strong and a weak implicature is that the latter creates "common impressions rather than common knowledge" (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, 224).

Drawing on RT, Koglin's (2015) PhD thesis focuses on the cognitive effort required to post-edit machine-translated metaphors in comparison with when a human translator renders this trope. In particular, the author's aim is two-fold: to explore (a) the impact of context and two different machine-translation (MT) outputs on cognitive effort required to post-edit machine-translated metaphors; and (b) the cognitive effort required to post-edit machine-translated metaphors compared to their translation from scratch.

The experimental design consisted of three groups: one control group and two experimental groups. Participants from both experimental groups were asked to post-edit a machine-translated journalistic text whereas the control group was assigned to translate it on their own. Each experimental group had two post-editing tasks: Task 1 required participants to post-edit a Google machine-translated output, while Task 2 involved post-editing a Systran machine-translated output. Data

collection was conducted under the experimental paradigm of data triangulation in translation process research (Alves 2003). Five tools were used, namely a prospective questionnaire to profile the participants, retrospective (free and guided) verbal protocols, a five-point Likert Scale, Translog to log keystrokes and mouse movements, and two eye trackers to track eye movements on areas of interest.

Results confirmed that *context* (and not the type of metaphors) determines the amount of effort required to both translate and post-edit metaphors. Further, it is suggested that the rule-based MT output might lead to a decrease in cognitive effort required to post-edit machine-translated metaphors. In addition, the analysis of data collected in the experimental groups shows that cognitive effort required to post-edit metaphors is not lower in Task 2 compared to Task 1. This result is consistent with the RT paradigm, and suggests that the raw machine-translation output may have stimulated new inferences, which consequently increased the effort required to post-edit metaphors. In terms of trade-off between effort and effects, the author found three possible interactions: (a) more cognitive effort results in more cognitive effects, (b) more cognitive effort does not result in additional cognitive effects, and (c) less cognitive effort results in more cognitive effects.

Sequeiros (1998, 2002) analyses pragmatic additions and omission in Spanish to English literary translations with respect to the TL. He defines *enrichment* as:

> A process of completion of the logical form (i.e. the semantic representation encoded by the utterance) whose aim is to arrive at the proposition expressed, which may or may not be one of the set of thoughts explicitly communicated by the utterance.
>
> (Sequeiros 2002, 1070)

The RT idea of how a logical form is 'completed' to arrive at the propositional form (cf. 2.3.2) is used by Sequeiros to expand upon the idea of interlingual pragmatic enrichment. According to the author (2002, 1078), "an utterance is a case of interlingual enrichment if its semantic representation is the intended enrichment of the semantic representation of an utterance from another language". He builds upon Gutt (1991), stating that interlingual enrichment involves the translator explicating the TL in relation to the full propositional form – rather than following the logical form.

Furthermore, Sequeiros (2002, 1077) argues that the logical possibilities between the two languages seem to allow four different cases as regards explicitness:

1. Translation more explicit because of (enrichment):
    i. linguistic differences between two languages;
    ii. a choice of the translator on some other grounds.

2. Translation less explicit because of (impoverishment):

    i. linguistic differences between two languages;
    ii. a choice of the translator on some other grounds.

Sequeiros (2002) further details four areas of enrichment: temporal enrichment, thematic enrichment (agent, source, and possessor), enrichment based on discourse relations, and enrichment based on implicatures. These four areas of enrichment build on his previous work on impoverishment (Sequeiros 1998) and give a useful taxonomy of the types of pragmatic shifts that may occur in translation.

Lastly, we look at Sasamoto's (2019) RT-oriented study on the translation of onomatopoeia,[14] focusing on a **corpus**-based analysis using bilingual (Japanese-English) recipe data from Cookpad Inc. All expressions were categorised into three groups, using Flyxe's (2002) classification:

- highly lexicalised onomatopoeia (mainly psychomimes), which can be used without the quotative particle *to*;
- onomatopoeia for which the use of the quotative *to* was optional and which were mainly phenomimes;
- the least lexicalised onomatopoeia (mostly phonomimes), for which the quotative *to* was compulsory.

The five most frequent expressions from each category were analysed, together with random samples of their concordance.

The nature of onomatopoeia – which is deeply rooted in human sensory experience – means that its translation is highly context-bound and, as such, extremely difficult to put into words. In addition, different languages have different morphological and phonological constraints, and there seem to be many expressions used to translate each onomatopoeia. However, Sasamoto's (2019) analysis reveals that onomatopoeia does not impose many challenges for translation as only a limited number of expressions are used repeatedly. It is interesting that these expressions are all from Groups 1 and 2.[15]

In order to identify why other onomatopoeia – especially those from Group 3, behaved differently, each omission instance was examined for the expressions that had a high omission rate. In these cases, onomatopoeia was not omitted from translation because it was hard to translate, but rather omissions are said to be the result of considerations of relevance. In some cases, it was not necessary to include the onomatopoeia in the translation as impressions were communicated by other means – other constituents of the translation unit – or inferable from the context. In others, consideration for style seems to have influenced what appears to be an omission. In all cases, however, an inclusion of onomatopoeia might have imposed extra processing effort without a significant reward. The loss of extra effects communicated in the ST is "balanced out by

requiring less processing effort for the target-text readers" (Sasamoto 2019, 218).

To sum up, as the author states, "it is consideration of the context in which the nebulous effects of onomatopoeia use are communicated that explains why and how the effect of onomatopoeia is translated, rather than a failed attempt to find linguistic equivalence" (Sasamoto 2019, 220).

3.4.6 Irony, jokes, and wordplay

Recent literary and pragmatic views on the interpretation of irony (see Hatim and Mason 1990) seem to have agreed upon the role played by inference. In particular, an inferentially based, RT approach to communication (cf. Kamyanets 2017, Ruiz Moneva 2001, 2017, Puşnei-Sîrbu 2017) has offered fruitful insights into the understanding of irony.

Ruiz Moneva's (2001) study makes proposals for the issues that the translation of irony may present the translator. Firstly, as a process of ostensive-inferential communication, translation entails a relationship between what is encoded and what may be inferred. In the case of irony, the author states that there is an extra layer of meaning which usually remains implicit and must be inferred from the context.

Furthermore, we have learned from Gutt (cf. 3.2.2) that translations are geared to interpretively resemble the original in terms of implicatures and explicatures so as to be optimally relevant. What is key in the translation of irony is that a similar level of explicitness is kept in the TT, since an under-explicitation of the ironic message may lead to misunderstandings, whereas its over-explicitation may spoil the effect.

Thirdly, in the case of figurative language (cf. 3.4.5) and irony, contextual assumptions may come with weak degrees of strength, which means that "they are the more enjoyable the less they announce themselves, and that the addressee is supposed to take a greater degree of freedom in the reach of the meaning intended" (Ruiz Moneva 2001, 244). The concept of relevance as a trade-off between processing efforts and cognitive and contextual effects is seen as highly suitable. On the one hand, ironic remarks that draw too much attention to themselves can be irritating since they involve little effort, and the ironic content is over-explicit. On the other hand, significant under-explicitation resulting to a shaky identification of irony may require too much effort and result annoying for the TA. As a result, the criterion of optimal accessibility to irony discussed by Yus (1998) is particularly important both in the identification and translation of irony as it indicates a relevant balance between efforts and effects.

Lastly, Ruiz Moneva (2001) argues shows that the contextual sources and their incompatibilities may be a valuable criterion for tracing the ironic meaning, as well as the communicative clues (cf. 3.2.3) which aid the addressee in recognising the communicative intention. Simultaneously, the analysis of these contextual sources – and the incompatibilities

displayed by them – may guide the translator in conveying the ironically intended meaning in the TL.

Yus (2016b) discusses the translation of jokes, and proposes a 'road-map' for translators, as shown in Figure 3.2:



Figure 3.2 Yus' (2016b, 265) itinerary for the translation of jokes.

The translator is initially asked to process the SL joke and Interpret it in the same manner that the SC wanted his SA to Interpret it. To accomplish his goal, the translator must engage in a mutual parallel adjustment (cf. 2.3.4) of explicit content leading to an explicature, implicit import leading to implications, and the appropriate quantity of contextual information to effectively interpret the joke. This understanding of the Interpretation of the joke as intended for the SA and in their culture is critical as any attempt to communicate the original Interpretation will require that the language stimulus be processed in the context intended by the SC. Otherwise, there is no reason to believe that this Interpretation will be optimally communicated to the TA.

The next stage is crucial in any translation of jokes, that is identifying the inferential steps or strategies predicted by the SC inasmuch as they are intended to elicit humorous effects in the SA. This phase – the lower limit of the pragmatic scenario – is necessary if the translator wishes to establish the conditions and linguistic choices that will allow the joke to be efficiently conveyed to the TA. In this regard, Yus (2016b, 264) states that "keeping similar inferential strategies or steps (or substituting them for equivalent ones) is the main objective of a translation of humorous texts".

Parallel to this, the translator should be aware of major cultural information that might contribute to the humour in the joke, such as parallelisms of societal stereotypes on professions, sex roles, races, and so on, as well as culture-bound historic events, places, and names. If these intracultural referents are preserved in the TT, but absent in the target culture, this knowledge may increase mental effort with cognitive effects required to counterbalance that effort.

Once the translator fully understands the source of humour as intended for the SA, the three steps involve the attempt to produce a TL joke that resembles the original in 'relevant' ways:

1. The translator should seek parallel forms of transferring *cultural* information from the source culture to the target culture and substitute intra-cultural referents if necessary;
2. The translator should seek for *semantic* choices that allow for similar coding of information in the source and target languages. Occasionally, the linguistic repertoires of both languages will make this task extremely difficult, necessitating replacements;
3. Most importantly, the translator will investigate whether the *pragmatic* scenario predicted by the SC can be preserved in the TL joke, both in terms of the quantity and quality of inferential strategies used and the resulting balance of effects and effort. To arrive at appropriate results in this pragmatic scenario, the translator is required to adapt, alter, or replace the

> SL material as much as is necessary. This is, of course, a predictive activity, but there is no assurance that the results and effort will be duplicated.

Following the roadmap in Figure 3.2, Yus (2016b, 250–251) analyses some examples of translations of jokes, including a Spanish joke in (12):

(12)

(12a) SL joke: Q: ¿Por qué Stevie Wonder y Ray Charles se llevaban tan mal? A: Porque no se podían ni ver. [Q: Why didn't Stevie Wonder and Ray Charles get on with each other? A: Because they couldn't even see each other.]

(12b) TL translation: Q: Why didn't Stevie Wonder and Ray Charles get on with each other? A: Because they couldn't see eye to eye.

In Figure 3.2, this joke is indicated as "Case 1" (C = yes; S = yes; P(a) = yes; P(b) = yes).[16] It creates humorous effects through the accessible interpretation of "no se pueden ni ver" (*couldn't even see each other*), an idiom indicating that "they can't stand each other". The SC intends this relevant Interpretation be processed in parallel to a literal reading of *can't even see each other* since both Wonder and Charles are blind. The humorous effect is due to the simultaneous enjoyment of both Interpretations (literal/idiomatic), which at the same time blocks the idiom's higher accessibility as a chunk (favoured by the preceding stretch of text).

Here, the cultural scenario is not an issue for the translator because both artists are well-known in the Spanish-speaking world.[17] In terms of the semantic scenario, we can observe that English has a comparable idiom: "to see eye to eye", which allows the parallelism between blindness (literal) and relationships (idiomatic) to be preserved. The pragmatic scenario is also kept as the translation plays with literal and idiomatic meanings associated with human relationships and eyesight. However, the balance of effects and effort is not faithfully preserved, since "not seeing eye to eye" means *not sharing a similar opinion*, whereas the Spanish "no poder ni verse" has a more intense meaning of *can't stand each other*. Yet, it may fall inside the range of possible balances of effects and effort that we can consider an adequate translation.

Lastly, RT-oriented research in TS has analysed a number of types of language manipulation included under the umbrella term of *wordplay*.[18] In particular, it focuses on a type of wordplay which causes the most problems for translators – that is, the pun, the manipulation of sounds and meanings of words with the intent of being witty. In other words, puns "enable us to say things that cannot otherwise be said, and that is

why they are both repulsive and attractive at the same time" (Klitgård 2018, 234).

Díaz-Pérez (2015) offers a RT account of the translation of *Alice in Wonderland* and *Through the Looking Glass*. His main aim is to analyse the translation of puns in a corpus consisting of one Galician and six Spanish versions of the two novels. The analysis is based on 959 textual fragments which correspond to the 137 ST extracts, and shows that translation technique selection is determined, among other factors, by the first principle of relevance (cf. 2.2.2).

When there is a coincidence in the relation between the levels of signifier and signified in the SL and TS, translators usually choose to translate literally and replicate a congenial pun. In the other cases, translators seek to create a pun that – while it may not be able to duplicate the meanings of the ST pun – at least yields some of the cognitive effects intended by the SC, particularly those related to processing of wordplay. Omission of secondary information, a non-selective translation (retaining the several meanings of the ST pun in a non-punning context), diffuse paraphrasing, editorial means, or transference are some of the other solutions adopted by translators. Variables which include the specific version considered or the type of pun, have been found to have an effect on the choice of the translator's strategy. Furthermore, it has also been proved that choice of translation strategy and use of editorial means are interconnected.

3.4.7 Audiovisual translation

Audiovisual translation (AVT)[19] is developing at remarkable speed. The technological advancements of the digital era have had an enormous impact on AVT practice, as well as on the way audiences consume audiovisual products (films, television series, documentaries, videogames, and the like; see Díaz-Cintas 2005). At the same time, the first decade of the twenty-first century has seen a boom in academic courses training audiovisual translators and scholarly work on AVT (Orero 2004). Such practices might entail making audiovisual programmes accessible to viewers who do not speak the language of the original text, therefore requiring interlingual translation in the form of **dubbing** or **subtitling**, for example. Indeed, the focus of RT-informed research on AVT is on dubbing and subtitling, the two most widespread AVT interlingual modes used for the translation of films.

The heuristic potential offered by RT has been explored by subtitling translation scholars such as Bogucki (2004, 2020), Díaz-Pérez (2014, 2015, 2021), Martínez-Sierra (2010, 2015), as well as in theses on the interface between the study of dubbed texts and RT (e.g., Peleato 2007).

Drawing on RT, Díaz-Pérez (2021) proposes an analysis of jokes (cf. 3.4.6) containing sexual innuendos in ambiguous utterances from the

first two seasons of *Modern Family*, and their translation into Spanish. The author finds that the ambiguity and sexual innuendos are mostly reflected in the Spanish versions analysed. In all those cases, the cognitive effects intended in the ST, including humorous ones, are also accessible to TT viewers. Thus, it follows that the pragmatic scenario is preserved in the TT, sometimes at the expense of a sacrifice in the semantic scenario. In audiovisual texts, ambiguity may also impact the visual channel. Although, in some cases, the visual element renders the translator's task difficult, in others it acts as an aid to both the translator and TT viewer, contributing to the yielding of humorous effects.

Bogucki (2020) proposes an updated model of decision-making in subtitling, which is meant to be contrasted with his original proposition (Bogucki 2004):



Figure 3.3 Bogucki's (2020, 48) proposed model of relevance-driven decision-making in subtitling.

The concept of *context*, as described in RT, is given considerable weight in the suggested paradigm. All subtitling decisions are based on this notion, and the immediate surrounding of the discourse included within the same filmic message – the visual semiotic channel of the audiovisual text – is referred to as the *small* context. On the other hand, the *large* context is the audience's cognitive environment as mirrored in the subtitler's cognitive environment. The subtitler determines if the TA's cognitive environment matches that of the SA. If there is a mismatch, the subtitler then decides which language means to adopt in order to make the TT (the subtitle) relevant to the TA. If, however, the subtitler's own cognitive environment is insufficient to make an informed decision, the resulting subtitles will suffer in terms of quality and, more generally, relevance. A translator who fails to recognise the context and the contextual features of the SA and TA is bound to generate an output that is inferior, leading to misunderstandings (or heavily increased processing effort).

Further, this model tells us that the large context contains the little context in the ST. While the small contexts and the translated version are (almost) identical, the large contexts do not have to be because the TA's general knowledge is likely to differ from that of the SA; the difference will become "more apparent the more the audiovisual text is embedded in the source culture" (Bogucki 2020, 48). The large context of the TT has a direct impact on the expectations of the TA, as indicated by the arrow at the bottom of Figure 3.3.

After a skilled subtitler has correctly detected and accounted for contextual implications, the final output is created using specialised software. However, it is still the translator who takes decisions and responsibilities within the constraints imposed by the machine and rooted in guidelines and conventions (such as time and space restrictions). As a result, the main consideration is always what is relevant enough to be included under these constraints. The linguistic means used to render the dialogue in its visual environment should ideally follow the first principle of relevance (cf. 2.2.2).

3.5 Interdisciplinary methods of analysis

It is now obvious that translation is an enormously hard task that demands unique translator skills. Besides bridging the linguistic divergences, translators have to balance the SC's intentions against the readers' expectations, while Interpreting the sociocultural aspects of the original and the translation. In order to embrace this complexity, the field of translation process research has now evolved to such an extent that it is a "*perfect interdiscipline*, interfacing with a whole host of other fields" (Hatim and Munday 2004, 8; my emphasis).

As Gutt's approach to translation becomes consolidated by applications of RT, some authors have pointed out alternative, more *interdisciplinary*

possibilities of investigating the translation/pragmatics interface. The aim is still to describe translation phenomena and establish general principles, but the methods of analysis are more varied, as already seen in the studies presented in 3.4. In some cases, the sociocultural features of translation have become as prominent as linguistic ones. In other studies, the main aim is to understand the specific psychological processes involved, the nature of action control, and how the brain supports translation processing 'beyond the literal meaning'. So, some authors have explored the feasibility of integrating neuroscientific and behavioural data in the investigation of the inferential nature of translation processing. I will give a small selection of interdisciplinary methods in this section.

3.5.1 Comprehension by ST and TT viewers

As mentioned in 3.4.7, the translator's task is particularly difficult to elucidate in multimodal environments as the construal of implicatures in audiovisual texts often involves the combined use of spoken language and salient non-verbal cinematic signifiers.

Desilla (2012, 2014, 2019) examines pragmatics in AVT, presenting an overview of various pragmatic phenomena and elucidating their importance in the construal, translation, and reception of audiovisual texts (films). The author looks at Grice's work on implicature (cf. 1.3.2), and treats implicatures as a sub-type of non-conventional indirectness, but also focuses on the cognitive psychological perspective of RT, which is said to have the conceptual tools for understanding context selection.

As a way of illustration of her methodology, I will discuss Desilla's (2014) work, in which experimental pragmatics intersects with AVT. The methodology is applied to a study on the comprehension of implicatures by British and Greek viewers in the two *Bridget Jones* films and their subtitled versions. It comprises three stages: multimodal transcription (Baldry and Thibault 2006), pragmatic analysis, and empirical testing of implicature comprehension by actual SAs and TAs. Multimodal transcription is used as a means of identifying the contribution of verbal and non-verbal semiotic resources to the construal of implicatures and the creation of overall meaning by the filmmakers. The multimodal transcription for each instance of implicature identified in both films, was complemented by an analysis of the comprehension procedure that the recovery of the implicature would seem to call for. ST and TT are explored in terms of their immediate contextual premises, explicatures (cf. 2.3.2), implicated premises and implicated conclusions (cf. 2.3.3). The experimental study is designed to probe implicature comprehension by a sample of ST and TT viewers, while also testing the extent to which the intuitive pragmatic analysis carried out before represents a realistic account of implicature understanding by SA and TA.

Results shows that implicatures whose understanding presupposes familiarity with specific aspects of the British culture presented the Greek audience with substantial difficulties. In particular, Desilla's analysis demonstrates that ST and TT viewers do not always understand implicatures in the way the filmmakers would like them to, and/or the scholar had predicted. This finding highlights the subjectivity and creativity of audience response and, therefore, the need to corroborate research hypotheses through studies involving real audiences.

Braun's (2016) study confirms the explanatory potential of cognitive-pragmatic approaches in this field by focusing on three interrelated sub-processes underlying all forms of AVT: the comprehension of the multimodal discourse by the translator, the translation of selected elements of multimodal discourse, and the comprehension of the newly formed multimodal discourse by the TA. She analyses RT and Mental Model Theory, used to discuss and question common perceptions of AVT as being 'constrained' and 'partial' translation.

According to Braun, AVT can serve as a test bed for multimodality studies, and the two cognitive-pragmatic approaches are said to play an important role in this. Aided by available software for multimodal transcription and analysis, they provide a framework for combining qualitative and quantitative analyses of multimodal discourse processing and AVT. Such analyses can be enriched with introspection by translators and TAs to elicit information about comprehension processes and translation strategies, and complemented by more recent methods such as eye tracking (cf. Orero and Vilaró 2012, and 3.4.2). One specific advantage seems that "they make it possible to combine process-oriented studies and reception studies in the same framework" (Braun 2016, 130).

Further, they can also feed into sociological and pedagogical studies of AVT, especially studies of possible correlations between the profile and training of the audiovisual translator and the quality of the AVT solutions. RT and Mental Model Theory are also said to support research into alternative approaches to AVT practice, especially research that challenges practices which contribute to the perception of AVT as 'constrained'. Lastly, a cognitive-pragmatic framework can be useful for researching human and machine-based approaches to AVT due to its potential for deconstructing the processes involved in AVT.

3.5.2 Sci-tech translation

Scarpa's (2019) chapter aims to show the pragmatic issues that may arise in sci-tech translations, using RT and Austin's (1962) sociocultural pragmatics, which focuses on speech acts.

The author states that interpretive resemblance is largely attainable as the ST and TT usually match in terms of contexts of use, intended

readers' expectations and knowledge of the world, and main communicative purposes. In this type of translations, meanings can be conveyed across different languages because the norm is that:

1. the informative purpose of both the SC and the translator – and the other subordinate communicative aims – are mainly not culture-specific;
2. ST and TT readers have a shared way of thinking and experiencing; and
3. the pragmatic goal of the TA (to do, to learn, to evaluate, etc.) coincides with both that of the ST writer's intended reader and the translator's own informative intention.

Despite the norm of a high degree of invariance of meaning in the ST and TT, Scarpa (2019) states that a pragmatic aspect that is also key to the sci-tech translator is that meaning is derived not only from what is said, but also from what is not said. In this area of translation, optimal relevance is enhanced by the translator's ability to reproduce the ST sense and the SC's intentionality, as well as "to recover the utterance's **illocutionary force** and effect . . ., i.e., the added meanings and consequences associated with the utterance, which may override literal sense and be non-conventionally associated with the linguistic expression involved" (Scarpa 2019, 285).

In order to bridge the gap between ST and TT readers, the translator has the option of spelling out the missing information. An issue arising from an implied meaning in the ST – which does not find an immediate match in the TT – can result from the grammatical form of an utterance which, however, diverges from its pragmatic use. For instance, Scarpa examines rhetorical questions, which frequently appear at the beginning or end of (popular or didactic) sci-tech texts, and have the pragmatic goal of introducing a new topic – rather than eliciting information.

Let us consider the following example drawn from Collis and Montgomery (1997, 99). It is an Italian translation (13b) of a textbook (13a) on corporate strategy, where the rhetorical question in the ST has the function of introducing the section listing:

(13)

(13a) ST: But this raises the question: What are the appropriate boundaries for a particular firm?

(13b) TT: A questo punto, però, si pone *il problema* di stabilire quali siano i confini ottimali per un'azienda. [BT: In this regard, however, *the problem* is raised of determining what are the optimal boundaries for a particular firm.] (Emphasis in the original.)

Here, the translator has chosen to neutralise the interrogative structure as the norms and conventions governing the same textual model in texts in Italian as a language for special purposes require a higher level of formality (Sabatini 1999, 155). He has done so by converting the direct interrogative into an indirect interrogative form introduced by the noun "problema" in (13b). It is in cases such as this that considering the TT receivers' expectations and beliefs – as well as previous knowledge and intentions – is paramount for a translation to be accepted and correctly interpreted by its intended audience.

At the highest level of expert-to-expert communication, the ST displays a high level of technicality and linguistic underdeterminacy (see also Krüger 2015, 46–47). A considerable amount of competence over the subject matter is assumed by the ST producer and the translator in, respectively, the ST and TT readers to rebuild the implicatures that are not explicit (and can be arrived at by experts only). In this context, the translator's previous knowledge of the subject matter and **genre**-specific conventional argumentation and terminology is fundamental. It is also at this level that "translation novices must resist the temptation of over-explicitating because they lose sight of the intended TT readers" (Scarpa 2019, 286).

3.5.3 Translators' metacommunicative and metapsychological processes

A new trend in empirical-experimental research using brain-imaging methods, such as positron emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), has shed light on the understanding of the biological bases of language.

Szpak (2017), Alves et al. (2019), and Szpak et al. (2020) look at translation-related activities in the brain from a combined perspective, which brings together the RT notion of metarepresentation (Gutt 2004b) and the concept of *perspective taking*,[20] drawn from literature on the psychological processes of understanding other people's intentions, called theory of mind (ToM; cf. Baron-Cohen et al. 1985). Drawing on brain-imaging studies, RT and ToM, the authors try to investigate how perspective taking interposes both metacommunicative and metapsychological processes and locates it within a broad brain area.

Alves et al. (2019) draw on Grice's model, RT, Gutt's approach to translation, and the ToM to state that translation processes require "deductions stemming from a cognitive context, from propositions derived from the meaning of the utterance, as well as from inferentially driven processes" (Alves et al. 2019, 131).

In order to investigate this assumption, Alves et al. present a proposal for an experimental design, which aims at investigating the inferential mechanisms involved in translation processing at behavioural and

neurophysiological levels. In particular, they develop an experimental paradigm in which the translator is asked to infer the speaker's informative intention by relying both on the linguistic signal and the wider discourse and social context in which the utterance serves its communicative purpose. Accordingly, they develop two experimental stimuli, one involving processing the translation beyond its literal code (i.e., idioms), and another one in which the speaker meaning critically depends on the particular context that utterances are embedded in. On a neurobiological level, they believe that the inferential nature of translation processing recruits some of the regions – particularly, the left inferior parietal lobe and bilateral medial frontal gyrus – typically involved in tasks involving reasoning about the mental states of others.

Lastly, Szpak et al. (2020) also provide a new inferential account of neurophysiological data in both reading and translation tasks, opening up novel research avenues for a metarepresentational view of translation. In particular, the brain regions commonly related to the ability of making inferences are discussed in the light of neuroimaging and TS. In their account, interpretive resemblance of attributed thoughts (metarepresentations) involves brain regions related to the identification of the target perspective (a metacommunicative process), which in turn involves brain regions related to the attribution of second-order mental representations to others (a metapsychological process).

3.5.4 Post-editing machine translation

In recent years, translation process research (TPR) has advanced to a state which allows TS scholars to study "what source and target text units are being processed, at a given point in time, to investigate what steps are involved in this process, what segments are read and aligned and how this whole process is monitored" (Alves 2015, 32). Thus, researchers have argued for a closer integration of TPR and cognitive science.

Carl and Schaeffer (2019) propose a computational framework for post-editing **machine translation** (PEMT) based on RT and the noisy channel model (Levy 2008, Brown et al. 1993),[21] stating that such a combination accounts for both the unconscious priming effects and the conscious processes in PEMT. They argue that translation is grounded in 'priming' as the implicit memory of the ST segment 'primes' the translator to produce a translation which is structurally and lexically similar to the TT. While subliminal priming processes facilitate the translation output, translators must also establish a set of conscious metacognitive strategies which provide them with criteria to decide whether the produced translations do correspond to the expectations.

In translation, "priming effects indicate the strength by which shared combinatorial nodes are activated" (Carl and Schaeffer 2019, 64). Lexical and syntactic links between the ST and its translation are triggered by

shared combinatorial nodes. The authors further explore a set of formal criteria for quantifying translation literality so as to build a framework of conditional probabilities to conceptualise the priming strength as a random variable in a translator channel.

In the case of post-editing, the translator is primed by two stimuli: the ST and the MT output. Due to its similarity with the target text, the MT output is a stronger prime than the original source text, which makes post-editors accept MT suggestions more easily even when the TT becomes ungrammatical or unidiomatic.

However, translators should be experts in assessing their primed translation output, deploying monitoring strategies to avoid the pitfalls that elements such as false friends may lead to. RT is used by the authors to explain this metacognitive behaviour. In particular, translators need to make sure that inferences over implicatures and explicatures lead to the same Interpretations. In PEMT, this is conceivable if the main aim of translators is direct translation (cf. 3.2.2).

To date, MT tools do not have access to the context in which the texts are produced or processed, nor do they yet have models of optimal relevance in order to compute intentions and implications of the ST or the TT. We must, therefore, assume that the ST and TT share the same context which allow for the same implicatures. This reduces the task of post-editing to checking the similarity of explicatures of the ST and the TT. In particular, the post-editor would need to check whether the translation is correctly encoded – lexically and syntactically – and whether similar inferences can be drawn based on the co-text.

3.6 Criticisms

As discussed in 3.2, Gutt draws heavily on Sperber and Wilson's (1986/1995) account of human communication and cognition to claim that:

> *the phenomenon commonly referred to as "translation" can be accounted for naturally within the relevance theory of communication developed by Sperber and Wilson: there is no need for a distinct general theory of translation.*
>
> (Gutt 1990, 135, emphasis in original).

Gutt's (1990, 1991/2000) proposal, even though it emphasises the pointlessness of a separate theory of translation, is praised by a number of TS scholars for its discussion of the role of context (Baker 2006) as well as its concept of *faithfulness*. For instance, Pym (2010, 35) underlines that the RT approach to translation represents a welcome shift of focus, allowing the concept of interpretive resemblance to be seen as an operative

concept within the sub-paradigm of directional equivalence. Further, Wendland (1997, 91) acknowledges the contributions made by Gutt with reference to the departure from the unrealistic attempt to translate the "full meaning".

Reservations about the role of RT in translation have been expressed on other aspects of Gutt's model. Firstly, Hatim and Munday (2004) state that Gutt has shown little concern with textual criteria such as genre membership. Yet, "most theorizing by proponents of 'relevance' on translation strategy (descriptive vs interpretive, direct vs indirect), could not completely ignore macro-structures such as text type or genre" (ibid., 67).

However, Gutt (1998) implied that inference can only be enriched by awareness of the conventions governing the communicative event within which texts or genres occur. Unger (2001) also discusses a variety of translation problems which are often attributed to genre effects, which effects are analysed and shown to reveal that genre is a diverse notion which can function in various ways in comprehension processes. To explain these, an account of genre based on RT is proposed, its central claim being that genre information can crucially contribute to the fine-tuning of relevance expectations in complex stimuli. On the theoretical side, this account refines our view of the management of expectations of relevance. On the practical side, it is shown that this account of genre is powerful enough to identify the sources of translation problems attributed to genre effects, and, together with Gutt's (1991/2000) account of translation, guide the translator to adequate solutions in given situations.

The biggest opposition, however, comes from scholars who adopt functional equivalence approaches as they consider Gutt's theory as "an elaborate, theoretically-based effort to justify" a return to formal equivalence (Wendland 1997, 86). Pym (2010, 35) even refers to Gutt as a "theorist of equivalence".[22]

Here, Gutt's critics seem to equate direct translation with formal equivalence. They may have come to this understanding because Gutt talks about retaining the linguistic properties (through shared communicative clues; cf. 3.2.1) and presupposing the original context. The defining quality of a direct translation is that it purports to interpretively resemble the original completely – that is, it strives for complete, interpretive resemblance.[23] This criticism, however, seems to betray two misunderstandings of Gutt's theory. Firstly, the impression that Gutt's primary objective is to promote formal equivalence is based on a misunderstanding of his stated aim, that is, to provide a unified account of the phenomenon of translation task performance. By viewing translation as secondary communication (cf. 3.2.1), Gutt aims to lay down conditions for effective communication in translation. RT undermines functional equivalence because it exposes as false the assumption that maximum interpretive

resemblance can be achieved while presupposing the target TL context. It also undermines formal equivalence because the first principle of relevance emphasises the importance of minimising processing effort.[24]

Another limitation in Gutt's model – as discussed with reference to RT in 2.6 – is argued to be the lack of discussion on cultural or social dimensions of translation practices. Venuti (2021, 180) asserts that Gutt's "stress on cognition was admittedly reductive: it effectively elides the specificity of translation as a linguistic and cultural practice, its specific textual forms, situations, and audiences". He states that RT offers "an extremely complex yet abstract formalisation that highlights individual psychology without figuring in social factors" (ibid., 273). Gutt's approach is thus believed to contemplate a universal reader, one characterised by an overwhelming desire for minimal processing effort and immediate intelligibility.[25] The idea of pan-cultural communicative principles is argued to make the task of translation easier. Translatability would be high because, notwithstanding systematic linguistic differences, all parties could be expected to approach meaning construction and interpretation in the same way. Nevertheless, evidence from miscommunication in translation and cross-cultural pragmatic research seems to suggest the cultural relativity of at least some pragmatic concepts (cf. Baumgarten 2017, 531).

Gutt's theory of translation has also been critiqued on the basis that it (and RT) overrationalises the process of communication, reducing it to premises and inferences, and under-recognises emotional and connotative meaning (e.g., Wendland 1997; however, see Wilson and Carston 2019).

Another common criticism of Gutt's work is that it lacks practical applications. Wendland (1997) points to its many flaws when applied to Bible translation. The author (1997, 91) states that the approach "appears to be deficient in a number of other areas, particularly in its exclusivistic perspective and its idiosyncratic terminology, which leads to some confusion in its practical application". Wendland's criticism then focuses on the first principle of relevance which he considers impractical as it "presupposes an idealized communicative situation" (Wendland 1997, 94). In particular, critics question how and by whom the various 'rankings of relevance' are to be determined in specific contexts of translation.

Malmkjær (1992, 308) states that "an understanding of relevance theory will not by itself enable translators to predict the relevance of any particular turn of phrase to those individuals which they might see as the projected audience for their translations". Tirkkonen-Condit (1992) also contests its applicability as too vague. Almazán García (2001) considers Gutt's proposal as insightful, yet still incipient. Şerban (2012, 219) questions the status of textual evidence in pragmatics-oriented translation research, and whether it is possible to attribute intentions or motivation based on textual analyses.

Gutt attempts to respond to these criticisms in his lengthy Postface to the 2000 edition of his 1991 book (Gutt 2000, 202–238). Firstly, he attributes the negative comments to the tendency of TS scholars to think in terms of "an 'input-output' account of translation" (Gutt 2000, 204–205). He explains the approach as follows:

> Its most central axiom appears to be that translation is best studied by systematic comparisons of the observable input and output of the translation process: 'input' being the original text, 'output' being the translated or target text.
>
> (Gutt 2000, 204)

Other approaches present translators with a body of descriptive comparisons, based on which they offer guidelines on how to handle translation task issues in the translator decision-making process. Since Gutt offers no such generalisations, they seem to assume that his contribution is purely philosophical – which we have shown it is not the case.

3.7 Summary

One of the most influential works in CTIS has been Ernst-August Gutt's (1991/2000) *Translation and Relevance: Cognition and Context*. Working on the assumption that translation falls within the domain of communication, Gutt sees translation as an action based on the interpretive use of language, and postulates that the only difference between translation and other types of communication is that the ST and the TT are in two different languages. Thus, the study of the process of translation should focus "on the comparison of interpretations, not on the reproduction of words, linguistic constructions or textual features" (Gutt 2000, 233).

Ostensive communication by translation depends on the interplay between the psychological context or "cognitive environment" of an utterance, and the processing effort required to derive contextual effects. It involves establishing a chain of resemblance relations between a set of Interpretations, which starts with the intended Interpretation of the ST and ends with the assessment of (the evidence for) the Interpretation arrived at by the TT reader. Thus, to ensure interpretive resemblance, translators make use of metacognitive activities through monitoring processes.

Gutt (1989) makes a distinction between direct and indirect translation, depending on their degree of "interpretive resemblance between utterances [in terms of] explicatures and/or implicatures" (Gutt 1989, 75). Direct translation allows for complete interpretive resemblance. In order to reach this, the SA must share the same context in which the author originally encoded the ST. The translation will then allow the TA

to draw similar inferences as those expected for the SA, guided by the two RT principles. Indirect translation, in contrast, occurs when only a subset of the ST context is represented or recoverable in the TT context.

Gutt further extrapolates from RT by specifying that faithfulness in translation is a matter of yielding the intended interpretation of the ST through adequate contextual effects that avoid unnecessary processing effort (Gutt 2000, 101–102). The degree to which the Interpretation resembles the ST – and the means of expressing that Interpretation – are determined by their relevance in the receiving situation – their accessibility and ease of processing for the TA.

Over the past three decades, Gutt's RT approach has been integrated into experimental translation process research, as it "postulates an optimal cognitive relation between the minimum processing effort necessary for the generation of the maximum cognitive effects" and "offers a productive way to investigate the role of effort in translation task resolution" (Alves and Gonçalves 2013, 108). In particular, the notions of effort-effect relation, pragmatic competence, procedural meaning, and explicitation have been key to the empirical investigation of how translators arrive at target products as well as how audiences respond to TTs (cf. 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5).

Regardless of the criticism explored in 3.6 – according to which RT has not been formalised enough to a degree that allows for rigorous quantification and predictive modelling of translation processes – RT continues to be used as a tool in translation theory as it seems to capture the complexity of translation processes in different settings, and help translators understand the laws of effective communication. As Kliffer and Stroinska (2004, 171) state, "it may well prove to be the most reliable tool for handling the interpretive richness evinced by real-life data".

3.8 Food for thought

I hereby present a reading list, review questions, and exercises on the applications of RT to TS, with a focus on an account of translation as interpretive language use.

3.8.1 Further reading

- Gutt 1992. (Five lectures which outline Gutt's perspective on RT, and provide suggestions for how the theory can be applied to the translation of the Bible.)
- Gutt 2000. (From the 1991 1st edition, Gutt's central claim is clear: given a comprehensive theory of inferential communication, there is no need for a special theory of translation. In this second edition, the author addresses peer criticism, and attempts to bring out more clearly the unique mandate of translation.)

- Alves and Gonçalves 2007. (Building on RT and connectionist principles, this paper presents the rationale and assesses the plausibility of a dynamic cognitive model of translator's competence proposed by Gonçalves (2003).)
- Carl and Schaeffer 2019. (A look into the future of translation process research. The authors propose a computational framework for post-editing machine translation based on the well-known noisy channel model and RT.)

For a comprehensive list of T&I authors who adopt RT, I suggest to look up List 14 ("Translation and interpreting") on the *Relevance Theory Online Bibliographic Service* website updated by Yus (2022).

As regards CTIS approaches in general, the list is multiple. Here are some of the most recent ones in chronological order:

- Shreve and Angelone 2010;
- Rojo and Ibarretxe-Antuñano 2013;
- Schwieter and Ferreira 2017a;
- Jakobsen 2017;
- Tipton and Desilla 2019;
- Alves and Jakobsen 2020;
- Muñoz Martín and Halverson 2020a.

3.8.2 Review questions

We can now go back to exercise (8) in 2.8.3, and review some of those questions (and more) in the light of what has been discussed in this chapter:

- The notion of *equivalence* has often been left vague, and/or has been given different meanings according to different TS approaches. How do you incorporate this notion into a RT account of translation?
- With the help of a translated children's book, discuss what is meant by the concept of *resemblance*. How prominently does faithfulness feature, and what constrains it? Think about the issues involved and illustrate from a ST that it would be possible to translate in at least two different ways.
- Does Gutt believe that translation should aim to make the Interpretation your hearer arrives at, consistent with the presumption of optimal relevance?
- What problems are likely to be encountered in attempting to 'translate' a sacred text descriptively?
- Which pragmatic skills should a translator possess, according to Gutt?
- How do you 'adjust' procedural elements in the TT to achieve 'the same' relevance?

- What is the role of metarepresentation in a RT-oriented approach to translation?

3.8.3 Exercises

(1) Read the opening line of *Harry Potter and the Philosopher's Stone*, the first novel in the Harry Potter series written by J. K. Rowling (1997) – one of the most translated series of all time, with the first book having been translated into over 70 languages. You will notice a word, "privet", which indicates any of various deciduous or evergreen shrubs of the genus *Ligustrum*, having clusters of small white flowers and commonly grown as a hedge in UK's leafy suburbs.

- Assess the translation(s) of this – so very British – opening line into your language. In 3.2, we stated that RT scholars consider translation as just another type of verbal communication. I suggest you provide a similar step-by-step description of the RT fast-and-frugal heuristic (cf. example (20) in 2.3.4) to the TT. Also, consider how the cognitive environments of a ST and a TT can be incompatible, and how 'literal' translations can only compound the issue of incompatibility.
- Compare and contrast the following three translations into Italian (a), German (b), and Brazilian Portuguese (c):

a) Il signore e la signora Dursley, di *Privet Drive* numero 4, erano orgogliosi di poter affermare che erano perfettamente normali, *e grazie tante*. [BT: Mr and Mrs Dursley, of *Privet Drive* number 4, were proud to say that they were perfectly normal, *and thank you very much*.] (Rowling 1998a, 5; my emphasis).

b) Mr. und Mrs. Dursley im *Ligusterweg* Nummer 4 waren stolz darauf, ganz und gar normal zu sein, *sehr stolz sogar*. [BT: Mr and Mrs Dursley at number 4 *Privet* [*German term*] *Drive* were proud to be completely normal, *very proud indeed*.] (Rowling 1998b, 1; my emphasis).

c) O Sr. e a Sra. Dursley, da *rua dos Alfeneiros*, no 4, se orgulhavam de dizer que eram perfeitamente normais, *muito bem, obrigado*. [BT: Mr and Mrs Dursley, of *Privet* [*Portuguese term*] *Drive* no 4, were proud to say they were perfectly normal, *very well, thank you*.] (Rowling 2000, 1; my emphasis).

In RT, the interaction of stimulus, assumptions and Interpretation would be drastically disturbed if the processing effort (which will be greater, the more implicit an assumption is) went unrewarded. That is, relevance would be compromised if the effort expended in

retrieving a given assumption substantially exceeded the obtainable rewards. Let us focus on the translation of "Privet Drive" and the last, somewhat over-the-top comment "thank you very much" in Rowling's (1997) passage. Do you think the translators of (a), (b), and (c) compromised relevance in any aspects? If so, why?

- Now attempt a translation of this opening line into one of your working language(s), aiming for a higher or lower degree of interpretive resemblance, assessing the possible differences in effect on the TT reader. Remember that true translations seek to guarantee that a TT utterance is a sufficiently faithful representation of the original – that it resembles it closely enough in relevant respects.

(2) Compare and contrast Linati's (1927) translation in (10) with Scalero's (Woolf 2014, 5) translation:

Aveva l'impressione costante, anche ora guardando i taxi, di essere lontana, lontanissima, in mare aperto, e sola. Sempre aveva l'impressione che vivere, anche un solo giorno, fosse molto, molto pericoloso. [BT: She had the constant impression, even now looking at the taxis, that she was far, very far away, out at sea, and alone. She always had the impression that living, even for one day, was very, very dangerous.]

As you read Scalero's translation, make a list of features characterising interpretive use of language, and interpretive translation. Pay particular attention to the reasoning behind the ruling out of descriptive use as an adequate representation of the translation process. Would you state that Scalero's translation involves establishing a stronger chain of resemblance relations than Linati's? What would you do differently to improve its relevance? Would you aim for a higher or lower degree of interpretive resemblance?

(3) These days (in 2022), if you hop on a Trenitalia high-speed train, you might encounter the following sign, warning passengers that they must travel with a valid ticket (Figure 3.4):



Figure 3.4 A warning sign on an Italian train.

To any Italian reader, the first line – the quote of question and answer in inverted commas ("No ticket? No parti") – immediately brings to mind a famous line from a highly successful TV Martini ad, starring George Clooney, in which the actor shows up empty-handed at a party and is rejected with the following words: "No Martini? No party!"

In English, there is plenty of precedent for the idea that "No X No Y" implies a conditional relationship between the lack of X and the lack of Y, generally with an implied modal as well: "If there (is, were) no X then there (will, can, should, would) be no Y". Examples include "No justice/no peace" "No shirt/no shoes/no service", as well as site-safety signs, such as "no hat/no boots/no job". This paratactical structure is, on the other hand, mainly humorous when used in Italian; it is not to be found in the standard variety of the language, and it is immediately associated with the ad in English (cf., thus, the use of "ticket" in Figure 3.4). This wittiness would be lost on an English speaker, as (a) the ad was not as popular abroad as it was in Italy, and (b) you would have to be proficient in the language to make the inferences yielded by the pun with "parti" (lit. *you leave*) and its ungrammatical structure.

Comment on whether the translation of this pun in Figure 3.4 ("Forgot your ticket? Forget your trip!") is direct or indirect, whether you find it resembles the original interpretively, and how it could be explained following the models described in 3.4.6. Can you conceive of how it might sound and look, were you to adopt an alternative strategy? Once you have finished translating, reflect on the procedures you have employed.

(4) Examine the following passage and its translation into German, taken from Krüger's (2015, 25) corpus:

a) Depending on the process or power plant application in question, there are three main approaches to *capturing the CO_2 generated from a primary fossil fuel*. . . .

b) Abhängig vom jeweiligen Verfahren oder Kraftwerkstyp gibt es drei Hauptansätze zur *Abtrennung des bei der Verbrennung eines fossilen Primärenergieträgers . . . entstandenen CO_2*. [BT: Depending on the specific process or type of power plant type there are three main approaches to capturing the CO_2 *generated from the combustion of a primary fossil fuel* . . .; emphasis in the original.]

- This example shows a prototypical phenomenon of scientific/technical discourse. The ST information that CO_2 is generated from a primary fossil fuel is rendered more explicitly in the TT, which states that CO_2 is generated from the combustion (Verbrennung) of a primary fossil fuel. In other words, the ST is more underdetermined than the TT with reference to CO_2 production. Do you believe this explicitation is needed in this context? How

is it made prominent in this communicative context and how can it be captured in RT terms? Is interpretative resemblance achieved, as Scarpa (2019) predicts?

- Now attempt to use a **Computer-Assisted Translation** (**CAT**) tool of your choice. The goal of fully automatic or MT remains elusive, yet recent developments have been promising. Do you find the same explicitation in the MT product as the one in (b)?

(5) Consider this famous passage taken from Shakespeare's (2003, 119) *Macbeth*, Act IV, Scene I. The king is sleepless with guilt, despised by everybody, and his marriage shattered, so he decides to seek out the witches to learn what the future holds for him. They are aware that trouble is approaching, and Shakespeare creates a fantastic scenario in which they mix a potion for him to swallow. While they are boiling their ingredients in a hot cauldron over an open fire, the witches chant the following words:

Round about the cauldron go;
In the poison'd entrails throw.
Toad, that under cold stone
Days and nights hast thirty one
Swelter'd venom sleeping got,
Boil thou first i' the charmed pot.
Double, double toil and trouble;
Fire burn and cauldron bubble.

- Now choose a translation into a language you know well. Would you say that the translation is predominantly direct or indirect? If the translation is indirect, try to turn it into direct. If already direct, reflect on the situation and examine the idea of resembling the original closely enough in relevant respects.
- One specific source of difficulty is when the 'function' of a stylistic feature is not heeded (cf. Section 3.4.5). In particular, the working principle in the area of phonology and style is: if (semantic) meaning behind sound is felt to be particularly relevant, the need to select from a range of possible clues becomes important. It is indeed the case here; the witches are differentiated from the other characters by the way they speak. In this scene, it is almost as if they are talking in a foreign language. The way Shakespeare does that is to abandon his usual blank-verse iambic pentameter and make the witches speak in rhyming couplets. In particular, this creates a strange, mesmeric effect – a surreal quality of the last two lines ("Double, double toil and trouble/Fire burn and cauldron bubble"). Examine the problem and the solutions opted for by the translator. Is this sound-based poetics (rhyme, rhythm, etc.) translated? Are ST sounds (esp. the

onomatopoeia "bubble") replicated in the TT you are assessing? What should a translator do to avoid the loss of these features, or even unintended effects of an over- or under-translation?

(6) In many Translators' Codes of ethics, a requirement is to "produce rapid, accurate and *faithful* translations of documents" (UNESCO 2019; my emphasis). How far would you agree with these Codes' proposals or do you feel that the translator's work cannot really be compared to that of the ST author? Given the definition of *faithfulness* in 3.2.1, do you believe this requirement is tenable? Are there other proposals you would want to add?

(7) Analyse a number of translations of a religious text published for children, and compare these versions with translations done for scholarly purposes. Evaluate the choices made in order to ensure that the interpretive translation moves away from the formal end – in the case of children's translation – and towards the formal end – in the case of its scholarly version.

Notes

1 For instance, Chomsky's transformational-generative grammar was famously applied to the study of written translation by Nida (1964), who furthered the notion that transfer took place at the level of deep structure. Clearly, there still is a series of non-linguistic approaches to T&I, which will not be analysed in this volume. See Munday (2016) and Pöchhacker (2016), respectively, for an overview of different theories in translation and interpreting studies.
2 Cf. Muñoz Martín and Halverson (2020b).
3 Cf. 4.3.
4 Gutt was critical of previous approaches to translation, in particular House's (1981) functionalist approach, which argues that STs and TTs should match one another in function. Central to House's discussion is the concept of overt and covert translations (see chap. 3 in Gutt 2000).
5 Note that this notion bears no resemblance with that of *dynamic equivalence*, which was first expounded in Nida and Taber (1969), and later as 'functional equivalence' in de Waard and Nida (1986). Koller (1989, 1995) and de Beaugrande (1978, 1980) also argued for a focus on equivalence in TS from a textual pragmatic perspective.
6 Obviously, this is mostly not an either/or choice, but rather the two ends of a continuum.
7 For instance, parallelism and similar rhetorical devices do not perform the same role in English as it does in other languages.
8 As a consequence, cross-linguistic transfer of meaning is not different from, for instance, adapting a book for a children's audience or rewriting an article for a popular newspaper (Gutt 1991/2000).
9 There is a typo ("bid" for "bit") in the original text.
10 The English construction "Go and" seems to serve the purpose here.
11 Gutt's approach has influenced research on the translation of religious texts, including the Bible (e.g., Alo 2010, 2013, Blass 2010, Gutt 2006, 2009, Hill

et al. 2011, Smith 2007), the Qur'an (e.g., Nazemiyan et al. 2013, Zaki 2019), Kitáb-i-Aqdas (Honeyman 2003), and Tao Te Ching (Solska 2004).

12 Note that Woolf does not write "life was dangerous", but "to live" as if it were not life that is dangerous, but the *act* of living itself.

13 There is a plethora of studies on literary translation from a RT-informed perspective. They range from the analysis of translated prose (Barciński 2019, Duarte 2013, Edwards 2001, Esfandiari and Jamshid 2011, Korzeniowska 2008, Ruiz Moneva 2000, 2017, Sellevold 2008, Vasileanu 2017) through drama (e.g., Alrasheedi 2016, Iliescu Gheorghiu 2011, Stock 2014, Stolarski 2004) to poetry (e.g., Dahlgren Thorsell 1998, 2005, Grzegorzewska 2008, Villa Jiménez 2016, Walczak 2020), with a variety of – extinct or modern – language combinations. A good explanatory summary of the view of literary translation as "clues-based interpretive use of language across language boundaries" in literature is given by Zhonggang (2006, 46).

14 Cf. also Zhao and Chen (2018).

15 This suggests that – contrary to Flyxe's (2002) claims – the translation of more lexicalised onomatopoeia is stable.

16 In the example, *C* means *cultural scenario*, *S semantic scenario*, *P(a)* means *pragmatic scenario (a): inferential steps*, and *P(b)* means *pragmatic scenario (b): balance of effects and effort*.

17 In other cultures, these may have to be substituted with more accessible intracultural, blind celebrities.

18 See, for instance, Díaz-Pérez (2013, 2014), Jing (2010), Lazović (2018), and Szymanska (2005).

19 A wide array of terms has been used in the past to refer to the translation of audiovisual productions (e.g., screen translation, film translation, and multimedia translation), but AVT seems to be the term now most widely used – both in the industry and in academia.

20 Translation is considered an activity that involves a global function required to carry on social relationships, namely, *perspective taking*.

21 The noisy channel model is a mathematical formalisation of communication processes which – similar to RT – has been used to explain different communicative situations.

22 However, Hatim and Munday (2004, 66) describe Gutt's model as an "alternative to formal vs dynamic equivalence models which had signalled a shift from the form of the message to the no less problematic idea of response".

23 Since RT does not contemplate the possibility of *complete* interpretive resemblance across contextual gaps, this attempt at complete resemblance constrains direct translation in presuming the original context. And this presumption of the original context can be said to be "more a consequence of the main part of the definition than a central part of that definition" (Smith 2002, 113).

24 Smith (2002, 110) points out that "awkward receptor language idiom that results from attempting formal correspondence drastically increases processing effort, causing the translation to communicate poorly with its receptor audience"; thus, its use in a TT would not be very effective in relation to its intended audience.

25 There appears to be a misunderstanding as to the notions of relevance and direct translation. See Blakemore (2002) and Wharton (2009) and in 2.6 for a counterargument on the sociocultural factors, and 3.4 for examples of interdisciplinarity in TS. I will also discuss the sub-personal and personal levels of explanation in RT-driven T&I theory in greater depth in Section 5.2.2.

4 Relevance Theory and interpreting studies

4.1 Introduction: interpreting and its bewildering complexity

Interpreting is seen as a complex process in which *cognitive*, *linguistic*, and *social* constraints interact according to the type of mediated event and the intentions, competence, and dispositions of participants. Throughout its (relatively brief) history, research on Interpreting studies (henceforth, IS) has thus drawn on different sciences for concepts and component processes to design models for research or training, some of which have been highly influential in one or both of these uses. In particular, two major modelling perspectives have been widely adopted: social/relational and cognitive process models.[1]

The dynamics of the communicative interaction between participants (including the interpreter) in the mediated event are highlighted in **social or relational models**, which have been mainly applied to the analysis of **dialogue interpreting** (henceforth, DI). These paradigms highlight the interaction between interpreters and the other parties, which is shaped by established or implicit norms. Norms define the interpreter's role, and vary according to sociocultural context, setting, and the agreed or implicit function of the interpretation (e.g., Kirchhoff 1976/2002; Pöchhacker 1994; Kalina 1998).

The interpreter's role and status in the interaction is said to be negotiated in the face-to-face encounters of public service interpreting more than in international conferences. Drawing on Goffman (1981), Wadensjö's (1992, 1993/2002, 1998) influential dialogic model of participation framework accounts for such shifts in the triadic interaction, complementing the three speaker roles with three possible receiver roles.[2]

Conversely, **cognitive process models** – including all CTIS models – focus more on the interpreter's mental activities, and seem to be particularly well suited to the study of **conference interpreting** (henceforth, CI), where the dominant mode is simultaneous. The interpreter's role in CI tends to be more standardised, with less attention to the management of the exchange and more focus on elements such as speed and register.

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As a result, **simultaneous interpreting** (henceforth, SI) models place a greater emphasis on the interpreter's mental processes. To design models for component processes – speech comprehension and production; attention/resource allocation, memory, and coordination – these models often rely on cognitive psychology. The key issue here is to understand how these factors interact or overlap in the difficult job of extracting meaning from one linguistic form and expressing it in another, often under time constraints.

This distinction is not watertight, and the line between social or relational and cognitive process models is sometimes blurred since context or situation can be seen as both external reality and psychological construct (cf. also 3.1). In particular, the vast proportion of RT-oriented research in IS is characterised by an interdisciplinary perspective, which still remains a significant feature of this field, and is reflected in many of the key academic studies (some of which will be discussed later on in this chapter).

Nevertheless, it is true that T&I studies have shifted their focus from texts to *mental* processes. In particular, CTIS approaches see T&I as a special instance of the broader concept of communication. This communicative act – together with the decision-making process involved – is accounted for in terms of such relations as 'cause and effect', which underpin the process of inferencing, a mental activity taken to be central to any T&I process. Inference for translators and interpreters differs mainly in processing constraints – for example, speed – and contexts used. In interpreting, contextual knowledge is drawn more from direct visual perception and temporal co-presence than in translation as translators generally rely on clients' documents. Further, given that linguistic ambiguity may force a choice of output when no equivalent ambiguous word exists in the TL, interpreting provides particularly clear evidence of the need for inference in utterance comprehension.

The degree of explicitness and transparency with which linguistic utterances convey the speaker's intended meaning varies. This poses the question of whether an interpreter can (or should) 'simply translate' or draw on inferences to derive the most probable intended meaning. This issue is inextricably linked to those of fidelity (cf. 3.2.2), and the interpreter's role as a mere 'conduit' or "communication facilitator" (Pöchhacker 2016, 147). In public service interpreting, most notably in legal settings, controversial viewpoints on this issue are expressed. Another concern is whether an inferred meaning must be communicated only implicitly, and if the same degree of implicitness or explicitness should be kept in the TT.

This chapter shows how, over the last 30 years, the case has been cogently made – in both DI and CI studies – for the centrality of RT pragmatics to the understanding of the issues we have discussed, and the interpreting process *in toto*. Section 4.2 starts by examining the first cognitive process models, which have influenced more recent paradigms.

Furthermore, I will give an overview of the RT-informed models in CI – in the simultaneous (4.3) and consecutive (4.4) modes –, while Section 4.5 illustrates RT-informed analyses of DI studies.

4.2 Early cognitive models in interpreting studies

Early studies of interpreting as a process relied on a code model (cf. 1.1), assuming that what speakers say carries a quantifiable meaning that hearers are able to retrieve completely. Studies such as Barik (1975/2002) evaluate interpreter output in terms of omissions, additions, or substitutions of ST material. The interpreter's objective seemed to be complete semantic – if not grammatical – equivalence between a SL message and a (corresponding) TL version. On this basis, the key standard for measuring an interpreter's performance was a restricted, linguistic notion of *accuracy*.

CTIS researchers have attempted to build models to depict aspects of cognition, based mostly on the concepts and theoretical frameworks borrowed from neighbouring disciplines such as psychology, neuroscience, and linguistics. In fact, "interdisciplinary inspiration is an outstanding feature of model building in CTIS" (Xiao and Muñoz 2020, 4).

Between the mid-1960s and the mid-1980s (before the foundation of T&I studies), the earliest attempts to create theoretical models for cognition in T&I were made. During this period, the most important paradigms in Europe were the Science of Translation, championed by academics at the University of Leipzig, and the Interpretive Theory, developed by scholars at today's University of Sorbonne Nouvelle. Both schools were deductive and rationalistic, yet they crucially differed in that Leipzig worked on translation and drew from Chomskyan generative linguistics, whereas Paris centred on interpreters and borrowed mainly from psychology.

The cognitive dimension is at the heart of the Paris School scholars (Seleskovitch 1962, 1976, Seleskovitch and Lederer 1984), who developed the Théorie du Sens (or Interpretive Theory) as a challenge to the prevailing view that CI was no more than a linguistic activity, and at the same time rejected the concept of *equivalence* at word or sentence level. The proponents believed that linguistics was too focused on words and phrases to be able to account for interpreting, and developed a three-step model of interpreting (and, later, translation): comprehension, reformulation, and production. The intermediate stage happened in the 'black box', and they hypothesised that in this black box meaning became deverbalised.

The focus was thus on *vouloir-dire* (intended meaning) via an act of 'deverbalisation' and subsequent re-expression in the TL. According to this process, an interpreter abstracts sense from words in the SL in order to express a similar sense in the TL. Applying this theory to SI, Lederer (1981) noted an alternation between deverbalised reformulation

of cognitively processed data and rapid transcoding of self-contained or context-independent items in echoic memory, which she claimed explains differences in time lag. Lederer proposed that multiple operations interact: conceptualisation overlapping with hearing, linguistic comprehension, and enunciation; possible transcoding of fixed terms or the first few words of a new utterance before the speaker's meaning is clear; and continuous self-monitoring. Nevertheless, linguists have argued that this theory appear to assume that the entire "sense" of a speech could be grasped and re-expressed exactly as intended, suggesting that speech is fully determinate.

Seleskovitch and her colleagues fell short in delivering sound progress;[3] however, they made huge and positive steps to foster and shape CTIS. In particular, with or without explicit recognition of the role granted by linguists to *inference* in utterance comprehension, several CI authors have echoed its central importance in interpreting, notably for the strategy of anticipation.[4]

The Russian interpreter and scholar Chernov (1978) moved beyond the narrow concept of linguistic accuracy to create a semantic-pragmatic model of SI based on speech acts and implicatures (i.e., the Probability Prediction Model). His account focuses on the role of – both semantic and 'situational' – redundancy as a key property of discourse that guides interpreters' 'probability prediction' (anticipation) in their decision-making process, enhancing the feasibility of SI. The author also states that redundancy is inherent in language at various levels, but is enhanced by the interpreter's prior knowledge, decomposing and rearranging 'sense structures' (i.e., *inferencing*) during comprehension, and gradual attunement to the pattern of new and old information in the discourse, which is typically carried in the rheme of each sentence (while the more redundant theme offers opportunities for compression).

Further, Chernov (2004) discusses the role of inference in interpreting in detail, differentiating four different types: linguistic, cognitive, situational, and pragmatic. Only linguistic inference is said to be language-specific, supporting comprehension and aiding the derivation of implicit sense. It also aids the interpreting process – most notably, enabling anticipation – by increasing the 'subjective redundancy' of the discourse for the interpreter.[5]

From the mid-1990s, several cognitive models of T&I popped up, pointing to a need to articulate an 'internal' vision of the field – much as the Paris School had argued before. These models were inspired by one or more neighbouring disciplines, mostly based on information-processing views, largely conceptual, and seemingly distant from empirical support or refutation. As discussed in 3.4 and 3.5, Gutt's (1991) model of translation has been one of the most successful in TS. After the Paris-based scholars, the interpreter's task of re-expressing a speaker's input in a different language under time and mental processing capacity constraints is

foregrounded in another model developed by another 'practisearcher': Gile's (1985, 1991, 1997/2002) Effort Model.

The Effort Model aims to explain variations in interpreting tasks in terms of the fluctuating demand on processing capacity from four non-automatic processes, known as *efforts*: listening/analysis, memory, production, and coordination. They compete for attentional resources require sufficient processing capacity on the part of the interpreter in order for the interpreter to meet the varying requirements of a given task. Issues can arise when either overall or effort-specific capacity is exceeded. The major distinction between Interpretive Theory and Effort Models can be seen in the way they define the key resources required to render an item in SI. While Gile emphasises the scanning, reordering, and retrieval processes involved, the Paris-based scholars focused on the external knowledge required to appropriately Interpret them.

From filling inaudible micro-gaps in the phonetic stream to matching anaphoric pronouns with referents for which no explicit grammatical pointers are provided (Graesser et al. 1994), much of the inferencing processes that underpin utterance comprehension rely upon subconscious and quasi-automatic processes. When inferencing appears in a list of interpreting strategies (cf. Gile 1995), it is to be Interpreted as a more conscious reliance on extratextual knowledge or context to address issues with ST processing.

Similarities have been drawn between the RT notion of *context* put forward by Gutt and Gile's Effort Model for SI and CSI. A further comparison can also be made between the RT notion of *inference* and *comprehension* put forward by the Théorie du Sens (cf. Lederer 2010, 178). In the next sections, we will explore how RT has been used by IS scholars to explain how listeners can make sense of interpreters' utterances by processing the decoded linguistic signal in all available contexts, which may include various beliefs, immediate perceptions, and familiarity with sociocultural communicative norms. We will start by exploring CI, which encompasses SI (cf. 4.3) and **consecutive interpreting** (henceforth, CSI; cf. 4.4).

CSI is still much in demand in CI settings (Gile 2006); however it has been largely replaced by SI, which is carried out while the delegate is speaking. The increased presence of SI has aroused interest among researchers in explaining this complex task (see Gile 2006), and a number of these studies have been informed by RT work on how languages are processed.

4.3 Relevance Theory and simultaneous interpreting

In Gutt's (2000, 213–215) Postface, the concept of translation as a case of interlingual speech was directly transposed to the realm of (simultaneous) interpreting. In particular, the scholar claims that interpreting can

be accommodated in Sperber and Wilson's (1986/1995, 232) RT view of communication as illustrated by Figure 3.1 in 3.2.1.

According to this diagram, utterances are interpretive representations of the SC's thoughts, and hence involve one level of metarepresentation, while the utterance produced by the interpreter is an Interpretation of the SC's thought – which, in turn, is an Interpretation of a thought attributed to someone who expressed it in a different language. In other words, the TT utterance involves a further level of metarepresentation, and can only be relevant as a thought about a thought. Gutt (2000, 215) concludes that the communicator whose utterance the TA is actually dealing with is that of the interpreter, who must often settle for renderings that "resemble the original less closely, but get across easily what he considers to be adequately relevant aspects of the original" (Gutt 2000, 123). In other words, interpreters (just like translators) must be able to retrieve intended meaning quickly, and render STs in a way that allows them to convey what they deem to be important characteristics of the original, while not exactly replicating the original (cf. 3.2).

Gutt's model has been overtly embraced by a variety of scholars in IS, with a varying degree of faithfulness to the original paradigm and influence from other disciplines. In particular, RT-oriented CI researchers generally share the overall objective of studying cognition in multilectal mediated tasks. They have attempted to build models to depict aspects of translational cognition, mostly based on the concepts and theoretical frameworks borrowed from both RT and neighbouring disciplines, such as psychology, neuroscience, and linguistics. In fact, as stated for CTIS in general in 4.2, interdisciplinarity is a key feature of model building in this field.

4.3.1 Setton's mental model

In a **cognitive-pragmatic** perspective that aims to reconcile cognitive and communicative aspects, 'practisearcher' Robin Setton (1998, 1999, 2006) was the first scholar to espouse Sperber and Wilson's (1986/1995) application of the Communicative Principle of Relevance to T&I and Gutt's view of interpreting as attributed thought. This RT-oriented model is also proposed in two manuals by Setton and Dawrant (2016a, 2016b), who dwell on both the interests of CI students and the guidance of their trainers, considering the future of the discipline and the need to integrate RT-oriented theory into the teaching practice.[6]

Setton's (1998, 1999) work is interdisciplinary in nature. In particular, his (1999) book-length study of Chinese-English and German-English interpreting draws on RT and synchronised transcript analysis; methodological and cognitive assumptions are provided by RT and a 'weakly-interactive' parsing model is adapted to SI.

In both Gutt's and Setton's work, competence is seen as a mental faculty, and the mind thought of as modular (Setton 1999, 69–71). However, Setton and Dawrant (2016b, 482) observe that translation is an activity in which time offers more opportunity for research into the author, text, and audience, and the (historical) intentions and contexts of senders and receivers. In translation, the emphasis seems to be on the translator's decisions and their implications for the positioning of the product within the extremely broad range of what may be deemed *translation*, as well as its justification in terms of user expectations. In interpreting, instead, "these norms and possibilities are more circumscribed, so our focus (especially for interpreter training) must shift to *process*" (Setton and Dawrant 2016b, 482; my emphasis).

So, Setton draws on Gutt's ideas, and the principles of relevance and the concept of *optimal interpretive resemblance* apply particularly well to the real-time performance of the simultaneous interpreter, as shown by his wealth of empirical evidence of interpreters' performance. On this basis, Setton and Dawrant (2016b, 482) argue that "quality in interpreting can be defined as fidelity plus relevance". In this context, relevance will depend on the speaker's expressive ability, the listener's comprehension, their accessible contexts (through knowledge, preparation, and presence), and their motivation to communicate. Thus, the interpreter's goal is to:

> make accessible to the interpreter's audience the cognitive effects intended by the speaker as she understands them, at reasonable processing cost and risk, using whatever communicative devices available in the output language are appropriate and effective to do so in her projection of the listener's available contexts.
>
> (Setton and Dawrant 2016b, 485)

Setton points out that the quality of the TL ostensive stimulus - the extent to which it provides adequate cognitive benefits - depends on the linguistic competence of the interpreter. In choosing a particular rendition of the SL ostensive stimulus, interpreters must anticipate differences between their own and the TL addressees' cognitive environment so that the stimulus effectively controls the addressees' cognitive environment and constrains their search for relevance.

Complete interpretive resemblance is, however, not attainable in SI. Under the constraints of simultaneity, interpreters have very little time to choose and compose a TL stimulus, and addressees have little time to process it. Compared to primary interlocutors, simultaneous interpreters must also depend on a different (smaller) linguistic repertoire. For instance, while lexical features expressing register, lexical connotations, and routines can often be reproduced, this is invariably less so with syntactic features (e.g., complex syntactical structures). These features of

the SL utterance have to be replaced or rendered by other means, such as intonation or by chunking the TT into more manageable and flexible smaller syntactic units.

Setton argues that SI is only possible in face-to-face settings where both speakers and the interpreter share time and space. The co-presence in the same physical environment facilitates interpreters' adjustment to the primary interlocutors' cognitive environments. Further, Setton suggests, interpreters have to acquire – through advance preparation – those facts about the world (called "residual contexts" in Setton 2006, 386) which potentially play a role in the contextual make-up of the primary interlocutors. These facts broaden the interpreters' range of contextual assumptions and help them to simulate in their own mind a processing environment similar to those of the primary interlocutors as the basis for interpreting SL utterances and composing TL stimuli.

Unlike previous models focusing on cognitive processes, aimed either at a more or less holistic representation of processing phases or tasks (cf. 4.2), Setton's composite SI model aims at a detailed breakdown of psycholinguistic operations in terms of hypothesised mental structures and procedures. In particular, Setton describes interpreting as a process in which linguistic decoding constantly interacts with inference from multiple inputs, including previous knowledge and rich *pragmatic clues* in the discourse. This work expresses scepticism about a "strategies-for-structure" approach, pointing out that "marked syntactic structure alone does not obstruct SI" (Setton 1999, 282), and foregrounding instead the cognitive-pragmatic processing of linguistic and contextual cues.

The notion of "**pragmatic clues** to inference" (Setton 1999, 204) is proposed by drawing on the distinction between conceptual and procedural information (cf. 2.4). The author sees SI as a process in which linguistic decoding interacts with inference using both extratextual knowledge and pragmatic clues, generating a continuously updated **mental model** of the SC's communicative intent, against which the interpreter is called upon to reformulate successive segments to meet TL constraints.

It is worth noting that Setton divides the items or aspects of language used to direct listeners to relevance into two types: those which "express attitude and intentionality and which indicate the relative importance a Speaker attaches to an item, or direct the hearer to a context in which to process it" (Setton 1999, 199), and those which "function as 'directives', or instructions to a hearer on logical or thematic processing" (Setton 1999, 201). The first group (Setton 1999, 199) includes:

1. overt expressions of belief or desire and their alleged derivatives (hope, intent, satisfaction, etc.), such as attitudinal adverbs (e.g., *frankly*);
2. expressions which imply such beliefs and desires, such as factive and implicative verbs (*regret that*, *remember that*); and

3. features which give relative importance to propositions or their parts, such as evaluative and evidential adverbs (e.g., *especially*) and DMs (e.g., *however*, *after all*, *anyway*).

The second group (Setton 1999, 201–202), instead, includes:

1. DMs (e.g., *after all*, *moreover*, *and*, *but*), and *so*, *given that*, *assuming*, which guide co-processing (e.g., contrasting) of propositions and the assumptions contained in them; and
2. prosodic devices like contrastive stress, which impose perspective or contrasting at the clause-internal, phrase or word level, as well as expressing a range of attitudes.

Setton (1999, 201) acknowledges that "there is a fine and somewhat fuzzy line" between the two and and does not claim to make a clear distinction between them in the analysis of his corpus. Furthermore, although he does not fully integrate procedural elements into his model of SI, he notes that:

> The use and distribution of procedural and non-truth-conditional devices obviously varies between various languages. . . . Not surprisingly, such items *tend to disappear* in German-English or Chinese-English translation, since their closest equivalents in some uses would be parentheticals . . ., which may result in an undesirable loosening of the register.
>
> (Setton 1999, 204, my emphasis)

In this approach, processing capacity is seen as more elastic than in the Effort Models. As interpreter expertise increases, "knowledge schemas and a 'bilingual phrasebook' of more or less directly transcodable items free up attention" (Setton 2015a, 266). In particular, they can relieve **working memory**, freeing up attention for: (a) monitoring output quality, (b) dealing with more difficult or anomalous input (cf. accents, speed), and (c) taking strategic or diplomatic decisions (compression, omission, explication, etc.).

In this model, problems arise mainly when the process is forced back onto low-level, "bottom-up" operations (such as deciphering or parsing) with a high cost in attention and coordination. This may occur in novice performances or difficult conditions. Experts working with rich input in good conditions can achieve adequate accuracy and fluency, subject to professional skills, including vigilance against 'cognitive prejudice' and linguistic interference from cognates, and, in SI, acquired techniques (e.g., chunking) in order to avoid or compensate for the temporary distortions that result from having to start formulating in mid-utterance (Setton 1998, 1999).

Setton's (1999)[7] processing model (Figure 4.1) incorporates a range of cognitive-scientific research to address all relevant aspects of comprehension, memory, and production in SI:



Figure 4.1 Setton's (1999, 65) processing model for SI.

The author conceptualises all the processes as variably superimposed. The sensorimotor level (cf. bottom) comprises audiovisual input processing, on the left, and the articulatory system, to the right. The recognition-retrieval level comprises elements which identify basic linguistic

units after perception, or select and implement them for production. The upper central level provisionally encompasses whatever contributes further to meaning assembly and formulation, including memory, world and local knowledge, and a record of previous discourse. This level is controlled by a (working-memory-based) "Executive" (top centre), which is said to be responsible for overall coordination and secondary pragmatic processing, compensating at the production stage for the inevitable semantic approximations and re-injecting pragmatic guidance in the TL.

Context (i.e., all accessible knowledge) is key at all stages of cognitive processing, hence the pivotal role of the "task-oriented mental model" in adaptive memory. The mental model, which is sourced by both situational and world knowledge, shares with the "Assembler" a "language of representation" which encodes meaning in terms of propositions and attitudes. It is this operationalisation of intermediate representations that allows Setton (1998, 1999) to carry out a "blow-by-blow micro-analysis" of various discourse phenomena which had been left unaccounted for in previous cognitive process models of SI.

Setton's (1999) Chapter 8 concludes with four strategic principles of SI:

1. *principle of pragmatic incrementality*: interpreters can produce speech before the SL utterance is complete, relying on either a context-based mental model, or a logical or propositional form;
2. *placeholding principle*: interpreters produce approximations for segments which are not yet fully understood and modalities not yet resolved;
3. *principle of efficiency* for the mental model, which represents the input received and the result of its processing as efficiently as possible;
4. *principle of pragmatic compensation*: interpreters reconstruct the pragmatic and ostensive dimension of the speech.

To sum up, Setton's approach to corpus-based linguistic analysis of the interpreting process has proved to be successful in the study of IS. His model succeeds to bring together the Interpretive Theory and cognitive process models (cf. 4.1), offering "a more sophisticated account of 'sense' in the light of state-of-the-art research in cognitive science and . . . explicitly build[ing] *context processing* into the analysis of linguistic input" (Pöchhacker 2004, 76; my emphasis).

4.3.2 The quest for optimal relevance

Viaggio (1996, 2002) also embraces Gutt's (1990, 1991) application of RT to IS, focusing on the notion of 'cost-effectiveness' of the effort required from the interpreter or the TA to process the formal features in terms of the relevant information gained or lost. He states that it is "the assessment of the relevance factor that governs the interpreter's strategic

choice of whether to strive for some kind of a rendition or not" (Viaggio 1996, 184).

In particular, Viaggio (1996) applies RT and Gile's Effort Model to explore wordplay (cf. also 3.4.6) and other instances of metalingual use in SI, involving an interplay of form, content, and pragmatic intention. According to his results, metalingual use makes great demands on the interpreter in terms of Gile's efforts: it requires specific receptive attention to the verbal features of the original; it necessitates a more refined elocutionary effort in producing the TL version; and it strains the interpreter's short-term memory. Hence, the importance of a correct assessment of the metalingual comment's relevance on the basis of a real-time analysis of the communication situation in order to find out if all this energy is well spent. Particular attention needs to be paid to the SC's pragmatic intention and intended sense, and the TA's needs and expectations.

Viaggio (1996, 184–185) further states that the interpreter, between hearing and speaking, (a) must decide what is the propositional content of the segment in question or its contribution to intended sense; then, (b) he must assess whether stylistic losses or compromises are advisable; and lastly, (c) he must proceed to think of an adequate translation, recreation, or compensation – be it a complete, partial, or zero rendition.

Viaggio (1996) gives some examples of 'metalingual traps'. One of the most frequent cases is said to be poly-metalingual use in drafting meetings – the interpreter as editor – in which linguistic Interpretation comes to the fore. Let us consider the following statement at a UN meeting (from Viaggio 1996, 191):

(1)

(1a) ST: "I suggest that on the third line from the bottom of page three the text read *should* rather than *shall*."

(1b) TT: "Sugiero que en el antepenúltimo renglón de la página tres el texto diga *debe* en vez de *debería*." [BT: I suggest that on the third but last line of page three the text should read *must* instead of *should*.]

There is likely to be a problem with (1b). The "third but last line" on page three of the Spanish text might read nothing of the sort; the relevant passage in the Spanish version is neither on page three nor in the third line from the bottom, and it reads not "debería" but "deberá", which is exactly what *shall* means in (1a), so the Spanish text does not need to be changed. That is why the author proposes the following amendment to the TT: "Sugiero que en el penúltimo renglón de la página tres del texto inglés (segundo de la página cuatro del texto español) en vez de *should* se diga *shall"*. La enmienda no se aplica al texto español" [BT: I suggest that the third line from the bottom of page three of the English text – second in page four of the Spanish text – read *shall* rather than *should*.

The amendment does not apply to the Spanish text.] It is a much longer version, but it appears to be utterable at normal speed in most instances, since the interventions tend to be short and parsimoniously spoken, with the added pauses of turn-taking.[8]

The interpreter may also limit themselves to:

(2)
(2a) "El delegado sugiere una enmienda al texto inglés." [BT: The delegate suggests an amendment to the English text.]
(2b) "Sugiero que en el texto se diga *shall* en vez de *should*." [BT: I suggest that the text read *shall* rather than *should*.]

Solution (2a) sees the role of the interpreter shift to that of 'principal' (Wadensjö 1998; cf. 4.1), downgrading the TA's status to that of observers. It is to be avoided when the interpreter's TA can be assumed to have some grasp of the original language, whilst it is mandatory when such is not the case. In (2a) we have a report, rather than a rendition; it is the interpreter who explains, rather than the delegate who speaks (a case of *indirect translation* in Gutt's terminology; see 3.2.2). In (2b), a case of direct translation, the interpreter speaks with the delegate to amend the English rather than the Spanish text.

Vianna's (2005) work is a further attempt to discuss SI within the framework of RT, based on Gutt's and Setton's account of SI as interpretive use of language. Firstly, she draws on Setton (1999; cf. 4.3.1) to highlight the differences between translation and SI, adding that interpreters, contrary to translators, frequently deal with source text produced by non-native speakers, which cause all sorts of difficulties, ranging from thick accents to incomprehensible syntax. Another difference is that it is a "high-wire act in a circus" (Vianna 2005, 173). While the translator not only has time to come up with interesting solutions to complex passages, but also has knowledge of the entire text. Interpreters, instead, deal with real-time communication and do not know how the speaker will continue his speech (cf. use of wordplay).

Secondly, the author discusses the question of effort in terms of the effort expended both by the interpreter and their listeners, stating as follows:

> Other things being equal, the more processing effort involved in understanding an utterance, the less relevant that utterance becomes, to the point that hearers may eventually abandon the search for relevance altogether because the processing effort involved is greater than the cognitive effects to be achieved.
>
> (Vianna 2005, 175)

However, interpreters cannot clearly abandon the search for relevance if the source speech involves extra processing effort. The difficulties may

abound: SCs may speak too fast, too low, or too loud, or too far from the microphone, or too near it; they may use regional expressions or have a very thick accent; or they may have speech difficulties, such as a stutter or a lisp.

Part three of Vianna's article discusses the role of the interpreter in the communicative act, and the possible degrees of interpretive resemblance achieved by the interpreter's rendering of the source speech. Using their knowledge of the audience, the interpreter is called upon to make assumptions about its cognitive environment and the potential relevance that any aspects of the Interpretation would have in that cognitive environment (Gutt 2000, 116). This does not mean that the interpreter will always accurately judge what would be optimally relevant for the TA or what the shared cognitive environment includes. They make this decision based mainly on information they can obtain from seeing the audience and the audience's reactions, knowing the topic of the conference, and using their own intuition.

Lastly, the author suggests a few relevance-theoretic explanations to certain types of errors in SI. According to Setton, many studies of SI lack a "pragmatic dimension, particularly in the definition of errors" (Setton 1999, 46). RT is here used to provide this pragmatic dimension to the identification, and prevention, of these errors.

Vianna (2005, 184) gives an example of wrong conceptual address in a Portuguese to English rendition:

> (3)
> (3a) Speaker: Me refiro ao eixo do mal. [BT: I am referring to the axis of evil.]
> (3b) Interpreter: I am referring to the evil axis.

As seen in 2.3.1, mentally represented concepts are seen as involving a conceptual address, which gives access to a linguistic, logical, and encyclopaedic entry. The word or term which encodes this concept gives the hearer access to this mental representation. In (3b), the interpreter translated "eixo do mal" as "evil axis". However, the SC was using this expression metalinguistically, quoting the phrase "axis of evil", which was first used by US President George W. Bush in his State of the Union address on 29 January 2002 – a few months after the 9/11 attacks – to describe foreign governments that, during his administration, allegedly sponsored terrorism and sought weapons of mass destruction. The fact that it was not translated by the corresponding term in English, puts the TA on the track of the wrong Interpretation.

This would have given the hearer access to a conceptual address where information about the objects described by that word or expression is stored. In particular, when hearing "evil axis", the TA will access a linguistic entry, a logical entry, and an encyclopaedic entry which will help them construct an ad hoc concept (cf. 2.3.2) concerning roughly an axis

that is evil – nothing to do with the original Portuguese expression in (3a). This becomes even clearer with continuation of the speech: "países que representam um risco para a segurança de todos nós!" [BT: countries which pose a security threat to us all!]. The interpreter's error made their utterance less relevant by increasing the processing effort required of the TA. Had the interpreter chosen the correct translation, Vianna argues, their audience could have had immediate access to the conceptual address for this expression, and it would have helped them process the rest of the sentence using the implicated premises and achieve the intended cognitive effects.

To conclude, both Viaggio and Vianna believe that RT is not only an excellent framework for SI research, but also a possible tool for improving interpreter-training methods.

4.3.3 Enrichment in simultaneous interpreting

Vandepitte's (2001) article presents a revised definition of anticipation in CI, seen both as the oral production of a particular part of a message in special circumstances, and a mental process. In particular, it does so in terms of 'deliberate enrichment', drawing on RT.

Vandepitte analyses a case where the ending has not yet been uttered, which resembles situations of not having been able to hear a particular word or just not getting that word from the speaker. When interpreters do complete an assumption in this way, they put themselves in a situation that is similar to, for example, a worker hearing from a colleague, "It will take *some time* to finish this task". Here, the worker also has to fill in a gap – that is, decide what "some time" actually means. In RT terms, this is a case of enrichment (cf. 2.3.2), a procedure in which the interpreter needs to retrieve a missing element in order to find the intended meaning of the message.

Interpreters find the missing element by relying on the tools available: their comprehension skills, which include "an inferential process that applies to the premises available to the interpreters in their cognitive environments" (Vandepitte 2001, 329). An experienced interpreter prepares their cognitive environment in such a way that it resembles the speaker's cognitive environment as much as possible, and then produces an anticipated item that is most likely to be the intended one. In accordance with the first principle of relevance (cf. (3) in 2.2.2), it will be the first result from an inferential process based on the relevant assumptions from their cognitive environment, which yields adequate contextual effect.

In contrast with a comprehension process in everyday interaction, in which the listener does not feel the urgent need to engage in anticipating, the interpreter deliberately tries to complete a proposition that is not yet complete. In a sort of 'competition' with the SC, the interpreter does not wait seconds to receive the missing element in the SC's flow of words, but mentally goes on processing. Thus, Vandepitte defines anticipation as "the mental production of (parts of) relevant assumptions to be used

in deliberately produced instances of enrichment" (Vandepitte 2001, 330), in which the relevant assumptions are those that the SC also holds. While the interpreter needs the best cognitive environment available for the situation, they will use its assumptions in the inferential enrichment procedures that their comprehension skills will rely on.

To sum up, anticipation in CI is found to yield a high number of cases of strengthening, rather than deletions, additions, or contextual implications (cf. 2.2.1). This is a cognitive aspect which is typical of CI, and distinguishes it from other communicative acts.

4.3.4 Explicitation

Gumul (2008) explores the relationship between explicit (cf. 2.3.2) and implicit (cf. 2.3.3) levels of communication in SI, with the aim to explore the relationship between this phenomenon and relevance under the constrained conditions of a SI task. In particular, this study is an attempt to determine to what extent striving for optimal relevance of the translated discourse is interpreting students' priority motivation to explicitate implicit information.

Gumul's (2008, 196) initial hypothesis is that "in most cases, explicitating shifts will be induced not only by the intention to achieve maximal contextual effects for minimal processing effort, but will primarily be necessitated by the constraints of the simultaneous interpreting task".

The research was conducted on the Polish-English language pair, in both directions, and focuses on the performance of 28 advanced interpreting students who are native speakers of Polish with English as B language. The corpus of STs consists of five authentic political speeches, constituting four sets. Each of the analysed sets was interpreted by 14 subjects, which amounts to 56 interpreting outputs and a corpus of around 110,000 words.

The results reveal that strategic explicitation in SI seems to be due to both interpreting constraints and the search for optimal relevance. Constraints-conditioned explicitating shifts prevail. Out of 95 retrospective verbal protocols reporting intentional explicitation, in 49 cases explicitating shifts were triggered by interpreting constraints, while in 34 cases such transformations were due to striving for optimal relevance of the TT. There were 12 cases in which no reasons for explicitation were verbalised. The remark was just a straightforward statement that explicitation was intentional without giving any reasons. None of the remarks hinted at an intention on the part of the interpreter to comply with translational norms.

Although explicitation in SI appears to be overwhelmingly attributable to striving for optimal relevance – and thus aiming at reducing the processing effort of the target audience – the prevailing tendency is that it is mainly triggered by the existence of various interpreting constraints. Yet, as observed in the corpus (and indicated by retrospective verbal

protocols), when interpreters are faced with heavy constraints of the SI task, they resort to explicitation to guarantee optimal relevance of the TT.

By adapting Bogucki's (2004, 87; cf. 3.4.7) RT model, Gumul (2008, 200) concludes that "whatever factors impede the interpreter's actions, the choices that result from the interpreting process are filtered through the meta-constraint of relevance" – that is, they are ultimately geared at achieving maximal contextual effects for minimal processing effort.

Much like Setton (1998, 1999, 2006), authors such as Vandepitte (2001) and Gumul (2008) corroborate Gutt's (2000) view of T&I as attributed thought, stressing the fundamental underdeterminacy of linguistic encoding. Yet, Gutt's (2000) approach will be challenged by the academics in the next sections.

4.3.5 The multimedia environment in in-vision sign language interpreting

Stone's (2007, 2019) work also deals with interlingual enrichment, but analyses decisions made by sign language sight translators and interpreters, in particular during news and current affairs programmes. Most of these programmes include spoken input that is delivered in a multimodal environment – the newsreaders and their viewers – while information is understood within the context of that multimedia environment. Scripted and spontaneous speech is uttered within the context of other information being made available in the shared cognitive environment, which is also available to British Sign Language (BSL) sight translators and interpreters.

In his 2019 work, Stone draws on RT, Blakemore and Gallai (2014; cf. 4.5.2), and Sequeiros (1998, 2002; cf. 3.4.5) to analyse this multimodal environment and the ways in which interpreters manage that environment as they craft their renditions of English in-vision programmers into BSL. The author (2019) argues that BSL interpreters engage in (and shift between) three different forms of "multimodal deixis":

- *pointing*: allowing the audience to watch the programme as information is provided by the images on screen alone);
- *telling*: using BSL to render information; and
- *showing*: using depicting strategies that are isomorphic with the images on screen.

These forms are "visually motivated by the shared cognitive environment and satisfy the linguistic requirements of BSL and the cultural norms of using depicting strategies to communicate using the single channel of vision" (Stone 2019, 168). This depiction of deixis may derive from their gestural repertoire, linguistic repertoire, or a fusion of both linguistic and gestural repertoires – and yet satisfies the ostensive communicative requirements in providing optimal access to the news and current affairs for the deaf TA.

In other words, if STs are understood because of the multimedia environment they are produced in, then the language that is produced must be contextually appropriate, drawing upon contextual assumptions that the viewing audience will make by virtue of what they are seeing. These viewed, contextual assumptions can be represented by depicting handshapes which are visually motivated by the shape of an entity. For instance, a person is a long thin cylinder and represented by an upright index finger, which can be moved in space to represent a person moving about. This then can be used in a rendition of movement with respect to the screen so that it is isomorphic with the screen – for example, a weather person using the screen to gesturally depict how rain clouds move.

To conclude, RT helps us to explain the decisions that sight translators and interpreters make when considering the non-present audience. The presence of the professionals on screen makes them present much like the dialogue interpreters described in Blakemore and Gallai (2014; cf. 4.5.2) as many of the strategies aimed at 'covert' translation strive for mutuality (rather than Gutt's attributive use).

4.3.6 Addition of discourse markers in European Parliament speeches

Götz (2017, 2021) investigates DMs and cognitive hedging in interpreted speech. In particular, her 2017 article looks at the translation and SI of the Hungarian DM *vajon* ("I wonder") in the English to Hungarian direction. The data was collected from European Parliament speeches: the translation corpus consists of 125 occurrences of *vajon* in the Hungarian translations, and their English STs; on the other hand, interpreting-related data is analysed in 75 contexts, both in the original speeches in English and their SI into Hungarian.

Firstly, her study addresses issues around the rendition of DMs, drawing on the role of added DMs in interpreter-mediated discourse explored by Blakemore and Gallai (2014; cf. 4.5.2). The author then proceeds to examine the functions of utterances in which *vajon* occurs, applying both RT and the so-called 'translation method' (Aijmer and Simon-Vandenbergen 2004). In particular, Götz investigates the techniques of omission and addition as these are said to offer insights into how DMs are perceived and rendered in mediated texts.

Although the small scale of this study can not lead to broad generalisations, the author found that *vajon* is used without corresponding ST forms. This means that the use of *vajon* is linked to the functions of *vajon*-utterances in STs, and not to individual linguistic forms.

Results show that zero-form contexts were just slightly outnumbered by contexts containing a corresponding linguistic form in the ST. In this respect, Götz's (2017) first hypothesis – most TT *vajon* forms will have corresponding ST forms – was confirmed. However, the second hypothesis – the interpretation data will show strong links between particular ST and

TT forms – is not confirmed; strong links were found only between certain forms (e.g., *vajon . . . -e*; *vajon* in a subordinate clause and *whether*, etc.), and only in translations.

Further, no clear answer emerged with regard to the question of the role of *vajon* in English-Hungarian translated texts. To a certain degree, *vajon* structures appear to be linked to certain ST structures; for example, *whether* and *if* as subordinators correspond to subordinated clauses that frequently feature *– e* and *vajon*.

The author thus argues that *vajon* is not so much used to translate specific ST forms, but rather a procedural tool with which the effect of the ST can be reproduced in the TL. The focus is shifted from how DMs are translated or interpreted, to how the contexts which contain them are rendered. The corpus is characterised by contexts with a rhetorical function. Translators and interpreters could have detected this, and as a result translated them using *vajon*, a frequent DM in Hungarian rhetorical questions. This, however, would suggest that this data set is concerned with the translation of rhetorical questions, rather than that of *vajon*.

Applying RT, the author argues that translators and interpreters insert *vajon* as 'participants' in attributive language use, conveying their Interpretation of a given text or utterance in translation (Gutt 2000). Further, additions in the translation data were found to be in line with Blakemore and Gallai's (2014) findings about DM additions in the interpretation data, which they understand to reflect the interpreters' thought processes. As such, Götz assumes that translators and interpreters detect the strong personal commitment *vajon*-questions and rhetorical questions share, and seek to communicate it, thus reflecting the speaker's point of view.

4.4 Insights into consecutive interpreting

CSI is a mode of interpreting in which the speaker says a few sentences whilst the interpreter takes notes to help them perform their job accurately and efficiently; when the speaker stops, it is the interpreter's turn to reproduce what the speaker has said for the TA. According to RT accounts of CSI, consecutive interpreters strive to achieve optimal relevance; that is, to obtain the largest possible cognitive effect with the least effort, especially during note-taking. We will see how this tenet is explored in a (relatively low) number of studies on the CSI process.

4.4.1 A relevance-theoretic approach to note-taking

In contrast to pre-cognitive studies views, in which note-taking is seen mainly as a memory-supporting technique, Albl-Mikasa (2008, 2016) applies RT to the analysis of note-taking in CSI. Her (2016) process-oriented analysis gives a linguistic and cognitive discussion of meaning construction at the local and global levels. Against this background, the author (2016, 107) states that "RT is ideally suited to shed light on the

recovery not only of more and less explicit natural language utterances, but also of their even more reduced and highly economical representation in the (form of) NT (utterances)". In other words, a detailed study of the necessary enrichment and various completion and expansion processes in real-life notation texts (henceforth NTs) becomes possible by adopting the analytical tools provided by RT.

Albl-Mikasa (2008, 2016) specifically looks into reduction and expansion processes. Firstly, she reconstructs interpreters' notes as an individualised language, exploring the language dimension with regard to word meanings, formation and inflection, semantic relations at sentence and text levels, as well as pragmatic functions. She builds up her argument by laying the cognitive theoretical foundations against the backdrop of the social-constructivist paradigm, presenting an empirical study on the discourse dimension of the use of linguistic notational means in NTs. In doing so, she outlines the added value of the methodological tools provided by RT to analyse the balance between explicit and implicit information in NTs.

As the results show, the step from ST to NT (in ST reception/NT production) typically involves a considerable amount of reduction. The reduced information is expanded again as the interpreter moves from the NT to the TT (in NT reception/TT production). She describes these reduction processes during note-taking in three steps: *ellipsis*, *restructuring*, and *high condensation*. In other words, note-taking is seen as the creation of an elliptical, restructured intermediate text from which the interpreter then formulates a full, extended TL utterance by supplying the missing details from context.

Albl-Mikasa's (2008) study focuses on renditions by five trainee (English-German) consecutive interpreters, with the aim to describe the process of note-taking in terms of NT reception and production. Adding the RT constructs of explicature and implicature to the general account of cognitive text processing as **coherence** building and the construction of a mental representation at local and global levels, her approach helps compare ST, NT, and TT in terms of the underlying propositional representation. In particular, it shows how the meaning of highly fragmentary NTs is retrieved in CSI.

Results of this empirical study show that interpreters operate relatively closely along *micro-propositional lines* when processing the ST, NT, and TT, with the explicature regularly having the same propositional form as the corresponding proposition in the ST.

As a way of illustration, let us consider example (4) of a CSI performance, drawn from Albl-Mikasa (2008, 214). The contextual background is a meeting at the UN Environment Programme, debating the role of host countries of endangered species:

(4)

(4a) ST: Those people cannot be denied the right to use their natural patrimony. What they are asking for is a fair compensation

by the world community for the non-use of this natural patrimony. Their contribution to the endangered species is to host them.

(4b) TT: Diese Menschen müssen das Recht haben, ihre natürlichen Ressourcen zu nutzen, und dafür fordern sie zu Recht einen Ausgleich – *und wenn sie diese Ressourcen nicht nutzen, fordern sie zu Recht einen Ausgleich von den Industriestaaten*. Ihr Beitrag *zur Erhaltung* bedrohter Tierarten ist, dass sie diese Tierarten in ihren Ländern *fördern und quasi* aufnehmen. [BT: These people must have the right to use their natural resources, and for this they rightly demand compensation – *and if they do not use these resources, they rightly demand compensation from the industrialised countries*. Their contribution *to the conservation* of endangered species is that they promote and virtually host these species in their countries.] (My emphasis).

To begin with, the interpreter has access to the mental representation stored in the process of understanding (4a). His notes were as follows in Figure 4.2:



Figure 4.2 Example of notation.

Source: From Albl-Mikasa (2008, 213).

According to the author's analysis, the meaning of NT utterances may be recovered further by developing the linguistic input (i.e., notation signs and symbols) into the fully propositional explicature. The interpreter does this by means of reference assignment and disambiguation. He also adds to and enriches the ST information by drawing on non-linguistic sources and the first principle of relevance (cf. (3) in 2.2.2).

Surprisingly, Albl-Mikasa (2008, 215) discovered that

> *linguistic sources* such as the notation co-text (NC) and knowledge of the target language (TK) were more frequently resorted to in recovering the explicatures from the NT than *non-linguistic sources* such as background knowledge (BK) and the understanding of the source text (US).

Table 4.1 focuses on the underlying proposition or explicature; the developments of what is made explicit in the NT (cf. second column) can be described only thanks to the expressions documented in the first column (based on the NT in Figure 4.2):

The recovery of the meaning in a NT starts from the level of the explicature. That is, confronted with a ST utterance such as the second utterance in (4a), the interpreter is likely to:

1. note down something along the lines of "↙will Ausgleich f[ür] non-use"; and
2. expand this into a TT utterance such as "und wenn sie diese Ressourcen nicht nutzen, fordern sie zu Recht einen Ausgleich von den Industriestaaten" (cf. 4b).

Thus, the interpreter sticks to the propositional form underlying the ST in the notation and TT, operating at a micro-propositional level. As a result, the three texts are closely interlinked. The NT clearly reflects the ST surface structure, in an elliptical manner:

NT: ↙will	ST: they are asking for
NT: Ausgleich	ST: fair compensation by the world community
NT: f non use	ST: for the non-use of this natural patrimony

The TT is a development of the reduced linguistic contribution of the NT:

NT: will Ausgleich	TT: fordern sie [zu Recht] einen Ausgleich [von den Industriestaaten]

Table 4.1 Underlying proposition or explicature in a notation text.

Notation	*Developments (as documented in the TT)*	*Source*
Mensch dieser muss Recht h[aben] use Nat[ure] ↙ [Mensch dieser] will Ausgleich f[ür] ↙ non use	"Diese Menschen müssen das Recht haben" "ihre natürlichen Ressourcen zu nutzen" "und dafür fordern sie zu Recht einen Ausgleich" "und wenn sie diese Ressourcen nicht nutzen"	• Plurals from US • Definite articles from TK • Possessive pronouns from US or previous NC • Technical terms from BK, US, and TK • Personal pronouns from NC • Idiomatic expressions from US and TK • Indefinite articles from TK • Coordinating and semantically classifiable conjunctives from NC and US • Subject and object from NC (arrow) • Demonstrative from US or NC
Ausgleich	"Ausgleich von den Industriestaaten"	• Prepositional phrase from US (source text: "by the world community")
Beitrag	"Ihr Beitrag zur Erhaltung bedrohter Tierarten"	• Possessive pronoun from US or previous NC • Prepositional phrase from BK or US
= host end[angered] sp[ecies]	". . . ist, dass sie diese Tierarten in ihren Ländern fördern und quasi aufnehmen"	• Subordinating construction from TK • Personal and demonstrative pronoun from notation and target text co-text • Prepositional phrase from US • "fördern und quasi" – unnecessary addition, possibly for strategic reasons (e.g., to gain time)

Source: From Albl-Mikasa (2008, 214–215).

NT: f non use — TT: und wenn sie [diese Ressourcen] nicht nutzen

According to the author, the enrichments in square brackets do not indicate structural changes, but a mere reflection of the (memorised) ST and its explicatures:

TT: zu Recht — ST: cannot be denied the right
TT: von den Industriestaaten — ST: by the world community
TT: diese Ressourcen — ST: natural patrimony

The interpreter leaves the inference of possible implications and conclusions to his TA, and is thus less likely to note down – and render into the TL – an implicature like "It is high time host countries were paid compensation for preserving the world's living genetic resources"/"Es ist höchste Zeit, dass Gastgeberländer für die Erhaltung der Artenvielfalt auf der Welt entschädigt warden". So, explicatures (and, with it, micro-, rather than macro-propositions) are shown to be a key level of processing in note-taking.

4.4.2 Maximising and/or optimising quality in CSI

Al-Kharabsheh's (2017) study attempts to examine the premise that RT can function as a standard or a benchmark for maximising and/or optimising quality in CSI. He draws on Gutt's work and empirical data[9] obtained from 25 trainee interpreters' recorded sessions in order to provide a relevance-driven account for a number of semantic, syntactic, and cultural issues in CSI.

The interpreter's perspective on the TL cognitive environment may have an impact on his decision-making process. For instance, there are times when a direct translation is the only way to obtain the needed degree of resemblance, and vice versa. To ensure that the desired degree has been achieved, the interpreter should keep an eye on both the likely benefits – cognitive effects – and the TA's processing effort. Let us take a look at an utterance (5a) from a television documentary on global economic growth, translated by Al-Kharabsheh's (2017, 36) case study students (5b):

(5)

(5a) ST: *The cycle of crises is spinning faster* and with greater potential for destruction. (Emphasis in the original.)

(5b) TT: تدور عجلة الأزمات بسرعة . [tadūru 'ajalatu al-'aazamāti bi-sur'atin]

Example (5) helps analyse the issue of relevance-driven quality in interpreting culture-bound expressions by focusing on the vivid metaphor in *bold*. 80 percent of the students gave the literal rendering in (5b), which is "inelegant, and would maintain a certain foreignness" (Al-Kharabsheh 2017, 37). The term عجلة ['ajalatu] ("cycle") does not collocate with الأزمات [al-'azamāti] ("crises"), contributing to make the TT somewhat comic and leading to the loss of the image borne by the trope. This leads to a flawed understanding of the message, and the TT counts as an irrelevant piece of information.

Relevance can here be achieved by providing a conventionalised metaphor such as تدور دوامة الأزمات [tadūru dawwāmatu al-'azamāti] (BT: "the whirlpool of crises") as this contextually relevant rendition helps

retain the denotative and connotative components of meaning displayed in the ST. In fact, the "whirlpool" image is key in achieving optimal relevance, alongside an adequate degree of quality. The connection in the ST between "cycle of crises" and "spinning" would be kept in Arabic through the use of تامزألا [al-'azamāti] ("crises"), and ةمواد [dawwāmatu] ("whirlpool") partly because the generalised convention in Arabic is that crises, conflicts, disasters are described in terms of a "whirlpool". Such a relevance-oriented solution is said to be part of indirect interpreting (cf. Gutt 2000, 168–201).

The findings hint at the fact that the degree of quality in CSI largely depends on the degree of relevance achieved by the interpreter's TL version. According to the author, quality in CSI grows exponentially with the degree of relevance achieved by the interpreter's TL version. The study highlights that picking up on the intended contextual assumptions of the ST and developing sensitivity to the **communicative clues** are crucial steps to guide interpreters in their search for optimal relevance in the TL, and to enable them to predict and construct the required degree of relevance needed to interpret the utterance – which would, consequently, warrant a corresponding degree of quality.

In conclusion, Al-Kharabsheh's work shows that RT can be considered a reliable tool in the evaluation of interpreting efforts and for fine-tuning the interpreters' performance, and remains critical in interpreter decision-making and for the delivery of the desired output. In particular, it can be considered a reliable frame of reference, or a reliable screening system that can ensure both relevance-building and a correspondingly concomitant quality-building in CI.

4.4.3 Reducing and focusing cognitive overload

Ying (2010, 2011) focuses on the development of a RT-oriented "conceptual mapping model" – that is, a working model for optimising the cognitive effort needed to achieve higher cognitive effects in the process of CSI.

His work urges practitioners and trainee interpreters to understand the cognitive nature of the interpreting process, and to know what they are searching for in the constant in-flow of information and how to negotiate between competing behavioural tasks. In particular, it (a) differentiates cognitive abilities from language-related interpreting skills, (b) explains a hierarchy of cognitive constructs (known as *main concepts* and *minor concepts*), and (c) suggests three working strategies to optimise the interpreter's limited cognitive processing resources.

In particular, consecutive interpreters are encouraged to allocate their attentional resources given to information processing by using *filtering* (attention to main concepts of the ST), *rearranging* (using a layered

schema of concepts), and *reproducing* (using linguistically clear, audience-oriented structures to reproduce concepts).

To sum up, Ying aims at the creation of a qualitative pedagogical tool which would enable CSI trainers and students to monitor their performance quality, identify how to reduce and focus cognitive overload, and thus self-regulate the trainee interpreters' learning processes.

4.4.4 Procedural elements in consecutive interpreting

In Sykes' (2005) work, Setton's approach to procedural elements of speech (cf. 4.3.1) is adopted. It includes both indicators of speaker attitude and directives on logical or thematic processing in an analysis of five trainee interpreters' handling of *ostensive guidance* in CSI.

In particular, the objective of this study is to answer the following two questions:

- Is there evidence in the students' performances that learners merely report what content they have extracted, losing the ostensive guidance?
- Is there evidence that learners translate the SL procedural devices as if they encoded content?

The analysis proceeds in stages. Firstly, the author transcribes the five students' performances together with the original discourse on which they were based, and then proceeds to translate the foreign language discourse into English. Secondly, she places the original speech and interpretation side by side in the form of a table to facilitate comparison of the two pieces of discourse. Sections of the original are matched as closely as possible with corresponding sections (in terms of meaning) of the interpretation.[10] Lastly, Sykes analyses the students' handling of ostensive guidance in the performance and weighs the evidence for and against Setton's (1999) assertions.

Detailed analysis of the students' performances seems to allow to pick out aspects which confirm trainers' intuitions regarding the special status of "links" (Sykes 2005, 99). The use, by two different students, of two directives in quick succession – as if uncertain of the link between two concepts – is particularly interesting. However, the author states that the complexity of the interpreter's task makes it difficult to draw any firm conclusions on this subject.

4.5 Dialogue interpreting and Relevance Theory

Aside from conference settings, there are other institutional contexts in which interpreting takes place (i.e., legal proceedings, healthcare, educational or media settings). This interpreter-mediated communication in

spontaneous face-to-face interaction is also known as *community* or *dialogue interpreting* (henceforth, DI; see Mason 1999).

Pragmatics has inspired extremely interesting research in this field, where it is often complemented by sociolinguistics. In particular, pragmatic studies of DI have drawn on Brown and Levinson's (1978, 1987) and Leech's (1983) politeness theory, Austin's (1962) speech act theory, and Grice's co-operative principle (cf. Chapter 1 and 3.1). Through fine-grained, contextualised analyses of transcripts of interpreting sessions, or by using a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods to explore corpora, these authors have been able to explain a wide array of aspects of interpreter behaviour. It seems beyond doubt, at this point, that interpreters are full participants in any encounter that they mediate, which is always a 'triadic exchange' (see Mason 2001).

Together with Wadensjö's (1992, 1998) seminal work (cf. 4.1), Berk-Seligson (1990, 197) was perhaps the first to call for the inclusion of pragmatics in court interpreter training programmes as a means of making trainees aware of the potential effect of their translational choices on juries. In particular, she showed the difficulties involved in handling hedging and politeness features in courtroom interpreting.

Following this, other scholars (e.g., Rigney 1999; Hale 2001) have investigated equivalence of **illocutionary force** in the translation of speech acts. Hale (2001) investigated the interpreting of questions in examination-in-chief and cross-examination in adversarial courtrooms, finding that the illocutionary force of coercive questions is sometimes lost, partly due to the different form of such questions in Spanish and English. Some of these unconscious or habitual processes can presumably be brought to consciousness and actively resisted or suppressed in order to respond to different externally imposed or prevailing norms and conventions.

These socio-pragmatic models (cf. 4.1), which are now gathered under the umbrella term "DI paradigm" (Pöchhacker 2016, 71), are being developed alongside cognitive-pragmatic approaches, inspired by Gutt's and Setton's contributions and often interdisciplinary in nature.

4.5.1 Mutual accessibility of contextual assumptions

In his interdisciplinary analysis of dialogue interpreting, Mason (2004, 2006a, 2006b) adopts certain aspects of RT to analyse interpreted exchange, in particular the notion of a mutual cognitive environment required for relevant communication to occur.

He suggests that "a way forward in analysing the pragmatics of DI lies in "using the evidence of actual responses . . . to trace the communication of meanings *beyond what is said*" (Mason 2006a, 366, emphasis in original). Further, he agrees with Gutt that the concept of *interpretive resemblance* (cf. 3.2.2) can be used to describe DI, and regards the first principle of relevance (cf. (3) in 2.2.2) as "applicable to the interpreted

encounter as much as it is to any communicative event" (Mason 2004, 365). In particular, the cognitive principle of relevance is argued to be particularly adequate to account for interpreted events as interpreters "are constantly conscious of the need to be brief (efficient) and to-the-point (effective) because of the perception that their interventions hold up or lengthen the communication process" (Mason 2006b, 109).

Mason argues that the pragmatic shifts involved in the interpreters' renditions may be analysed as translational adjustments made in order to improve relevance; in other words, the interpreter is required to adjust their output in order to preserve the balance between contextual effects and processing effort. This view is reflected in the account that Mason (2006a, 361–362) gives for the interpreter's representation of the interpreter's utterance (6d) in the following interpreter-mediated interview between an immigration officer and a Polish immigrant:[11]

(6)

(6a) IO: OK when you arrived in the United Kingdom, did you see an immigration officer in Dover?

(6b) PW: Tak. [Yes.]

(6c) IO: That immigration officer would ask you some questions. (. . .)

(6d) IN: Urzędnik zadał ci dwa pytania. Coś ty jemu powiedziała? Dlaczego tutaj przyjechałaś? [The official asked you two questions. What did you say to him? Why did you come here?]

In (6), the immigration officer and the interpreter are said to share a mutual cognitive environment, and the contextual effects of utterance (6c) are retrieved by the interpreter without unnecessary processing effort. The interpreter's response shows that what is meant by utterance (6c) is taken by her to mean, "I know the immigration officer asked you some questions, and I would like to know how you replied". There was no guarantee, however, that a literal translation into another language of either the linguistic meaning of utterance (6c) or of what is actually said would allow the same contextual effects to be derived; hence, the interpreter's explicitation in (6d).

Following Gutt (cf. 3.2.2), the author further states that inferential processes are universal, but not completely predictable in human interaction. Inferences triggered by an utterance range from the allowable in a context, to those plausible or likely in a context, to the actual ones (Mason 2006a). Only the actual inferences result in the Interpretation of an utterance readers eventually arrive at. The actual inferences, however, may or may not fully coincide with what is plausible to infer.

However, this "should not be taken to imply espousal of the whole [relevance] theory" (Mason 2006b, 120). Mason draws some of the key concepts from other – mainly sociological – theories, and distinguishes other fundamental levels of analysis. Most notably, he embraces Widdowson's

(1996) distinction of two major senses in which the term 'discourse' is used:

- Discourse 1 (D1): the pragmatic process of negotiation of meaning in communication, based on (but by no means reduced to) what is said;[12]
- Discourse 2 (D2): socially constituted conventions of belief and established values which constrain the way people think and use their language to achieve meaning.[13]

By the same token, Mason sees the need to distinguish two kinds of context and two kinds of power in DI (Mason 2006b, 116–117):

Table 4.2 Components in Mason's (2006b, 116–117) pragmatics-sensitive discourse/conversation analysis.

	Context	*Power*
Corresponding to D1 (cf. Widdowson 1996, 2004)	C1: the set of premises used in interpreting an utterance/"a subset of the [user's] assumptions about the world" (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, 15), subject to each user's pretextuality and constantly evolving within the exchange (recontextualisation).	P1: power within the exchange (gate-keeping rights, the power to interrupt, question, etc.), often invested in the interpreter, who occupies a "position which control[s] scarce resources" (Anderson 1976, 218).
Corresponding to D2 (cf. Widdowson 1996, 2004)	C2: relevant aspects of the sociocultural/ historical context, including institutional constraints.	P2: institutional power (cf. Inghilleri 2003, 2005), intimately bound up with discourse (D2) and ideology.

The author states that the "investigation of D2, C2, P2 is crucial if we are to make sense of community interpreting events but our investigations also need to be informed by evidence of the evolution within actual exchanges of D1, C1, P1" (Mason 2006b, 117). If we limit our consideration of power to P2 alone, he argues, we do not necessarily notice what happens in interpreter-mediated interaction. By conducting the analysis of talk shown in Table 4.2, Mason states that scholars can fill the gap between the micro-analysis of mediated interaction in its narrowest sense, and the ethnographic study of interpreters as social beings and of the events in which they participate, as exemplified by Inghilleri (2003, 2005) and others.

This strong case for the co-existence of discourse-analytic and RT-based studies of interpreter-mediated events made by Mason (2006b) has been heeded by Gallai (2015, 2016, 2017), who employs a two-pronged approach to analyse interpreter-mediated police interviews.

4.5.2 Gallai: the illusion of an 'invisible' interpreter

In contrast with previous approaches to interpreting as interlingual interpretive use and DMs as pragmatic or communicative "clues" (cf. 3.2.2 and 4.3.1), Blakemore and Gallai (2014)[14] and Gallai's (2015, 2016, 2017) interdisciplinary work on DMs in police interpreting draw a comparison between FIT representations in fiction – as analysed by Blakemore in 2.4.2 – and interpreter-mediated utterances in order to reassess the way in which attributed thoughts are represented in DI.

Gallai's data consists of seven naturally occurring police interviews involving four professional interpreters, two language combinations (English-Italian and Portuguese-Italian), and both suspects and a vulnerable victim. Interviews 1 and 2–7 were held to investigate two distinct offences, a robbery (interview 1) and an infanticide (interviews 2–7). In terms of methodology, his large-scale, empirical study of DMs in interpreter-mediated police interviews is characterised by a combined approach, proceeding from the broader levels of social context to the intricacies of cognitive processes. In particular, Goffman's (1974, 1981) interactional sociolinguistics, as mediated by Wadensjö (1992, 1993/2002, 1998), and the RT approach are adopted in order to relate micro-level analysis of participants' utterances to the broader, macro-level issues of role and power distribution that have dominated discussion in interpreter-mediated communication (cf. 4.5.1).

This corpus-based analysis shows that DMs are ubiquitous and integral to the ongoing understanding in police interpreting. Aside from a number of renditions, Gallai's study established that interpreters quite rarely render DMs 'operationally', providing a 'faithful' (cf. 3.2.2) interpretation of the original. Instead, the largest category is omissions. As a result of the loss of DMs, potential for miscommunication increases.[15]

Omission is, however, not the only feature of interpreters' treatment of DMs. Opposed to omissions, Gallai finds, are cases in which DMs are also added in renditions of utterances which do not contain corresponding expressions. In particular (Gallai 2015, 183), there are two cases of addition, namely:

- *non-speaker-oriented additions*: cases in which the interpreter's rendition includes DMs not found in the original and which must be attributed to the interpreter, who is thus taking responsibility as 'principal' (Wadensjö 1998); and

- *speaker-oriented additions*: cases in which the interpreter's rendition includes a DM not found in the original, but which is nevertheless understood as being attributed to the original speaker, allowing the interpreter/'author' (Wadensjö 1998) to ascribe to the hearer the responsibility for what they say.

While the two types of additions can be regarded as evidence for a 'visible' interpreter (e.g., Roy 2000; Wadensjö 1998), they are justified in different ways.

Let us now consider a case of speaker-oriented additions in interview 1. The following extract (Gallai 2015, 189) is drawn from the preliminary phase of the interview, in which Manuel (M) is given a 'cognitive' (or mnemonic) instruction after the introduction of the note-taker, Danny. Note how the police officer (P1) repeatedly highlights the need for 'literal' translation by the recurrent use of expressions such as *exactly*, *verbatim*, *word for word*, *everything*, which are (paradoxically) closely rendered or sometimes even added by the interpreter (cf. utterance 200 "*everything* that you say"):[16]

Table 4.3 Example of speaker-oriented addition of *so*.

197	P1	Er:: and I mentioned earlier that Danny (.) er: is writing notes as well
198	I1	Mh mh
199	P1	Er:: (.) it's not normally too much of a problem really when we've got an er an interpretation (.) taking place as well but (.) normally er at this point I would ask you <u>not</u> to talk too fast so that we can keep up (.) **but** obviously with the int- wi- with yourself Mariza interpreting Danny has a little bit more time to write things down anyway
200	I1	°Okay° (.) er:: o Danny também está a tomar nota (.) do outro lado (.) e:: tá a to- a tomar notas da conversa (.) e normalmente ele ia-te pedir pra tu não falares muito depressa (.) para dar ao Danny o tempo de tomar notas (.) **mas** como eu estou presente (.) eu tenho que interpretar tudo o que tu dizes (.) e isso já não vai ser necessário (.) **portanto** podes falar [ao teu:] tua maneira (.) normal *[BT: Danny is taking note[17] as well (.) on the other side (.) and is ta- taking notes of the conversation (.) and normally he would ask you not to talk too fast (.) to give Danny the time to take notes (.) but as I'm here (.)I need to interpret everything that you say (.) and that will no longer be necessary (.) so you can speak [at your:] your normal (.) pace]*
201	M	[okay]
202	I1	That's fine

203	P1	But in any case just take your time because obviously (..) you know Mariza needs to tak- be able to take in (.) er what you're telling me: in order to (.) be able to interpret it properly
204	I1	Mas [seja com for] er:: (.) fala er:: pausadamente porque a Mariza tem que tomar notas e tem que explicar a mim o que é que se passa *[BT: But [in any case] er:: speak er:: slowly because Mariza needs to take notes and needs to explain to me what is happening]*
205	P1	[for the tape]
206	M	Mh mh
207	P1	Okay (.) er ar- are you okay Mariza with (.) what we're doing there as far as (.) [your] role is concerned?
208	I1	[yes] yes that's fine
209	P1	Okay
210	I1	Ele perguntou-me se eu esta- se eu estava de acordo (.) estava tudo bem com (.) a minha função como intérprete na discussão *[BT: He asked me if I wa- if I agreed (.) everything was fine with (.) my role as an interpreter in this discussion]*
211	P1	Now when I spoke to Mariza before: (.) in here (.) I was just explaining she needs (.) to (..) as directly as possible interpret exactly what you said (.) to me (.) a- and (.) and vice versa
212	I1	Quando eu falei com a Mariza antes aqui na sala eu tive-lhe a explicar er: que ela tem que er:: interpretar diretamente (.) o que é que tu me dizes (.) e: vice-versa *[BT: When I spoke to Mariza before here in the room I was explaining to her er: she needs to er:: interpret directly (.) what you tell me (.)and: vice versa]*

Source: From Gallai (2015, 189).

Gallai (2015, 189) states that, while *but* in 200 has been operationally rendered, "*portanto* [so] is added in order to represent the original speaker's perspective". The former makes salient an inferential route in which (a) the interpretation of the first segment gives Manuel access to an assumption ("I am required to speak slowly"), whereas (b) the interpretation of the second segment leads to the recovery of an assumption which contradicts this assumption ("I am not required to speak slowly"). The inferences can be summarised as follows:

> In this part I would ask you not to talk too fast so that we can keep up. (proposition expressed by segment 1)
> If that is the case, I am required to speak slowly (contextual premise)
> ⊢ I am required to speak slowly. (implicated conclusion)

> With yourself Mariza interpreting Danny will have a little bit more time to write things down anyway. (proposition expressed by segment 2)
> If Danny has more time to take notes, I am not required to speak slowly (contextual premise)
> ├ I am not required to speak slowly. (implicated conclusion)

Instead, the segment including *portanto* is added in order to make implications of the police officer's utterance explicit and, in this sense, it could be said to represent a thought which is not represented explicitly in the utterance:

> Mariza is required to interpret everything that Manuel says. (proposition expressed by segment 1)
> If Mariza is interpreting everything Manuel says, Danny will have time to make notes even if you speak at your normal pace. (contextual premise)
> ├ You can speak at your normal pace. (implicated conclusion)

In the unmarked role of an 'animator' (who is expected to maintain impartiality and accuracy as enshrined in codes of conduct), the interpreter might have managed and rendered the police officer's utterances in 197–199 quite differently. The interpreter's shift to the first-person in 200 ("eu estou presente (.) eu tenho que interpretar") is required to mark his role as interpreter. However, in utterances 204, 212, and 214, the interpreter chooses to resort to the third person (cf. "Mariza"), showing inconsistency with her previous renditions. Another shift of 'footing' (Wadensjö 1998) is to be found in the last part of 200 ("that will no longer be necessary (.) so you can speak at your: [your] normal (.) pace"), when the interpreter appears to make the inferences drawn from the police officer's prior original utterance more explicit.

As Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995) have shown, the more responsibility the hearer is given in the Interpretation process, the greater the sense of intimacy that is communicated between the communicator and the audience (cf. 2.2). However, Blakemore and Gallai argue that neither the narrator in (27) in 2.4.2, nor the interpreters (when adding speaker-oriented DMs in Table 4.3) are communicators. When speaker-oriented procedural elements are added, optimal relevance seems to be achieved not by increasing the mutuality between the interpreter and his TA, but by creating a sense of mutuality between the SC and his TA. In other words, these DMs contribute to a sense of intimacy between the hearer and the original speaker. Thus, the police interpreter's addition of DMs discussed in Table 4.3 is justified by the way in which they contribute to the impression of a more direct line between the officer and the interviewee's thoughts.

In these cases, the interpreter's decision to add a DM in a rendition is inevitably based on their own understanding of the utterance made by the original speaker; an understanding which may be inaccurate in some respect. The reality is that their rendition is intended as an Interpretation of *his* Interpretation of the original utterance. It is this reality which is captured by Gutt's claim that T&I should be treated as examples of attributive use in which the interpreter's utterances are Interpretations of their thoughts about the thoughts of the original speaker. This is in line with recent research in interpreting studies which shows that interpreters are in reality both visible and active. However, Gallai (2015, 2016, 2017) argues that the speaker-oriented additions shows that there is a sense in which the interpreter can be said to be aiming at **invisibility**. Their aim in adding a DM which is attributed to the original speaker is to create the illusion that the audience is 'hearing' the 'voice' of that speaker rather than that of the interpreter (cf. 2.4.2).

To sum up, this type of mediation by the interpreter can contribute to the illusion of the 'invisible' interpreter, also enshrined in public authorities' codes of conduct. Once the interpreter has provided the evidence, he can often be said to 'disappear' in order to leave the audience to draw on their imagination either to create metarepresentations of thoughts which are not represented in the utterance, or even to create metarepresentations of otherwise "ineffable aspects of thoughts" (Blakemore 2010, 22). In particular, *well* is often independently introduced in the interpreter's utterance to help disguise the interpreters' voice and establish rapport with the interviewee. This conclusion diverges from Wadensjö's (1998, 225) view of DMs as "obstacles" to interpreter-mediated communication and from legal interpreting scholars' (e.g., Berk-Seligson 1990, Hale 1997, 2001; cf. also 2.2.3) analysis which imply that the addition of hedges – amongst other features such as particles and disfluencies – imbues the testimony with a more powerless style.

Since the effectiveness of interrogation is affected by the extent to which interpreters and officers share an understanding of interpreters' practices, this research suggests the need for a more nuanced conceptualisation of codes of practice and extensive training for interpreters and interviewers in sociological and pragmatic aspects of interpreted encounters.

4.5.3 DMs in war crime trials

We remain on the topic of DMs in DI by looking at Mišković-Luković and Dedaić's (2012) RT and socio-pragmatic analysis of the rendition of the Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian (BCS) DM *odnosno* ("that is", "in other words") in a selected trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY; cf. also beginning of 1.1). The defence legal team disputed the way *odnosno* was interpreted in several instances.

Following Blakemore's account of the relevance of propositional encodings (cf. 2.4.1), the authors state that *odnosno* semantically constrains what is explicitly communicated. This DM contributes to the relevance of a host utterance as a procedural element which "establishes an inferential connection between the propositional constituents PC1 and PC2 in which PC2 is the communicated concept of the linguistically encoded concept in PC1" (Mišković-Luković and Dedaić 2012, 1364). The specific type of relation between PC1 and PC2 (e.g., general-specific, abstract-instance, set-member, part-whole, etc.) will pragmatically be determined according to context. Given that it signals that PC2 is the speaker's interpretation of PC1 (i.e., the interpretive relation is established between the two segments) and that PC2 is a communicated concept based on the linguistically encoded concept in PC1, an *odnosno*-utterance always carries an assumption of a strongly communicated explicature.

This explicature is two-pronged, and depends crucially on both the co-text and global context. In the case of the ICTY renditions, Mišković-Luković and Dedaić (2012) observe that ideological and institutional settings determine the constraints that are considered in the construal of meaning.

Furthermore, the authors identify two distinct cognitive/pragmatic meanings: reformulatory and distributive. The interpreter's choice of interpreting *odnosno* with "and" seems to diverge from these two pragmatic meanings, and therefore represents an issue that we consider to be either the matter of an interpreter's error or otherwise a choice constrained by their understanding of or beliefs about the ideological reality. According to the authors, such renditions may be linked to their contextual sensitivity as the topics invoke delicate national issues during the war, and indicate the interpreter's hesitation to convey the most neutral form of meaning (since their utterances are both politically sensitive, and legally binding).

By choosing what looks like the most neutral rendering of the *odnosno*-utterance, the interpreter effectively strengthens the clarity of the expression, or rather weakens ideological edges in order to obstruct its ideological categoricalness. The interpreter seems to shy away from attributing any vague meanings to the utterance – meanings that could be (but not necessarily are) pragmatically embedded in the original utterance. However, perfect ideological correctness is an unattainable goal.

To conclude, the meanings of DMs seem to depend not only on the local context (co-text), but also – more widely – on global contexts such as political, ideological, and institutional. Mišković-Luković and Dedaić (2012) introduce a novel insight into the issue of DMs in interpreter-mediated interactions by applying the RT framework of ad hoc concept construction (cf. 2.3.2) as their analytical apparatus. They find the

cognitive options that were taken as resources for the evasion of the court interpreter's responsibility towards a "disagreeable" meaning. By choosing the most neutral translation, however, the interpreter often steps aside from the court-required 'direct translation'.

4.5.4 Relevance and meta-relevance in interpreter-mediated courtroom proceedings

Gallez's (2014) empirical case study explores the impact of the court interpreter on the defendant's "discursive ethos" (Amossy 1999) – that is, the image the speaker conveys of himself in the discourse – in real-life Dutch-French proceedings at a Flemish Assize Court. The defendant's ethos is examined in three transcribed speeches: the defendant's examination by the judge (dialogue), the prosecutor's closing speech, and the defence lawyer's plea about the guilt question (both monologues). The methodology involved in the evaluation of the ethos is interdisciplinary in nature in that it involves both an interactionist and a RT perspective.

The analysis shows that the interpreter is an active participant in the triadic interaction. In particular, Gallez (2014) applies the concepts of *relevance* and *meta-relevance* to the analysis of dyadic sequences between the interpreter and the defendant in the defendant's language which – as they are not interpreted – are opaque to the judge and tend to be excluded from the proceedings. Drawing on Yovel (2003), Gallez (2014, 189) defines the notion of a 'meta-relevant' element as one "that provides information relevant to the ongoing proceedings and is recognised as such".

Gallez notes that some of the interpreter's interventions that result in opaque dyadic sequences to one of the parties can be explained as acts aimed at the search for 'meta-relevance' within the framework of the trial. This is the case, for example, of interventions by the interpreter in which she adds a question as a 'principal', or remarks through which she guides the defendant to provide an answer relevant to the metacommunicative purpose of the specific situation (i.e., a meta-relevant answer in the context of the trial).

Through recurrent meta-pragmatic recontextualisations, the interpreter tends to improve the relevance of the defendant's answers, and hence modifies their ethos in the process (cf. also Gallez and Maryns 2014). In the interpreted utterances, the defendant appears as more collaborative, assertive or aggressive – generally, more adapted to institutional 'socio-textual practices' (cf. Hatim and Mason 1997). The author states that ethos is key in this case as the defendant was tried for attempted murder and the reprojection of his ethos may have affected the jury's view of whether or not the defendant had the intention to kill his rival and had premeditated the crime.

As well as highlighting the interpreter's role in the production of a polyphonic ethos for the defendant, this case study raises the question of the impact of the court interpreter on the judicial decision-making process. As a conclusion, Gallez's (2014) research underlines the importance of faithfulness in court interpreting, and discusses the latitude, role, and responsibility of the court interpreter in ensuring the defendant's right to a fair trial.

4.5.5 Relevance and meta-relevance of interpreting sequences in police interviews

Monteoliva-García's (2017) article examines two mediated (English-Spanish) police interviews of Spanish-speaking detainees – who are both suspects in cases of drug possession and dealing, and users of English as a second language – in which professional interpreting services were used on a 'standby' basis. 'Stand-by interpreting' (Angermeyer 2008) is characterised by the integration of monolingual interaction without interpreting and localised interpreting sequences.

The analysis focuses on the different degrees of each party's involvement in the initiation of interpreting sequences, as well as the frequency and distribution of sequences according to the interview phase. Methodologically, the author adopts Gutt's concept of *relevance*, as well as that of *meta-relevance* (see Gallez 2014; cf. 4.5.4) and *reflexive coordination* (Baraldi and Gavioli 2012)[18] in order to assess their potential to describe and explain standby interpreting-related phenomena.

Results identify patterns that show the collective nature of stand-by police interpreting. Monteoliva-García (2017) hypothesises that differences may be due to the specific characteristics and objectives of each interview phase, since – although language comprehension and production issues were observed in all phases – the interlocutors do not pay the same degree of attention to the management of interpreters' utterances in each stage. While officers recurrently project their institutional role by resorting to interpreting (or exolingual communication), police interpreters – when they observe comprehension issues – tend to intervene independently of the phase they are in, and even highlight interview aspects that present difficulties for the detainees. The latter, instead, resort to the service of interpreters mainly to repair comprehension issues or compensate for lexical deficiencies. The analysis further reveals the fundamental role played by non-verbal language (such as gaze), both as an expressive resource and a strategy for compensating for lexical deficiencies and as a mechanism for selecting the interpreter.

With regard to the notions of *reflexive coordination* and *relevance* in the interpreting process, Monteoliva-García (2017, 114) concludes that the intermittent use of police interpreters serves to identify the factors that make it relevant, as it becomes an element to be managed and negotiated.

In this sense, it seems appropriate to use the term *meta-relevance*. A particular feature of stand-by interpreting is that interpreters constantly need to make inferences and decisions on their utterances, which is taken for granted in the other (non-selective) interpreting modes.[19]

To conclude, Monteoliva-García's (2017) results stress the collaborative nature of standby interpreting. In particular, they highlight the significance of multimodal aspects in the management of turns and the indexation of the actions of the different interlocutors in accordance with the formal aspects of the genre (police interview), the interpreter's role in the interview, and the (general and specific) aims of each interview phase. After exploring the contextualisation indicators that point to the causes that appear to underlie episodes of standby interpreting, the article suggests the application of the concept of *meta-relevance*.

4.5.6 Modelling courtroom interpreters' competence: the role of clues

In another publication on the role of legal interpreters, Stroińska and Drzazga (2017) focus on interpreter-mediated court cases, particularly on how the interpreter can best decide what can be missed out and what must be included in order to convey within the time available a text that is optimally representative of the original. In particular, the authors argue that RT offers insights into two aspects of the interpreters' utterances: explicatures and implicatures.

The authors present three case studies on the interpreter's lexical, syntactic, and pragmatic choices. They illustrate real-life situations from the court interpretation practice of one of the authors, who has worked as a certified court interpreter (for Polish and German) in the Province of Ontario, Canada, for over 25 years. Their work focuses on cases in which this is especially difficult, namely cases in which the legal interpreter works without previous knowledge of the texts to be translated.

On the basis of their analysis of the three cases, Stroińska and Drzazga argue that the framework of RT allows to pinpoint difficulties that interpreters encounter in identifying the relevant message in the ST. While implicatures may seem more problematic to resolve in real-life situations than explicatures, explicatures often pose significant difficulty in interpretation.

The examples further show that the decision-making processes and changes in interpreting may take place within one "conversation" (case study 1) or over a longer period of time in cases when experience of poor comprehension of the interpreted text and/or confusion about its relevance and its contextual effects lead the interpreter to new translation choices in order to keep the TT relevant. In each case, the relevance of the best candidate for translation emerged gradually as the interpreter gathered more information through the **clues** offered by the speakers (cf. 3.2.3). These clues were used to gradually construct the context, and

led the interpreter to the translational choices characterised by the highest degree of optimal relevance. This task appears to be particularly challenging in the context of legal interpreting, where limited time forces the interpreter to choose from a set of possible Interpretations of the message very fast.

To sum up, Stroińska and Drzazga (2017) argue that RT offers insights into two aspects of messages that need to be understood in communication – explicatures and implicatures. While implicatures may seem more problematic to resolve in real-life situations, explicatures are considered to pose significant difficulty in legal interpreting. The authors show how RT may be used in both interpreters' training and work. Viewing interpreting as a clue-based, interlingual interpretive use of language, is said to be particularly useful in "analysing on the spot interpretation practices where interpreters have to navigate their way through text to be translated without the benefit of having knowledge of the context in which the speaker is operating" (Stroińska and Drzazga 2017, 104). The interpreters' clues may lead them to modify their initial choices even if this requires considerable processing effort on their part. The result of the interpreter's work is a TT which can be processed by the TA with minimal effort, and which can be seen as having optimal relevance.

4.5.7 Effects of the verbalisation of interpreters' inferences

The main aim of Delizée and Michaux's (2019) study is to improve our understanding of the negotiation of meaning in triadic, interpreter-mediated interactions. To this end, they focus on the effects of inference verbalisation on the interaction. The conceptual tools of RT are applied to three interpreted excerpts of Russian-French psychotherapeutic interactions.

In their corpus, the authors observe that interpreters verbalise some of their inferences about what the SC wants to communicate. In line with RT, this verbalisation reflects the cognitive processing of the ST utterance; it is the tangible piece of evidence that the interpreter makes assumptions about the SC's intended meaning, and that they co-construct meaning during the interaction.

Delizée and Michaux's (2019) analysis suggests that, by making their inference explicit, the interpreter actively co-participates in the recontextualisation process, as Gallez (cf. 4.5.4) and Mason (cf. 4.5.1) observed. Such co-operative activity seems to be broader than Baraldi and Gavioli's (2012) concept of *reflexive coordination* (cf. 4.5.5), and even to encompass it. At a local level, the interpreter's inference verbalisation reduces the cognitive efforts required from the recipient to process an utterance. Further, at the global level, it makes the discursive intention of a set of utterances more manifest.

Thus, the interpreter is in a position to co-create a shared cognitive environment between the participants (Delizée and Michaux 2019, 280).

The interpreter makes discourse segment intentions and/or links between them – as they perceived them – more manifest. Thus, they strengthen intra-discursive **coherence**. This, in turn, makes the global intention of the interaction – which can be argumentative – more manifest. Through inference verbalisation, the interpreter can also reinforce the inter-discursive coherence between the two primary participants (i.e., produce a rendition that transmits the SC's perceived intention while integrating the TA's argumentative position). In other words, the verbalisation reduces the TA's cognitive efforts to process the rendition, while simultaneously enhancing mutual understanding between the parties and supporting their collaborative efforts to communicate.

Delizée and Michaux (2019, 280) further suggest that the interpreter may utter renditions that are "collaborative" – that is, in which they exhibit their own understanding of the parties' discursive segment and/or global intentions. Through subtle negotiation of propositional content and pragmatic and prosodic aspects, the interpreter is argued to make these intentions more manifest. By means of this type of rendition, they seem to pursue co-operative coordination, being driven by the desire to co-operate and also to involve the other participants in this co-operation effort. Interference verbalisation can thus be considered as a tangible trace of the interpreter's co-operative stance in the process of meaning negotiation between the participants during the interpreted event.

To conclude, Delizée and Michaux's (2019) results suggest that by verbalising inferences, the interpreter "co-creates a shared cognitive environment, reinforces intra- and inter-discursive coherence, diminishes the cognitive efforts of the recipient, and encourages primary parties to cooperate" (ibid., 263). The analysis of the cognitive processes at work in the excerpts tends to show that what has so far been treated as the interpreter's additions or 'expanded renditions' (Wadensjö 1998) allows to exercise co-operative coordination.

4.6 Critical voices

There is a general agreement amongst IS – including RT-oriented IS – scholars that interpreting cannot be studied in isolation, and that the communicative situation must be studied as a whole, albeit with a focus on the interpreter (cf. Roy 1993/2002, Wadensjö 2004, 107). For instance, Wadensjö (2004, 108) emphasises that "primary parties' and interpreters' utterances *co-exist in sequences of embodied utterances*" (emphasis in the original; cf. also 4.5.7).

We know that Sperber and Wilson's notion of *context* (cf. 2.2.1) is not to be understood as a stable construct, but rather as "a subset of the individual's old assumptions, with which the new assumptions combine to yield a variety of contextual effects" (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995,

132). Therefore, context is dynamic and changing over the course of a communicative event, but always internal and mental by definition. This internal level must always be taken into account by RT-informed models in IS, and on this level interpreters' utterances "co-exist".

Useful as these approaches have proven to be in enhancing our understanding of the complexities of the interpreter's task, the RT emphasis on context as mental representation has been heavily criticised for downplaying features of context as a form of social interaction, a "socially constituted, interactively sustained . . . phenomenon" (Duranti and Goodwin 1992, 6) – that is, the power relations involved.

Thus, the main criticism levied at RT approaches to IS has been their reliance on an ideal speaker and hearer in an imagined context, devoid of cultural and social difference. Mason (2006a, 2006b, 2012), in particular, believes that all participants in interpreter-mediated exchanges have their own cultural and social history, predispositions, personal narratives, etc. These predispositions, collectively termed "pre-text" by Widdowson (2004), affect participants' processing of what they hear. Thus, it must be accepted, Mason (2015, 239) argues, that "all actual participants have pre-textual assumptions of their own, and that these are heavily constrained by issues of cultural background, identity, power differentials and so on", rather than seeking logical mechanisms whereby hearers select the first Interpretation consistent with the first principle of relevance (cf. (3) in 2.2.2) as being what the speaker intended. According to Mason and other critics, it is on the basis of these that meanings are negotiated.

In this context, one particular criticism levied against RT applications to IS is that the theory offers no examples in which the cognitive environments of communicators are mismatched in terms of cultural background, identity, or social status. This has led critics to state that RT-oriented IS models only focus on ideal communicators who are cognitively matched through purely 'logical' processes.

However, the RT account of communicative context and 'discourse' is arguably complementary to other (more sociologically oriented) frameworks,[20] as the studies of both CI and DI we have discussed have shown. Many RT-oriented authors have concomitantly adopted other theories, notably Goffman's interactional sociolinguistics as mediated by Wadensjö (1992, 1998). In their work, communication is also viewed as a social phenomenon, and each participant in a triadic, interpreter-mediated encounter affects each other participant's behaviour (Mason 2015, 239). Thus, one can argue that while it is true that "the social character and context of communication are . . . essential to the wider picture" (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, 279), it is also true that "in communicating in a social context people are enabled by various sub-personal systems – grammatical competence, an inferencing system, the visual system" (Blakemore 2002, 8). In other words,

communication in socially determined conditions as described by Goffman can be said to be enabled by a sub-personal inferencing system as described by RT.

Moreover, critics believe that this 'connection' through mental processes raises another methodological issue. According to Mason (2006b, 114) "in the absence of access to the interpreter's thought processes", the researcher can indeed give proof of ostensive behaviour, yet they "can only suggest possible inferences, except where succeeding turns at talk provide evidence of actual take-up of particular meanings by participants".[21]

In other words, ostension may be verifiable (from clues present in what is said), but inference is performed by hearers within their own context, to be understood as "a subset of the hearer's assumptions about the world" (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, 15), and to which the analyst does not have direct access. Critics state that the only reliable evidence of assumptions made by participants (including interpreters) is to be found in their response (uptake).

Two examples given by Mason (2015, 238) serve to illustrate the point. Firstly, the author quotes Setton's (1999, 259) comment on a sequence originally cited by Gile (1995, 83) to show how processing load can induce multiple errors in the performance of even professional interpreters. Gile had identified 11 errors in a 70-second segment of interpreter output. Part of the source sequence is reproduced here:

> Before I dissertate on some of my ideas, first of all Bob Kearney says to me he says "I would much rather you have said your piece before lunch so we could have a good laugh and enjoy our lunch" And I took that as a compliment (. . .)

Setton (1999, 259) provides an account of the pragmatic inferences necessary to make sense of this elliptical utterance. Yet, Mason (2015, 238) states that "the inferences supplied by the analyst are not necessarily those actually made by receivers of the original utterance". The RT tendency to spell out inferences is said to leave little room for genuine ambiguity. And here, the interpreter's perplexity may indeed not be a case of pragmatic incompetence, but of *ambiguity*. For example, Setton suggests that "have a good laugh" offers the implicature that the speaker's views are laughable and, thus, that he should be offended. Therefore, "I took that as a compliment" should seek to cancel that implicature. But Mason argues that, here, "have a good laugh" can equally implicate "we can be relaxed" – it being understood that conference speakers are nervous until they have finished their speech – and "I took that as a compliment" could implicate that "he enjoys my company".

Mason (2015, 238) also provides an example from Gutt (2000, 123), who cites an interpreting example of a different kind offered by Claude Namy (1978, 27). A French technocrat, addressing his American

counterpart, says: "Quelle est la proportion de main d'oeuvre indirecte que vous appliquez à l'entretien du capital installé?" [*What proportion of indirect labour do you apply to the maintenance of fixed capital?*]. Namy (1978) offers two translations, preferring the second to the first (literal) one on the grounds that it makes the message clearer:

(7)

(7a) What is the proportion of indirect labour you apply to the maintenance of the fixed capital?

(7b) How many people do you employ to keep the place clean and maintain the equipment?

Gutt's RT view of this account of the interpreter decision-making process is that (7b) is preferred to (7a) because it requires less processing effort in exchange for adequately relevant aspects of the original (cf. 3.2.2). Yet, Mason argues, if the interpreter drew on the assumption that the French speaker was seeking a percentage figure, or that previous co-text had evoked the concepts "fixed capital" or "indirect labour", then a different version might be preferred. The first principle of relevance (cf. (3) in 2.2.2) will apply, but other factors are at play as well. Mason suggests that there is a strong intercultural element here – French abstraction vs American informality – that professional interpreters are aware of, but such considerations have not been given much attention in RT-oriented IS.

Lastly, Setton (2015a, 267) states that a reliable detailed model of the (human) cognitive process of interpreting is not attainable as "inference from performance data can be supported by cognitive and linguistic theory, but . . . source data cannot be exactly replicated, ruling out controlled experiments as a primary basis for building falsifiable models".

This view is shared by Will (2015) in her volume on verbal indirectness in DI. Will analyses a selection of pragmatic approaches, including Grice's maxims, speech act theory, and RT. The author concedes that enrichment, disambiguation, reference assignment, etc. can be useful to transform conceptual representations forms into propositional forms in utterances in which verbal indirectness is intuitively determined. However, she adds that RT poses many issues in its application to T&I data analysis. In particular, the TA's assessment of how relevant an utterance is, should be seen as a cognitive process which IS researchers cannot explore; "what the hearer decides (for himself) cognitively cannot be demonstrated here" (Will 2015, 107; my translation). She also agrees with Setton that the non-replicability of source data rules out controlled experiments, and thus makes RT-informed models in IS hard to falsify. These criticisms seem to contradict the possibility or usefulness of studying cognition and the interpreting process only from the

interpreter's perspective. Or, at least, critics have indicated that such a study would disregard such important factors in the interpreting situation as to become uninteresting.

Clearly, a model of the interpreting process that includes the cognition of several participants may become so complex – depending upon the level of detail – that it risks not fulfilling its intended task, i.e., that of visualising central components in the model and the relations between them in order to test them empirically. However, despite such objections, I believe that in view of the interpreter's central role in the complex social and cognitive activity of interpreting, their cognitive and problem-solving processes merit further study.

A researcher can gain access to 'deverbalised' (cf. 4.2) processing – which indeed takes place in a non-verbal cognitive state – by analysing the reconstituted form of the verbalised output after the re-expression stage. Indeed, one of the aims of the works illustrated in this chapter is to observe the interpreter's sensitivity to the pragmatics expressed, how this is conveyed in the interpretation, and the likely outcome of the interpreter's respective choices for the interaction.

Studying the interpreter's cognition in interpreting is perfectly possible and relevant as long as the other participants' cognitive behaviour is also appropriately accounted for in the models and data. As Setton (2015b) correctly points out, Sperber and Wilson's (1986/1995) revised edition includes the definition of presumption of relevance to consider the communicator's abilities and preferences (cf. 2.2.2). This may go some way towards modelling common interpreting contexts, involving non-native speakers and listeners and/or conflicting cognitive environments.

4.7 Summary

One of the most challenging issues in all human communication and, in particular, in mediating this communication through T&I, is the retrieval of hidden, indirect meaning in utterances. That is why RT lends itself to universal application. Equally adaptable in IS as in TS, RT has already proved to be as popular, and over the past 30 years its concepts have circulated amongst scholars worldwide.

Relying on the models fleshed out in Chapters 2 and 3, the present chapter has empirically analysed the key RT-informed work in IS. In particular, DI and CI scholars have adopted RT to shed light on a plethora of phenomena – from DMs to enrichment – observed in data sets, which are characterised by different sizes, drawn from various professional settings, and analysed according to numerous methods.

IS scholars drawing on RT tend to adopt a descriptive, qualitative method of inquiry, which "seek[s] to describe, decode, translate and otherwise come to terms with the meaning, not the frequency of certain

more or less naturally occurring phenomena in the social world" (Van Maanen 1979, 520). In other words, they strive to describe and interpret the variable of phenomena in a transcribed corpus generated in real-life interpreting sessions, in a way as to rule out both an empiricist approach – which relies only on factual evidence – and simultaneously address the criticism sometimes levelled at more rationalist positions (i.e., that their theoretical claims are not based on 'real' data).

In terms of methodology, a number of authors (cf. 4.3.2) have relied heavily on Gutt's seminal work for the theoretical aspects of their models, and embraced his claim that IS would benefit from focusing only on the competence of human beings to communicate with each other, and in particular it should contribute to understanding the mental faculties that enable us to interpret. However, the vast majority of the RT-oriented studies on interpreting - including Setton's and Delizée and Michaux's – have demonstrated the usefulness of an interdisciplinary theoretical framework (and its underlying assumptions) in guiding the description and explanation of interpreted discourse both at the interactional and "internal" level of cognitive processing in relation to specific empirical data. Lastly, a number of authors (e.g., Gallai in 4.5.2) have challenged Gutt's account of interpreting as interlingual interpretive use and reassessed the way in which attributed thoughts are represented in interpreting.

Unlike TS studies, RT-informed approaches to interpreting have mainly focused on the *product*, rather than the process. The TT is evaluated in terms of its 'faithful' rendition of the SC's intentions in terms of interpretive resemblance, and interpreting is viewed as a series of decision-making processes, whereby solutions are made, re-examined, and modified as new information is added in the construction of the context (cf. also Carston and Powell 2006). The relative relevance of interpreter's choices is constantly re-evaluated, and so those choices are not final and may change.

To this end, scholars aim to identify the effects of interpreters' inferential processes in interpreter-mediated events. Despite the difference in emphasis, RT-oriented interpreting models thus broadly share several points, such as recognising the need for analysis of contextual knowledge, the search for relevance, the intermediate mental stages between comprehension and formulation, and the role of external and internal constraints on the mediated event. Another *fil rouge* in RT-oriented studies in this area is the strong case for the co-existence of social/relational and cognitive pragmatics-based studies to analyse mediated events. This at least partly answers criticisms levied at this field of research.

Theoretically and methodologically, DI has opened up intriguing research questions and possibilities, especially after the emergence of several different communicative needs within communities (cf. legal settings),

and the respective organisation of the interpreting market around such needs. Nevertheless, the diversity of the needs and complexities arising from this particular mode of interpreting – to which different types of DI respond (e.g., health, humanitarian, educational interpreting) – have not led to as much flourishing RT-informed research as in CI settings. We hope that this will change in the near future, and that thanks to this volume many students will approach DI-related phenomena within a RT perspective.

To conclude, RT-based research in IS has far from exhausted its field of inquiry, especially given its interdisciplinary outlook. After all, no single model, however complex and elaborate, can be validated as an account for the phenomenon as a whole. This leads to the question whether one type of framework on its own can be taken as the basis for the complex, multi-dimensional phenomenon of interpreting, or whether it is indeed possible to develop a unitary interdisciplinary framework which encompasses both the cognitive and the social dimensions of communication. Many scholars (e.g., Inghilleri 2012) have pointed towards an all-around account of interpreting, yet the integration of cognitive pragmatics and social and intercultural studies in IS still awaits large-scale investigation. We will discuss this and further prospects for T&I theory, practice, and training in the next chapter.

4.8 Food for thought

4.8.1 Further reading

Here is some suggested further reading to develop understanding of ideas in this chapter and to find out more about RT-oriented IS:

- Setton 1999. (Starting from semantic representations of input and output in samples of professional SI from Chinese and German into English, Setton's analysis explains key phenomena in terms of an intermediate cognitive model in working memory, allowing a more unitary view of resource management in the SI task.)
- Setton 2013. (A great article which aims to explore the (processing) models in CI, and in particular the distinction between relational models and cognitive process models.)
- Setton and Dawrant 2016a, 2016b. (The first volume is a comprehensive coursebook which sets out an updated step-by-step programme for trainee interpreters. For instructors, course designers, and administrators, more detailed and extensive tips on pedagogy including RT), curriculum design, and management are to be found in the Trainer's Guide.)
- Mason 2006a. (Adopting a RT approach, but also drawing on some insights from conversation analysis, this article examines evidence

of participant moves to show inferencing at work and the evolving, intra-interactional nature of context.)
- Blakemore and Gallai 2014. (Blakemore's account of discourse markers in FIT is applied to data from interpreter-mediated police interviews where renditions include DMs added by the interpreter to develop an alternative RT account of T&I.)

For an overview of cognitive-pragmatic theories in IS, I suggest to read the following publications, listed in chronological order:

- Saldanha 2009;
- Pöchhacker 2013;
- Pöchhacker 2015;
- Pöchhacker 2016 (in particular, chap. 6);
- Mason 2015 (entry on linguistic/pragmatic approaches);
- Setton 2015b (entry on RT);
- Baumgarten 2017;
- Gallai 2019.

Lastly, for a comprehensive list of T&I authors who adopt RT, I again suggest you look up List 14 ("Translation and interpreting") of the *Relevance Theory Online Bibliographic Service* website, updated by Yus (2022).

4.8.2 Review questions

Here is a list of questions for review you can tackle on your own or with your trainer(s):

- To what extent can the RT-oriented models which have been explored in this chapter and which foreground a given conceptual dimension (e.g., cognitive), be said to be compatible with conceptualisations at other levels of modelling (cf. 4.1)?
- Which features of different interpreting models in the sphere of cognitive processing (cf. 4.2), can be identified as shared conceptual ground with RT?
- How does the meaning of key concepts such as *faithfulness*, *resemblance*, *interpreter role*, and *context* differ from one model to another?
- According to RT-oriented IS models, an interpreter is likely to seek as much deviation from the ST as necessary for a linguistically successful and culturally adequate rendering, and as little deviation as possible as long as she does not risk a (linguistically and culturally) corrupted rendering. In other words, she will not deviate any further if this takes only more effort without improving the relevance of the interpreting output. Do you see this in your practice?

- Someya (2016, 171) states that "the question of language choice in notetaking . . . is really the wrong question to be asking – whatever language or non-language code one chooses, the bottom line is that it must satisfy [the first principle of relevance] for the best benefit of the interpreter". Do you agree?
- Albl-Mikasa's (2008) study in 4.3.1 shows that (micro-)propositional processing – and hence a somewhat form-based attitude to note-taking – may be advantageous, even if it means that the linguistic means of expression will be followed rather closely, and that the notes will be dense rather than reduced. What are the implications of keeping the cognitive load to a minimum in the CSI task, and the effect of this strategic principle on the level of processing?
- Describe Setton's processing model for simultaneous interpreting (Setton 1999, 65).
- To what extent are consecutive interpreters able to flexibly adjust the allocation of cognitive resources in the interpreting process, according to the models illustrated in 4.4?
- Why does Mason (2006b, 120) not espouse the whole RT?
- What does Gallai mean by the notion of *illusion of interpreter's invisibility*?
- Summarise the main advantages of inference verbalisation according to Delizée and Michaux (2019).

4.8.3 Exercises

(1) In The European Commission Directorate-General for Interpretation's Speech Repository 2.0, you can find hundreds of specially selected videos of real-life speeches and tailor-made pedagogical material. The Speech Repository is a free resource and can be found at this link: https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/sr/ (European Commission DG for Interpretation, n.d.).

- Select a SI speech in the language, type, level, and domain which suit you most, and record your interpretation.
- Now listen back to your recorded voice and check whether you followed Setton's four strategic principles of SI discussed in 4.3.1, that is:

    1. the principle of pragmatic incrementality;
    2. the placeholding principle;
    3. the principle of efficiency for the mental model;
    4. the principle of pragmatic compensation.

(2) On 2 July 2003, one day after Italy taking over the rotating Presidency of the European Union Council, German MEP Martin Schulz criticised the then Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi of Italy for his domestic policy. Berlusconi (Articolo21 n.d.) replied:

> Signor Schulz, so che in Italia c'è un produttore che sta montando un film sui campi di concentramento nazisti: la suggerirò per il ruolo di kapò. [Mr Schulz, I know of a film-producer in Italy who is making a film about Nazi concentration camps; I will recommend you for the role of a kapo.]

To an Italian native speaker's ears and eyes, Berlusconi's sarcasm was obvious, also due to his ascending tone and sardonic smile while uttering the word *kapò*. Even though Berlusconi later on insisted that he was just "being ironic", his comparison with the Nazis caused a diplomatic rift.

Prosodic features and facial expressions used in a 'humorous' way tend to be far from universal. The example could potentially pose a problem of relevance when translated into other languages. This would be compromised (gratuitously or meaningfully) if the interaction of stimulus, contextual assumptions, and Interpretation were disturbed for any reason. This is precisely what often happens when we do not see the point – or the assumed joke or irony.

Consider Berlusconi's (Articolo21, n.d.) utterance in terms of intercultural communicative difficulties, and answer the following questions:

- What is the relevance of the reference to a *kapò*?
- Is "campi di concentramento nazisti" also a relevant issue in this context? What is implied by this expression?
- We have explored RT-oriented approaches to T&I which have proposed the notion of *communicative clues* (cf. 3.2.3) and *pragmatic clues* (cf. 4.3.1), which help guide the audience to the intended Interpretation. How many clues can you find here? How do they 'work'?
- What would you have uttered that day if you had worked in the booth in order to guide the hearers to the intended Interpretation? What should you have done to avoid unintended effects?

(3) To appreciate what is going on in a dialogue interpreter-mediated event, the parties involved and the interpreters engage in some form of inferencing. Since a satisfactory rendition in RT must guide the TA towards making appropriate inferences, this kind of inferential input is used as a basis for the decision-making involved regarding what to say and how to say it in the interpreting.

This is put to the test when the episode is placed in the wider context of communication. First, find a passage in a CI event in which there is a racist or sexist remark, and then try to translate it into another language. How did you achieve interpretive resemblance?

(4) Focal effects – such as emphasis – may be achieved by such formal means as stress in some languages, but not in others. Stress is a crucial

clue (cf. 4.3.1) which, if unavailable in the TL, may be replaced by other syntactic means that serve a similar function (e.g., clefting, DMs, or other procedural elements).

- Give examples of focal effects in speeches in your own language.
- Will all clues yielded be worth attending to? If not, what leads us to consider a clue 'relevant' and others 'irrelevant'? How can you deal with these elements in note-taking in CSI?
- Can a marked pattern of borrowing from English be sometimes explained in a similar way?

(5) How would you deal with a situation such as the following? During a SI speech in English, the ST speaker adopts a pseudo-French style, manipulating his language on both the phonic and the grammatical levels:

- If you are working in groups, consider how you might arrive at a particular Interpretation using explicit reasoning. Then compare the Interpretations different people give of the same passage in the SI speech in English, considering how they may vary. If pragmatic principles are common to all of the people involved, as RT believes, then there must be an explanation (e.g., varying access to contextual assumptions). You might encounter here cases where two people understand something differently from the passage in pseudo-French as one speaks French (and is more accustomed to its phonic features), and the other doesn't.
- Which solutions can you suggest to guide the reader to the relevant values of the linguistic properties in SI?

(6) In the following extract from my police interpreting corpus (cf. 4.5.2), Manuel (M), the alleged victim of a robbery in a park, recalls the events freely, telling them to the interpreter (I1) and the police officer (P1) almost as if carefully rehearsed:

233	M	Eu tava em er no apoio escolar e:: que foi mais ou menos (.) quando acabei foi mais ou menos às (..) três horas e meia quatro horas (..) **então** eu perdi o autocarro e fiquei sozinho (.) eu tava a correr pra o autocarro **mas** (.) perdi-o (.) então eu fiquei sozinho e não tava mesmo lá ninguém ném carros que:: passar (..) e depois (.) de repente vejo um homem do outro lado e não liguei (.) não liguei ao homem e continuei à espera do autocarro (.) o homem (..) veio (.) veio ter comigo e disse ((**sighs**)) se- segue-me que eu tenho uma arma e: e eu vi a arma dele que tava enrolada ((**makes gesture of wrapping**)) num pano (.) branco (..) e . . .

(*Continued*)

(Continued)

		[BT: I was attending the er the after-school class and:: 'cause it's more or less (.) when I finished it was more or less (..) half past three four o'clock (..) ***so*** *I missed the bus and was left alone (.) I was running for the bus* ***but*** *(.) missed it (.) so I was alone and there was actually no-one there not even cars that:: went by (..) and then (.) suddenly I see a man on the other side and I didn't pay any notice (.) I didn't pay any notice to the man and carried on waiting for the bus (.) the man (..) came (.) came up to me[22] and said fo- follow me 'cause I have a gun an: and I saw his gun that was wrapped in a white (.) cloth (..) and . . .]*
234	I1	**Só um momento** ***Just a moment***
235	P1	Do do you want to (.) **so- sorry can I interrupt** (.) do you want to just (.) make it into smaller bits so that (.) **so we can get the interpretation done in in between Manuel**
236	I1	Yes I think we'll get more er detail in er that way
237	P1	Yeah
238	I1	**Er: eu (.) se tu:: se nós conseguirmos partir mais eu vou conseguir dar mais detalhes sobre aquilo (.) que tu estás a dizer** *[BT: Er: I (.) if you: if we can break it down more I'll be able to prove more details on what (.) you're saying]*
239	M	Tá bem *[BT: It's fine]*
240	I1	**Eu vou explicar agora também (.)** *[BT: I'll now explain as well]* er:: I was in er:: an after- er:: school support**?** (.) er: class**?** and it was finished about fifteen thirty (.) or four o'clock (..) and er:: I missed the bus (.) I was running towards the bus **but** I couldn't er reach it (.) **so** I was left alone in the street (.) and er:: there was no-one around (.) not even cars passing by (.) er:: I did notice there was a man on the other side of the road **but** I didn't pay any attention to him (.) er:: this man (.) er: came across the road towards me (.) and said (.) follow me I have a gun (.) he had a:: and I noticed he had a gun rolled in a white cloth
241	P1	Okay

We are in phase 3 of the Enhanced Cognitive Interview (Milne 2004, 2), in which the officer has initiated a free report. Increasing recall is crucial for investigative interviews. Further, rapport building between the interviewee and the interviewer is crucial (St-Yves 2006, 92), especially in interviews with vulnerable witnesses. Try to answer the following questions by paying particular attention to the expressions highlighted in bold:

- Do you think the interpreter has achieved complete interpretive resemblance?

- Do you think the dynamics of mediated interview are altered by the presence of the interpreter who is empowered to ensure successful communication – that is, to incorporate his understanding of what is (implicitly and explicitly) communicated into a pragmatically corresponding TT?
- Choose a particular linguistic expression and consider what it contributes to meanings in that particular context. What must its linguistically encoded meaning be? (This might seem to be a question about semantics rather than pragmatics, but notice that we need to consider how expressions are understood in contexts in order to make assumptions about their linguistic meanings.)
- Consider forms which are used differently by different people or groups (e.g., L2 users or regional variations); consider what the differences are and how they lead to different kinds of Interpretations.

(7) On 27 February 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Selenskyi addressed his people in a press conference, after major cities in the country came under sustained attack from Russian forces. He concluded his impassioned speech (a) by calling the war a "genocide" (retrieved from a tweet @PatDiekmann, 27 February 2022):

(a) Преступные действия России по отношению к Украине имеют признаки геноцида. Об этом я говорил и с Генсеком ООН. Россия на пути зла. Мир должен прийти к лишению права голосу России в Совбезе ООН. Украинцы! Мы четко знаем, что защищаем. Мы точно победим. Слава каждому нашему солдату! Слава Украине! [BT: Russia's criminal actions against Ukraine have the hallmarks of genocide. I also spoke to the UN Secretary General about this. Russia is on the path of evil. The world must come to deprive Russia of its right to vote the UN Security Council. Ukrainians! We know exactly what we are defending. We will definitely win. Glory to each of our soldiers! Glory to Ukraine!]

(b) Das, was Russland in Ukraine veranstaltet ist ein Genozid. Ich habe darüber mit (.) UN-Sekretär (..) gesprochen. Russland ist (.) auf dem Weg (.) des Bösen. Russland (.) *muss* ihre Stimme (.) in UN (.) verlieren. Ukrainer (..) wir wissen ganz genau (. . .) was wir verteidigen. [BT: What Russia is doing to Ukraine is genocide. I have spoken about this with (.) UN Secretary. Russia is (.) on the path (.) of evil. Russia (.) must lose its voice in UN. Ukrainians, (..) we know exactly (. . .) what we are defending.]

During her simultaneous interpretation (cf. b), the Ukrainian interpreter for the German media outlet Welt made it part-way before her words were drowned out by tears. Aside from omitting a few words ("General" and "Security Council") and the last utterances of the ST, other features of her rendition are worth noting; she fails to use the German articles

for both "Ukraine" and "UN" – possibly due to an influence from her native language – and to keep the figurative use of "hallmarks" (cf. a). Further, when she understandably becomes emotional, her voice becomes shaky after uttering "wir wissen ganz genau (. . .) was wir verteidigen" [BT: *we know exactly (. . .) what we are defending*], in contrast with the determined tone of Selenskyi's speech. Can you analyse the interpreter's rendition in (b) according to Setton's model, with a special focus on the notion of residual contexts (cf. 4.3.1)? Is it a question of sharing 'too much' mutual cognitive environment?

Notes

1 Cf. Pöchhacker 2016; Setton 2003, 2013, 2015a; cf. also the distinction between external and internal context in 3.1.
2 According to Wadensjö's model, the dynamics of the interview are radically altered with the addition of an interpreter, transforming the oppositional dyad into a triadic mixture of opposition, co-operation, and shifting alignments. The different entities that can be invoked by a speaker are: (a) the *animator*, responsible only for the production of speech sounds; (b) the *author* or entity who is responsible for formulating the utterance; (c) a *principal* or interlocutor responsible for the meaning expressed. Correspondingly, Wadensjö (1998, 91ff) expanded on this model and developed an analogous taxonomy of reception formats (*reporter*, *recapitulator*, and *responder*) for hearers in interaction. Goffman's (1981) notion of *footing* is also relevant in this context since it has its basis in participation frameworks – that is, participants' alignment, or orientation to, particular roles, either as receivers or producers of talk.
3 It must be noted that the Paris School model has been widely used in training, and further developed by authors such as Laplace (1994).
4 The most widely discussed strategy of SI, defined specifically as the simultaneous interpreter's production of a sentence constituent before the corresponding constituent has appeared in the SL input (see Setton 1999, 52).
5 Chernov (2004, xxvi) also finds RT to be "highly relevant" to his model of message probability anticipation in SI.
6 In Setton and Dawrant (2016a, 2016b), ideas for planning curricula or even the ongoing training of active interpreters are provided, and almost every type of professional environment is described for trainee interpreters and teachers to take note of.
7 Cf. also in Setton and Dawrant (2016b, 297–299) for vulnerable points and training foci in this SI model.
8 Lederer (1981) and Setton (1999) also discuss the simultaneous renditions in their corpora with reference to the interpreters' pauses as reflected in their transcriptions; Setton (1999, 246) suggests that various types of hesitancy phenomena correspond to different levels of attention.
9 The SL recorded material was taken from TV news bulletins, TV documentaries, and one of King Abdullah's II speeches delivered at a joint US Congress.
10 This was feasible because a structure similar to that of the original speech (or which at least attempted to mirror it) was usually imposed on the interpretations by the students' notes.
11 Key to the dialogue: *IO* = Immigration Officer; *PW* = Polish Woman; *IN* = interpreter.
12 RT and Gricean pragmatics are argued to be on this level.

13 The notion of D2 here echoes Foucault's sense of the term and is the sense widely used in **Critical Discourse Analysis** (**CDA**) and Cultural Studies.
14 For applications in RT-informed approaches, see 4.3.5 and 4.3.6.
15 Possible reasons for this imbalance in omissions were suggested, such as the procedural nature of DMs which may pose a comprehension and translation problem for L2 speakers, regardless of their language proficiency or accreditation. Divergence between the source and the target utterances may also be due to cross-linguistic pragmatic differences, which are impossible to rule out, or to stylistic preferences by the interpreter, which are difficult to predict.
16 This is taken from interview 1 of Gallai's corpus, which was held with a vulnerable child, Manuel, the alleged victim of a robbery in a park. The interview is therefore defined as a "vulnerable witness interview" and is held with only Manuel, the interpreter (I1), and the police officer (P1) present in the room. The BT is here given in italics, underneath the original utterances.
17 The English collocation 'to take notes' would be accurately rendered in European Portuguese with expressions such as *tirar notas* or *fazer anotações*.
18 Baraldi and Gavioli (2012) developed the concept of *reflexive coordination*, by which the interpreter empowers each primary participant by giving them a space to talk during the interaction and to be actively involved in it: in particular, by using gaze (e.g., Mason 2012), giving opportunities of self-expression – including manifestations of cultural identity (e.g., Penn and Watermeyer 2012), and through dyadic interactions aiming to obtain medically relevant information from the patient and taking into account his or her needs.
19 This task, in a way, resembles coordinative actions in which the interpreter acts as 'principal' (Wadensjö 1998), such as in requests for clarification.
20 See also 2.6, 3.6, 4.5.1, and the interdisciplinary reassessment of the interaction between external and internal context in 5.2.2.
21 This is a point which is also raised about Seleskovitch and Lederer's (1984) Interpretive Theory.
22 "Vir ter com" is a colloquial expression in European Portuguese, whose meaning can only be inferred from the context: "to come across/up to(wards)" (similar to verbs such as *vir falar com* or *abordar*).

Part III

5 Relevance Theory in context

Theoretical implications and practical applications

5.1 Introduction

T&I studies have come a long way since House (2013, 46) made an impassioned "plea for a new linguistic-cognitive orientation" in TS in order to balance the "predominance of cultural, social, ideological and personal concerns" which she perceived in TS and which, she considered, was in danger of ignoring "the essence of translation" (ibid., 47) to the detriment of any enhanced understanding of translated text.

The last two chapters have illustrated how RT has provided an answer to that plea. Insights from RT pragmatics began to be taken up from the 1990s onwards, when more nuanced attention was paid to cognitive parameters in T&I. Since its inception, RT-oriented research on T&I has shared a distinctly common trait: it has challenged the myth of 'equivalence' and 'literalism', and has discussed cases of translators' and interpreters' lack of awareness of maintaining pragmatic aspects of language. Although T&I official procedures and common belief normally prioritise the practitioner's 'conduit' function, RT empirical research has shown that suggested norms are not mirrored by translators' and interpreters' actual behaviour in different settings.

In this context, Gutt's application of RT was foundational, especially his concept of T&I as *interlingual interpretive use* that aimed to develop a concept of faithfulness that is generally applicable and, yet, both text- and context-specific. The literature review in the previous chapters has shown a fruitful application of RT, in which the theory "provides a natural basis for an empirical account of evaluation and decision-making" (Gutt 2000, 23). We have also seen how RT scholars – in particular, cf. 3.5 and 4.5 - use a variety of analytical methods and draw from a set of data-collection methods to tell a different story; translators and interpreters are not merely conduits that translate words from one language to another, and they frequently play a considerably more active role than is usually imagined. Pragmatic alterations of the ST in their renditions can be said to have procedural consequentiality and impact on the TT as they have the effect of moving the interpreter and translator into focus.

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Along the way, we have looked at some ways in which these studies have been developed, applied and challenged. The theory has been applied in a large number of areas and tested and challenged in a number of ways, so that this chapter cannot hope to come close to providing a comprehensive overview. Instead, it aims to indicate a number of important areas and give a general overview of the theoretical (5.2) and methodological (5.3) issues involved, with an aim to inform T&I theory, practice, and training programmes. In 5.4, I will further explain how the theory can be effectively applied to T&I training and practice.

5.2 Theoretical implications

Without a descriptively and explanatorily adequate model of interlingual communication, hypotheses about the T&I activities of such a mind cannot be tested. And RT has proved to be a highly adequate model in these fields.

As seen in 2.3, Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995) argue that utterance Interpretation is not achieved by identifying the semantically encoded meanings of sentences, but involves inferential computations performed over conceptual representations or propositions - that is, the propositional content of the utterance Interpreted taken together with contextual assumptions.

The significance of this view of communication in T&I studies is that, firstly, it makes a plausible account of the dynamic nature of human communication, including T&I processes. The individual differences among communicator and audience may cause the complexity of contexts that are established 'online' rather than 'a priori' (Alves and Gonçalves 2003, 6). Secondly, it establishes the cause-effect framework of cognitive efforts, which helps to "predict communication problems when the audience lacks ready access to certain pieces of information which are needed for consistency with the principle of relevance" (Gutt 2000, 164). Thirdly, it advocates the economical use of cognitive efforts to achieve the best communicative effect. This offers an important inspiration to solve the conflicts between limited cognitive processing capacity and cognitive overload in the interpreting process.

Since the 1990s, we have seen how this inferential account has been pursued and professed by many T&I scholars in their description and explanation of a wide array of phenomena. In particular, the cognitive and communicative principles of relevance have been efficient to deal with complex, multifaceted inferential issues, ranging from the Interpretation of translated sci-fi texts (cf. 3.5.2) to the multimedia environment in in-vision sign language interpreting (4.3.5), from offline to online communication. Yet, is there anything that unifies these approaches?

5.2.1 A unified definition of T&I

Over the years, RT-informed studies on T&I phenomena have moved from Ernst-August Gutt's (1991/2000) seminal volume, and Fábio Alves'

(1995) cognitive model of the translation process (cf. 3.4.1) to a RT-informed definition of the interpreting process, which Gerver (1971, viii) had defined as "a fairly complex form of human information processing involving the reception, storage, transformation and transmission of verbal information". This performance of multiple cognitive tasks in IS has been explored in all modalities: SI (cf. 4.3.1), CSI (cf. 4.4), and DI (cf. 4.5.2). The cognitive demands made of the interpreter may be even higher given the likelihood of 'problem triggers' such as longer turn lengths, intentional pauses, and specialised verbal strategies.

This *fil rouge* of scholarly work shows the coming together of researchers working within RT in various modalities under the same umbrella definition of T&I, that of *interlingual interpretive use* (cf. 3.2.1). Thanks to this notion, the most central and traditional distinction between the domains of T&I is eroding within CTIS. This development lies in a conviction that, in spite of numerous differences, these two lines of tasks also share a number of key cognitive characteristics. Oral and written language mediation draws on the same cognitive resources – and, from a language user's (or language use) perspective, one cannot exist without the other in today's society.

In 4.5.2, we have also seen that, in contrast with Gutt's and Setton's approach to T&I as interlingual interpretive use, Gallai's interdisciplinary analysis of DI has drawn a comparison between FIT representations in fiction as analysed by Blakemore (2009, 2010, 2011) and interpreter-mediated utterances in order to reassess the way in which attributed thoughts are represented in face-to-face interpreting when it comes to the use of speaker-oriented addition of procedural elements such as DMs. In particular, Blakemore and Gallai (2014) and Gallai (2015) show how practitioners accommodate the use of procedural elements in an attributive account of interpreting which turns on resemblances in content, dubbing the RT definition of *faithfulness* in terms of "resemblance in content" as too weak in the DI setting (cf. 5.3).

In general terms, Gallai argues that interpreters' and translators' renditions contribute to the illusion that the hearer has direct access to the SC's thoughts. As with fiction, where "the effect of free indirect style is a seemingly unmediated view not only of a character's thoughts but also of his thought processes" (Blakemore 2010, 138), the effect of interpreted or translated speech may be regarded as a metarepresentation of the writer's or speaker's thoughts which is perceived to be *unmediated* by the thoughts of the interpreter/translator who is responsible for producing the TT. In those cases, T&I is no longer seen as an example of tacitly attributive use of language in the sense described by Gutt (1991/2000), and the practitioner cannot be treated as communicating their thoughts about the thoughts of the ST communicator.

The fact that these various types of mediated event – conceived of as holistically experienced sets of cognitive 'states' and activities involved in the mediator's task at hand – are brought together in this RT-informed,

cognitively based approach also has to do with the recognition of the common cognitive foundations in models of language processing. This approach holds promise for capturing differences related to modality. However, the previous chapters have also shown how several disciplines - such as notions from theory of mind (cf. 3.5.2, 3.5.3) and Goffman's interactional sociolinguistics (cf. 4.5.2) - have started to find their place, alongside RT, in the toolbox of a research domain that is simply interdisciplinary by its very nature.

5.2.2 Interdisciplinary perspectives

Current research in applied linguistics is more focused on mixed-methods approaches that combine corpus linguistics with other (more qualitative) approaches. RT-oriented research is no exception. Theoretically and methodologically, Chapters 3 and 4 have demonstrated a general agreement that the translator and interpreter cannot be studied in isolation; the whole communicative situation must be studied, albeit with a focus on the mediator. Examples of theoretical frameworks used alongside RT in the previous chapters include: Austin's sociocultural pragmatics (cf. 3.5.2), connectionist approaches (cf. 3.4.3), the noisy channel model (cf. 3.5.4), parsing model (cf. 4.3.1), as well as Goffman's interactional sociolinguistics (4.5.2).

As we have seen in 3.6 and 4.6, a critical issue in the analysis of T&I processes and products remains the modelling of *context*. Up to the present, both cognitive and social-interactional notions of context have been invoked. Although the context relevant in meaning Interpretation is likely an amalgamation of cognitive, social, and interactive components, non-RT-informed T&I theories tend to be focused on one: the socio-interactional aspects of mediated interaction. As a result of the focus on the event per se, the cognitive aspects of the practitioner's tasks are in certain respects moved to the background (see Englund Dimitrova and Tiselius 2016, 199).

From the previous two chapters, it is clear that this should not be the case, and that there is a need for mixed-method approaches, fully embraced by relevance theorists today (cf. 2.6). RT does not attempt to say all that there is to say about the phenomenon it aims to explain. On *cognition*, the theory makes a claim about how we allocate our cognitive resources in general, but does not make specific claims about the majority of cognitive systems and processes. On *communication*, RT makes a claim about how we use cognitive resources when we recognise that someone has openly produced an act of intentional communication, verbal or non-verbal, but it has less to say about covert or accidental forms of information transmission. In other words, RT aims to tell part of the story of how we think and understand the world (cognition) and how we convey thoughts and understand each other (communication).

So, authors such as Mason or Gallai demonstrate the usefulness of an interdisciplinary theoretical framework (and its underlying assumptions) in guiding the description and explanation of discourse both at the interactional and internal level of cognitive processing in relation to specific empirical data. But questions (cf. 3.6 and 4.6) are being raised about what it means to integrate the cognitive and the social domains in an account of interpreting, from a philosophical and practical perspective. Given that Widdowson's (cf. 4.5.1) or Goffman's (cf. 4.5.2) approach to communication is a personal-level approach and Sperber and Wilson's approach aims for a sub-personal explanation, is there any way in which they can be reconciled in T&I, or never the twain shall meet?

There are multiple points of interface between these sociocultural and cognitive-pragmatic approaches to human communication. Firstly, as pointed out at the beginning of this section, both offer alternative models to the fundamental determinacy of linguistically encoded meaning and recognise that comprehension involves much more than the decoding of a linguistic signal.[1] A parallel can also be drawn between the RT distinction between first-order informative intention and a higher-order (communicative) intention – the attribution of which is yielded by ostensive behaviour (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995; Wharton 2008, 2009) – and Goffman's notion of communication as intentional stage behaviour, whereby not all interactions are necessarily communicative.[2]

However different in scope and aims, this idea of a *situated* context, where speech incessantly transforms and adapts to situations, is nevertheless shared by both RT and social or relational models (cf. 4.1). In particular, the common emphasis on mutual shared understanding and meaning led authors such as Pöchhacker (2016, 72) to remark on "considerable shared ground between the DI paradigm and the cognitive-pragmatic approach". Both theories take seriously the "real-time on-line nature" (Mason 2006a, 360) of communication and consider it as a process of joint negotiation of meanings among participants, and the context as a dynamic set of assumptions used by participants. The utterance is seen as embedded in a specific, immediate communicative context, and language is analysed in terms of the occasions of specific utterances, and the face-to-face immediacy of spoken encounters.[3]

It may be the case that a single model cannot provide a complete account of every aspect of communication. The RT emphasis on context as mental representation can be argued to downplay features of context as a form of social interaction. These issues have been shown to assume varying degrees of importance in any kind of communication, but are particularly important to explain aspects of interaction in DI.

A translated text is available to the TA at once and in its entirety, and is a fixed instantiation of the context, thus meaning is negotiable – to a lesser extent than in interpreting. The TA recognises the contextual assumptions as they proceed through the text; their responses, however,

do not bear upon the TT formation. In DI, instead, the intended meaning of the interaction as a whole unfolds. Context and language use are in a truly triadic relationship, one shaping the other as the interaction unfolds (cf. "communicative *pas de trois*" in Wadensjö 1998, 12). Most RT-informed DI research can thus be said to have a twofold perspective: from the main vantage point of cognitive processing, scholars also incorporate interaction aspects into a potential model. In other words, they want to capture how some aspects of interaction are managed cognitively by the practitioner.

To sum up, a wide array of studies mentioned in Chapters 3 and 4 set out to make a methodological contribution to this fledgling area of T&I research by adopting an interdisciplinary outlook which is a balance between applied pragmatics (RT) and other (macro-ideological, sociological) disciplinary traditions and perspectives. In particular, we have seen that DI studies encompass reflections on issues beyond the level of text, which include the study of interpersonal relationships. They have proved to be a useful analytical tool to explore the complex and multifaceted nature of fluctuating asymmetries in T&I. On one hand, the sociological aspects of interpreting as an activity taking place in – and, at the same time, shaping – a particular interaction have been analysed. On the other, an interest in the mental processes underlying language use led to the adoption of a RT framework in order to show how and if interpreters convey implicatures triggered by a DM in the original utterance, matching the SC's intention.

5.3 Testing Relevance Theory in mediated communication

In terms of methodology, T&I scholars drawing on RT tend to adopt descriptive, qualitative methods of inquiry. Depending on the type of (mixed-method) model and the researcher's epistemological position, a model can be tested conceptually or in relation to specific empirical data. A number of developments in RT-informed T&I research are here identified, pointing to the future of this field.

5.3.1 Expanding methodologies: triangulation

The first promising developments are shown by the combinations of different methods – even methods from different disciplines – used to study the highly complex process of T&I.

Technological advances are making new research tools available to collect data to understand what goes on during the T&I process in a more holistic manner. In particular, the adoption of research methods from psychology and cognitive psychology, in addition to statistical methods regularly employed in psycholinguistics, have helped advance our understanding of

the workings of the translator's mind. RT-oriented research into TS has started with early think-aloud protocols (cf. 3.4.1), and has been developed further through triangulation of data collection methods, such as keystroke logging, neuroimaging, eye tracking, and verbal protocols in experiments on translation combined with corpus data, and most recently, increasing interfaces with translation technology (cf. 3.5.4).

As we have seen in 3.5.3, another new trend in research is brain-imaging methods, such as positron emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), which have helped to shed light on the understanding of the biological bases of language. They open a potential for interdisciplinary studies of T&I, yet they require much more methodological competence than is usually included in researcher training.[4]

Lastly, it is undeniable that, for translation process data – such as eye-tracking or fMRI data – the issue of ecological validity remains; the realistic process of translation must be reduced to an observable configuration of explanatory (independent) and response (dependent) variables, and this leads to artificial data. Corpus analysis is at an advantage here, because the data can be natural realistic data.

In RT-informed T&I studies, corpus linguistics techniques have been applied to a plethora of data. The investigations illustrated in 3.4.4, 4.3.1, and 4.3.4 are excellent examples of the adaptation of corpus linguistic methods to investigate key characteristics of T&I under a RT lens. In this context, the 'scales' used in RT-oriented T&I studies are various. Such changes affect the length of TT excerpts under consideration – which may be full texts, but also the time scale, which may span from seconds to days.

There is, nevertheless, one problem with corpus data. There is initially a gap between observed phenomena in the data and cognitive explanations. Phenomena under observation – such as explicitation (cf. 3.4.4) – can be diagnosed, yet it takes fairly elaborate statistical techniques to relate them to specific variables. Further, issues of confidentiality would rule out the setting up of a generally available comparable corpus in IS, such as that proposed for translation (cf. Baker 1995, Laviosa 1997). Nonetheless, much can be achieved by individual (comparative) studies (e.g., Gallai's work). A parallel quantitative method of inquiry may help develop and employ statistical models, theories, and/or hypotheses pertaining to the phenomenon, particularly serving as a means to explore the multitude of issues arising from TTs. Indeed, triangulation can help overcome the weakness or intrinsic biases and the problems that come from single-method, single-observer studies.

5.3.2 Integrating product and process

A second important development is that of integrating T&I product and process research, as they mutually complement each other rather than constituting rival candidate methodologies.

It is a widespread paradigm in empirical linguistics that hypotheses about language production are initially tested on product data (corpora), which usually yields correlations between situational variables and patterns in the product. Any further progress towards causal explanations involves experiments and predictions, and it is this combination of product and process data that brings us closer to causal in addition to correlational explanations (cf. 3.4.4).

A point to consider is that cognition is a process of the mind, yet none of the methods discussed here observes such processes directly. Even if the context governing language choice and utterance Interpretation in T&I will encompass external (e.g., cultural) and internal (cognitive) factors (cf. 5.2.2) – with the latter fully or partly based on the former – it could be said that only the external factors can be described and modelled with any claim to objectivity and accuracy in terms of interpretive resemblance.[5] Studies cannot claim to prove the potential impact of the translator- or interpreter-induced modifications on the TA's thoughts and thought processes, but only examine their impact on the interaction. In other words, *product* data (corpora) show the outcome of cognitive processes at best, and *process* data (e.g., eye-tracking, keylogging, and fMRI data) show correlates of cognitive processes, but not these processes directly.

However, it is worth remembering that this is true for monolingual communication as well, due to the discrepancy between the linguistic meaning recovered by decoding and the proposition expressed by the utterance of these expressions (cf. 2.3). There may be "implicatures to identify, illocutionary indeterminacies to resolve, metaphors and ironies to interpret" (Sperber and Wilson 2002, 3). All this requires an appropriate set of contextual assumptions, which the hearer must also supply. In 2.3.4, we saw that miscommunication happens in our daily, monolingual interactions.

The picture of human communication delineated by Sperber and Wilson is similar to a music composition, in which a 'note' (an ostensively communicated input) is introduced by a 'musician' (the SC) with the presumption of optimal relevance, and successively taken up by its audience, decoded, and (inferentially) developed by interweaving the parts. However beautifully and clearly structured this 'music' may be, miscommunication can – and does indeed – happen. As we have seen in 2.3.4, inferences are non-demonstrative - they are best described as "suitably constrained guesswork". So, RT-oriented T&I scholars should not purport to be able to read each and every TA's mind. In this field of study, more often than not, researchers have the opportunity to see an output of a "suitably constrained guesswork".

In this context, IS scholars might have a slight advantage here. Descriptions of the relationship between the TT stimulus and the TA's responses to it in IS – especially in DI – provide explicit and detailed clues to

relevance principles determining language choices and intended meaning in authentic situations, and have been observed systematically and empirically within RT-oriented research.

Right from the outset of RT research on the cognitive aspects of T&I, RT scholars' main goal was to learn about how TTs had come to exist. Thus, their focus was on studying the TT production *process*. This helped shift the focus from texts to their *producers* – in a fashion similar to what the Paris School scholars (cf. 4.2) had done much earlier. Today, translators and interpreters still are in the spotlight, but several variations on the theme are becoming commonplace. It has become obvious that T&I *products* result from T&I processes, and thus, they should be studied as well.

It must be further noted that research in all areas of RT-informed T&I studies is no longer centred only on texts or the mediators, but it also focuses on other participants in the event, notably (but not restricted to) the TA. Thus, there is not only a shift of cognitive and sociocultural context from one language/culture to another (cf. 5.2.2), but there are also two additional participants between the ST producer and the TA, that is the client commissioning the translation and the translator, or the interpreter and (for instance) the judge who will read the police report redacted with his help – each having their own intentions and expectations. The naturalistic behaviour of all participants should ideally always be studied in order to understand a mediated event (cf. Roy 1993/2002 within DI studies). This would not contradict the possibility of studying cognition and the T&I process only from the mediator's perspective. An example is Stone's work on interlingual enrichment applied to decisions made by in-vision British sign language sight translators and interpreters (cf. 4.3.5). Most of these programmes include spoken input that is delivered in a multimodal environment – the newsreaders and their viewers – while information is understood within the context of that environment.

Clearly, a model of the T&I process that includes the cognition of several participants may become so complex that it risks not fulfilling its intended objective, that of visualising key components in the model and the relations between them in order to test them empirically. Despite such potential obstacles, in view of the mediator's key role in the complex sociocultural activity of T&I, his cognitive, problem-solving activities merit further study. Indeed, some of the studies in Chapters 3 and 4 have shown that the mediator's cognition is highly relevant and has a key role, as long as the other participants' cognitive behaviour is also accounted for in the models and data. In brief, scholars are reconstructing the mediators' cognitive flow, but are also increasingly interested in the cognition of their communication partners. In other words, RT-oriented researchers are increasingly focusing on all agents, factors, and aspects of T&I events.

5.3.3 Experimental testing

Gutt (1991/2000) has shown that elements of language can encode processing 'signals' which provide guidance to the TA as to how an expression is intended to be relevant. These instructions are empirically grounded, and can be used to make testable predictions about the success (or failure) of communication. The author argues that the 'cause-effect' framework provided by RT can be used to predict issues when the TA lacks ready access to certain pieces of information that are needed for consistency with the principles of relevance. Based on these assumptions, Gutt suggests that one should set up experiments to investigate relations in T&I – a suggestion that is well suited for grounding T&I as a cognitive activity.

So, experimental testing (cf., for instance, 3.4.5, 3.5.1, and 4.3.1) has often been viewed as the method of choice in RT-oriented T&I research, even though it confronts the researcher with a paradoxical difficulty. Given the complexity of the phenomenon, models should be as 'complete' as possible; the more complete the model, however, the more difficult its experimental validation. This problem is acknowledged by Setton (1999, 64), who states:

> It is fair to say that in the current state of knowledge, our assumptions about the workings of peripheral systems, like word recognition and articulation, are more secure than those concerning central processes, which are less accessible to experimentation.

Rather than experimentation in the classic sense of hypothesis testing in a controlled lab environment, the methodological option for models chosen by authors such as Setton has thus been the analysis of a textual corpus generated in authentic (or simulated) sessions. Considering the number of variables involved in real-life T&I data, however, such analyses cannot strictly 'test' the model; rather, they will serve to demonstrate the usefulness of the model in guiding the researcher's description and explanation of empirical data.

So, language and text features have been used to support and enrich data analysis. The first source of data comes from texts (e.g., 3.5.1) or a collection of utterances (e.g., 4.5.1) – mainly as part of a corpus. RT scholars aim to investigate trends across them, and the techniques involved can be focused in two directions. Some approaches will focus on explaining how a TT works by applying notions from RT. Others will focus on testing predictions of RT by looking at the extent to which particular TT conform to them. Since RT considers and makes predictions about all kinds of ostensive communicative acts, the texts to be considered can include non-verbal and multimodal texts (cf. 4.3.5) – texts which combine verbal and non-verbal material. Here, we have seen (cf. 3.4.5) that an important area of TS research is the application of RT notions to stylistic elements of translation.[6]

Now that we have summarised the theoretical and methodological implications of RT-informed research in T&I, a question arises: how do we incorporate this theoretical view of T&I skills to be trained into a learning model? And what would the skill components, course syllabi, exercises, and learning materials for T&I practitioners and service users involving cross-linguistic RT pragmatics look like?

5.4 Issues in translation and interpreting practitioner (and service user) training and practice

In T&I education, curriculum design and development address the progression of skill and knowledge acquisition in order to become professionals, and the creation of exchanges that promote skill and knowledge attainment, most notably through lesson planning that considers aspects of formal and informal assessment. In particular, a good T&I programme should: (a) help anticipate the complexities of the mediator's role and critical points for performance; (b) stress the need to use (socio-cultural) and cognitive context; (c) show how strategic choices must be weighed against constraints of time and coordination (especially in case of interpreting); and (d) show the feasibility of providing quality in various contexts.

A growing body of empirical research (e.g., Clark 1991, Holtgraves 1999, Leinonen et al. 2003) shows that *pragmatic* processing skills are distinct and separate from *linguistic* processing skills. So, both should be trained. The authors discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 have shown how an in-depth knowledge of cross-linguistic RT pragmatics is useful in terms of interpreter and translator training[7] and practice, in a wide array of sectors and language combinations. Here, a key concept is that of *competence*, which is embedded in the comprehensive theory, claiming that the ability to translate and interpret requires highly complex metacognitive skills.

It must be highlighted that the common view[8] here is that expertise in the cognitive dimensions of T&I and its acquisition are functions of a sustained effort – practice – rather than a function of talent. While talent – the innate aptitude for executing well without much prior training or experience – can (co)determine successfulness in most activities, expert performance is achievable predominantly by a sustained engagement in said activity. Thus, translators and interpreters also become "broadband" (Alves and Gonçalves 2007) performers through training and practice since prolonged engagement in T&I activities will result in the acquisition of skills and strategies that are useful to the efficient performance of the task at hand.

5.4.1 Meta-/cross-pragmatic competence as a mental faculty

In 3.3.5, we mentioned how Gutt defended a competence-oriented research of translation (CORT), which seeks to understand and explicate

the mental faculties that enable human beings to translate/interpret in the sense of expressing in one language what has been written/uttered in another.

Gutt's plea for the development of a CORT was picked up by Alves (2007) and Alves and Gonçalves (2003, 2007), who emphasise the central role played by metarepresentation and metacognition in the development of competence (cf. 3.4.3). In particular, the authors propose an interesting difference between *general* and *specific* translation competence as a teaching tool:

- *general translator competence*: background knowledge, abilities, and strategies a successful translator needs to master, and which lead to adequate translation task performance;
- *specific translator competence*: it operates in coordination with other sub-competences, and works mainly through conscious or metacognitive processes, being directly geared to the maximisation of interpretive resemblance.

The acquisition of these competences is to be understood as a gradual, systematic, and recurring process of expanding neural networks between various units of the translator's cognitive environment, and should lead one to become a "broadband translator" – that is, an expert translator who works on the basis of communicative cues provided by the ST and reinforced by the contextual assumptions derived from their cognitive environments.

We have also seen that competence is defined in a slightly different way in RT-informed IS (cf., for example, 4.3.1). What clearly distinguishes interpreting from translation – except for the case of sight translation, a hybrid – is that:

- in *translation*: the intensity of expended cognitive effort is relatively low, and the feeling of discomfort associated with effort (mostly) only arises if it is prolonged, while
- in *interpreting*: this intensity can be very high – for example, when the speaker is fast or speaks with a strong, unfamiliar accent, or when the speech is informationally dense.

As both listeners and speakers, interpreters must derive and give access to meanings that are optimally relevant to the other parties, which entails acquiring and projecting their cognitive environments. This is achieved, in part, through pre-briefings and assignment preparation. Yet, in interpreting – unlike translation – much of the accessible context used by the SCs comes from the online unfolding discourse and communicative situation. In particular, Setton (cf. 4.3.1) has shown how the inferential possibilities derived from this co-presence are constantly exploited in SI.

5.4.2 Ensuring quality: interpretive resemblance plus relevance

The definition of optimal relevance is also useful in defining quality in T&I, subject to the additional requirement of faithfulness (cf. *optimal interpretive resemblance*) to the SC's message (see 4.3.1 and 5.4.3).

Within the RT framework, a translator's or interpreter's aim should be to produce a *faithful* translation of the original, where *faithfulness* is defined in terms of interpretive resemblance (i.e., in terms of shared explicatures and implicatures). The result of the mediator's work should thus be a text or an utterance which "can be processed by the L2 audience with minimal effort and which can be seen as having optimal relevance" (Stroińska and Drzazga 2017, 105). Mediators must also choose the degree of faithfulness or resemblance (cf. 2.5 and 3.2.2). The cognitive effects accessible to the mediator's TA will depend on his ability to minimise their processing effort. In an inferential account, superficial deletions or additions may not be errors, as implied by a code model, but a means of using listeners' inferential processes to convey meanings in the absence of 'equivalent' expressions.

In this context, we can adopt Setton and Dawrant's (2016b, 482) formulation of the overall goal of interpreting, and apply it to T&I overall. The ultimate goal of translators and interpreters is, thus, to make accessible to the TA the cognitive effects intended by the SC as he understands them, at reasonable processing cost and risk, using whatever communicative devices (including clues, cf. 5.4.4) available in the TL are appropriate and effective to do so in his projection of the listeners' available contexts. In other words, relevance will depend on the speaker's expressive ability, the listener's comprehension, their accessible contexts (through knowledge, preparation, and presence), and their motivation to communicate.

Complete interpretive resemblance is, however, hardly attainable in T&I. Under the constraints of simultaneity, for instance, Setton (cf. 4.3.1) argues that interpreters have very little time to choose and compose a TL stimulus, and addressees have little time to process it. Gutt (1998, 42; cf. 3.2.2) states that enormous formal differences between languages make complete interpretive resemblance untenable also in the case of translation.

5.4.3 Implicit and explicit competence

Within the RT framework, the TA treats all utterances inferentially. RT shows how listeners must use inference not just to derive implicit meaning but also meaningful explicatures, via processes such as disambiguation and enrichment. In a monolingual interaction, it may be quite difficult to pin down the traces of this inferential treatment. However, they are more easily detectable in situations of inter-linguistic transfer, the translators/

interpreters being in the process of rendering (what they understood of) the ST (Mason 2006a, 364–365).

Several researchers looked into the interpreter's inferencing from a RT perspective, and observed that the translators/interpreters express their own perception of the meaning of the ST (cf. Gutt 1991/2000, Setton 1999, Vianna 2005, Albl-Mikasa 2016). Faithfulness (cf. 5.4.2) in most T&I settings requires mediators to aim to convey what was meant, but preserving the implicit-explicit outline of the ST as much as possible in the TT; that is, rendering explicatures explicitly, and providing the necessary clues (cf. 5.4.4) in TT for listeners to derive the implicatures at the same strengths.

5.4.4 The role of clues and procedural meaning

In RT, T&I are defined as *clue-based*, interlingual interpretive uses of language. We have explored RT-oriented approaches to T&I which have proposed the notion of communicative clues (cf. 3.2.3) and pragmatic clues (cf. 4.3.1), which help guide the audience to the intended Interpretation and are key in RT-informed training programmes.

If, as RT argues, SCs can be assumed to be aiming at optimal relevance (cf. 2.2), no aspect of language is disposable; in each case, its use will follow from the SC's aim of producing a TT which satisfies the presumption that it is the most relevant text consistent with the SC's interests and abilities. Further, a translator or interpreter, like any communicator, is constrained by the first principle of relevance, which governs all acts of ostensive communication (cf. (3) in 2.2.2). Since it is in his interests that the TA take up the guarantee of relevance and he is communicating and investing effort in the derivation of cognitive effects, it would be beneficial in such circumstances to provide linguistically encoded "signposts" (Jucker 1993, 438) that there are cognitive effects to be derived.

In particular, analyses of use of procedural expressions in renditions (cf. 3.4.2, 4.3.1, 4.4.4, and 4.5.2) are based on an approach in which these expressions do not encode a particular constituent of the proposition expressed by the utterance, but simply encode a constraint on the Interpretation of the utterances that contain them. This means that the TA is left with the responsibility for the Interpretation process (i.e., of deriving any interpretation which is consistent with that constraint).

The distinction between the conceptual and procedural meaning (cf. 2.4) has been used (in particular) in interpreting studies to clarify the difference between explicitation, where the interpreter supplies additional content that listeners may need as context, notably to understand jokes or culture-bound references (e.g., Vianna 2005, Mason 2006a, Gumul 2008), and the addition of procedural DMs (Gallai 2015, 2016). Both explicitation and procedural elements contribute to the achievement of optimal relevance.

Stroińska and Drzazga (2017; cf. 4.5.6) have further argued that while implicatures may seem more problematic to resolve in real-life situations than explicatures, the latter often pose significant difficulty in interpretation. The authors have shown how a view of interpreting as a clue-based, interlingual interpretive use of language may be used in both interpreters' training and work. The interpreters' clues may lead them to modify their initial choices even if this requires considerable processing effort on their part. The result of the interpreter's work is a TT which can be processed by the TA with minimal effort, and which can be seen as having optimal relevance.

However, mediators do not always use these elements of speech, or use them correctly. For instance, analysis of bilingual police interviewing (cf. 4.5.2) has shown that interpreters resort to form-based interpreting in renditions characterised by disfluency, inaccuracy, and uncertainty. This is contrary to the 'verbatim' requirement of Codes of Conduct, according to which an interpreter's role is to produce an utterance that almost exactly reflects the original speaker's intentions for the hearer. Gallai found that when interpreting DMs, (qualified) police interpreters – regardless of their language combination – seem to be concerned more about the comprehensibility and acceptability (Ng 2009, 41) of the interpretation, rather than the procedural elements present in the original utterances.

Gallai's approach also serves as the basis for the explanation of the frequent use of speaker-oriented procedural expressions in interpreters' renditions as devices which contribute to the illusion of 'absence of mediation' by encoding constraints on the implicatures of the interpreter's utterance. The interpreter is still a communicator in the sense that their act of representing the thoughts of another is optimally relevant: they is responsible for orchestrating and crafting their rendition in such a way that the hearer will recover the optimally relevant Interpretation of the original speaker's utterances. However, optimal relevance seems to be achieved not by increasing the mutuality between interpreter and hearer, but by creating a sense of mutuality between the original speaker and the hearer. Thus, according to this approach, the police interpreter's addition of DMs discussed in 4.5.2 is justified by the way in which they contribute to the impression of a more direct line between the officer and the interviewee's thoughts.

The reason behind the not 'relevant' renditions of DMs seems to be the procedural nature of these elements, which may pose a comprehension and translation problem for L2 speakers elements – regardless of their language proficiency or accreditation. Divergence between the ST and TT may also be due to cross-linguistic pragmatic differences - which are impossible to rule out - or to stylistic preferences by the interpreter, which are difficult to predict. However, this lack of concern to procedural meaning appears to be mainly attributable to practitioners' lack of training in cross-linguistic pragmatics, and consequently of pragmatic competence, that is their ability to comprehend and produce language appropriately

Table 5.1 Classroom task on the use of repetitions used ironically in the ST.

Premise	• Syntactic structures (an example of clues) can be vehicles for the expression of a diverse range of pragmatic meanings. Languages differ not only in the patterns of structure employed, but also in the inferential routes that these patterns can trigger.
Main question	• How can translators/interpreters be sure that changing or preserving this given syntactic arrangement (a repetition) in the ST would ensure optimal interpretive resemblance in a TT? Explain.
Sub-questions	a. Do you know enough about cross-pragmatic differences between the ST and TT languages? b. Assuming that certain communicative acts do enjoy a reasonable degree of universality, how can we be sure that the TT reader will or will not appreciate the irony conveyed through similar or different syntax in her cognitive environment?
Task	• Trainers give two groups of students real-life examples of two (translated/interpreted) versions of the same text: i. one preserving the ST syntactic arrangement; ii. the other abstracting or modifying the syntax. • Students are asked to identify implicatures that these texts are likely to give rise to and consider how to explain how they are arrived at with reference to the RT approach (cf. 2.3); • Students can then compare the two versions with regard to the implicatures they said they are likely to generate; • Finally, students state whether they see if the reception of certain effects (in this case, irony) is affected.
Class discussion	• The two groups compare and contrast their thoughts on the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of the clues adopted by the translator/interpreter in his rendition.
(Possible) outcome	• The same repetition in the TL is (not) as sensitive or curiosity-arousing as it is in the SL; thus, the relevance is maintained/not maintained.

in a communicative situation, taking into account contextual elements necessary to derive implicit meaning.[9]

One might, thus, envisage a training module on clues based upon previous studies. For instance, just like semantics, syntax can generate its own communicative clues. Table 5.1 gives an example of a task on a form of repetition[10] uttered with irony, to be performed in the classroom:

In the case of standardised settings such as legal interpreting, legal professionals – such as police officers, lawyers, and judges – are usually trained in interviewing techniques and tend to pursue a monolingual strategy in mediated interviews. Were they made aware of the nature of their own (conscious or unconscious) linguistic strategies and the extent to which interpreting can frustrate both, this may lead to the formulation of specific training modules. These, in turn, can highlight such matters as

procedural aspects of language in question structure and management of triadic interaction (especially control of turn-taking), and in this context RT can contribute to bringing awareness to the legal process.

To conclude, practitioners and users should thus be made aware of the pragmatic importance of these clues which they tend to treat as disposable. Omissions and divergent renditions distort the pragmatics of the STs. More generally, unless extensive training in these pragmatic aspects of interlingual communication is carried out, they can be expected to 'disrupt' interpretive resemblance. Instead, practitioners should strive to achieve a fine balance between what is possible, given the nature and dynamics of the communication at hand, and what is desirable in terms of the context and the aims of the parties involved.

5.4.5 Cognitive efficiency

RT has also served to discuss issues of cognitive efficiency and cognitive load. Just as SCs and TAs represent their own and each other's meanings to themselves as they communicate, T&I practitioners must metarepresent these meanings, adding one more order of metarepresentation to the other levels which are already routinely handled (Sperber 1994).

In RT-inspired TS, an efficient process is one in which the translator exerts time and effort effectively so that cognitive resources are allocated only to those sub-tasks needed to complete the overall task. This kind of processing efficiency is closely related to expertise (cf. 5.4.1).

In CI, Setton (1999, 259) shows how processing load can induce multiple errors in the performance of even professional interpreters, while Ying (2010, 2011) created a qualitative pedagogical tool which would enable CSI trainers and students to monitor their performance quality, identify how to reduce and focus cognitive overload, and thus self-regulate the trainee interpreters' learning processes.

As regards DI, I concur with Mason (2008) that a way to reduce interpreters' omissions of pragmatic features – alongside summarised translation and interruptions – would be to render STs in a 'semiconsecutive' mode – that is, in smaller chunks (instead of one big segment). This would allow the interpreter to interpret after each chunk, and then return the floor to the speaker who was interrupted so they can move on to the next chunk. In the courtroom context, Mason (2008, 53) finds that the practicality of this mode of interpreting depends on the co-operation of the actor (lawyers, witnesses, etc.), over which the interpreter has no direct control. In other DI settings, this could again be overcome through training.

5.4.6 Monitoring skills

In IS, monitoring (cf. 3.3.3, 3.5.4, 4.3.1) is included in several process models (e.g., Lederer 2010, Setton 1999) to account for the observed fact

Table 5.2 The dialogue interpreter's different kinds of monitoring according to Englund Dimitrova and Tiselius (2016, 200).

When an SC speaks, the interpreter . . .	*When the dialogue interpreter speaks, he . . .*
1. monitors his comprehension of the SC's utterance; 2. monitors the relation of the SC's utterance to the interpreter's previous interpreted utterance; and 3. monitors his memory and processing capacity, in order to interrupt and take a turn, if necessary.	1. monitors his own utterance, as an utterance in the given language; 2. monitors, when relevant, the relation of his own utterance to the SC's previous utterance; and 3. monitors the verbal and non-verbal reactions of the other parties.

that interpreters monitor their own TTs, as evidenced by their corrections and repairs, while still also listening to continuing SL utterances. Apart from repairs and corrections in the TT, empirical evidence for monitoring comes also from retrospection (see, for instance, Tiselius 2013).

This concept is explored by Englund Dimitrova and Tiselius (2016, 200), who describe the functions of the dialogue interpreter's different kinds of monitoring as follows in Table 5.2:

Englund Dimitrova and Tiselius (2016, 200) thus propose that "different kinds of monitoring, both of the interpreter and the other parties, are a crucial and pervasive part of the community interpreter's processing and hence a defining factor of this type of interpreting". They further suggest that video-recordings are necessary for studying cognitive aspects of DI as non-verbal, procedural elements such as gaze patterns and gestures are important factors of, for instance, monitoring. By combining monitoring, a more cognitive notion, with "professional self-concept", a more social notion, they suggest that it is possible to investigate how cognitive and social aspects (cf. 5.2.2) are embodied in the interpreting process.

5.4.7 Language proficiency enhancement

So far, our T&I pedagogy has also – almost deliberately – downplayed language itself as it focused on the ability to look for meaning through the ST, identify the SC's message and intent, and made these the main drivers of TT production.

However, as Setton and Dawrant (2016b, 236) argue in their volume on CI training, language proficiency can only be "clearly assessed in interpreting [and translation] performance once we have mastered the mechanisms of capture and formed a clear representation of the message with enough attention still free to self-monitor and attend to the quality of our output". But what is the potential for enhancing language

proficiency in L2? What does 'bilingual' mean, and how can students make the best of their cognitive limitations for T&I?[11]

To assess the ability for mature verbal communication – according to neurolinguistic and L2 acquisition research (cf. Paradis 2004) – we must consider that it engages not just the language system (implicit and explicit language knowledge), but at least other two more cognitive submodules co-operating with each other (i.e., affective motivation and pragmatics).

Firstly, implicit (also called "procedural")[12] language knowledge is acquired unconsciously (and mostly in childhood), and is what we use unconsciously and automatically to produce grammatically 'correct' language. Explicit linguistic knowledge, on the other hand, complements this with the representable and conscious knowledge developed later through formal training. In adults, explicit language knowledge mostly takes the form of an expanding lexicon, and is intertwined with cultural and world knowledge learned throughout life.

The second submodule is centred in the limbic system and linked to affective motivation. Paradis (2004) cites two kinds of motivation that may typically drive and enhance effective L2 language learning: (a) instrumental (i.e., to improve one's professional status), and (b) integrative (i.e., to become part of a community).

Finally, this volume has focused on the submodule of pragmatics, especially on its key role of providing vital insights into the SC's intentions in T&I. According to Paradis (2004, 20), foreign language learners are more likely to understand semantic meaning (cf. 1.3.2 and 2.3.2) than pragmatic meaning. Aside from literary tropes, L2 learners learn mostly the literal meanings of words. The pragmatic components are difficult to teach explicitly, and are best acquired through practice in natural settings.

To sum up, the ability for mature verbal communication in teenager or adult language learners may be developed – through mixed implicit and explicit learning – at an adequate level for T&I, provided that pragmatic competence can be internalised well enough to become fast and automatic. This requires exposure through contact, and intensive and regular practice. Trainees should do exercises with a focus on the active listening and reading (e.g., aloud, trying to 'be' the writer or speaker) of a wide variety of texts, as well as on content rather than form. Thus, they will gradually acquire a sense for implicit meanings, en route to a near-native level of competence in understanding, and some native-like habits of expression – such as prosodic elements or use of idioms.[13]

5.4.8 Ethical implications

In Chapters 3 and 4, we have analysed a continuum of interpreters' and translators' pragmatic abilities in a wide array of settings. I believe that RT-informed sets of (cross-pragmatic) abilities – such as inferencing – are directly intertwined with training and ethics.

By showing that the acts of communication we call T&I can be adequately accounted for as a form of 'secondary communication', Gutt has made a significant contribution to the quest for a *unified* account of T&I (cf. 5.2.1). He has shown that RT can empower translators and interpreters to *predict* the conditions for effective communication in T&I. This necessity emerged not just to empower translators, but also because Gutt aimed to describe how translators constantly have to make decisions about implicitness/explicitness (cf. 5.4.3), even though these decisions are often unconscious (cf. 3.4.4). Some of the questions that arise are: what does and should a course on meta- and cross-pragmatic elements for trainee interpreters and translators include to empower (i.e., to create a level of 'social capital' for)[14] the people mediators work for, as well as practitioners themselves and engaging stakeholders?

We have stated that RT-informed training can empower professionals to *predict* the conditions for effective communication and, thus, help interpreters and translators with (micro-linguistic) choices. Let us take the case of police interpreters' frequent misuse of DMs (cf. 5.4.4), which has been considered evidence of the interpreters' pronounced involvement impacting on interlingual communication, and on their 'neutrality' enshrined in Codes of Practice. Ultimately, this will impact on the fairness and effectiveness of the T&I process and the legal proceedings. In such a demanding profession, from a police interview rapport phase to the translation of a report, the misuse of pragmatics by practictioners has an overall negative impact on the different aims of the proceedings - and, ultimately, on justice.

Against this backdrop, the ethics of the practitioner's pragmatic impact on mediated communication should form part and parcel of training. We should ensure that the concept of shared responsibility in all T&I settings truly extends to the recruitment and, above all, education of all professionals in this field (cf. Baker and Maier 2011).

Certainly, all countries should have a unified level of quality assurance, especially through the establishment of registers, whereby trained professionals are given preference over untrained practitioners. In particular, countries should provide specific training on ethical, sociological, and pragmatic aspects of interlingual communication. Another key issue in this context would be the development of more nuanced Codes of Conduct, which will include cross- and meta-pragmatic skills. To this purpose, swift actions need to be taken to adjust guidelines for performance standards (i.e., in terms of accuracy and completeness) and interpreters' ethical conduct as members of the profession (i.e., in terms of confidentiality and integrity). In particular, cross-pragmatic research on T&I suggests the need for a more nuanced conceptualisation of Codes of Practice, which accounts for a higher degree of latitude afforded within role definitions.

The rising emphasis on *accountability* should be considered while creating T&I training syllabuses, which sometimes only promote the ethos

of neutrality. More responsibility results in increased visibility, and therefore increased pressure on the profession as a whole to demonstrate that it is aware of its influence over society as a whole.

In order for students to embrace this responsibility and develop an awareness of their micro-linguistic – as well as macro-social – impact on society, the classroom must be configured as an open space for reflection and experimentation. Educators should establish a collection of pedagogical tools used to create an environment in which students can make situated ethical judgements, practice the consequences of such actions, and learn from their experiences.

A role-play in the classroom may involve the following scenarios (cf. Bell 2010, 41). If you're 'pro-life', does your use of clues in a translation for an abortion clinic inferentially guide the TA to a different meaning than the one intended by the SC? Or, if you're pro-choice, and you are called upon to interpret for a crisis pregnancy centre, are you explicitating your beliefs through inferential choices? Are you sure that you are relying on shared, situated cognitive environments and capabilities?

Firstly, debating such problems in the safe context of the classroom allows students to freely rehearse all sides of an argument, and consider its ethical/linguistic consequences from many angles. Further, considering the classroom as an open arena for ethical thought may complicate the issue of evaluation. By which criteria can educators evaluate students' performances? A key solution may be to design grading standards that focus on the quality of T&I performance in terms of pragmatic choices as well as ethical thinking.

5.5 Summary

In this chapter, we have shown how the pragmatics of relevance is a useful perspective from which to research and teach the cognitive aspects of what happens in T&I, and what it is that regulates the elusive job of a translator and an interpreter. In particular, we have considered the most significant data that has been discussed in the last two chapters, compared treatments of these by different scholars, and looked at some of the main areas of current debate.

Gutt (1991, 20) describes this RT-oriented focus of T&I studies in the following terms: "Relevance theory . . . tries to give an explicit account of how the information-processing faculties of our mind enable us to communicate with one another. Its domain is therefore mental faculties rather than texts or processes of text production". Firstly, Section 5.2.1 has drawn on Gutt's work to show how the unifying theoretical force of this new paradigm is summarised in the definition of T&I activity as *interlingual interpretive use*.

Section 5.2.2 has shown that, as a disciplinary entity which is more than the sum of its parts, RT-informed T&I studies have often developed

along various pathways, 'pushing the envelope' in several interconnected directions by combining a micro-linguistic (cognitive pragmatic) analysis with macro-social understanding. These mixed-method approaches are based on the view that communication cannot be described as "corollaries of relevance theory" (Ward and Horn 1999, 556) – in other words, as following readily from the concepts of RT – and that they should be investigated by focusing on the points of contact between the cognitive and social (or other) aspects of communication. As Simon (2000, 25) states in a passage on his theory of bounded rationality,

> rational behaviour in the real world is as much determined by the "inner environment" of people's minds, both their memory contents and their processes, as by the "outer environment" of the world on which they act, and which acts on them.

Multiple points of interface between the adopted research traditions – one based on a personal, and the other on a sub-personal view of human interaction – have also been discussed.

Aside from this emergence of an interdisciplinary perspective, we have seen that other key vectors of development in terms of methodology within RT-informed T&I studies are: a move towards triangulation; integrating product and process; the expansion of the object of study to all participants in communicative events; the gradual coming together of studies of different modalities, including multimodal presentations (i.e., written text, spoken discourse, audiovisual products); and experimental testing (cf. 5.3).

Having discussed the conceptual designs and methodological frameworks underlying this paradigm, we have moved on to show how the tools and notions selected can be implemented and related to each other with a view to creating curricula and working in the field of T&I (cf. 5.4). In this context, we have discussed the central role of cross- and meta-pragmatic competence and the notion of quality, the latter being defined as faithfulness plus relevance. At the end of the T&I process, the strategies chosen by the mediator to transfer the SL message should have succeeded in making his rendition interpreting resemble the ST.

Issues may reside in case of a deficient (meta-pragmatic) ability to fully engage with the conceptual and procedural processes triggered by the ST. For instance, interpreters in Gallai's corpus seem completely absorbed in the attempt to decipher words and expressions, taking no heed of the modifications in their cognitive environment brought about by the use of a DM in the original utterance. As a result of the loss of procedural meaning, potential for miscommunication increases.

In short, practitioners seem to have a limited understanding of how communication and cognition work, and how to analyse their performance micro-linguistically. While some countries and international

organisations attempt to set out the duty of the practitioners in Codes and guidelines, such recommendations never mention cross-pragmatic skills, and may enforce a mechanical or rule-bound ethics on interpreters.

To conclude, this chapter has reminded ourselves of the key things which RT offers for accounts of the dynamic nature of the mediated communication, considered the kinds of data which might be relevant, and looked at ways in which the theory has been tested and developed in a number of T&I areas. Practitioners are called upon to apply the appropriate techniques based on cross-linguistic pragmatic knowledge in order to deliver a 'faithful' rendition, as well as be acutely aware of ethics and what constitutes their role – both at a micro- and macro-level of speech. In this scenario, attention to education, recruitment policies, regulation (where appropriate), and raising awareness of professional consciousness all seem to be key factors. All the more, the inclusion of all key players in this process appears to be critical. In particular, T&I users – from immigration officers at ports of entry, to MEPs or the TA of a technical translation – are also called upon to undergo training on translators' and interpreters' role boundaries.

Of course, there is a lot more to be said. We haven't attempted to survey the whole field, but hopefully we have seen enough to understand the central concerns of RT-inspired T&I studies and the main differences between its major 'branches'. The debates continue and the literature surrounding them is ever expanding. It is hard to imagine areas wider or more complex than human cognition and communication. Given the range of phenomena which seem to be relevant in explaining any act of mediated communication, it might seem daunting to attempt to come up with accounts which reveal more than a very small part of the overall picture. However, we could think of this as an opportunity rather than a problem. There is a vast area to explore, and room for more research.

Notes

1 Cf., for instance, the linguistic underdeterminacy thesis discussed in 1.1 or Goffman's (1967) sociological notion of face as the public self-image that every speaker wants to claim for themselves.
2 See the process of "dramatic realization" discussed in Goffman (1959); cf. also Mason (2006a).
3 For example, Wadensjö (1992, 1998) defines Goffman's (1981) notion of *footing* as a person's alignment (as speaker and hearer) to a particular utterance, thus emphasising the simultaneity of 'speakership' and 'listenership' and implying that talk in face-to-face interaction is carried out and 'created' in parallel with listening (where listening may include overt verbal activity; cf. back-channelling).
4 For instance, data analysis requires competence in standard statistical techniques.
5 Cf. Will (2015) in 4.6.
6 However, literary texts have a slightly unusual status. They are 'natural' texts in that human beings produce them; yet, they might also be seen as

'unnatural' in that they are created for literary or other effects, not always spontaneous, and often intended to represent something which someone else might say or have said (see also 2.4.2).

7 Taguchi (2011) gives an interesting overview of empirical studies that have presented a variety of options for pragmatics teaching and learning, in formal classrooms as well as in less traditional learning environments (e.g., online social media).

8 Cf., for example, Alves and Gonçalves (2007), Jääskeläinen and Tirkkonen-Condit (1991), and Englund-Dimitrova (2005).

9 In DI, scholars have also highlighted the negative impact of the consecutive, ad hoc nature of face-to-face interaction, which makes it difficult for interpreters to adjust their strategies accordingly and quickly.

10 Cf. question of parallelism 3.2.3, and Jackson (2016).

11 Cf. also Schwieter and Ferreira (2017b).

12 The terms *implicit* and *procedural* here are not related to the notions discussed in 5.4.3 and 5.4.4 respectively.

13 Interestingly, Malmkjær (2017) suggests that studying translations and their STs can enhance cross-linguistic awareness not only among language learners and trainee translators, but also more generally.

14 Cf. Inghilleri (2003, 2005).

6 Future directions

6.1 Introduction

There is no doubt that there have been very significant developments since Grice (1957, 1969) developed his initial ideas, Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995, 278) expressed their hope for novel studies "with new insights", Gutt's work in the 1990s, and Gile's (2002, 182) sceptic request for "convincing empirical evidence" within RT-oriented IS.

While RT applications to T&I research have generated spirited debate (cf. 3.6 and 4.6), they have nonetheless resulted in insightful analyses on mediated communication, and continue to be relevant for systematic descriptions of meaning construction to this day. This is mainly due to the flexibility of RT, which has allowed investigators to apply and adapt it to fit their research methodology. In particular, the cognitive-pragmatic RT model has been used by a plethora of T&I studies scholars in order to provide a detailed breakdown of mental procedures followed by translators and interpreters in numerous settings, as well as to explore the concept of cross-linguistic pragmatic competence in training.

Nowadays, RT-inspired approaches in T&I studies come in different methodological shapes and forms, and interdisciplinarity is of the essence. However, there are still many unanswered (or only partially answered) questions about the pragmatics of T&I which theorists might focus on in future, and it is not easy to predict what exactly they will be. It is important for any discipline to be open both to new research directions and to contributions from new scholars. Thus, this volume finishes by running through some possible future directions and including ideas for projects. In particular, there is still a lot of work to do to form unitary, RT-oriented models of T&I (6.2), and to set up a mutually beneficial interplay between descriptive and interlingual RT studies (6.3).

6.2 The quest for unitary, Relevance Theory-oriented models of translation and interpreting

Mediated communication is a dynamic mesh of different settings and modes, many combinations of natural languages (including signed

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languages), and multiple cultures. And the boundaries of this ever-changing entity are becoming even more blurred due to new technologies. Oral communication used to be distinctly synchronic and co-present; yet, now there are synchronic forms of written communication as well as oral, synchronic forms - where speakers need not be in the same room, such as video remote interpreting (VRI).

It is hoped that the (experimental) methodology employed by the authors in this volume will be replicated in future research in order to both address its limitations, and confirm or disconfirm its findings. Scholars can use data from other settings, topics, and language combinations in order for the results to be more universally acceptable. Clearly, completely different challenges may be faced by practitioners who deal with disparate languages and cultures as traditional indigenous cultures in Australia (e.g., Cooke 1995) or sign language interpretation (e.g., Roy 1996, 2000).

Chapter 3 showed how the theory has been applied to different types of translation – from sci-tech through AVT to religious and literary texts – in different language combinations, and the same can partly be said about interpreter-mediated communication (cf. Chapter 4), with studies ranging from the European Parliament to a Flemish assize court. However, many more are still missing from the list. Further, RT-informed IS have mainly focused on simultaneous and legal interpreting settings, while CSI has been mostly neglected.

The object of study is expanding,[1] while at the same time retaining some of its fundamental features. This is all the more obvious in RT-informed approaches, for which the foundations of mediated mediation rely on shared, situated cognitive environments and abilities. Some of the vectors of development outlined in Chapters 3 and 4 are relatively new (cf. work on CSI in 4.4), while some represent evolutionary patterns that were established well before the recent growth (cf. Gutt's influence in 3.4). We believe that these RT-oriented approaches are specific enough to generate research hypotheses in sufficiently high granularity. These models are usually interdisciplinary in nature, and have the potential to be further developed to analyse specific components of the T&I process. The neglect to work towards such models would be a hindrance to making progress on that front.

In 5.3, we discussed how RT-informed T&I studies are moving in the direction of empirical disciplines; these involve techniques needed for corpus building, including annotation and querying, and for experimental methodologies. A case in point here is triangulation, an analysis technique used in multi-method research designs which has been highly successful in RT-oriented TS. The combination of (two or more) theories, data sources, and methods should also be employed to analyse a wider range of IS phenomena.

Corpus linguistics and new research tools (such as neuroimaging studies applied to translation task execution) have greatly helped RT researchers in terms of data collection, and the main aim has been to understand

phenomena in a more holistic manner. Techniques are being developed for corpora, involving sampling, representativeness, annotation and consistency checking, evaluation of results, isolating individual explanatory variables from several explanatory sources in the product, and interfaces with translation technology. In particular, the adoption of methods from psychology and cognitive psychology – in addition to statistical methods regularly employed in psycholinguistics – have helped advance understanding of the workings of the translator's mind in RT-informed, and more broadly, CTIS research. It is hoped that these technological tools will also be adopted on a larger scale within RT-informed IS research.

In terms of experiments, we need to move forward on questions such as naturalness of experimental situation, size, hypothesis formulation, and interpretation of results. Progress in experimental design needs to include competence in handling tools such as eye tracking and multilayer integrated corpus building, operationalisation of relevant variables, interfacing with T&I technology,[2] and contacts with the relevant research communities (e.g., CTIS or RT; cf. 'experimental pragmatics' in 6.3). In this context, findings from neighbouring CTIS approaches to interlingual communication – such as the ones collected in the volume edited by Muñoz Martín and Halverson (2020a) – are very welcome and inspirational. And as in the case of corpus-based work, researchers need to introduce transparent documentation and replicate experiments in order to increase the sustainability of research design in process studies (cf. Alves and Hurtado Albir 2017, 547). T&I involves both comprehension and production, but it is different from other forms of understanding and production through the double-bind of the relationship between renditions and the ST (as well as the TT), and additionally through the involvement of at least two languages/cultures.

We hope to see continued development along all fields of T&I studies, though the pace of development could vary across areas. Moreover, growth may be more vulnerable in some areas due to a relatively younger 'age' and/or the role of non-academic factors, such as institutional factors. For instance, the interface with neuroscience (cf. 5.3.1) has received an important boost through the interest and commitment of colleagues at the Laboratory of Experimentation for Translation (LETRA/UFMG), set up at the Federal University of Minas Gerais in Brazil. Colleagues at the Institute of English Studies at the University of Warsaw have also experimented with issues in TS.[3] We do hope to see this continue and grow to reach a critical mass that will ensure its continuation in fields such as DI and CI. However, it is clear that data collection and analysis in such areas of research is massively hindered by external, non-academic factors.

Our further hope is to witness more explicit engagement with epistemological frameworks and direct comparisons with contending CTIS theories and constructs. As part of this effort, I would echo the plea for more meta-methodological discussion made by Olalla-Soler (2020).

In this scenario, it is imperative that RT scholars reflect on the epistemological positions and consequences of the models illustrated in the previous chapters, in particular on the issue of accretion vs issue of comparison and 'scientific progress', and the status of research paradigms. For example, does this growing body of work merely add studies in a process of empirical/theoretical accretion, or does it challenge our previous understandings and the state of knowledge in the field? Are broader CTIS frameworks being built or elaborated, and how does one RT model position itself epistemologically compared to work in other neighbouring disciplines? After all, scientific progress consists of the solution of both 'empirical' and 'conceptual' problems, and research paradigms in RT-inspired T&I studies will have more or less success on the basis of their problem-solving capacity.

As previously stated, an interdisciplinary mindset has characterised many RT-informed approaches across the T&I research spectrum. The interdisciplinarity of this work is almost a natural consequence of the decision to observe the T&I phenomena, which are of such complexity as to elude attempts at constructing a comprehensive model. Reducing this complex, multi-dimensional phenomenon to the cognitive-communicative dimension would however have been as one-sided as previous attempts to take sociocultural dimensions as the one and only yardstick of T&I quality (cf. 5.2.2). The RT account of communicative context and 'discourse' from the viewpoint of the "sub-personal cognitive processes which are involved in the human ability to entertain representations of other people's thoughts and desires and ideas on the basis of public stimuli such as utterances" (Blakemore 2002, 60) is different from – yet, arguably, complementary to - approaches in which communication must be viewed as a sociocultural phenomenon (cf. 4.6). While the significance of the combination between the adopted disciplines has been recognised before, existing studies which aim to draw an explicit connection between them are still partly lacking in empirical focus (and work on real-data sets).

On the issue of evidence, a vast number of T&I process models illustrated in Chapters 3 and 5 have sought grounding in the analysis of authentic performance data. However, as mentioned in 5.3.2, discovering the link between mental processes and practitioners' TT is far from straightforward. The field of T&I displays complex patterns of strategies – compression, paraphrase, explicitation, etc. – which are individually highly variable, and thus pose a severe challenge to performance analysis and process modelling. In IS transcripts, for instance, predictable language processing operations may be scrambled by strategic and expertise effects, such as more restructuring and processing in larger chunks (Moser-Mercer et al. 2000). A realistic model must therefore allow for individual strategic choices.

We have seen how lack of pragmatic competence (cf. 5.4.1) can be an issue for translators and interpreters given that it is partly universal, yet

partly culture- and language-specific. In particular, translators and interpreters can unconsciously project and sense mood through non-verbal clues like pupil size and facial expressions, but also through clues specific to a culture or language, ranging from gestures through intonation to word choice and sentence structure. The (procedural) meaning of such clues (cf. 5.4.4) is context-bound and hard to define, so they can usually only be learned and internalised implicitly, through contact and interactive experience.

In this context, further experimental studies are needed to follow up on the speculations proposed in 5.4, which should extend to the investigation of the effect of adequate pragmatic training on the overall performance of interpreters and translators, and the feasibility of maintaining a high level of interpretive resemblance. In official settings, training should result from a rapprochement between researchers, trainers, practitioners, and public entities in an attempt to achieve a more symmetrical relationship between theory and practice (cf. Arrojo 2013). One could envisage the organisation of joint training workshops where all stakeholders can exchange views and work together to build up a partnership based on an understanding of each other's needs.

The incorporation of theory into teaching is always a major challenge; one that is complicated by the fact that practitioners in this field are not usually required to have formal academic qualifications in order to become professionals - and, thus, tend to see theory as irrelevant. It is fundamental that we find ways to bridge the usual gap that separates practice from theoretical frameworks such as RT.

To sum up, the works presented in Chapters 3 and 4 illustrate the successful application of RT constructs to issues of interest and import to T&I studies. The key perspective here should be one of a unified account of the cognitive dimension and a mission to train professional interpreters and translators in pragmatic competence, also given the analyses discussed which show that the interpreters' and translators' renditions clearly serve to disempower the SC because of their substantive pragmatic interference.

As new areas within the RT-informed T&I scholarship open up, the epistemological, theoretical, and methodological differences and debates that pertain within neighbouring disciplines – especially in CTIS – should also be reflected in and engaged with by RT scholars. But the richness brought about by the new theoretical developments in monolingual, descriptive RT studies should also not be ignored.

6.3 Promoting interchange between descriptive and applied relevance-theoretic pragmatics

Right at the start of this volume (cf. 1.1), we tentatively adopted a working definition of *pragmatics* as the branch of the study of language

concerned with 'meaning in context'. The last five chapters have all been concerned with questions of what is involved in studying T&I meaning in context from a RT perspective, and how RT-oriented approaches to T&I may be applied to various types of data, then compared and evaluated.

RT has in fact provided an illuminating framework for the consideration of various ways in which language is used in T&I. These topics[4] offer the chance for RT pragmaticists to test out their ideas in relation to various types of real-life data, as opposed to the invented data subjected to intuitive interpretation that was current throughout much of the early history of RT pragmatics. Nevertheless, the relationship between descriptive and applied activities within T&I has largely been unidirectional. Applied, interlingual RT studies have drawn on the theory to formulate rules on the basis of empirical findings regarding translational strategies and processes, while descriptive RT scholars verify, reject, or modify theoretical assumptions without necessarily considering issues arising out of a multilingual context.

This needn't be the case, and both applied and descriptive are not to be seen as 'stand-alone' disciplines. T&I research and RT pragmatic research should be in a mutually beneficial relationship. On one hand, RT theoretical framework helps explain the conditions of successful meaning transfer across languages and cultures. On the other hand, T&I research is relevant to pragmatics because it provides empirical evidence of form-function relationships across languages and the universality or cultural specificity of pragmatic principles. This 'dialogue' also helps refute claims by scholars such as Kopytko (1995), who criticised theoretical pragmatics as it is based on assumptions about what would constitute optimally relevant behaviour, rather than on empirical studies of real-life communication (cf. also 2.6). Lastly, written and (in particular) oral translations can be seen as externalisations of language processing. In other words, they are reformulations of what translators/interpreters understand from the linguistic material presented to them in the SL. In this way, translations and interpreted speech offer a window on individuals' working out meaning in language use.

In this scenario, there are a number of trends and topics in RT studies, which are opening up new frontiers for the study of human communication and cognition, and whose co-operation with applied RT studies is very welcome.

An area in which co-operation has already begun is experimental pragmatics. This was set up in the 1990s, with a significant increase in work based on data from experiments. It is a way to test hypotheses and provide empirical evidence to account for how language functions as a cognitive activity – and which immediately disproves Kopytko's claim. Experimental pragmatics is now a large and growing field (cf., for instance, Noveck 2018, Noveck and Sperber 2004, and van der Henst and Sperber 2004). Its observational and corpus data methods have been an inspiration for

T&I studies (cf. 3.4); they include questionnaire-based work, data from reading and response times, as well as - more recently - evidence from electroencephalography (EEG), functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), and the use of eye-tracking technology. Other ways of testing and developing ideas have also included the use of data from corpora (cf. also 5.3).

Work in stylistics is another way of testing theoretical ideas. It focuses on how texts are produced, interpreted, and evaluated (for discussion, see Chapman and Clark 2019 and Locher and Jucker 2021), and could go hand in hand with the studies on stylistics in T&I. This work constitutes one of the most important applications in modern RT studies.

Naturally, work in stylistics has implications for the analysis of the language of individual literary texts since they illustrate some aspect of how meaning is conveyed, how characters interact or how the author or narrator of a text interacts with the reader (e.g., cf. 2.4.2). That is, RT takes some aspect of pragmatic meaning as their method and some literary text or texts as their data. However, there are other ways in which RT has been seen as relevant to literary studies. For instance, Furlong (1996, 2011) has considered the nature of literariness, arguing that it should be understood as a property of Interpretations. In particular, she distinguishes spontaneous from non-spontaneous Interpretations.[5]

Other important trends are emerging in the following areas: (a) first and L2 acquisition, (b) non-verbal and multimodal communication, (c) prosody and procedural meaning in general, (d) pragmatics of social interaction, and (e) linguistic semantics and language variation and change.

Firstly, RT developmental studies look at what might happen when acquiring our first language, but also consider how pragmatics is involved in L2 acquisition.[6] Foster-Cohen (2000) suggests that the technical notion of *relevance* helps to clarify ideas which have been expressed using an informal notion of *relevance* in the past. More specifically, if we assume that RT principles are universal, the 'specialness' of pragmatics in L2 contexts is not to do with pragmatics varying cross-linguistically, but must be due to more general cultural differences, varying availability of particular contextual assumptions and, of course, differences in linguistic competence.

Even though it has been acknowledged that non-verbal channels of communication (cf. 6.2) are as important for successful communication, there is still no RT study of their role in T&I. It is clear from previous monolingual research that many lexical devices interact with non-verbal behaviour. It is possible that the exploration of non-verbal components – such as eye-gazing – accessible through a video-recording may be helpful in determining the intended Interpretation of certain verbal and prosodic behaviour. Future RT work will develop fuller understanding of the nature of prosodic meaning and the contribution of particular non-verbal behaviours, and how these interact. It is particularly interesting to consider to what extent particular prosodic or non-verbal meanings

have become encoded or conventional, and to what extent they rely on pragmatic inference.

As well as considering non-verbal communication, a significant amount of work in RT has now been carried out on multimodal communication (cf. 5.3.3). The role of pragmatics in understanding how all of the various aspects of multimodal texts (which some would say means all texts) is not always clear, and some accounts focus on the pragmatic processes involved in multimodal meaning. For instance, Forceville (2002, 2010) has studied how images and multimodal texts are understood from a RT point of view. Yus (2009) has developed a unified RT account of visual and verbal metaphor. A number of theorists have also worked on modelling multimodal comprehension, in some cases combining this with experimental work.

Another area in which descriptive and interlingual RT research should work closer together is the analysis of the subtle, but nonetheless pervasive consequences of the TA's treatment of procedural elements in different settings. Following from Blakemore (2011), this type of analysis should not be restricted to DMs such as *well* or *so*, but can be extended to a range of expressions which impose semantic constraints on the relevance of the text or utterance that contain them. In particular, it has been recognised that the meaning of interjections - such as *ah!*, *right* - or expressives - such as *damn* and *bloody* - are also procedural elements used for identifying emotional states or attitudes (cf. Blakemore 2011; Potts 2007a, 2007b). This raises the question of whether the use of these expressive devices in renditions can be explained in terms of an attributive account which turns on resemblances in content. The very subtlety of these elements means that all parties, including the translators and interpreters themselves, are less likely to be aware of them and, therefore, less likely to guard against them. Although each one alone, it may be argued, cannot affect the overall T&I process, their cumulative effect cannot but contribute to an altered state of mediated communication. Further, it needs to be asked whether their addition also contributes to the sort of mutuality discussed in 4.5.2. Implementation of verification and validation mechanisms, including other studies on the interpreter's treatment of procedural elements, would be useful in ascertaining the most pragmatically appropriate renditions.

In this context, it is clear that prosody also plays a number of key roles in utterance production and Interpretation, and RT linguists have been interested in this for many years. Shared assumptions include that prosody encodes procedural meaning, and that intonational meaning affects the recovery of higher-level explicatures. Partly based on some of Wharton's (2003a, 2003b) suggestions about how to rethink Grice's distinction between natural and non-natural meaning, Wilson and Wharton (2006) consider the nature of prosody in general, and have identified three types of prosodic meaning.

IS and RT should further co-operate on the pragmatics of social interaction. In RT, there is now a greater focus on all of the features which interact in social exchanges, and how cognitive and social factors interact. For instance, Mercier and Sperber (2017) state that intentional communication and the pragmatic principles which govern interaction arose for social reasons. Future work may focus on how communicated meanings emerge during whole interactions, and how meanings can be co-constructed before and after - as well as during - interactive behaviour.

Lastly, as discussed in Chapter 2, semantics and pragmatics are co-dependent. We cannot propose semantic analyses without considering how they contribute to Interpretations in specific contexts, as much as we cannot account for Interpretations in contexts without considering the contribution of linguistic meanings. There is much work to do on understanding what linguistic forms contribute, how they are understood in contexts, and how pragmatic processes are involved in changes in meaning.

To sum up, relevance theorists have often claimed that the explicit development of an overall framework is a strength of the theory. At the same time, some RT research has focused on very specific areas (e.g., procedural meaning). While its roots lie firmly in linguistic pragmatics, the influence of this research has spread – and continues to spread – to a number of disciplines, some of which might be said to exist beyond its original domain. Research into relevance in T&I can be counted amongst these, and the two domains share common aims: to describe and explain pragmatic phenomena, become a blueprint for teaching and research, and develop new lines of inquiry.

These new trends have opened up – and will indeed open up – new frontiers for the study of human communication and cognition. As these unfold, our understanding of the impact of pragmatics-related phenomena on the T&I/cognition interface is bound to increase. To this end, depending on the object of analysis, a collaborative research project with scholars from the descriptive and applied branches of RT would most certainly prove to be highly beneficial in order to explore the richness of mediated, real-life data. Co-operation should be encouraged, as Rabadán (2008) states, by conforming to two basic guidelines when designing a project: usefulness and usability of results for applied purposes.

6.4 Conclusion

If RT can be broadly defined as encompassing the study of the cognitive principles and processes involved in the construal of meaning-in-context (cf. 2.1), researchers in RT-oriented T&I studies have worked on both the inferential chains necessary to understand an SC's communicative intention – starting from their ST – and the different representations underlying the comprehension of various T&I phenomena as cognitive

processes. And since the 1990s, many scholars have shared Gutt's belief that this theory of communication and cognition contains the key to providing a unified account of T&I.

We have come a long way since Mason's (2006b, 108) statement that "pragmatics [can offer] an additional dimension to the analysis of interpreter-mediated communication". This chapter has briefly considered the challenges that lie ahead as the field of RT-inspired T&I studies develops further. It is my sincere belief that all of the developments that we have sketched in Chapters 3 and 4 and exemplified in Chapter 5, will continue to be fundamental for the further development of both RT – and, more broadly, CTIS – and T&I studies as we move forward.

Without a doubt, interdisciplinarity will continue to be of the essence. Our intention has never been to suggest that all aspects of T&I can be explained in cognitive terms. We have seen that T&I are complex forms of communication and involve the interrelationship between a variety of factors,[7] and ST Interpretation cannot be considered "a one-time affair but rather is culturally and situationally grounded" (González-Lloret and Ortega 2018, 201).

No theory stands still and, of course, we expect developments and revisions to take place. It is highly desirable that research in this field continues to work towards a 'healthy' balance between description and explanation by exploring the nature of what is processed and the way mental models are negotiated in real-data sets. There is still a lack of research exploring the relationship between RT pragmatics and T&I processes in relation to a wide array of topics, settings, and languages. In particular, I look forward to a large-scale investigation on the notion of T&I cross- and meta-pragmatic competence, and how to train it.

Against this backdrop, the possibilities offered by a mutually beneficial interplay between descriptive and applied pragmatics are limitless. We have discussed applications of the theory in fields such as language acquisition, first and second language learning and teaching, and stylistics. Applications vary in the extent to which they restrict their focus to understanding phenomena in the light of the ideas being applied or also aim to test theoretical ideas - much like in T&I studies. While current research uses a wider range of techniques, introspection and experimentation are still the most used methods. Again, a large-scale empirical research using these research tools would be useful to test them with real-life data.

Given that there is hardly a limit to the features that are open to examination by T&I studies and RT scholars – and given the recent upsurge in interest in these areas –, we can look forward to a steady stream of scholarship in the years to come. As stated, there is a significant role for systematic empirical research in this field. Of course, there is no principled reason to decide in advance what kinds of data might be relevant to testing and developing the theory in T&I settings. Relevance theorists, like other theorists, will continue to look for new kinds of data which

will test and help to develop the framework. It is up to us to seek out new horizons, and discuss ways in which (old and newly acquired) relevance theorists can look out from their discipline(s) and articulate and encourage synergetic directions through which RT research might inform and be informed by work in other areas.

It has been a rewarding and exhilarating process to witness and document the key developments with RT-oriented T&I research over the past three decades. The models that we have analysed can be seen as snapshots of a theory that aims to describe or explain such a complex phenomenon or process as translation or interpreting. Like any theoretical proposal, a model is perfectible and, if explicit enough, falsifiable, but can still serve as a handy thinking tool in an ongoing research process, an aid to teaching, or as a blueprint for an operational technology.

Of course, the overall aim will be to explain mediated communication in general. Developing fuller accounts will include developing our understanding of central notions such as *interpretive resemblance* and *cross-pragmatic competence*, as well as richer accounts of the Interpretation of particular utterances and other mediated communicative acts.

I hope that this book has given a sense of the vastness of the challenge and the excitement of developing our understanding of parts of the overall story. Even more, it is also my profound hope that it has helped you – researchers, students, trainers, and T&I practitioners alike – to develop your understanding of the range of topics considered by work in RT-oriented T&I studies, and inspired you to work on aspects of the puzzle, in an ideal, virtuous circle in which practice informs research informs practice. After all, "researchers are needed not as bystanders to this rapidly changing . . . process, but as a relevant, responsible, reliable and integral part of it" (Corsellis 2006, 350).

My wish is that the next book on T&I studies with a focus on RT will contain work that is not prefigured here at all; work that is the outcome of new ideas, models, and findings. So, I suggest you start by collecting samples that may be valuable to test the theory. No source of data can be ruled out as irrelevant in advance. This can be anything – from parallel translations of a Shakespearean tragedy, SI parliamentary sessions, NTs, or examples of (good and bad) healthcare interpreting. Once you have set on your hypotheses, try to apply the RT notions you have learned, and see how they can help you explain and model T&I processes – and, ultimately, evaluate translators' and interpreters' quality and competence.

Notes

1 For example, Albl-Mikasa is currently working on an article which analyses non-standard English as a lingua franca input for interpreters (personal communication); Gutt is working on his second book-length publication with the aim to "help people to cope with the challenges arising from our mental faculties involved in ostensive communication across boundaries of language

and culture" (personal communication; email from the author on 18 February 2022); and Sasamoto on AVT practices that do not fall into conventional AVT norms, always from the perspective of RT (personal communication).

2 This does not just refer to understanding semi-automatic and automatic language processing in computer-assisted translations. As of 26 February 2022, Zuckerberg announced Meta's plan for "AI Babelfish", a universal speech translator that aims to build systems that directly translate speech in real time from one language to another "without the need for an intermediary written component" (Roettgers 2022).

3 Cf. Mioduszewska (2004), Korzeniowska and Grzegorzewska (2005), Wałaszewska et al. (2009), Kisielewska-Krysiuk et al. (2010), and Piskorska (2012).

4 Looking at past developments, there are some areas where things have moved quickly (e.g., the explicature-implicature distinction), areas where things have remained quite stable (e.g., the two principles of relevance), as well as areas where there seems always to be more to discover (e.g., accounts of metaphor).

5 Spontaneous Interpretations are typical of everyday exchanges where hearers follow the relevance-guided comprehension heuristic. Non-spontaneous Interpretations go further, seeking further evidence and further possible Interpretations, weighing them up and considering how likely each of them are. It is a matter of degree and Interpretations can be more or less spontaneous.

6 See also, for example, Foster-Cohen (2004) and Jodłowiec (2010).

7 For instance, consider the cases of *non-speaker oriented additions* discussed in 4.5.2. They are intended to represent the perspective of the interpreter, and must be explained in social interactional terms specific to the social environment in which the interaction occurs.

Glossary on key notions of Relevance Theory and Relevance Theory-oriented translation and interpreting studies

This glossary contains a list of key technical notions involved in understanding the central claims of RT and RT accounts of translator-/interpreter-mediated events. The glossary can be used as a stand-alone presentation of key ideas, as well as something to refer to while reading through the book chapters. Some of these key technical terms are mainly adopted by pragmaticists, others by T&I scholars; the indications in brackets will help you navigate their uses.

As often happens in the world of research, there is disagreement about some of the entries, and it is important to be aware of the nature of these disagreements. Some are relatively minor, amounting mainly to questions of labelling, while more significant disagreements affect the nature of understanding and theory. For example, the term *logical form* would have a completely different meaning in generative grammar, but it is not relevant and thus not indicated here. On the other hand, there is a significant difference between the understanding of the term *context* in RT-oriented T&I works; thus, it is hinted at in this glossary. However, I have kept these discussions brief here. Of course, these notions are explored in more detail in the rest of the book, and have also been discussed in the relevant literature mentioned in the references.

ad hoc concept construction (RT)	Also known as lexical adjustment, it is the *pragmatic* adjustment of a lexical concept in the linguistically decoded *logical form*, the adjustment being a narrowing or strengthening, a broadening or weakening, or a combination of both.
assumption (RT)	A thought (conceptual *representation*) treated by the individual as a *representation* of the actual world, including other people's beliefs, desires, etc. Assumptions in RT may be held with varying degrees of strength. See also *contextual effect*.
audience	The readership of a text or the hearers of an *utterance*.
audiovisual translation (TS)	*Translation* of any audiovisual medium, such as films, DVD, etc. This typically involves *dubbing* or *subtitling*.

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broadband translator (Alves & Gonçalves)	Expert translators who work on the basis of *communicative cues* provided by the ST and reinforced by the contextual assumptions derived from their *cognitive environments*. As a result, they are able to create a coherent TT and encompass higher levels of metacognition.
cognitive effect (RT)	A *contextual effect* occurring in a cognitive system; a change in an individual's beliefs. Positive cognitive effects lead to a worthwhile difference to the way an individual represents the world. Three kinds of cognitive effects are mentioned in RT: (a) *contextual implication*; (b) strengthening an existing *assumption*; (c) contradicting an existing *assumption*.
cognitive environment (RT)	The interaction between the contextual *assumptions* regarding the meaning of an *utterance* and the *Interpretation* yielded or, to put it differently, between 'purpose' and 'use'. In more technical terms, it is a set of facts that are *manifest* to an individual.
cognitive linguistics	A branch of linguistics which explores the role of such mental processes as *inference* in the reasoning necessary for processing texts. In cognitive-linguistic analysis of T&I *processes* (CTIS), *translation* is seen as a special instance of the wider concept of communication, and this – together with the decision-making process involved – is accounted for in terms of such relationships as 'cause and effect'.
cognitive pragmatics (pragmatics)	A number of theories – such as RT – which explain the use of language in human communication in terms of the communicators' *assumptions* and their accessibility. They have influenced CTIS over the years.
cognitive process models (T&I)	Paradigms which include all CTIS models, and focus on the translator's and interpreter's mental activities. In IS, they are particularly well suited to the study of *conference interpreting*.
coherence	Much like *context*, this term has different definitions according to the theory adopted. In RT, coherence is simply a consequence of the hearer's search for an *Interpretation* that is consistent with the *first/cognitive principle of relevance*. Coherence in text linguistics, however, is what makes a text semantically meaningful, and is achieved through syntactical features such as the use of *deixis*, anaphoric and cataphoric elements, or a logical tense structure, as well as implications connected to general world knowledge.
communicative clue (Gutt)	A stimulus to *Interpretation*, supplied by formal properties of the ST. Just as a communicator in a monolingual environment gives his hearers clues that enable *inferential* processing, translators are required

	to provide shared communicative clues arising from a variety of properties, such as syntactic and phonetic properties, *discourse markers*, formulaic expressions, onomatopoeia and phonetic properties that give rise to poetic effects. Gutt's notion of *direct translation* is defined in terms of (shared) communicative clues, allowing for explicit treatment of many issues. (See also Setton's *pragmatic cue*.)
comprehension heuristic (RT)	A set of RT analytic principles that rely on rules in dealing with *utterances*. According to these principles, hearers must: (a) follow a path of least effort in computing *cogntive effects*, that is test interpretive hypotheses (*disambiguations*, reference resolutions, implicatures, etc.) in order of accessibility; and (b) stop when their expectations of *relevance* are satisfied (or abandoned).
computer-assisted translation (TS)	A type of *translation* in which computerised tools – such as term banks and translation memory tools – are used to assist the human translator. Human translators take charge of translating, reviewing, and proofreading on the CAT platform.
concept (pragmatics)	A mental *representation* of something present in the world.
conceptual encoding (RT)	Linguistic encoding, by a word or phrase, of a concept which forms part of larger conceptual *representations*. Cf. *procedural encoding*.
conference interpreting/CI (IS)	Spoken translation between one language and another during an event. This type of interpreting is suitable for conferences and events of many different sizes (from international summits to small seminars) and in multiple public and private sectors (sciences, finance, etc.). Compared to *dialogue interpreting*, the interpreter's role tends to be more standardised, and there is less attention to the management of the exchange and more focus on elements such as speed and register.
consecutive interpreting/CSI (IS)	A mode of *conference interpreting* in which the speaker pauses every few minutes to allow the interpreter to render each successive segment. Notes taken by professionals for consecutive *interpretation* show some common features, but are otherwise essentially individual.
context	In pragmatics, it is any relevant physical, linguistic (or co-textual), or general (or real-world) knowledge feature of the dynamic setting or environment in which a linguistic unit is systematically used. Secondly, context can be regarded as either the external, situational context and the wider cultural context in which it is embedded (cf. *social and relational models*). Here, it is assumed that contexts are dynamic and affected by social interactions. Social and cultural

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	contexts are made up of socially or culturally relevant features of where interactions take place. On the other hand, context can be seen as made up of the internal, cognitive factors that can influence one another in communication (cf. CTIS). In RT, it is the subset of existing mentally represented *assumptions* (originating from perception or memory, or decoded and inferred from speech input) which interact with newly impinging *information* to give rise to *contextual effects*. Further, the context of an *utterance* is the *truth-conditional*, *propositional content* expressed by the *utterance* (together with, optionally, its higher-level *explicatures*), as opposed to *procedural encodings*, directing an addressee to contexts for deriving *implicatures*. Finally, the context of use in T&I studies caters for such factors as whether the *translation* is in written form, orally done (*interpreting*), or as *subtitling/dubbing*, etc.
contextual effect (RT)	Meaning understood as the creation, abandonment, strengthening, and/or weakening of *assumptions* in a cognitive device which results from processing *information* in *context*. See also *contextual implication*.
contextual implication (RT)	Synthetic implication obtained by combining new *assumptions* non-trivially with the *context*. It is distinguished by the other two non-trivial forms of *cognitive effects*: strengthening and contradicting/ cancelling an existing *assumption*.
conventional implicature (Grice)	A category of *implicature* identified by Grice that is determined by the conventional features attached to particular lexical items and/or linguistic constructions, but doesn't contribute to *what is said*, and therefore to *truth-conditional* meaning when the word is used. The *discourse marker* 'but', for instance, conventionally introduces an implicature of contrast. Cf. *conversational implicature*.
conversational implicature (Grice)	A category of *implicature* that is central to Grice's model. Unlike *conventional implicatures*, these are not determined by conventional meaning, but instead depend on general features of language use. It is derived from the saying of *what is said* via the *co-operative principle* and its component *maxims of conversation*. There are two types: *generalised conversational implicatures* and *particularised conversational implicatures*.
co-operative principle (Grice)	The overarching principle proposed by Grice, according to which communicators are urged to make a well-founded, appropriately informative, and relevant contribution to communication in a perspicuous manner. Cf. *maxims of conversation*.

corpus linguistics	A methodology that involves computer-based *empirical studies* (both quantitative and qualitative) of language use by employing *corpora*.
corpus/corpora	An electronically readable database of naturally produced texts which can be quantitatively analysed for word frequency, collocation, etc. by a computer. In T&I studies, corpus-based studies are an increasingly important branch which analyses T&I using corpora and tools derived from *corpus linguistics*.
critical discourse analysis (T&I)	Qualitative analytical approach for critically describing, Interpreting, and explaining the ways in which discourses construct, maintain, and legitimise social inequalities. CDA takes a number of different approaches and incorporates a variety of methods that depend on research goals and theoretical perspectives.
cross-cultural pragmatics (pragmatics)	The study of culturally different ways of using language, and of different expectations among different members of linguistic communities regarding how meaning is negotiated. In T&I, it has contributed to testing and training methods.
decoding (RT)	The first phase in *utterance* comprehension, comprising phoneme/lexeme recognition and the application to the resulting strings of syntactic and *semantic* rules, yielding *logical forms*.
deixis	The property of words and expressions which indicate some aspect of situation and, thus, require *information* from *context* to be understood fully. Deictic expressions include those that express person, time deixis, and place deixis.
descriptive use (RT)	The use of language in which a form (*proposition*) purports to be true of a state of affairs. In *translation*, this mode amounts to a 'free', *indirect translation*.
dialogue interpreting (IS)	Also known as *public service interpreting* or *community interpreting*, it is arguably the most common form of *interpreting*, enabling people who are not fluent speakers of the official language(s) of a country to communicate with the providers of public services so as to facilitate full and equal access to legal, health, education, government, and social services. Cf. *conference interpreting*.
direct translation (Gutt)	In Gutt's model, a TL *utterance* is a direct *translation* of a SL *utterance* only if it purports to interpretively resemble (cf. *interpretive resemblance*) the original completely in the *context* envisaged for the *utterance*. So, a direct *translation* is a kind of *translation* performed in situations where we need to translate not only what is said, but also how it is said.
disambiguation (pragmatics)	The process of determining which sense of a word is being used in a particular *context*.

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discourse marker	Element of speech – such as *well*, *but*, and *so* – that indicates how an *utterance* relates to its *context* or fits into the discourse in which it occurs. DMs have been a particular focus of interest in RT, where they are said to encode *procedural*, rather than *conceptual encodings*.
dubbing (TS)	A technique used in the translation of films in other languages. It involves substitution of the ST actors' voices in translation with a new TT voice, often attempting to synchronise the original lip movements with the TT sounds.
empirical study	Based on experiment and observation, rather than just theory. T&I *corpus*-based studies are an example.
equivalence (T&I)	A key term in TS, relating to the relationship of similarity between ST and TT segments. This notion – be this dynamic, pragmatic, or textual – is advocated by authors such as Nida or Koller, and has been largely text-based. For RT, see the concept of *faithfulness*.
explicature (RT)	A term used in RT to refer to an inferential development of one of the incomplete conceptual *representations* or *logical forms* encoded by an *utterance*. In other words, an explicature functions to flesh out the linguistically given incomplete *logical form* of the sentence uttered, yielding fully *propositional content*. This process of developing is guided by the *first/cognitive principle of relevance* and is specific to *context*. Explicatures are distinct from *implicatures*, and can be basic or higher-level (or higher-order).
explicitation (T&I)	Explanation in the TT that renders the sense or intention clearer than in the ST.
explicitness (RT)	An *assumption* communicated by an *utterance* is explicit if and only if it is a development of a *logical form* encoded by that *utterance* (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995: 182). Explicitness is a matter of degree, just as is *faithfulness*.
faithfulness (RT; Gutt)	In RT, this notion bears no resemblance with that of *equivalence*, but rather it refers to the notion of *interpretive uses* which represent thoughts or *utterances* by sharing logical or *contextual implications* with those thoughts or *utterances*. This means that we can judge them by how closely they resemble the thought or *utterance* they represent; or, in other words, how faithful an *Interpretation* they present. The degree of faithfulness varies and is governed by the *first/cognitive principle of relevance*. This concept is also used in RT-oriented approaches to T&I, in which it indicates the degree of success of a *translation* or *interpreting* in communicating the same *assumptions* (via *implicatures* and *explicatures*) as its ST. Cf. also *interpretive resemblance*.

first/cognitive principle of relevance (RT)	A RT principle which claims that human cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of *relevance*. In other words, human cognition is organised in such a way as to try to derive as many positive *cognitive effects* as possible for as little effort as possible.
free enrichment (RT)	A *pragmatic* process whereby the linguistically decoded *logical form* of the sentence uttered is conceptually enriched into a fully *propositional form*. They include: Supplying the non-verbalised constituents (necessary to get a meaningful proposition) and *ad hoc concept constructions*.
free indirect speech	A style of third-person narration which uses some of the characteristics of third-person along with the essence of first-person direct speech. In RT, the evidence provided by the author in FIT texts and used to derive metarepresentations of the character's thoughts is indirect in the sense that the reader must infer or work out the character's thoughts from the linguistic properties of the *utterances* together with contextual *assumptions*. The reader is said to invest her effort in processing FIT *representations* because she has recognised the author's act of *ostensive* communication. In this sense, the communicative intention in FITs must be attributed to the author who represents the character's consciousness. Blakemore challenges this notion in her work on FIT.
generalised conversational implicature (Grice)	A type of *implicature* described by Grice that arises by default unless blocked or cancelled by some aspect of *context*. Grice distinguished them from *particularised conversational implicatures*. They have no role in the account of explicit and *implicit* meaning developed in RT.
genre	Conventional forms of *text* associated with particular types of social occasion or communicative events (e.g., news report, cooking recipe, editorial).
illocution/ary force (speech act theory)	The intention of a speaker in producing an *utterance*, which may be more or less explicit or encoded in clues to how the propositional content of an *utterance* is to be taken, realised either grammatically, by 'illocutionary-force indicating' devices (such as mood markers), or by other pragmatic means (exploiting *context*).
illusion of invisibility (Gallai)	Drawing on Blakemore's account of *free indirect speech*, Gallai states that, when adding speaker-oriented *procedural encodings* (which are attributed to the original speaker), the translator or interpreter's aim is to create the illusion that the TA is hearing the SC's 'voice' – rather than that of the translator or interpreter. This concept challenges Gutt's notion of translation as *interlingual interpretive use*.

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implication/imply (Grice; RT)	A (logical) conclusion obtained from a set of *assumptions* by deduction. Logical implications may be trivial, analytic (those necessary and sufficient for grasping the content of an assumption) or synthetic (those which exploit the *information* by applying deductive rules to several *assumptions*). Cf. *implicature*.
implicature (Grice; RT)	A technical term which refers to part of what is communicated when an *utterance* is produced in *context* that is not part of the literal meaning of the linguistic form used. The term was coined by Grice who drew a distinction between this and *what is said*. In RT, however, many aspects of meaning that for Grice would have been implicatures are analysed as *explicatures*. They can be implicated premises or implicated conclusions, strong or weak. For Grice, see also *conventional implicature*, *generalised conversational implicature*, *particularised conversational implicature*.
implicit (RT)	Meaning inferred from co-processing *information* derived from *decoding* the *utterance* with an *assumption* external to it, rather than simply by development of the *logical form* of the *utterance*. Cf. *implicature*.
indirect translation (Gutt)	A *translation* which responds to the urge to communicate as clearly as possible. They may be freely modified by making *implicit information* explicit in order to achieve maximal *relevance* for its intended readers. Cf. *direct translation*.
inference (pragmatics)	A *cognitive linguistic* mechanism which works out conclusions on the basis of other *assumptions* or communicative behaviour. In other words, the act of forming an *assumption* by processing one or more other *assumptions* (derived from whatever source).
information (pragmatics)	Something which justifies change in a cognitive construct that represents physical or mental experience.
interlingual interpretive use (Gutt)	Definition of *translation* according to Gutt, who draws on the RT notion of *interpretive use*. A translated text is thus seen as an *Interpretation* of the author's or speaker's thought, which in itself is an *Interpretation* of a thought attributed to someone who expressed it in a different language. This account is contrasted with Gallai's notion of *illusion of invisibility*.
interpretation/ Interpretation (pragmatics; IS)	In *pragmatics*, the metarepresentation of a communicator's thoughts recovered by an addressee. In IS, instead, it is a synonym for *interpreting*. As indicated at the beginning of this volume, the two terms are distinguished as follows: 'interpreting' (lower case) is the activity of a (conference or dialogue) interpreter, while 'Interpretation' (upper case) is the mental activity described in linguistic *pragmatics*.

interpreting (IS)	Spoken translation, sometimes also called *interpretation*. The two main types are *conference interpreting* and *dialogue interpreting*.
interpretive resemblance (RT; Gutt)	Relationship by which one representation (e.g., a thought or *utterance*) represents another (a thought, *utterance*, or a representation of another's thought as derived from his *utterance*) in virtue of a resemblance between their *logical forms* – as in, for example, reported speech, quotation, metaphor, or *translation*. According to Gutt, the aim of a *direct translation* is to achieve interpretive resemblance in terms of shared *explicatures* and *implicatures*, and translators must choose the degree of resemblance. Cf. *interpretive use* and *faithfulness*.
interpretive use (RT)	Also known as *attributive use*, it is the use of language to express a thought which itself represents another thought or *utterance* (one's own or attributed to someone else) in virtue of a resemblance in content (logical, *semantic*, conceptual). It is contrasted with *descriptive use*. An important distinction made within the interpretive domain is also between attributive uses of language (indicated by the linguistic form) and tacitly attributive uses. A much-debated sub-type of tacitly attributive use of language is verbal irony. See also *interlingual interpretive use*.
linguistic underdeterminacy thesis (pragmatics)	The thesis whereby there is a gap between the encoded meaning of a *sentence* uttered by a speaker and the *proposition* that he communicates.
literalness (RT)	Equivalence between the *proposition* of the *utterance* and that of the thought. Opposed to loose language.
logical form (RT)	A structured arrangement of concepts; the logical properties of a conceptual representation in virtue of which it is involved in logical processes and enters into relations (such as contradiction or implication) with other conceptual *representations*. See *explicature*.
machine translation (TS)	A *translation* produced by a tool or software that performs all the translating tasks automatically. No human involvement in the translating process is required. Cf. *computer-assisted translation*.
manifest fact (RT)	A fact is manifest to an individual at a given time if and only if s/he is capable at that time of representing it mentally and accepting its representation as true or probably true. Mutual manifestness is key for any type of communication to take place. Cf. *cognitive environment*.
maxims of conversation (Grice)	Term used by Grice for the nine subprinciples of his *co-operative principle*, classified into four categories: Quality, Quantity, Relation, and Manner. Grice suggests that SCs aim to follow them and that

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	addressees assume that they are observed overall – even if *what is said* on its own seems not to follow them. Addressees infer *implicatures* because they assume the maxims must be followed.
mental model (Setton)	Setton's composite SI model aims at a detailed breakdown of psycholinguistic operations in terms of hypothesised mental structures and procedures. He draws on RT and synchronised transcript analysis to describe interpreting as a process in which linguistic *decoding* constantly interacts with *inference* from multiple inputs, including previous knowledge and rich *pragmatic cues* in discourse.
metacognitive ability (Alves & Gonçalves)	In the cognitive model of translation competence, it indicates the translator's multi-level mental processes geared to the maximisation of interpretive resemblance (i.e., to regulate the relation between processing effort and cognitive effect), and mediated by the metarepresentations they create. See also *narrow-band translators* and *broadband translators*.
modular/ity (RT)	Organisational property of a system, such as the human mind, dividing it into sub-systems or modules with limits on their interaction. In RT, mind-reading is a dedicated *inferential* module (cf. *ostension processor*), and *pragmatics* is a submodule of the mind-reading module, with its own principles and mechanisms.
mutual parallel adjustment (RT)	RT assumes that *utterance Interpretation* involves a process of tentative hypotheses about explicit and *implicit* content which are constructed and adjusted in parallel and guided in order to satisfy the addressee's expectations of *relevance*.
narrow-band translator (Alves & Gonçalves)	A translator who tends to work on the basis of insufficiently contextualised cues (i.e., dictionary-based meaning of words), failing to combine *procedurally*, *conceptually*, and *contextually* encoded information.
natural meaning (Grice)	Noncognitive meaning involved when we are able to infer from something in the world that something else must be the case (often because of a perceived causal relationship).
non-natural meaning or meaning$_{NN}$ (Grice)	Communicative meaning which is intended to be recognised as having been intended (i.e., a matter of expressing and recognising intention).
ostension processor (RT)	Dedicated mental module, responsible for the inferential comprehension of stimuli. Cf. *modularity*.
ostension/ostensive (RT)	Making manifest one's communicative intention. By extension, the use of linguistic and other signs and devices which specify intentions locally by pointing to *contexts*. See *procedural encoding*.

ostensive-inferential communication (RT)	The kind of communication which gives rise to this presumption of *optimal relevance*. It is both made up of the *informative intention* (the intention to inform an *audience* of something), and the *communicative intention* (the intention to inform the *audience* of one's informative intention).
particularised conversational implicature (Grice)	One of the types of *implicature* identified by Grice in his model. It occurs in an individual *context* as a consequence of the maxims of co-operation and specific feature of that *context*. Cf. *generalised conversational implicature*.
pragmatic clue (Setton)	Items or aspects of language which are used to direct listeners to *relevance* in SI. Setton believes that there are two types: (a) those which express attitude and intentionality and which indicate the relative importance a SC attaches to an item, or direct the hearer to a *context* in which to process it, and (b) those which function as 'directives', or instructions to a hearer on logical or thematic processing (e.g., *discourse markers*.) Cf. *communicative clue*.
pragmatic intrusion	In *pragmatics*, it is the phenomenon whereby the pragmatically *inferred* content intrudes or enters into the conventional, truth-conditional content of *what is said* (Grice).
pragmatic/s	The systematic study of how we produce and understand human communication in a given *context*. It both refers to the processes involved in interaction and the study of – and theories about – them. 'Pragmatic' thus describes that dimension of human communication which exploits the assumed accessibility of *contexts*, and *inferential* abilities in receivers, to communicate *implicatures* and a wider range of *explicatures* than would be possible simply by the use of a code.
procedural encoding (RT)	An item or expression which encodes *information* on how to process conceptual *representations*, as contrasted with their content (*conceptual encoding*).
process (T&I)	What happens linguistically and cognitively as the translator works on the TT.
product (T&I)	The finished TT resulting from the translation *process*.
proposition (pragmatics)	A term used in philosophy and linguistics to refer to something that is expressed by a sentence when that sentence is used to make a statement, that is, to say something, true or false, about some state of affairs in the outside world. According to RT *pragmatics*, we need to make *inferences* to work out what proposition they represent.
propositional attitude (pragmatics)	*Utterances* usually present *propositions* under an explicitly or implicitly conveyed attitude to them on the part of the speaker, such as some degree of belief or desirability.

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propositional content (pragmatics)	What is involved in saying something that is meaningful and can be understood. Not included here is the function which the particular *sentence* performs in a specified *context*.
propositional form (pragmatics)	A *logical form* (a structured arrangement of concepts) is propositional if it is semantically complete (unambiguous, with reference assigned), and therefore capable of being true or false.
reference resolution (pragmatics)	Anchoring the meaning of a referring expression in the mental model of the agent processing the text.
relevance (RT)	Unlike Grice, RT argues that it is a property of *utterances*, defined in two principles: the *first/cognitive principle of relevance* (our cognitive system is oriented toward maximum relevance) and *second/communicative principle of relevance* (the ostensive stimulus gives rise to an expectation of a particular level of relevance, called *optimal relevance*). It is defined as an expectation on the part of the hearer that an attempt at *Interpretation* will yield adequate *contextual effects* at minimal processing cost. This has been applied to T&I studies, leading to such key distinctions as *direct translation* and *indirect translation*.
relevance theory (RT)	A cognitive-pragmatic theory developed by Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson. Grounded in a general view of human cognition, the central thesis of this theory is that the human cognitive system works in such a way as to tend to maximise *relevance* with respect to communication (*first/cognitive principle of relevance*). This approach has been fruitful in the field of T&I, in particular with the aim to determine *cross-cultural pragmatic* skills which interpreters and translators are required to hone.
representation (pragmatics)	A display of symbols or other forms which carries *information* about something beyond itself. A special type is called '*semantic* representation' – that is, the representation of the meaning of a *sentence* or *utterance* derived solely from the application of rules of grammar (lexical selection, reference etc.), with no reference to *context*, expectations, or other *information*.
saturation (pragmatics)	Process whereby a given slot, position, or variable in the linguistically decoded *logical form* is filled or saturated.
second or communicative principle of relevance (RT)	A RT principle which states that every *ostensive* stimulus (e.g., an *utterance*) conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance. The presumption of optimal relevance means that: (a) the *ostensive* stimulus is relevant enough to be worth the *audience*'s processing effort; and (b) it is the most relevant one compatible with the communicator's abilities and preferences.

semantic/s	Linguistic semantics is the study of the encoded meanings of linguistic items. A broader sense of semantics refers to the study of meanings more generally. Linguistic semantics often focuses on the link between linguistic expressions and mental *representations*. Semantics is contrasted with *pragmatics*, but there is much controversy over where the division between semantics and *pragmatics* lies.
sentence (pragmatics)	An abstract entity or construct defined within a theory of grammar, independent of any individual *context* of use. In *pragmatics*, it is usual to distinguish sentences from *utterances*, which are produced by speakers in *contexts*. The same sentence may be produced by different speakers in difference *contexts*; the resulting *utterances* will have different meanings. These differences will depend in part on the specific references assigned to deictic expressions in *context* (see *deixis*), but also on general features of language use (e.g., *implicature*).
simultaneous interpreting/SI (IS)	A mode of *conference interpreting* in which the speaker makes a speech and the interpreter reformulates the speech into a language his *audience* understands simultaneously. Simultaneous interpreters usually work in an interpreting booth, though they may also use a bidule (a portable equipment without a booth) or whispering (chuchotage).
social and relational models (T&I)	Paradigms which highlight the interaction between translators and interpreters and other parties, which in turn is shaped by established (or implicit) norms. The latter are said to define the translator's or interpreter's role, and vary according to sociocultural *contexts*, settings, and the agreed or implicit functions of the mediated event. In IS, they have been mainly applied to the analysis of *dialogue interpreting*.
speech act (speech act theory)	An act performed by an *utterace*, such as a bet, promise, curse, etc.
stylistics	A branch of literary criticism that analyses style, using interpretive tools from linguistics.
subtitling (TS)	A method of language transfer used in translating types of mass audiovisual communication, such as films.
think-aloud protocol (TS)	A technique for recording reactions elicited from translators or users of translations regarding the *process* of translation.
translation (TS)	The written communication of the meaning of a SL text by means of an *equivalent* TL text. In everyday use, the terms *translation* and *translating* are often used as an umbrella term to cover both written translation and *interpreting*. In this volume, however, they only indicate the former.

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truth condition/al (pragmatics)	In formal discussions of meaning, such as in logic and *semantics*, truth conditions are those facts about the world that would have to be in place in order for a *proposition* or a *sentence* to be true. *Speech act* pragmatic theory recognises a non-truth-conditional dimension in *utterances* (standardly called *illocution*) in addition to the *propositions* they contain. According to Grice, the *explicit/implicit* distinction refers to the difference between an *utterance's* truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional content, and the latter depends solely on *pragmatics*. RT assumes quite a different position.
truth value (pragmatics)	A concept associated with *proposition*, which may be true or false, but its truth or falsity may vary from *utterance* occasion to *utterance* occasion. However, on a particular occasion, a *proposition* will have a definite truth value; it is either true or false. It is true if and only if it corresponds to some state of affairs that obtains on that occasion, and it is false if and only if it does not.
utterance (pragmatics)	A communicative act which involves linguistic communication. In contrast with *sentences*, *utterances* are produced by speakers in *contexts* and, thus, have various spatio-temporal and physical properties. Unlike RT, early work on *pragmatics* (cf. Grice) assumed that *semantics* focused on *sentence* meaning, while *pragmatics* focused on *utterance*-meaning (also known as *speaker-meaning*).
what is implicated (Grice)	In Grice's account, a synonym for *implicatures*. *Inferences* only play a role in deriving 'what is implicated', the implicitly communicated *propositions* of an *utterance*, and do not play a role in *what is said*. Grice distinguishes two types: *conventional implicatures* and *conversational implicatures*.
what is said (Grice)	In contrast with *what is implicated*, Grice defines this concept as being closely related to the conventional or literal meaning of the *sentence* uttered, with the addition of *information* on *disambiguation* and *reference assignment*. Grice's *maxims of conversation* operate on 'what is said' in *context* to determine conversational *implicatures*. RT, instead, rejects '*what is said*' as an autonomous level of meaning.
working memory (Setton)	The extent of *representations* which are salient and accessible at a given time; in SI, it usually includes auditory, visual, and phonologically resolved images ('echoic' memory), conceptual structures (*mental model*), linguistic forms (lexicon), and task instructions (Executive).

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