

Syntax of the Cases in the Pali Nikayas



O. H. de A. Wijesekera

*Postgraduate Institute of Pali & Buddhist Studies
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Syntax of the Cases in the Pali Nikayas

By

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Contents

Foreword	4
Introduction	6
Abbreviations.....	8
1. General And Grammatical	8
2. Titles of Books, Periodicals, etc.	9
References	10
An Abstract Of The Thesis.....	12
Case-Forms In The Nikāyas.....	14
Chapter I The Nominative Case	39
Chapter II The Accusative Case	58
Chapter III The Instrumental Case	108
Chapter IV The Dative Case	156
Chapter V The Ablative Case	192
Chapter VI The Genitive Case.....	225
Chapter VII The Locative Case	265

Preface to the Digital Edition

I am very grateful to the Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Kelaniya, Sri Lanka and particularly to the Director Venerable Professor Kotapitiye Rahula for permission to reproduce this important work on Pāli Grammar by one of the leading Pāli and Sanskrit scholars in Sri Lanka in recent times.

I am also grateful to Ashin Sopāka who corrected the ocr-ed text, which lacked diacritics and had many problems in the text. It was a lot of patient and hard work to produce a usable document.

In some places Prof. Wijesekera omitted titles to his sections, and just had a number. I have included titles for these sections to indicate content and have placed those titles in square brackets. They do not appear in the original text. Also in square brackets are the pages of the original edition of this book which was published by the Institute.

The text is as written in the original book, but some formatting has been changed to bring it into line with the conventions used on this website. In particular, in the html edition the examples have been separated onto their own lines to make them easier to identify and read.

I did the final proof-reading, and in such a complex document it is possible that there are still some mistakes. If anyone notices any and can send them to me I will include corrections in a future edition.

Ānandajoti Bhikkhu
April 2016

Foreword

[v]

The work here presented is the first in a series of publications sponsored by the Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies of the University of Kelaniya, Sri Lanka, as a further extension to its on-going curricular and research programmes. Authored by the late Professor O.H. de A. Wijesekera, an eminent authority on Indological and Buddhistic Studies, this comprehensive and well-documented monograph on the Syntax of the Cases in the Pali Nikayas is one of his major contributions to an important aspect of Pali grammar and philology which had hitherto not been as exhaustively dealt with as it is here. The present work is Professor Wijesekera's doctoral thesis which was submitted to the School of Oriental and African Studies of the University of London in 1936. Although a little more than half a century has passed since its completion, it still remains unmatched for its thorough analysis and exhaustive treatment of the subject.

Professor Wijesekera held the Chair of Sanskrit at the University of Ceylon, in Colombo and later at Peradeniya from 1949 to 1967, and served for a period as Dean of the Faculty of Arts and also of the Faculty of Oriental Studies. He reached the peak of his academic career when he was appointed the first Vice-Chancellor of the University of Colombo in 1967.

I would like to record here our deep sense of gratitude to the members of the family of the late Professor Wijesekera for readily giving us permission to sponsor this publication and for the kind assistance offered throughout the preparation of the manuscript for its final printing. I would also like to express our grateful thanks to

Professor L.P.N. Perera for the initiative he took in publishing this thesis and Mr. Sanath Nanayakkara, Deputy Editor of the *Encyclopaedia of Buddhism* for his [vi] assistance in proof reading and in preparing the Index. Our thanks are also due to Messrs Karunaratne and Sons Ltd., for printing the book with great care.

Professor Y. Karunadasa

Director,

Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies.

Introduction

[vii]

The scope of the following treatise is a detailed analysis of the syntax of cases in the Pāli Nikāyas. With the latter we refer mainly to the prose section of the Sutta-Piṭaka, that which is usually designated by “the older Nikāyas”. When necessary either for illustration or for explanation (especially in instances where examples are not found in prose attesting to a normal or historical construction), the *gāthā* literature has been drawn upon.

It is sufficiently clear from these investigations that the Pāli Nikāyas represent an idiom which in its general outlines bears close affinities to Vedic syntax, thereby showing a nearer relation to Indo-European than Classical Sanskrit; a fact that may be considered as further support for Franke’s contention that “certain appearances exclude the possibility that (Classical) Sanskrit and Pāli (in growth and development) belonged to one and the same region” (Z.D.M.G. 1892, pp.315 *et seq.*). At the same time, however, there are conspicuous divergences in Pāli from Vedic as much as from later Sanskrit, (*vide* §§45,65,106,122,164 etc.). The fact of its being a Prākritic dialect, as distinct from the refined speech (*sams-kṛta*), also explains the marked influence of the popular idiom on its syntax, which is due in most cases to psychological reasons (*vide* §§26,45,76,114,135; also 22,23,24).

Other points under consideration which also throw light on the understanding of Pāli (and Indo-Aryan) syntax are: (1) The remarks of indigenous grammarians as well as of commentators on Pāli cases. Although on the whole Pāli grammarians make it a point to adduce examples from the canonical books themselves, in laying down rules

they merely follow the precedence of Sanskrit writers, particularly [viii] of Pāṇinī. It must be stated, however, in favour of Kaccāyana that he pays more attention to what may be called 'exceptional usages' (cp. §76) than Moggallāna, the prominent feature of whose observations is that he takes a wider view than the former. For the most part they repeat the conventional illustrations of Pāṇinī. One notable deviation in the terminology of commentators from that of the grammarians is found with reference to the terms used to denote the cases (*kāraḥ*). This is particularly seen in the case of Buddhaghosa's designation of the nom., acc., abl. and loc. (see Appendix). An effort has been made to do justice to their point of view and bring it into line with our comparative and psychological methods. (2) The morphological aspect of the cases in its bearing on their form and function in relation to Sanskrit (especially Vedic) and also Prākṛit. This is also important for developments in Pāli concerning case affinities and substitution. A special (the introductory) chapter has been devoted to this question.

It has further been endeavoured to show the importance of an understanding of syntactical relations for a correct interpretation of the Pāli texts. A considerable number of wrong translations (sometimes doctrinally important) have been found to contain errors which could only be detected through a more intense study of the Pāli case syntax.

O.H. de A.W

London 26 Jan. 1936.

Abbreviations

[ix]

1. General and Grammatical

Abl. = abl.	ablative	loc.	locative
Acc. = acc.	accusative	<i>loc.cit.</i>	in the place cited
Adj. = adj.	adjective	m. (masc)	masculine
Adv. = adv.	adverb	nom.	nominative
Balt. = Slav.	Balto-Slavic	nt. (neut.)	neuter
c.	with (cum)	obj.	object
Comy.	Commentary	para.	paragraph
cf. cp. = cp.	[Compare]	pl.	plural
Dat. = dat.	dativ	p.p.p.	past passive
<i>Dict.</i>	Dictionary		participle
Eng.	English	Prk.	Prākṛt
<i>et. seq.</i>	and the following	R. (Rem.)	Remark
ex.	example	sci.	being understood
f. (fem.)	feminine		(<i>scilicet</i>)
f.n.	foot-note	sg.	singular
gen.	genitive	Skr.	Sanskrit
ger.	gerund	subj.	subject
Gr.	Grammar	s.v.	under the word
ibid.	ibidem		(<i>sub voce</i>)
I.E.	Indo-European	Vārtt.	<i>vārttikā</i>
inst.	instrumental	(V.)	verse (<i>gāthā</i>)
kaś.	<i>Kāśikā</i> (on the sūtras of Pāṇinī)	Ved.	Vedic
lit.	literally	voc.	vocative

2. Titles of Books, Periodicals etc.

[x]

Dial.	Dialogues of the Buddha (in S.B.B. ed. Rhys Davids)
HKS	Untersuchungen zur Kaussyntax der indogermanischen Sprachen von Wilhelm Havers, Strassburg 1911.
J.A.O.S.	Journal of the American Oriental Society.
J. P.T.S.	Journal of the Pāli Text Society.
J.R.A.S.	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.
Kac.	Kaccāyana-vyākaraṇaṃ ed. M. Guṇaratana, Colombo. 1913
KVG	Kurze vergleichende Grammatik der indoger, Sprachen von Karl Brugmann, Berlin and Leipzig 1933.
K.Z.	Kuhn's Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung
Mog.	Moggallāna-pañcika ed. Sri Dharmānanda, Colombo, 1931
Pāṇ.	Pāṇini's Aṣṭhādhyāya.
PLS	Pāli Literatur und Sprache von W. Geiger, Strassburg 1916.
Prk. Gr.	Grammatik der Prakrit-Sprachen von R. Pischel, Strassburg 1900.
P.T.S. Trans.	Pāli Text Society's Translation.
Skr. Gr.	Sanskrit Grammar by A.A. Macdonell, Oxford 1927.
SS	Sanskrit Syntax by J.S. Speyer, Leyden 1886.
VG	Vedic Grammar by A.A. Macdonell, Strassburg 1910.
VGS	A Vedic Grammar for Students by A.A. Macdonell, Oxford 1916.
VSS	Vedische und Sanskrit-Syntax by Speyer, Strass. 1896.
Z.D.M.G.	Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländ. Gesellschaft.
ZfB	Zeitschrift für Buddhismus.

Abbreviations of Pāli Texts appear in the form used by the Pāli Text Society (see P.T.S. Dict.). To these add:

Pj	Paramatthajotikā	Sum	Sumaṅgalavilāsinī.
Pps	Papañcasūdanī.		

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An Abstract of the Thesis

“The Syntax of the Cases in the Pāli Nikāyas”

[xiii]

The Thesis is based principally on the prose parts of the *Sutta Piṭaka* but peculiarities of the syntax of *gāthā* literature have been dealt with in comparison with the former. This study is made in seven chapters each of which discusses one Case with a variety of examples showing its fundamental notions, general and special applications, and points of contact with other cases. The morphology of Cases in relation to Syntax has been treated in a separate introductory chapter, which forms a supplement to Geigor’s presentation in his *Pāli Literatur und Sprache*.

In dealing with syntactic facts observations have been made in three ways, viz. the grammatical, the logical, and the psychological points of view. Syntactic categories are established according to the available material in comparison with those valid for Vedic and Classical Sanskrit wherever it was possible, with special consideration of points of similarity with the Vedic usage. In following this historical and comparative method parallellisms with the older idiom and divergences from it have been noted by references to Speyer’s conclusions in particular and to those other authorities such as Brugmann in general.

The syntactic notions of local grammarians, chiefly of Pāninī, Moggallāna and Kaccāyana have been critically examined and discussed in relation to Nikāya concinnity. As far as possible their method of looking at fundamental syntactic problems has been considered with reference to the scientific point of view. From the Pāli Commentaries Buddhaghosa’s observations on the Cases,

especially those with regard to archaic and sporadic uses, have been collated and compared with those of orthodox grammarians as well as of modern scholarship.

O.H. De A. Wijesekera B.A. (Honours), Lond.

14th Nov. 1935.

Case-Forms in the Nikāyas

[1]

§1. Nominal Themes.

Although historically Pāli inherits its inflexion from the older language the original themes on the whole are continually being replaced by later ones mostly derived from oblique cases, a process seen clearly in the consonantal declension. Original vowel stems however are inflected as they are except in the diphthongal and *r*-declensions. In the former beside a few historical forms (PLS §88) cases formed from a new stem derived from original oblique cases are frequently found: e.g., *nāvā* M I.134 “ship”, nom. sg. from a stem *nāvā-* (< Skr. acc. sg. *nāvaṃ*, inst. *Nāvā*); *gavassa* M I.429 “of the cow” dat.-gen. sg., abl. sg. *gavā* D I.201, loc. *gave* Sn 310 from a stem *gava-* (< Skr. inst. sg. *gavā* etc.); a stem *gāva-* is also found in *gāvī* f. nom. sg. A IV.418, Ud 8,49, the long *ā* being due to the pl. forms (< Skr. nom. pl. *gāvaḥ* etc.). In the latter (*r*-declension) a few cases occur from derived stems: e.g., *sathārā* inst. sg. D I.163 from a stem *sathārā-* (< Skr. acc. sg. *sathāraṃ*). In the *gāthā* literature there is evidence for a stem in *-u* (from the base exhibited in the Skr. abl., gen., sg.) e.g., *sathuno* dat.-gen. sg. Sn 547,573; Th 1.131 (PLS §90).¹ But the consonant stems, especially those identical with roots, are comparatively rare in the Nikāyas due to the phonetic law of the falling off of the final consonant in Pāli as in Prk. (cp. PLS §75). Only a few historical forms survive which point to consonant stems. Of these the new themes are mainly formed in two ways:

¹ But Geiger (*loc. cit.*) explains it as being due to the fact that in compounds the *r* of the stem appears as in Pāli.

1. The final consonant of the Skr. nom. sg. which is either the stem terminal or its phonetic variant is elided and the stem thus vocalized is inflected according to the corresponding [2] vowel declension of that gender, thus: (a) Radical stems: *parisā-* from Skr. *pariṣad* f. “assembly” e.g., *parisāyaṃ* loc. sg. D II.218; *parisāsu* pl. S II.27; It 64; *vijju-* from Skr. *vidyut* f. “lightning” e.g., *vijju* nom. sg. S I.100; A I.124; (b) *anstems*: *brahma-* from Skr. *brahman* m. e.g., *brahmaṃ* acc. sg. M I.2, 328; *muddha-* from Skr. *mūrdhan* m. “head” e.g., *muddhaṃ* acc.sg. Dh 72; Sn 987; D I.95; also neuter stems *kamma-*, *pabba-*, etc., from Skr. *karman*, *parvan* (PLS §94 for instances); (c) *in-stems*: *seṭṭhi-* from Skr. *śreṣṭhin* m. “treasurer” e.g., *seṭṭhissa* gen. sg. S I.90; *hatthi-* from Skr. *hastin* m. “elephant” e.g., *hatthī* nom.pl. S I.211; *sāmi-* from Skr. *svāmin* m. “lord” e.g., *sāmiṃ* acc. sg. Sn 83; *cakkavattissa* M III.176 gen. sg.; (d) *s-stems* (Skr. *-as*, *-is*, *-us*.): *mana-* from Skr. *manas* nt. “mind” e.g., *manaṃ* acc. sg. S IV.7; *manassa* dat.-gen. sg. S IV.17; *mane* loc. sg. A II.158; S I.40, also *manasmiṃ* S V.171; *raja-* from Skr. *rajas* nt. “dust” e.g., *rajena* inst. sg. M I.25; *rajassa* dat.-gen. sg. Sn 406; *sira-*, *ura-*, *teja-* from Skr. *siras*, *uras*, *tejas*, e.g., *sirasmiṃ* M II.75; *urasmiṃ* A I.141; *tejasmiṃ* A V.319 loc. sg. cp. *tamā tamaṃ* Sn.278; *tapena* Sn 655.

In this declension a nom. sg. in *-o* is frequently found, with the masculine ending *-o* of the adjective or participle in agreement, pointing thereby to a *change of gender*. e.g., *tamo vihato* M I.22 “the darkness is destroyed”; *mano anicco* S IV.1 “the mind is impermanent”; *mano dukkho*² S IV.2 “the mind is ill”; *tejo pātukato* M II.184 “the fire is kindled”; cp. *mano supaṇihito* Sn 155 “the mind is well directed”. But that this change of gender is a later

² That *dukkha* is used adjectivally is seen from the preceding *cakkhum dukkham* etc.

phenomenon due to the influence of the preceding *-o* on the adjectival ending as seen from the above examples is shown by the fact that when the adjective precedes the noun the original gender is preserved. e.g., *santaṃ tassa manaṃ hoti* Dh 96. *is*-stems: *sappi-* from *sarpis* and others (*vide* PLS §75); *us*-stems: *cakkhu-* from Skr. *cakṣus* nt. “eye” e.g., *cakkhuṃ* nom. sg. S I.115; M III.136.

2. Themes are derived from the bases exhibited in original oblique cases, particularly the acc. sg. by virtue of its frequent use, thus: (a) From original root stems: *vācā-* from Skr. *vāc* [3] (< acc. sg. *vācam*) f. “speech” e.g., *vācāya* inst. sg. D I.114; *vācā* nom. pl. M III.76; D III.18; *vācānaṃ* gen. pl. Sn 454; *pāda-* from Skr. *pād* (< acc. sg. *pādam*) m. “foot” e.g., *pāde* loc. sg. A II.144; *pāde* acc. pl. Sn 573; (b) From *an-* stems as in: *rañña-* a sporadic stem from the weakest Skr. base *rājñ-* m. “king” (cp. Skr. inst. *rājñā*, loc. sg. *rājñi* etc.) e.g., *raññe* loc. sg. D III.83; *nāma-* from Skr. *nāman* nt. “name” (cp. acc. sg. *nāma*) e.g., *nāmena* inst. sg. D II.154; similarly *attena* inst. sg. M I.297; II.263; S IV.54; *dāmena* A III.383 also *damena* S IV.163, 282; (c) From *in-* stems: *vāsina-* from Skr. *vāsin* m. “dweller” (< acc. sg. *vāsinam*) e.g., *vāsine* acc. pl. D II.272; similarly, *palokine* acc. pl. Th 2.101 from Skr. *pralokin*; *pāṇine* acc. pl. Sn 220; *verinesu* loc. pl. Dh 197; (d) From *nt-* stems: *āyasmanta-* from Skr. *āyusmant* m. “venerable one” (< *āyusmantaṃ* acc. sg.) e.g., *āyasmante* loc. sg. S I.56; III.133; *āyasmantānaṃ* gen. pl. M I.64; similarly, *arahante* loc. sg. M I.254; *mahantasmim* loc. sg. A I.148; *bhavantānaṃ* gen. pl. M II.148; here there is also a new stem ending in *-ata* formed from the Skr. weak stem (*-at*) found in sg. oblique cases; e.g., *arahataṃ* acc. sg. A II.182 (*yatra hi nāma taṃ Bhagavantaṃ arahataṃ sammā-sambuddhaṃ āsādetabbaṃ*).

§2. Archaic Adverbs.

As remarked above there are a few historical forms in Pāli which without exception can be traced back to Vedic (cp. R.O. Franke, *Pāli und Sanskrit*, p.150 *et seq.*). Some of these have lost their inflexional value in Pāli and come to be regarded as adverbs or prepositions, and, according to commentators, even as particles or indeclinables (*nipāta*). This is chiefly characteristic of genuine adverbial cases like the acc. and inst., and to a lesser extent of the abl., gen. and the loc. as well. In the Nikāyas 18 such forms occur mostly as adverbs of *time* and *place* and rarely of *manner*, viz. a.) from original acc.: *uddham* “above” D I.23, 153, 251; II.293, 294; III.104; A III.323; V.109; Sn 894; acc. sg. of Vedic *ūrdhvá-*; *ciraṃ* “for a long time” Sn 678, 730, from Vedic *cira-*; *alaṃ* “rightly” M I.130; S II.18, from Vedic *áram* acc. sg. of an obsolete stem *ára-* “sufficient” [4] (VGS §178); *nattaṃ* “by night” Sn 1070, from Vedic acc. sg. *náktam* (VGS §178.2); *nāma* “by name” or “namely” S I.33, 235; Sn 157, 177, from Vedic acc. sg. *nāma* of *nāman* nt. “name”; *raho* “secretly” M II.251; III.157, from Vedic *rāhas* acc. sg. of *rāhas*; *hippaṃ* “soon” or “quickly” A II.118; III.164; Sn 413, 682, 998; Dh 65, 137, 236, 289, from Vedic adj. *kṣípra* (VGS §197.5.b.); *sayam* “by -self” D I.12; Sn 57, 320, from Vedic *svayám* originally nom. sg. of *svá-* (VGS §115.a.). b.) from original inst.: *dīva* “by day” S I.183; M I.125; Dh 387, from Vedic inst. sg. *dīva*; *micchā* “wrongly” Sn 438, 815 (*vide* P.T.S. Dict. *s.v.*), from Vedic inst. sg. *mithuyā* found as *mithyā* in the Brāhmaṇas (VGS §199.6.a.); *sahasā* “forcibly” Sn 123; A II.209, from Vedic inst. sg. *sāhasā* (VGS §178.3); *musā* “falsely” D 1.52 from Vedic inst. sg. *mṛṣā* “by or with neglect”.c.) from original abl.: *pacchā* “after, afterwards” D I.205; Sn 645, 773, 949; Dh 172, 314, 421, from Vedic abl. sg. *paścāt*; *ārā* “far, far from” Sn 156, 736; Dh 253, from Vedic

ārāt (VGS §178.5). d.) from original gen.: *cirassa* “since long”, “after a long while” e.g., *na cirass’ eva* D III.11; *sucirass’ eva* S I.193 also *cirassaṃ* in same sense D I.179; S I.142, where the final nasal is due to the analogy of the frequent use of acc. ending *-aṃ* as adverb; *divassa* used adverbially in compound with *divā* (see b.) e.g., *divā-divassa* “at noonday”³ S I.89; A.V.185; e.) from original loc.; *ratto* “by night” Sn 223; Th 2.312; Dh 296, from Ved. loc. sg. *rātrau*. Pāli has two archaic dat. forms *cirāya* “for long” Dh 342 and *svātanāya* “for tomorrow” D I.125 which however do not occur as such, that is to say adverbially, in the older dialect. Compare, however, Epic Sanskrit *cirāya* and the acc. adv. *śvastanam* (Monier-Williams, Skr.-Eng. Dict., s.v.).

§3. Dual Forms.

The main inflectional peculiarity of Pāli and Prk. as compared with Vedic and Classical Skr. is the loss of the dual. Its place is taken by the plural in all declensions (*vide* PLS §77.1.). So we find it with all names of things by nature considered in pairs such as eyes, ears, hands, legs etc. e.g., *hatthe dhovati* [5] M II.138 in place of *hastau dhovati* in the earlier language; similarly in *dvandva*-compounds usually expressed by the dual in Skr.: e.g., *ime pi candimasuriye evaṃ mahiddhike* etc. (acc. pl.) M I.69 and *candimasuriyānaṃ* (gen. pl.) D I.10. According to Geiger (PLS §77) *dve* and *ubho* are the only regular dual forms existing in Pāli. The latter is the normal masculine form (nom. and acc.) corresponding to Skr. *ubhau* but the former is only the feminine or neuter form, which is due to the fact

³ The sense of “early in the day”, “at sun-rise”, given to this compound by the P.T.S. *Dict.* (s.v. *divā*) is obviously erroneous.

that the nom. and acc. forms of numerals were used without discrimination for all genders in Middle Indian (cp. Pischel, *Prk. Gr.* §438). So it is found with masculine nouns. e.g., *dve dhammā* D II.60; *dve pabbajitā* D I.57. The form *duve* occurs only in *gāthā* literature e.g., Th 1.245 (*vide* PLS §114). These forms however exist only sporadically for the dual and as a *number* no more influences Pāli declensions. This is attested by the oblique case-forms of these in use as the loc. *ubhosu* (*tīresu*) S III.137; Sn 778; inst. *ubhohi* (*hatthehi*); gen. *ubhinnaṃ* S I.62, which are formed simply by adding the normal plural endings to a stem **ubha-* in the first two examples and the gen. appears to be formed on the analogy of other numerical forms (*dvinnam*, *tiṇṇam*, *catuṇṇam* etc.), beside the proper nom. *ubho* S I.87; A III.48; It 16, 43; Sn 661. There are however three or four other instances where we meet with probably the dual forms of *dvandva*-compounds. The first of these occurs in *kasirena ghāsacchādo labhati* A I.107, where the Burmese MS.(Ph) has the v.l. *ghāsaccaṃ* which is evidently a later ‘correction’. At A III.85 the above reading of the P.T.S. text is repeated, but once at A III.385 the phrase occurs as *kasirena ghāsacchādo labbhati*, the passive form of the verb showing that *ghāsacchādo* is here regarded as the masculine nom. sg. of *ghāsacchāda-*. But the compound consists of two masculine words *ghāso* “food” = Skr. *ghāsaḥ* and *acchādo* “clothing” = Skr. *ācchādaḥ*, and as such, must be treated either as a dual or collectively as a neuter sg. The proper construction then would be either *ghāsacchādaṃ labbhati* or *ghāsacchādā labbhanti*, the pl. being employed for the dual. So the above (A III.385) reading with the passive (sg.) is ruled out, establishing the first reading (A I.107) *ghāsacchādo* [6] *labhati* as correct. Consequently the ending *-o* would represent the older masculine dual in *-au*, as in *ubho* (< *ubhau*). There is however another alternative, that is, we may

possibly have here an earlier *ghāśacchāde* acc. pl., the *-e* having been later regarded as an eastern form and changed to *-o*. The other occurs in the phrase *natthi hāyanavaḍḍhane natthi ukkaṃsāvakaṃse* “there is no high and low, there is no increase and decrease”. These occur at least twice in the Nikāyas viz., at S III.212 and M I.518 and so cannot be misprints. If these coordinative compounds are taken as neuter sg. the form may be the eastern *-e*, but if, as is quite possible, they are used as plurals then the ending *-e* represents the dual nt. nom., subject of *atthi* which can agree with any number. Another instance of a similar doubtful character is *āyasmante*, voc. M I.474, which probably is an eastern form standing for *āyasmanto* corresponding to the Skr. dual *āyaśmantau* (vide §10). There is greater probability in accepting the pronominal form etc. (**not** cited by Geiger, PLS §107.1) occurring at Sn. 869, 870, as a neut. dual. acc. since it clearly refers to *sātaṃ asātaṃ ca* “what is pleasant and what is unpleasant”.

Inflectional Terminations

§4. Stems in *-a* (m.&nt.).

In the singular all the historical endings are retained, with the phonetic changes peculiar to Pāli, except the dat. which has been superseded by the gen. form *-ssa*. The older ending *-āya*, however, appears in the Nikāyas quite a number of times but it has there almost completely lost its original significance and in the few instances attested, denotes only *aim*, *direction* or *purpose* (vide §§96,113,106 & 107; cp. PLS §74). The reason for this replacement is to be found in the fact that already in the earlier dialect the dat. by virtue of its syntactical character had come into logical contact with

the gen. in many of its proper functions. So, even as early as in the period of the Brāhmaṇas (VGS §202.B.2.a.), the latter had encroached upon many uses of the former and in later Skr. almost ousted it from its legitimate [7] sphere of employment (SS §80). This process is seen also in the Prākṛts where the *-āya* form as represented by its phonetic developments *-āa*, *āya*, *-āe* etc. (Pischel *Prk.Gr.* §363) occurs mostly in the artificial dialect of dramatic poetry (SS p.100 f. n.).

§5. Pronominal Endings.

The influence of the pronominal declension is found in the endings *-smā* and *-mhā* which exist beside the normal *-ā* (Skr. *-āt*) of the abl. sg. and *-smiṃ*, *-mhi* beside the historical *-e* of the loc. sg..

a. An analysis of the Dīgha- and Majjhima Nikāyas has shown that the form *-smā* occurs only 4 times (leaving aside the repetitions) against some 95 of the *-ā* form. Of the latter 21 denote *cause*, *-smā* being never used in that sense in spite of the *causal* implication of the pronominal adverbs *kasmā* “why”, *tasmā* “therefore” and *yasmā* “wherefore”. It is also significant that it is always the *-ā* form that is used in syntactical agreement with the 6 prepositional adverbs ‘governing’ the abl., viz., *yāva*, *aññatra*, *tiro*, *uddhaṃ*, *adho* and *paraṃ*. e.g., *yāva c’aggā yāva ca mūlā* D I.75; M II.170; III.12 “from top to bottom”; *aññatra avusitattā* D I.90 “except from imperfection”; *tiro raṭṭhā tiro janapadā* M II.167 “across country and province”; *uddhaṃ pādatalā adhokesamatthakā* D III.104; M III.90 “above from the soles of the feet and down from the top of the head”; *paraṃ marañā* M III.101 “after death”. The forms in *-smā* and *-mhā* are confined to one particular syntactical category, viz.,

the *abl. of separation* (in the wider sense). So the former (-*smā*) mainly occurs in connection with the verb *pabbajati* “sets out”, especially in the stock phrase *agārasmā anagāriyaṃ pabbajati* “he sets out from home to homelessness” e.g., D I.18, 60, 115, 202; II.16, 230; III.31, 147; M I.200, 267, 345, 459; II.66, 181; III.261. It also occurs in *gāthā* literature e.g., Sn 1002, 1003, and with another verb of motion at S I.185, i.e. *agārasmā anagāriyaṃ nikkhantā*; also with the causative *pabbājeti* “expels” at D I.92, i.e. *raṭṭhasmā pabbājesi*. The historical form -*ā* however is the [8] more popular even here, occurring in the Dīgha- and Majjhima Nikāyas over 25 times with about 15 different verbs of motion. The verb *pabbajati* itself occurs twice with the -*ā* form, viz., *Sakyakulā pabbajito* M II.167, and once with its causative: *raṭṭhā vā nagarā vā pabbājeyyuṃ* D I.90, 91. In all the Nikāyas the -*smā* form appears only with 4 other verbs all of which signify *detachment*, *release*, or *aloofness*. e.g., *anissaṭṭā bhavasmā* Ud 33 “not free from becoming”; *gaṇasmā vūpakaṭṭho* M III.110; Ud 41; A IV.435 “detached or aloof from the crowd”; *virato methunasmā* D II.241 (verse) “abstaining from copulation”; *na parimuccanti dukkhasmā* M I.8, 65 “are not released from sorrow”. The form -*mhā* which is its phonetic development is even rarer in the Nikāyas, occurring only 3 times in the Dīgha and Majjhima, viz. *Naṅgaramhā pāyāsi* M II.119; *Rājagahamhā niyyāsi* D I.49 and *muñjamhā isikaṃ pabbāheyya* M II.17 “would draw out the reed from the muñja grass.” These examples show that -*mhā* too is used only for the notion of *separation*, particularly with verbs of *motion* denoting that *from which* there is a movement. It is evident therefore that the pronominal endings were confined, in the case of the *abl.*, to its function of signifying *separation*, while the historical ending -*ā* was still in the Nikāyas the popular form for all its varied uses in general.

b. The pronominal form of the loc. sg. in *-smiṃ* and its phonetic variant *-mhi* are not so rare in the Nikāyas as the corresponding abl. forms. The former is by far the more frequent of the two and occurs in almost every syntactical function of that case. e.g., *lokasmīṃ viharati* D I.23 “he lives in the world”; *veyyākaraṇasmīṃ bhaññamāṇe* D I.46 “while the explanation was being declared”; *sīlasmīṃ hoti* D I.65, 66, 67 “is part of (his) virtue”. The latter *-mhi* however is less frequent and is mostly used in verse, decidedly *metri causa*. e.g., *vanamhi jhāyato* Sn 221; *setamhi chatte anuhīramāṇe* D II.15 (verse) and the intermediate phonetical stage is also found in verse. e.g., *antalikkhasmi* S I.67 “in the intermediate space or sky”. The v.1. *-asmīṃ* which appears in one text is not in keeping with the metre. [9]

§6. Inst. sg. in *-ā*.

With regard to the inst. sg. it has to be remarked that beside the usual form in *-ena* a form in *-ā* corresponding to Vedic *-ā* (inst. sg. of *a*-nouns, m. & f.) occurs many times in the Nikāyas (cp.PLS §78). Franke has conclusively shown that such forms represent the inst. and not the original abl. sg. in *-āt* (Z.D.M.G. 1892, pp.313-315). It occurs with both masculine and neuter nouns, especially in the frequent phrase *sahatthā santappesi* “served or fed with his own hand”. e.g., M I.393; II.50; A I.274; D I.109; Sn p.107 etc. which the Comy. glosses in most places by *sahatthēna* (e.g., ‘*sahatthāti sahatthēna*’ Manorathapūraṇī II.372; Sumaṅgalavilāsinī I.277). It occurs but once in the Nikāyas outside this context i.e. in *na sahatthā paṭhavīṃ khaṇati* M II.51 “he does not dig the ground with his hand”. Here too the Comy. has *asahatthēna* (Sum. III.814). This ending however is not restricted to the above word. In *mā sokā pahato*

bhava Th 1.82 “do not be overcome by grief”, *sokā* is definitely the inst. sg. denoting *means* (cp. PLS §78). Since the abl. in *-ā* (< Skr. *-āt*) does not occur in this function, that is, to signify *means* in general or *instrument*, in the Nikāyas, we may regard the following as representing original inst. in *-ā* of neuter verbal nouns: *dassanā pahātabbā* M I.7 *et. seq.*; *bhāvanā pahātabbā* M I.12; *vinodanā pahātabbā* “should be got rid of by ...” M I.12. In all these examples the verb *pahātabbā* would require an inst. of *means* (by which) rather than an abl. of *cause* (through which), since effort on the part of the agent is implied. Similarly in *viriyā nimmathitaṃ padhānābhinibbattaṃ* M II.130 the sense prompts us to regard the *-ā* as inst. sg., Chalmers translating it correctly as “kindled by effort and fired by striving”, the preposition *by* implying *means* and not *cause*. In *sahatthā* referred to above also the inst. denotes means and is not due to a preposition *saha* which Franke (*loc. cit.*) thought is here contracted to *sa-*. On the other hand the compound stands for **svahastā*, *sa-* being the reflexive pronominal adjective Vedic or Skr. *sva*. When this inst. occurs with *saha*, the preposition meaning *with* or *together with*, the sense implied is *simultaneity* or *association* (*vide* [10] Sociative Inst. §64). e.g., *saha parinibbānā* D II.156; S I.159 “simultaneously with the passing away”; *saha vacanā* Ud 16 “simultaneously with the word” i.e. “as he spoke” (cp. Geiger, PLS §78.1. “zugleich mit dem Wort, im Augenblick, wo er es sagte”).

§7. The Ending of the Acc. Pl.

In the plural of the *a-* declension Pāli differs from Skr. in the acc. and dat. The historical ending *-ān* of the acc. is lost due to the fact that, since phonetically it becomes *-ā* by the falling off of the terminal consonant, it is liable to be confused with the nom. pl. in *-ā*.

The form in *-e* which is the regular acc. ending in Pāli and Prākṛt is borrowed, as Geiger suggests (PLS §78.3.), from the pronominal declension, where the original masculine acc. pl. *-tān* took the form of the nom. *-te* because it had lost its accusative character through the dropping of *-n* and in order to distinguish it from the feminine *-tāḥ* which too would give in Pāli *-tā*. But Geiger has drawn attention to one solitary survival of the *-ān* form appearing in *gāthā* literature, viz., in the phrase *vehāsān-upasaṅkamiṃ* Th 1.564.

§8. The Inst. Pl. in *-e*.

In the inst. pl. the regular form is *-ehi*, the phonetic development of Skr. *-ebhis*. It has been shown that the aspirate *bh* in Pāli is retained when it is in the body of the word but is generally reduced to *-h-* in inflexional endings (cp. R.L.Turner, *The Phonetic Weakness of Terminal Elements in Indo-Āryan*, J.R.A.S. 1927, p.277). Nevertheless the intermediate form *-ebhi* also occurs, though not frequently, mostly in archaic instances (cp. Geiger PLS §79). e.g., *ariyebhi* Dh 162; Ud 6. The same is found in other declensions. e.g., *jhāyibhi* *jhānasīlibhi* M III.13. The inst. pl. in *-ais* which is in fact the older of the two in Old Indian has come to be gradually lost even in Vedic (*vide* Macdonell, VGS §78.f.n.). It has left no trace either in Pāli or in Prk. owing to the confusion with acc. pl. in *-e*, except for one [11] solitary instance. The form *dhīro* occurring at Dh 207, it has been suggested by V. Lesný (*A new reading of the Dhammapada 207*, J. p.T.S. 1928), stands for *dhīre*, the older inst. pl. In all the MSS. of the Pāli version of the Dhammapada the reading is:

*bālasaṅgatacārī hi dīgham addhāna socati,
dukkho bālehi saṃvaso amitten' eva sabbadā,
dhīro ca sukhasaṃvāso ñātīnaṃ va samāgamo.*

“Verily he who walks in the company of fools suffers for a long time; living with fools is always painful as with an enemy; *living with the pleasant is wise*, like meeting with kinsfolk”. The italicized words give the literal rendering of the phrase *dhīro ca sukhasaṃvāso* and the Comy. (Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā P.T.S.Vol.III. p.272) too follows the same reading but does not comment on the form *dhīro*. However, as has been pointed out so cleverly by Lesný such a translation does not indeed make good sense, though grammatically there can be no objection to it. It is evident from the parallelism with the first part of the second line, viz. *dukkho bālehi saṃvāso*, that the reading should be either *sukho ca dhīrasaṃvāso*, as Max Müller suggested, or more likely *dhīre ca sukhasaṃvāso*, as Lesný takes it. The latter is supported by the Kharoṣṭhī version which attests to the fact that the second part is *-sukhasaṃvāso* (... *suhavasa ñātīhi va samakamo*, 39, *Les fragments Dutreuil de Rhins*, par Emile Senart. Journal Asiatique 1898, p.297), and not *dhīrasaṃvāso*, and also by the Skr. text which fills in the lacuna in the Kharoṣṭhī version by the inst. pl. *dhīrais* (*dhīrais tu sukhasaṃvāso*, XXX.26, L. de la Vallée Poussin *Documents sanscrits de la seconde collection M.A. Stein* J.R.A.S. 1912, p.369). Geiger (PLS §79) has instanced another place where the inst. pl. *-e* is authentic (Buddhavaṃsa 2.32, *guṇe dasah' upāgataṃ*) but the *-e* forms given by E. Müller in his *Simplified Grammar of the Pāli Language* as inst. pl. used with the sense of the dat. (such as *yācake* etc.) are not however instrumentals but only the loc. sg. (*-e*) denoting the person to whom something is given or offered. [12]

§9. The Dat. Pl. Ending.

The dat. pl. in Skr. is the same as the abl. pl. ending in *-(e)bhyas* which is retained in Pāli for the latter (abl. pl.) of *a-* stems as *-ehi*, which has been shown to be a phonetic development of **ebhio* (< **ebhiyo*), the aspirate being reduced to *-h* - as described above (§8). Pandit S. Majumdar Sastri in a monograph entitled ‘The Dative Plural in Pāli’, on the evidence of some survivals of the old dat. pl. in *-ehi* in the Asokan dialect, suggested the possibility of a few of these forms remaining in Pāli where the form normally used is the ending *-ānaṃ* of the gen. which as pointed out above (§4) is due to the syntactical displacement of the dat., in the pl. as in the sg., by the gen. But a close investigation of the Nikāyas shows that no certain vestiges of an historical dat. pl. exists in Pāli. There are however some instances of the *-ehi* form the sense of which seem to be bordering on that of the dat. (or the abl.). In the frequent phrase *yāvadeva manussehi suppakāsitaṃ* D II.113,114,219; III.122 etc., which Rhys Davids (Dialogues 11.113) translated as “until in a word it shall have been well proclaimed among men”, *manussehi* can be syntactically the dat. denoting the persons to whom something is proclaimed (*vide* §93 b.c.d.). There is also the reading *Yāva devamanussehi* Ud 64 which is supported by the Comy, on D III.122 ‘*deva-lokato yāva manussa-lokā suppakāsitaṃ*’ and also by the Buddhist Skr. parallel at Divyāvadāna 201 ‘*yāvad-deva manuṣyebhyaḥ*’. Whatever the reading may be it is an open question whether the ending *-ehi* here represents an older dat. (pl. *-ebhyas*) agreeing with the verb ‘*suppakāsitaṃ*’ or an abl. construed with *yāva* taken as a preposition. But if the latter be the case the rendering would be “proclaimed *up to* or *as far as* (gods and) men” which however does not make good sense. On the other hand if *yāva* is

taken merely as the adverb meaning “completely” (cp. Rhys Davids, “in a word”) or “just” as found in *alam vo tam yāvadeva sītassa paṭighātāya* D III.130 “just enough to stand the cold”, the phrase makes satisfactory sense. Accordingly it is quite probable that what we have here is an old dat. pl. We are confronted with a similar difficulty in the [13] case of *-ehi* in *ayaṃ bhikkhave uppatti asādhāraṇā puthujjanehi* A II.128 “this birth, monks, is not *common* to worldings”. The adj. *sādhāraṇa* in Pāli as well as in Skr. is capable of being construed with either the gen., dat. or inst. (*vide* Monier-Williams’, Dict, *s.v.*) but with the inst. its sense is usually “equal” because here a comparison is implied. When, however, the sense is “common to” as in the above example the dat. appears syntactically the more suitable construction. The *-ehi* ending therefore may here possibly stand for the older dat. pl. rather than the inst., preserved because of the option in the construction.

§10. Eastern Forms.

Among the sporadic forms of the above (*a-*) declension we may group the so-called Māgadhisms under which Geiger (PLS §80) includes the nom. and voc. sg. in *-e* both masculine and neuter. In the Dīgha- and Majjhima Nikāyas there are 6 such nom. forms of masculine nouns and 8 of neuters. The existence of these eastern forms can be justified on the ground that all these are put into the mouth of one or the other of the six leaders of heretical schools whose dialect was naturally some kind of eastern Prākṛt. Moreover it is significant that they are clustered together in passages of philosophic importance reported to have been said by them. These statements occur in the Sandaka Sutta of the Majjhima- and in the Sāmaññaphala Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya. They are: *bāle ca paṇḍite*

ca kāyassa bheda ucchijjanti D I.55; M I.515,518; *doṇamite sukhadukkhe, pariyantakaṭe saṃsāre natthi hāyanavaḍḍhane natthi ukkaṃsāvakaṃse* M I.518; D I.54; *ājīvasate, paribbājasate, nāgāvāsasate, vīse indriyasate, tiṃse nirayasate* M I.517-518; D I.53; *sattaguḷe khitte nibbeṭṭhiyamānaṃ eva paleti* M I.518; *kamme ca aḍḍhakamme ca* M I.517; *sukhe dukkhe jīve satt' ime* M I.517 with the less accurate reading *sukhe dukkhe jīvasattame* D I.56. These statements are repeated in a discourse by the Buddha at S III.211 (§§5,6&7). Also in the Sunakkhatta Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya the *-e* form is 5 times used by the Buddha in a talk with Sunakkhatta, the Licchavi. Here too they occur in a passage of [14] philosophic importance, viz., *ye lokāmisasaṃyojane se pavutte* M II.254; *ye anañjasamyojane se bhinne* M II.255; *ye ākiñcaññāyatanaṃsaṃyojane se vante* M II.255; *ye nevasaññānāsaññāyatanaṃsaṃyojane se ucchinne ucchinnamūle tālavatthukate anabhāvakate āyatim anuppādadhamme* M II.255. There are three other instances of the *-e* form outside the above context, viz., *ke ca chave sigāle, ke pana sīhanāde ti?* D III.24, where probably it is due to the fact that the phrase is borrowed from popular speech as an exclamatory metaphor conveying a sense of disparagement; *ye āyatane veditabbe* S IV.98, which the Comy. takes as nom. sg. (*'tasmā ye āyatane veditabbe ti taṃ kāraṇaṃ jānītabbaṃ ti attho'* Sāratthapakāsinī 391, v.l. *veditabbo*); *idha pana bhikkhave bhikkhu ... tasmim ca sukhe anadhimuchite* (for *-to*) *hoti* M II.223 “here, monks, a bhikkhu is not infatuated in the matter of that happiness”.

Geiger has instanced the voc. sg. (in *-e*) in *ehi tvaṃ samma Bhesike* D I.225 which he regards with Pischel (Prk. Gr. §366.b) as a nom. used in address as voc. In fact Pāli like Prk. has sometimes the actual nom. sg. instead of the voc. (*-a*) in addressing. e.g., *kin nu kho āvuso bho Gotamo taṃ jīvaṃ taṃ sarīraṃ udāhu aññaṃ jīvaṃ aññaṃ sarīraṃ* D I.157 (cp. Ardha-Māgadhī voc. sg. *putto*, Prk. Gr. §363). We have also the reverse case where the form in short *-a* is used for the nom. sg. in *-o*. e.g., *Kahan nu kho bho Nāgita etarahi so bhavaṃ Gotama viharati ... ?* D I.150, which may be either due to eastern influence (cp. Ardha-Māgadhī nom. sg. *Buddha-putta* for *Buddha-putto*, Prk. Gr. §364) or the sandhi form of the original *Gotamaḥ* with the dropping of the visarga. In the voc. pl. of *āyasmā* beside the regular *āyasmantā* and *āyasmanto* we find a form *-ante* used in addressing two persons. e.g., *āyasmante* (voc. pl. or dual) M I.474. If this be a dual form corresponding to Skr. *-antau*, standing for *āyasmanto*, the *-e* can be regarded as being due to eastern influence. Such influence is positively seen in the archaic nom. pl. ending *-āse* (Geiger PLS §79.4, for examples) which is the eastern form for Pāli *-āso* from Vedic *-āsas*. There are a few eastern forms in the pronominal declension also (*vide* §16). [15]

§11. Sporadic Forms of the *a*- Declension.

In the above paragraph we have referred to the archaic ending *-āse* of the nom. pl. masculine which represents the eastern derivative of the Vedic double ending *-āsas*, both feminine and masculine. In Pāli however this ending is never found with feminine nouns (PLS §79).

In the neuter of the *a*- declension there are a few remnants of the older Vedic plural of the nom. in *-ā*, beside the regular *-āni*. e.g.,

rūpā Th 1.455; D I.245; *sotā* Sn 345; *nettā* Th 2.257 etc. On the analogy of the masculine inflexion a neuter acc. pl. *-e* is formed, (m. nom. pl. *-ā*: m. acc. pl. *-e* = nt. nom. pl. *-ā*: nt acc. pl. *e*). e.g., *rūpe passitum* Ud 30; *rūpe ca pajānāti* M I.61; *rūpe paṭicca* S IV.18. This is also found with the verbal nouns in *-naṃ*, all being used in the plural thus removing the possibility of their being Māgadhī nt. sg. acc. in *-e*. e.g., *nīvaraṇe pahāya* D I.73; Sn 17, beside *nīvaraṇāni* (*vide* P.T.S. Dict. s.v.). But sometimes masculine adjectives are found used with them. e.g., *cattāro satipaṭṭhāne bhāventi* M II.11; showing that the identity of forms had later on given rise to change of gender.

§12. Feminine in *-ā*.

In the feminine *ā*- declension the older historical endings of the inst., dat., abl., and gen. have been replaced by *-āya* which is also used for the loc. beside the normal *-āyaṃ*. The ending *-āya* seems to be a later phonetic development of the Skr. abl. -gen. *-āyas*, the *-ḥ*- being dropped owing to the phonetic law already mentioned (*vide* §1.) and the shortening of the final vowel being due to the general phonetic weakness of terminal elements in Middle Indian as referred to (§8.). The replacement of the dat. both in the sg. and in the pl. by the gen. form is due to the same syntactical phenomenon as discussed in the case of the masculine declension (§4.). The older inst. *-ayā* is also lost being replaced by the abl. sg. *-āya* due to similar syntactical reasons (*vide* §§62,116 & 118). But a considerable number of inst. fem, in *-ā*, as in the masculine and neuter declensions, is [16] found in the Nikāyas. e.g., *saddhā pabbajitvā* M I.16,123 “leaving (home) through or by faith”, beside *saddhāya gharā nikkhamma* Sn 337; *tassā issā na supati* Sn 110 “he does not sleep through jealousy for her”;

assavanatā dhammassa D II.38; M I.168 (Comy. ‘*assavanatā ti assavanatāya dhammassa*’ Sum.II.467); *vyārosanā paṭighasaññā* Sn 148 “through anger and hatred”; *ekapuggalassa bhikkhave kālakiriya bahuno janassa anutappā hoti* A I.22 “owing to the death of one person there is worry for many people”. It is however difficult to say whether this ending *-ā* corresponds to the older Vedic inst. in *-ā* of feminine nouns as in *doṣā barhāṇā* etc., or is a phonetic contraction of *-āya* (cp. Prk. *-āa*). Geiger (PLS §§27.2, 81) is inclined to favour the latter possibility though Franke thought it was definitely the Vedic ending *-ā* of feminine inst. sg. (*vide*: Inst, *auf -ā von a-stämmen im Pāli*, Z.D.M.G. 1892 pp.313 *et seq.*). Even the form *-ā* in *abhiññā sacchikatvā* D II.92,153, beside *abhiññāya desitā* D II.119 can be inst. sg. of *means*, though Geiger (§27.2) regards it as a contraction of the *gerund* in *-āya* after the Comys. (e.g., ‘*tad abhiññā ti tad abhijānitvā*’ Sum. I. p.59).

§13. The Vowel Declension (-hetu).

Of the sporadic forms belonging to this declension the form *hetu* (abl. sg. m.) is interesting owing to its peculiar syntactical function. It is evidently a phonetic development from Skr. *hetos*, abl.-gen. sg. of *hetus* m. “reason or cause”, the dropping of the final *-h* -, and the reducing of the vowel *-o* to *-u* being due to the phonetic peculiarities of such terminal elements as described in the foregoing paragraph. As to the weakening of the vowel we may compare *sajju* (< **sajjo*) corresponding to Skr. *sadyas* (*vide* Geiger, PLS §§22&23). It is mostly used as a postposition denoting *cause* in which case it appears as a periphrase for the inst. or the abl. of *cause*. e.g., *attahetu parahetu dhanahetu* Sn 122 “because of oneself, others or wealth”; *na kho, Udāyi, etassa sacchikiriyāhetu bhikkhū mayi brahmacariyaṃ*

caranti M II.37 “it is not, Udāyi, due to [17] (the intention i.e. for the purpose of) realizing this ... that monks live the Holy Life under me”; *kāyassa pīṇanahetu* M II.191 “for (*lit.* because of) the pleasing of the body”. As seen from the rendering of the latter examples *-hetu* implies not only *cause* but *purpose* as well. It may not appear, however, always as postposition in a compound. There are many instances where it is used as a separate word agreeing with a gen. of the noun or pronoun which denotes the material cause implied. e.g., *puttadārassa hetu* M II.187 “*lit.* from the cause of son and wife” i.e. “due to or for the purpose of son and wife”; *yesaṃ hetu labhāmase* Kh 6 “owing to whom, *lit.*, because of whom, we acquire ... (cp. Comy. ‘*ye nissāya yesaṃ kāraṇā*’ Paramatthajotikā II. p.210). From these it is evident that what we have in the stock phrases *taṃ kissa hetu* D I.14; M I.1; A II.31, “why is it?”, *lit.*, “because of what is it?” and *kissa hetu* A III.303, IV.393; Sn 1131, is an abl. sg. *hetu* and a gen. of the pronoun (*kissa*, cp. *kissa nirodhā taṅhā nirodhōti* D II.33, where too *kissa* is gen. sg. “of what” and *nirodhā* is abl. similar to *hetu*). The suggestion that *-hetu* may be an elliptical form of the acc. sg. *hetuṃ* (*vide* P.T.S. Dict. s.v.) is therefore unwarranted, cp. SS. 193. f.n. 1. where he argues that in spite of Pāṇinī’s rule *śaṣṭīhetuprayoge* (2.3.26) a comparison with I.E. idiom shows that *hetoh* in the phrase ‘*kasya hetoh*’ is abl. & not gen. and that *kasya* is gen.

§14. The Consonantal Declension (*parisatiṃ*).

In the feminine *parisā-*, originally belonging to the consonantal declension (< Skr. *pariṣad*), the historical form *parisati* corresponding to Skr. *pariṣadi* occurs quite a number of times. e.g., D III.18; A II.180. Here the replacement of *-d-* by *-t-* is probably

due to the influence of other original consonantal stems like *sarit-* (e.g., acc. sg. *saritaṃ* Sn 3) where in Pāli beside a nom. ending in a vowel (cp. *sarī* parallel to *parisā* oblique cases are found with a -t- . This is however not a sporadic phonetic change peculiar to Pāli as Geiger suggests (PLS §39.4). In the examples adduced by him viz. *kusīta*, *mutiṅga* and *pātu-* (Skr. *kusīda*, *mṛdaṅga* and *prādur*) it is not quite certain which [18] form is the earlier. The first two are most probably loan-words in Indo-Aryan and the etymology of the last is uncertain. This form which is the loc. sg. is sometimes found with a final *anusvāra* as *parisatiṃ*. e.g., *parisatiṃ dhammaṃ deseti* M II.140 “he preaches the doctrine in (or to) the assembly”; *so Rājagahe parisatiṃ evaṃ vācaṃ bhāsati* A I.185 “At Rājagaha he tells these words to the (or in the) crowd.” At another place it occurs with the masculine pronoun. e.g., *sādhu te pañca dhamme imasmiṃ parisatiṃ bhāsassūti* M II.199 “well, declare to (or in) this assembly the five dhammas”. Here we have a v.l. *imissaṃ parisati*. The appearance of the *anusvāra* is probably due to the syntactical fact that verbs of *speaking* sometimes agree with an acc. of the *person to whom* the words are addressed (*vide* §§36.b,58.c.). The proper loc. significance of the historical form *parisati* being lost due to its archaic nature the construction was replaced by the more popular idiom, viz., the acc. with verbs of *speaking*. So the acc. ending -ṃ is added to a theoretical stem *parisati-* (f.). The fact that the loc. form, whether historical or later, is preserved when there is no actual verb but only the participle also strengthens the validity of our surmise. e.g., *bhāsītā kho pana te es’ avuso Pāṭika-putta Vesāliyaṃ parisati vācā* D III.18; “Were these words spoken by you, friend Pāṭika-putta, at Vesāli among the rabble?”; *parisāyaṃ bhāsato* D II.218, “speaking in the assembly”. For it is to be generally observed in Pāli concinnity

that the loc. appears in such *adnominal* instances in place of an acc. which is the more usual in the *adverbial* construction.

The Pronominal Declension⁴

§15. The Enclitic Forms.

Whereas in Vedic and Classical Sanskrit the enclitic forms *me*, *te* sg. are found only for the dat. and gen., *no*, *vo* pl. are found only in the acc., dat. and gen., Pāli like Prākṛt has extended their use to other cases as well. (*vide* Pischel, Prk. Gr. §420; acc. sg. *me*; inst. sg. *me*; acc. pl. *no*, *ne*; inst. pl. *ṇe*). Though [19] not infrequently, the forms *me* and *te* occur as accusatives in Pāli. e.g., *te ekena khaṇena ekena muhuttana ekamaṃsakhalaṃ ekamaṃsapuñjaṃ karissāmi* M I.377 “In a flash, in a moment, I shall reduce *you* to one mash, one mass of flesh”. (cp. Ardha-Māgadhī and Śaurasenī acc. sg. *te*, Prk. Gr. §421). Franke has also given as acc. sg. in Pāli the forms *me* and *te*, (*vide*, *Pāli und Sanskrit*, p.152). This employ seems to have originated in the contact between the uses of the acc. and the inst. as in the following causative construction where the causative verb *pāpetu* can take either the acc. or the inst. of its primitive subject that which would have been its subject in the original non-causative state (*vide* §59). e.g., *sādhu me bhante Bhagavā tapojigucchāya aggaṃ yeva pāpetu sāraṃ yeva pāpetūti* D III.48 “may the Blessed One make *me* attain to the summit, to the essence of disgust-for-asceticism” where *me* can be either the acc. or the inst. In the pl. *no* and *vo* are similarly found for the acc. e.g., *upāsakā no bhavaṃ Gotamo dhāretu* M I.413 “may the venerable Gotama take *us* as disciples”; *pahāya vo gamissāmi* D II.120 “I shall go leaving *you*”; *āmantayāmi vo* D II.156

⁴ Supplementary to Geiger’s presentation (PLS §§104-112).

“I address you” (cp. Māgadhī and Śaurasenī acc. pl. *vo*, Prk. Gr. §422). In the inst. there are definite examples where the form *me* is used for the agent. e.g., *maggam kho me gacchantena* A IV.334 “by me going the way”; *kammaṃ pana me karontena* A IV.334 “by me doing an action”; *akatena me ettha kataṃ* M I.515 *lit.* “by me not doing it is done, i.e., without my doing any task is done”; *mūlkena me evaṃ kataṃ* M II.248 “thus done by my deluded self”. It is also found agreeing with feminine nouns. e.g., *suto yeva me ... upanaccantiyā* D II.268 “was heard by me ... (while) ... dancing”. Buddhaghosa regards *me* in the stock phrase *evaṃ me sutam* D I.1 as standing either for the inst. or the gen. of agency (*vide* §154). He says: “*me saddo tīsu atthesu dissati: Tathā hi ’ssa gāthābhigītam me abhojaneyyam ti ādisu mayā ti attho* (i.e. inst.). *Sādhu me bhante Bhagavā saṅkhittena dhammam desetūti ādisu mayham attho* (i.e. dat.). *Dhammadāyādā me bhikkhave bhavathāti ādisu mama ti attho* (i.e. gen.). *Idha pana mayā sutanti mama sutanti ca atthadvaye yujjati*”. (Sum. I . p.28, Papañcasūdanī I. p.4.). There is no doubt therefore that the form [20] *me* was from very early times used as an inst. sg.. This extension of its use seems to have originated in the agent-use of the gen. forms *me* and *te*, which is a frequent construction in Pāli. e.g., *api ca m’ettha puggalavemattatā veditā* D II.152; Sn p.102 (Comy. ‘*api ca mayā ...*’ Pj.II.2.436); *taṃ kiṃ maññasi gahapati, sutam te ... evaṃ bhante sutam me* M I.378; *Samaṇo me Gotamo nimantito* Sn p.104; *te ca me evaṃ puttha* D I.192;III.28; *etaṃ me abhipatthitaṃ* D II.266 (Comy. ‘*etaṃ mayā abhipatthitaṃ*’ Sum.III. p.702); *bhāsītā me esā vācā* D III.54; *kičchena me adhigataṃ* D II.36; *yan te karaṇīyam* Sn p.39; *punar āyu ca me laddho* D II.285(V.); *sahitaṃ me asahitaṃ te ... āropito te vādo* M II.3; *taṃ me idaṃ bhante Bhagavā sakkhi diṭṭho* M I.370. In all these examples the gen. is as permissible to denote the agent as the

inst.. It is probable that the *me* here originally stood for the gen. but later on came to be regarded as the inst. of *agency*. Finally, in two instances *no* and *vo* appear in the role of nom. plurals. e.g., *yaṃ no Bhagavā dhammaṃ bhāsissati taṃ no sossāmati* M II.5 “what doctrine the Blessed One will preach to us, that we shall hear”; *mā vo muñcitha koci naṃ* D II.262 “Ye let not one escape, whoever it be”. In both these examples there is the alternate possibility of the enclitic being used merely as emphatic particle, but in *taṃ no sossāmāti* the emphasis, if *no* implies such, is not needed according to the context, though *vo* in the other instance may have an emphatic sense.

§16. Sporadic Forms.

Among the sporadic forms of the pronominal declension we may place the nom. pl. *amhā* formed on the analogy of the *a-* declension (nominal acc. pl. *-e*: pronominal acc. pl. *-e*: nominal nom. pl. *-ā*: pronominal nom. pl. X). e.g., *tena ca amhā attamanā* M II.132,177 “thereby we were pleased”. Similarly on the analogy of the *a-* declension the relative pronoun *yo* has a dat. sg. masculine *yāya*. e.g., *yāya eva kho pana atthāya* D I.90, beside the usual *yassa*, which is the gen. form used as dat. e.g., *yassa atthāya* M I.392. In the inflexion of the demonstrative pronoun a gen. pl. *sānaṃ* f. “of those (women)” occurs [21] beside the regular *tāsaṃ* or *tāsānaṃ*. e.g., *bāḷhā me dukkhā vedanā abhikkamanti no paṭikkamanti abhikkamo sānaṃ paññāyati* S V.80,345. A few archaic forms of the reflexive pronoun *sa*, (Skr. *sva*) “one’s own”, occur mostly in the *gāthā* literature. e.g., *saṃ ñātiṃ atimaññati* Sn 104 “he disparages his own relatives”; *nihīno sena mānena* Sn 132 “devoid of his own pride”;

samhi āsane D II.225 “in his own seat”; *sehi dārehi* Sn 108; *sehi dhammehi* Sn 298.

Finally, it may be mentioned that a few eastern forms have crept into the pronominal declension as into the nominal. e.g., *ye* for *yad* or *yaṃ*, and *se* for *tad* or *tam*. These are also found in the passages already referred to (§10). e.g., *Tattha yañce savitakkaṃ savicāraṃ, ye avitakke avicāre se pañītatāre* D II.278; *evam eva kho, Sunakkhatta, sammā-nibbānādhimuttassa purisa puggalassa ye nevasaññānāsaññāyatana-saṃyojane se ucchinnamūle ...* M II.256 (cp. Prk. Gr. §423). The same form *se* occurs also in the frequent adverbs *seyyathā* D I.145 for *tad* + *yathā* “just as, such as” and *seyyathīdaṃ* D I.89;II.91; S V.421; It 99 “as follows” for *tad* + *yatha* + *idaṃ*. The eastern form *ye* for *yaṃ* is found also in compound *yebhuyyena* D I.17;II.139, which is made up of Skr. *yad* and *bhūyas*. The interrogative *ke* for *ko* m. sg. also occurs in one of the above-mentioned passages (*vide* §10).

Chapter I

The Nominative Case

[22]

§17. The Nom. of Subject.

a. The nominative or the first case (*paṭhamā vibhatti* = Skr. *prathamā vibhakti*), as in the older languages, is mainly used to express the *subject* of the simple sentence with the verb in the active voice. Indian grammar has no term to denote the subject of the active verb or *grammatical subject*. The term *karṭṛ* signifies only the agent or the *logical subject* (cp. Speyer SS p.l., f.n.l). The logical connection between the subject and the main verb varies according to the nature of the latter. With a transitive verb the subject denoted by the nom. case is the virtual *doer* of the action (*kriyā*) whose influence is exercised on some object. e.g., *seyyathā vā pan' Udāyi, puriso asiṃ kosiyaṃ pabbāheyya* M II.17 “As if a man, Udāyi, were to draw out his sword from the sheath”; *Bhagavā dhammaṃ deseti* M II.5 “the Blessed One preaches the doctrine”. But when the verb is intransitive the nom. merely expresses the person or thing about whom or which a statement is made, it being not implied that he, she, or it exercises any influence on another person or thing. Or viewed from another point, with such verbs the subject expressed by the nom. is the sufferer of the action. e.g., *Tathāgato loke uppajjati* D I.62 “the Master arises in the world”; *dīpā jhāyanti* D I.50 “lamps are burning”; *vaṭṭaṃ vaṭṭati* D II.64 “the round (of life) goes round”. In this last example the nom. and the verb are etymologically related, a phenomenon that can be compared to the cognate accusative (*vide* §35).

b. Not seldom the pronoun standing as the subject of a sentence can be omitted or left to be understood. e.g., *adinnâdānaṃ* [23] *pahāya adinnâdānā paṭivirato hoti* D I.63 “abandoning theft (*sci.* he = *so*) lives abstaining from taking what is not given”. In such instances the pronoun is obligatory if the subject is to be emphasized and not the predicate. e.g., *so dhammaṃ deseti* D I.62 “*he* preaches the doctrine”. In impersonal constructions an action expressed in the verb may sometimes be referred to (cp. Latin *demonstrare* to point out) by the demonstrative pronoun in the neuter sg. e.g., *tassa purisassa etad ahoṣi* D II.130 “to that man it occurred ...”; *mamaṃ hi pubbe etad ahoṣi* D I.18,III.29 “to me in the past it occurred ...”. The demonstrative adverb *evaṃ* is often substituted for the pronoun in such instances. e.g., *Tassa evaṃ assa* D I.71 “it would occur to him thus: ...”; *tumhākaṃ evaṃ assa* D II.154 “it would occur to you thus ...”.

§18. Subject of Clauses.

a. In the case of participial clauses especially those with the gerund in *-tvā* having the active sense,¹ the normal construction generally permits of the same nom. being the subject of the clause or clauses as well as of the main sentence. e.g., *Atha kho āyasmā Sāriputto nivāsetvā, pattacīvaraṃ ādāya, yena Dhānañjānissa brāhmaṇassa nivesanaṃ ten’ upasaṅkami, upasaṅkamitvā paññatte āsane nisīdi* M II.192 “Then the venerable Sāriputta having robed himself, taking his bowl and upper garment, went whither the dwelling of the brahmin Dhānañjānī was, having gone he sat on the seat that was

¹ When the gerund is passive in meaning the logical subject is denoted by the inst. case, being the agent.

prepared (for him)”. Here *āyasmā Sāriputto* is the subject of all the gerunds, viz., *nivāsetvā*, *ādāya* and *upasaṅkamitvā*.

b. Instances are not rare, however, in Pāli where the subject of the gerund expressed by the nom. of the *noun* may further be taken up by its corresponding *pronoun* which then ‘governs’ the main verb. e.g., *Yathā va pan’ eke bhonto samaṇa-brāhmaṇā saddhādeyyāni bhojanāni bhuñjitvā te evarūpaṃ bījagāma-bhūtagāmasamārambhaṃ anuyuttā viharanti* D I.5 “Since certain recluses and brahmins having eaten the food provided through faith live addicted to the injury of animate and inanimate [24] things”. Here the pronoun *te* could be omitted without any loss to the general construction of the sentence or to its meaning as a whole. But such repetitions, though unnecessary from a strictly syntactical point of view, are not foreign to the Pāli idiom. Indeed it is not impossible in Pāli even to have one subject for the clause and another logically different subject for the principal sentence. In the above example the subject in both clauses is logically the same, for *te* really stands for and refers to the nominal subject *brāhmaṇā*. But in the following instances the subject of the main clause is not the same as that of the secondary one. e.g., *api ca me bhante imaṃ dhammaṃ sutvā lomāni haṭṭhāni* M I.83 “however, Sir, having heard this doctrine my hair stood on end”; *Iti kho Ambaṭṭha itthiyā vā itthiṃ karitvā purisena vā purisaṃ karitvā khattiyā vā seṭṭhā hīnā brāhmaṇā* D I.98 “So it happens, Ambaṭṭha, that having taken woman to woman or man to man the warriors are the best and brahmins are inferior”; *addasaṃ kho ahaṃ ... itthiṃ mūlhaḡabbhaṃ ... disvāna me etad ahoṣi* M II.103 “I saw ... a woman suffering in delivery ... and having seen (her) it occurred to me.”; *Puna ca paraṃ, bhikkhave, sappuriso ... upasampajja viharati, paññāya c’ assa disvā āsavā parikkhayāpentī* M III.45 “Furthermore,

monks, a good man ... having entered abides therein, and having seen with his insight the cankers are destroyed”; in this last example the causative form of the verb *parikkhayāpenti* being apparently used for the passive, there seems to be some doubt about the reading.

c. On the borderline between the above two constructions we may place the following example where *app' ekacce*, though referring to an antecedent *brāhmaṇā-gahapatikā*, is still a syntactically different subject: *Atha kho Thullakoṭṭhitakā brāhmaṇā- gahapatikā yena Bhagavā ten' upasaṅkamīsu, upasaṅkamitvā app'ekacce Bhagavantaṃ abhivādetvā ekamantaṃ nisīdīsu, app'ekacce ... (etc.) ... M II.55* “Thereupon the brahmins and householders of Thullakoṭṭhita came to where the Blessed One was, and having come, a few saluting the Blessed One sat on a side, a few more ... (etc.) ...”. [25]

d. It is also not unusual in Pāli to find the same nom. appearing as subject of the principal sentence and of a relative clause at the same time, the connecting relative pronoun being absent. So we find such instances as: *Ayaṃ vuccati bhikkhave bhikkhu phegguṃ aggahesi brahmacariyassa tena ca vosānaṃ āpadi M I.192* “This (one) is called, brethren, a monk (*sci. who = yo*) has captured the pith of the Higher Life and thus attained the Consummation”.

§19. Nom. with Passive Verbs.

a. With passive verbs the nom. expresses the *logical object*, the logical subject being put in the agent case (inst.). In other words it denotes the original object, expressed in the acc. of the active verb. e.g., *dhammo ca desīyati* D III.264; A IV.225 “the doctrine too is preached”; *evarūpaṃ bhojanaṃ diyyati* D II.354 “food such as these is given”; *assutavā puthujjano na parimuccati* M I.8 “the unlearned worldling is not released”.

b. The logical object thus put in the nom. with passive verbs is not necessarily the ‘affected object’ with verbs of influence (*vide* §31); it may represent an original acc. denoting the *place gone to* with verbs of motion. e.g., *Āraññaken’ āvuso bhikkhunā nâtikālena ... gāmo pavisitabbo* M I.469 *lit.* “Brethren, by a monk dwelling in the forest the village should be entered before a long period (has elapsed)”. Here in the active construction the place entered may be denoted either by the acc. (*vide* §40) or the loc. (*vide* §165). The road along which or on which one walks is also subject to the same alternative construction but the loc. is by far the more frequent. This too is put in the nom. in the passive voice. e.g., *maggo kho me gantabbo* D III.255 “the road should be walked by me”. The sense of the verb (*gacchati*) in this passage shows that it could also be used ‘transitively’ meaning to traverse. In fact the idiom *maggam gacchati* actually occurs in the Nikāyas (*vide* §36.d.).

c. The *infinitive* when used with such words as *arahati* “deserves”, *sukara-* “easy” and *sakkā* “is possible”, as complement [26] to the predicate, exhibits a passive sense and consequently agrees with the nom. of the noun which in the original active form would have been

expressed by the acc. e.g., *Na arahati 'yasmā Ambaṭṭho ... abhisajjintuntī* D I.91 “The venerable Ambaṭṭha does not deserve to be accused”; *Nayidaṃ sukaraṃ agāraṃ ajjhāvasatā brahmacariyaṃ caritaṃ* M II.55 “This Higher Life is not easy to be practised by one living at home”; *Na kho pana mayā sukaraṃ anadhigatā vā bhogā adhigantaṃ adhigatā vā bhogā phātiṃ kātuṃ* M II.66 “It is not indeed easy either for unacquired riches to be acquired by me or those acquired to be increased”; *nāyaṃ sukaro ... jīvītā voropetaṃ* S III.113 “this (person) is not easy² ... to be deprived of life”; *Sakkā pana bhante upamā kātuṃ* Sn p.126 “Is it possible, Sir, for an illustration to be made?” From these examples it becomes clear that the *infinitive* in Pāli, just as in Vedic and later Skr. (cp. VSS §219), performs the syntactical functions of the active, middle and passive infinitives.

§20. The Predicative Nom.

a. The nom. is frequently found in a predicative function with verbs of ‘being’ such as *bhavati*, *atthi*, *vijjati*, *sampajjati* etc. which are, generally speaking, the so-called *verbum substantivum* (cp. SS §2.). It is also found with other verbs of allied meaning such as *viharati* and *vasati*. With all these the nom. strictly speaking constitutes the complement of the predicate. e.g., *ahaṃ tena samayena purohito brāhmaṇo ahoṣiṃ* D I.143 “At that time I was the brahmin chaplain”; *asappuriso nāto hoti yasassī* M III.38 “a wicked man is noted and prosperous”; *ete aṭṭha sahāyā ahesuṃ* D II.230 “these were eight friends”; *te kārā mahapphalā assu* M I.33 “these actions were greatly fruitful (*lit.* of -great- fruit)”; *aññadatthu Bhagavato sāvaka*

² cp. English “he is not easy to kill”.

sampajjanti M II.123 “but actually (they) become the disciples of the Blessed One”; *bhikkhu ... viharati ātāpī sampajāno satimā* M II.11 “the monk lives strenuous, mindful and self-possessed”.

b. But sometimes in Pāli just as in Skr. the so-called *verbum substantivum* is not subjoined to the noun predicate which may [27] be the nom. of a substantive, adjective or an adjectival formation. e.g., *taṃ jīvaṃ taṃ sarīraṃ ... aññaṃ jīvaṃ aññaṃ sarīraṃ* D I.157 “that (is) the life-principle and the same the body ... one the life-principle and another the body”; *ahaṃ pi manusso* D I.60 “I too (am) a man”; *sambādho gharāvāso rajāpatho, abbhokāso pabbajjā* M III.33 “home-life (is) an impediment and an abode of dust, renunciation (is) the open(-space)”; *bahukiccā mayaṃ bahukaraṇīyā* M III.14 “we (are) busy and full of duties”. The same is found with adjectival formations derived from verbs such as gerundives and the like. e.g., *So tattha puḍḍo, so tattha pāsaṃso* M III.41 “he (is) in this matter honourable, he (is) here praiseworthy”; *Na c’ esa brāhmaṇā pañho evaṃ pucchitabbo* D I.19 “This question, brahmin, (is) not-to-be-asked in this manner”. Since the verb is implied in these participles, the *verbum substantivum* is hardly ever subjoined in such cases.

c. When the subject of the sentence is a pronoun (demonstrative or relative) the gender of the latter follows that of the noun-predicate. e.g., *yaṃ mam’ assa upādānaṃ, so mam’ assa vighāto* D I.25 “What is my clinging (to existence), that would be vexation for me”; *so mam’ assa kilamatho, sā mam’ assa vihesā* M III.28 “that would be exhaustion for me, that would be annoyance for me”. In the first example here *so*, though referring to *upādānaṃ*, anticipates the gender of *vighāto* (masculine), whereas syntactically *taṃ* would be

more logical. This shows that Pāli in such cases prefers the pronominal adjective to the neuter pronoun or the pronominal substantive. So even with the interrogative pronoun the same agreement is found: *ko nu kho bho Gotama hetu ko paccayo* D I.144 “What (*lit.* which) is the reason, venerable Gotama, what is the cause ...?”; *ke tumhe hothâti* M II.157 “who are you?”. In these examples *ko* and *ke* are used in the masculine because *hetu*, *paccayo* and *tumhe* are of that gender. But exceptionally the nom. sg. of the neuter pronoun is found in similar constructions. e.g., *kiṃ hutvā kiṃ ahoṣiṃ ahaṃ atītaṃ addhānaṃ?* M I.8 “what had been I, what was I in the long past?”. Here *ko hutvā* etc. would be as permissible. [28]

d. Pāli just as Vedic and Classical Skr. (*vide* VSS §100) employs certain adjectives (nom.) predicatively where we would normally expect an adverb. Speyer regards this as peculiar to Indian syntax. In some of these we can substitute the adverbial acc. without any loss to the general construction. e.g., *yassa vitakkā vidhūpitā ajjhataṃ suvikappitā asesā* Sn 7, “whose reflections are destroyed and scattered complete (i.e. completely cp. adv. *asesaṃ*); *idha kusala-sīlā aparisesā nirujjhanti* M II.25,26 “here merits and virtues cease remainderless (i.e. without a remainder, cp. adv. of manner *aparisesaṃ*)”; *te caranti suddhā* D II.254 “they wander pure”; *yo ’haṃ ākiṇṇo viharāmi* D II.30 “that I (should) live crowded”; *cattāro ca Mahārājā catuddisā nisinnā honti* D II.221 “the Four Great Kings were seated on-the-four-sides” (*catuddisā* probably standing for *cātuddisā*, the derived adjective). All these nominatives logically correspond to adverbs of *manner*.

§21. The Nom. with *iti*.

With verbs of *speaking, thinking, knowing, considering, accounting for* and *reckoning* that which is stated about the object is denoted by the nom. followed by *iti*. The clause consisting of the nom. and *iti* is used *predicatively*. The nom. itself is however generally regarded as a predicative nominative (*vide* VSS §§14 & 99), though strictly speaking it approximates to a *label use* (§22). e.g., *Imaṃ kho ahaṃ Udāyi puggalaṃ saṃyutto ti vadāmi no visamaṃyutto* M I.453 “This individual, Udāyi, I say (is) under bondage (and) not free from bondage”; *anāpattiṃ āpattiṃ dīpentī* A V.78 “they make out a transgression (to be) a non-transgression”; *sīho ti attānaṃ samekkhiyānaṃ* D III.25 “considering himself as a lion” or “to be a lion”; *jānāsi taṃ pāsādaṃ ... ucco vā nīco vā majjhimo vā ti?* D I.194 “do you know whether that mansion is high, medium or low?”; *coro t’ eva saṅkhaṃ gacchati* M II.88 “he passes off as a thief”. This nom. (neuter singular) may sometimes be impersonally employed. e.g., *ariyasāvako ... virāgā vimuccati, vimuttasmiṃ vimuttaṃ iti nāṇaṃ hoti* M I.500 “the āryan disciple is emancipated through [29] non-attachment, on being emancipated he obtains the knowledge that there is emancipation”. A curious distortion of the same construction is found where the person about whom the statement is made is denoted by the nom. with *iti* and the thing said by the acc. e.g., *seyyaṃ so ti vadāmi; pāpiyaṃ so ti vadāmi* M II.179 “I declare he is better; I say he is worse”, which should normally stand as *taṃ seyyo ti vadāmi* etc.

§22. The Label Use of the Nom.

The nominative is also used when the noun or the idea of the noun alone is signified. This may be called the *label use* as distinct from the adverbial nom. described in the preceding paragraphs (cp. KVG §§529 etc.). The nom. is therefore found either *adverbally* as subject or predicate of the verb or *absolutely*, that is, as an entity separate from the rest of the construction of the sentence. There are no genuine *adnominal* uses of the nom. unless we regard so the nom. of opposition and the nom. that forms the first member of co-ordinative (*dvandva*) compounds. Local grammarians have defined the nom. as fundamentally expressive of this crude or label notion. Pāṇinī states: *prātipadikāṛthaliṅgaparimāṇavacanamātre prathamā* (II.3.46), “the first case serves only to signify the gender and number of the thing designated by the word’s crude form or *prātipadika*” (cp. SS p.26 f.n.). This is echoed by both Kaccāyana and Moggallāna. The former has only curtailed the Skr. grammarian’s definition: *liṅgatthe paṭhamā* (Kac. 286) which means, according to the *vutti*, that the first case-ending is used to express the gender and the mere designation of a thing (*liṅgatthābhidhānamatte paṭhamā vibhatti hoti*). The latter lays down the terse aphorism: *paṭhamatthamatte* (Mog. 39) which according to the *vutti* implies that the first case is employed to denote just the sense of the noun or the designation (*abhidheyya*) of the thing. Thus Pāli grammarians seem to have merely followed the existing tradition as regards the definition of the nom., and no Indian grammar refers categorically to its subjective or predicative uses. The orthodox schools are however not [30] agreed as to the exact meaning of ‘*liṅgatthe*’. According to the Kātantra system *prātipadika* or *liṅga* is defined as that crude form of a word which, though significant by itself, is other than roots and

detached from actual *vibhaktis* (*vide. Philosophy of Skr. Grammar*, p. 171). Anyhow it is clear enough that what they refer to here is the above-mentioned label use of the nom.

§23. [Label Usage]

This label use is mostly found when the nom. is employed alone as designation or title of a book, chapter, or any other literary composition. e.g., *Dīgha Nikāyo*, *Majjhima Nikāyo*, *Selasuttaṃ*, *Raṭṭhapālasuttaṃ* etc.. Here the nom. merely plays the part of a label. Such titles are mostly used absolutely, that is, without any case-ending, the crude form of the noun only being used.

b. It is frequently found in enumerations beginning with *seyyathīdaṃ* “*lit.* which is thus” or “such as” and *yadidaṃ lit.* “which is” or “that is, namely”. The nom. after the former may refer to an antecedent in some other case as illustrated by the following example where it refers to an inst.: ... *micchâjīvena jīvikaṃ kappenti seyyathīdaṃ maṇilakkhaṇaṃ daṇḍalakkhaṇaṃ ...* (etc.). D I.67 “they live by wrong means of livelihood such as: fortune-telling from jewels, fortune-telling from sticks, .. (etc.)”; *sammad eva āsavehi vimuccati seyyathīdaṃ kāmāsavā bhavāsavā diṭṭhāsavā* S II.187 “he is completely released from the cankers, namely, the canker of lust, the canker of becoming and the canker of false views”; *esa paccayo jarāmaṇassa yadidaṃ jāti* D II.57 “this is the reason for decay and death, namely birth”. In the following example the adverb *tattha* represents an antecedent loc. case: *atha kho ahaṃ eva tattha bhiyyo yadidaṃ adhimutti* D I.174 “Furthermore, I myself am superior even in that (*lit.* there), that is to say, higher emancipation”.

c. With *maññe* “methinks, as it were”, the person to whom someone else mentioned before is likened is denoted by the [31] nom. which stands detached from the rest of the construction; hence it is logically akin to the above-described label use. e.g., *ayaṃ hi rājā Māgadho Ajātasattu Vedehiputto ... paricāreti devo maññe* D I.60 “This king Ajātasattu of Magadha son of Vedehi ... amuses himself like a god”; *kevaṭṭā maññe macchavilope* M I.456 “like fisher-folk over (their) catch”; *putta-mattā maññe natta-mattā maññe* M I.460; Ud 24, “as it were, just sons and grandsons.”

§24. The Nom. of Apposition.

Closely related to the above label nom. is the one used in apposition to and side by side with another noun, which is usually the name of a person. e.g., *Raṭṭhapālo kulaputto* M II.57 “Raṭṭhapāla, the householder(-son)”; *Ayaṃ Aciravatī nadī pūrā udakassa* D I.224 “This river, Aciravatī, is full of water”. It has to be remarked in this connection that in Pāli as in Skr. such usages as ‘the city of Pāṭaliputta’ etc. are not permissible. There is no gen. of apposition in Indian languages, the nom. being the only idiom. The label function of such nominatives is clearly seen in such semi-absolute uses of it as found in: *yad ariyo sevāmano Satthā gaṇaṃ anusāsituṃ arahati* M II.216 “associating with which the noble one, the Master, is fit to instruct a school”. Its absolute nature is further seen by instances as the following where the nom. in apposition differs in number from the other: *assosi mahājanakāyo caturāsīti-pāṇa-sahassāni* D II.29 “(thus) heard the great assembly (of) 84,000 beings”.

b. Sometimes, however, the particle *nāma* which originally was the adverbial acc. of *nāman* (*vide* §2) is subjoined to the noun in

apposition. e.g., *Kālī nāma dāsī* M I.125 “the maid-servant, by name, Kālī”; *tāpasa-brahmacārī Nigrodho nāma* D I.176 “the ascetic-student Nigrodha by name”; *Raṭṭhapālo nāma kulaputto* (cp. above a.) M II.55 “the householder (-son), Raṭṭhapāla by name”; *Mano-padosikā nāma devā* D I.20 “gods by name ‘debauched through mind’”. [32]

c. With numeral nouns such as *sataṃ*, *sahassaṃ* and *sahassāni* the nom. of apposition or the partitive gen. (vide §144.c) are concurrently employed. The latter is by far the more popular construction (cp. PLS §117.c) but the nom. is not by any means rare. e.g., *pañcasatāni upāsakā* D II.93 “five hundred lay disciples”; *paro-sahassaṃ puttā* D I.89 “over a thousand sons”; *Gandhabbā cha sahassāni* Th 1.164 “six thousands (of) Gandhabbas”. These may be optionally construed with the gen. thus: *pañcasatāni upāsakānaṃ* “five-hundred of lay disciples”; *paro-sahassaṃ puttānaṃ* “over a thousand of sons”; *Gandhabbānaṃ cha sahassāni* “six thousands of Gandhabbas”.

§25. The Nom. in Elliptical Clauses.

The nom. is also met with, used in an absolute manner, that is to say, detached from the main construction, in certain elliptical clauses or sentences where *hoti* is almost invariably to be understood. But due to the frequency of such idioms the necessity for the predicate element is not always felt.

a. In the following examples *nāma* occurring in the parenthetical clause has the force of *hoti* and to a certain extent covers the gap in the construction: *Ekam samayaṃ Bhagavā Kurūsu viharati*

Kammāssadhammaṃ nāma Kurūnaṃ nigamo D II.55,291 “Once the Blessed One was living among the Kurūs - (*sci.* there was) Kammāssadhamma a hamlet of the Kurūs”; *sā kho pana bhante bhaginī parakāminī hoti; Sikhaddhi nāma Mātalissa saṅgāhakassa putto, taṃ abhikaṅkhati* D II.268 “That sister, Sir, was desirous of other men - there was Sikhaddhi, the son of the charioteer, - she loved him”.

b. Similar is the use of the nom. after the adverb *yena* in the frequent construction ‘*yena ... tena ...*’. e.g., *yena Bhagavā ten’ upasaṅkama* M II.91 “whither the Blessed One, thither repair”. But when a second place has to be mentioned for precision the adverb *yena* may either be repeated or the nom. alone may be used. e.g., *yena Sappiniyā tīraṃ (sci. yena) paribbājakārāmo ten’ upasaṅkami* A II.29 “whither the bank [33] of Sappinī, (whither) the hermitage of Wanderers, thither he repaired”.

c. Again, *hoti* is to be understood with the nom. found in hypothetical clauses with *seyyathâpi*. e.g., *Seyyathâpi, brāhmaṇa, puriso daḷiddo assako anāḷhiyo, tassa akāmassa ...* M II.181 “Supposing, brahmin, (there was) a man, poor, destitute and wretched and to him ...”; *seyyathâpi Mahārāja udaka-rahado* D I.74 “supposing, Great King, (there was) a lake”.

d. When a point in time or space is to be reckoned from another point, the noun denoting time or space is put in the nom. and the incident that occurred at that distant point is denoted by a clause beginning with *yaṃ* “that”. e.g., *ito so bhikkhave eka-navuto kappo yaṃ Vipassi Bhagavā ... loke udapādi* D II.2 “It was the ninety-first aeon from this one that the Blessed One Vipassi arose in the world”.

This use of the nom. is the same as that allowed by Skr. grammarians in such constructions as *śataṃ krośāḥ Somanāthāt* “a hundred krośas from Somanātha,” where, however, the acc. is the more logical idiom (*vide* Monier Williams Skr. Grammar § 823).

§26. The Nom. Absolute.

The *nom. absolute* is not a regular construction in either Pāli or Skr. It is not entirely absent in the latter but as an idiom is very rare (cp. Monier Williams, *Skr. Grammar* §840). In Pāli however it seems to have been noted as part of the established concinnity by the author of the *Niruttidīpanī* (p.146), who mentions a so-called nom. absolute. But in the example adduced, viz., *gacchanto Bhāradvājo so, addasā Ajjhutaṃ isiṃ*, the nom. *gacchanto Bhāradvājo* is also the subject of the final predicate *addasā* in spite of the presence of *so* (cp. the insertion of the demonstrative pronoun with the gerund, §18.b.), and consequently the nom. is not strictly speaking *absolute*. Duroiselle also in his *Pāli Grammar* (§603.ii) refers to a nom. absolute in Pāli but gives no examples. In the Nikāyas we come across a few uses of the nom. with the participle in agreement, that appear to be as much legitimate [34] absolute constructions as are the loc. or gen. absolute (§§180 &158). These even exhibit the *temporal* sense. But since it is hardly found in the Vedas or the Brāhmaṇas or even in later Skr. literature the only explanation as to its appearance in Pāli is that it is a characteristic of the popular speech out of which the literary Pāli arose. We are supported in this assumption by the fact that there is evidence for such an idiom in the dialect of the Asoka Inscriptions (cp. *t[a]-thā karu* “if one is acting thus”, Girnar XI.4., according to Hultzsch, *Syntax of Girnar*, p. ix.). Moreover the context in each case shows that there is a psychological reason behind the use: it is

mostly due to the fact that in a long statement the nom. of the subject with which the speaker begins is so far removed from the predicate that he loses sight of the intended construction and concludes the sentence in quite an unexpected manner. So we find usages as the following:

Samvaṭṭamāno loko yebhuyyena sattā Ābhassara-samvaṭṭanikā honti D I.17 “the world evolving, the beings for the most part become Ābhassara-gods; *Evam eva kho bhikkhave idh’ ekacco kulaputto imasmiṃ dhammavinaye agārasmā anagāriyaṃ pabbajito cattāri bhayāni paṭikaṅkhitabbāni* A II.123 “Thus when a certain householder enters ordination in this Doctrine and Training, four things should be feared”. Here the v.l. kulaputte etc. shows that it was even felt by the earlier editors to be an absolute construction, and the v.l. -ssa is also syntactically permissible as denoting the gen. with the verb of fearing, paṭikaṅkhati.

a. In both the above examples the subject of the principal sentence is different from that of the participial clause. Sometimes the construction appears less *absolute* owing to the subject of the sentence being only the pronoun (*so, sā, taṃ* or *tad*) referring to the subject of the clause, as in:

Sugato vā bhikkhave loke tiṭṭhamāno sugatavinayo vā tad assa bahujana-hitāya ... sukhāya devamanussānaṃ A II.147 “The Sugata, brethren, remaining in the world or his Way of Discipline, that would be for the advantage ... for the happiness of gods and men.” Here the concinnity would remain [35] even if *tad* were to be omitted; but Pāli prefers to take the nom. as after the gerund, which we have discussed earlier (§18.b.).

b. When the nom. is followed by the present participle *santa-* or *samāna-* the construction approximates to an *absolute* use due to the *temporal* sense implied in the participle. Still the nom. being the subject of the main sentence it cannot be strictly called an *absolute* nominative. Since it nevertheless constitutes a temporal participial clause, we may regard it as a *semi-absolute* construction. e.g., *Rājā samāno kiṃ labhati* D III.172 “Being a king what does he get?”; *itthattaṃ āgato samāno agārasmā anagāriyaṃ pabbajati* D III.31 “being come (i.e. having come) to this state he sets forth from home to homelessness”. In the following instance the context does not clearly show whether *santā* refers to antecedent *mayam* or the following *tapo-jigucchā*. In the former case it would be a genuine *nom. absolute*: *mayam kho bhante tapo-jiguccha-vādā ... viharāma. Kathaṃ santā nu kho bhante tapo-jigucchā paripuṇṇā hoti* D III.40.

§27. The Nom. of Address.

The person addressed is denoted by the nom. case or more particularly, the *vocative*. Though in the singular of certain declensions the forms of the latter differ from those of the former, still there is no logical difference in the employment of the two cases. Normally the crude form of the noun is only used. e.g., *ambho purisa* M II.33; *alaṃ samma ghaṭikāra* M II.46. In the feminine singular the voc. form differs prominently from that of the nom. e.g., *ayye* M I.299 “O lady!” beside the nom. *ayyā*. Local grammarians too enjoin the use of the nom. for the purpose of denoting the person addressed. Pāṇinī denotes this use by the term *āmantrita* (II.3.48) and lays down in the next sūtra that the voc. sg. is especially to be called *sambuddhi*. What is remarkable is that they do not make any syntactical difference between the nom. and the voc.

(Pāṇ. *sambodhane ca*, *ibid* 47 and *sāssamantritaṃ* 48; Kac. *ālapane ca* 287; Mog. *āmantaṇe* 40) and do not consider the voc. as a distinct eighth case (cp. SS §38. & f.n.). It is peculiar to Buddhaghosa's terminology that [36] he explains this use as 'the case denoting the person engaged in listening to what is said' (*kathāsavaṇa-yuttapuggala-vacanaṃ*, Papañca-sūdanī I. p.13).

A few special voc. forms used for polite address are also found such as *āvuso* M I.184 "friend" and *bhante* D II.154,283 "Sir, venerable one". The former probably has its origin in an older **āyuṣaḥ* (the derived adj. from *āyus* "life") having the sense of "O long-lived one!" and the suggested derivation from *āyuṣman* or the pl. base *āyuṣmant* seems to be phonetically less likely (*vide* PLS §46.1. and P.T.S. Dict. *s.v.*). The latter (*bhante*) is regarded as a Māgadhism (PLS §98.3.) corresponding to Skr. *bhadanta* (cp. *Prk. Gr.* §366.b.). Both these forms may appear in syntactical agreement with a pl. verb. To this class also belongs the use of the nom. with the third person implied in *bhavaṃ*. e.g., *Taṃ kiṃ maññati bhavaṃ Mahā Brahmā* D II.228 "What does the great Brahma think? (i.e. What do you think, O great Brahma?).

§28. The Nom. of Exclamation.

The nom. when used in an exclamatory function is free from any syntactical connection and may be regarded as akin to the *label* use. Viewed from another point it is logically related to the *nom. of address*. It is mostly found with such exclamatory particles as *aho* etc. e.g., *aho Buddho aho dhammo aho dhammassa svākkhātā ti vadeti* M II.96 "he says: a marvel, the Buddha! a marvel, the Doctrine! a marvel, its perfect exposition!"; *aho sukhaṃ aho*

sukhanti Ud 20 “alas happiness! alas happiness!”; *aho nūna Bhagavā, aho nūna kusalo* M II.31 “a marvel, the Blessed One! a marvel indeed the (power of) goodness!”. This may sometimes appear without any exclamatory particle. e.g., *samaṇassa mahiddhikatā mahānubhāvātā* M II.144 “the greatness of his powers, the greatness of his majesty!”.

a. Not seldom is met with a nom. of certain adjectives and pronouns used in an exclamatory sense expressing usually [37] *surprise, confusion, bewilderment, a longing* or a *wish* such as in greeting. It is however doubtful whether these are nominatives of the neuter adjectives and pronouns as the preceding with *aho* of the acc. singular of exclamation as found in Skr. with *dhik* (SS §56) and in Latin. But in the instances found in the Nikāyas the ending *-aṃ* seems more likely to be the nom. sg. neuter agreeing with an implied *taṃ* or *etaṃ* in an impersonal construction. e.g., *acchariyaṃ vata bho abbhutaṃ vata bho* M II.144; D II.107 “(it is) wonderful indeed, marvellous indeed!”; *sāgataṃ bhante Bhagavato* D II.173; M I.212,514 “Welcome! to the Blessed One”; *alaṃ Vakkali kiṃ te iminā pūtikāyena diṭṭhena* S III.120 “enough ! Vakkali, what is the use of seeing this putrid body for you?”; *kiṃ pana bhante saddaṃ assosīti* D II.130 “what! Sir, have you heard any sound?” (cp. English ‘what!’).

b. The pronouns *ayaṃ, idaṃ* etc. are sometimes used with a semi-exclamatory sense though agreeing with a following nom. which however they do not qualify in strict logical sense. Here the pronoun is very much like a particle of demonstration such as English ‘here!’ and ‘there!’. e.g., *Ayaṃ samaṇo Gotamo āgacchati* M II.2,30, “here! the recluse Gotama is coming”; *nisīdatu bhante Bhagavā, idaṃ āsanaṃ paññattaṃ* M II.2 “may the Blessed One sit down, here! a seat has been prepared”.

Chapter II

The Accusative Case

[38]

§29. [General Character]

The primary function of the acc. or the second case (*dutiyā*) is to denote the *direct* or *near object*, in other words, that which is mainly affected by the verb-concept. Brugmann favours the term *grammatical object* in this connection (KVG §866). The name *kamma* (Skr. *karman*) of the local grammarians, on the other hand, strictly means the *logical object*, whatsoever may be its grammatical function; it implies the object of the active verb as well as the subject of the passive or the objective genitive (cp. SS p.I, f.n.). Apparently Indian grammar did not distinguish between the *grammatical* and the *logical object*, just as it did not make any difference between the subject and the agent, both being commonly denoted by the same term *kattā* (Skr. *kartṛ*) meaning literally “doer” (*vide* §17). The logical connection between the object and the verb, just as in the case of the subject and the latter, varies according to the nature of the action (*kriyā*). The acc. is more conspicuously *adverbial* than any other case. Even in its *adnominal* function the other noun to which it is connected bears a marked predicative character, being usually a verbal noun, agent-noun or some such formation.

§30. [Local Grammarians]

“That which the agent does or performs is the object” says Kaccāyana,¹ while Pāṇinī² defines it as “That which is most desired (*sci.* to be affected) by the agent”. Moggallāna has no special rule for this purpose but lays down in the *vutti*³ that “what is done by, or is intimately connected with, the action of the agent is the object”. It may be remarked that none of these gives a comprehensive idea of the logical function of the object but rather tries to explain the connection between the agent and the object. This is due to the common characteristic of all Indian grammarians, [39] namely, dealing with syntax only from the point of view of the agent and not viewing the sentence as one whole psychological unit. Strictly speaking Kaccāyana’s definition holds good only for verbs like *making, doing, performing* etc., while Pāṇinī and Moggallāna come closer to, if not actually anticipate, the modern conception, namely, that the noun-concept that is affected by verbs of *influence* is the object and is put in the acc. case (*vide* KVG §560). But the defect of Pāṇinī’s method is evident from his next *sūtra* “Or that which is not desired if it is not connected with the verb”, illustrated by “*viṣaṃ bhakṣyati*” and “*caurān paśyati*”, whereby he attempts to surmount the difficulty caused by the narrow meaning of the term ‘*īpsitatamaṃ*’ (most desired). Patañjali however thought that this rule might be done away with.⁴ As regards Kaccāyana’s definition, the only justification is that the verb of physical action is best instanced

¹ *yaṃ karoti taṃ kammaṃ*. Kac. 282.

² *karturīpsitatamaṃ*. Pāṇ. I.4.49.

³ *karīyati kattukiriyāyâbhisambandhīyatīti taṃ kammaṃ*, on the sutta *kamme dutiyā*. Mog. II.2.

⁴ *vide Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar*, p. 258.

by the root *kṛ* (*karoti*) “to do, to make”. All the examples he adduces contain either that verb or an equivalent. But Moggallāna appears to have taken a wider view, for his illustrations extend to such verbs as *pacati* “cooks” and *passati* “sees”. As usual, of course, both the Pāli grammarians for the most part merely repeat the conventional illustrations of Pāṇini (e.g., *kaṭaṃ karoti*).

§31. The Acc. of External Object.

Verbs of direct agency or verbs of *influence* (i.e. affecting) in their primitive or non-causative state may take an *external object* (cp. KVG §561) that is, the noun put in the acc. case may denote an actual, physical or material, object such as a person, thing or place. This may be called the *concrete external object*. e.g., *mā Tathāgataṃ vihesesi* M I.332 “do not harass the Tathāgata”; *gāviṃ vadhitvā* M I.58 “having killed a cow”; *gattāni anomajjāmi* M I.80 “I rub down the limbs”; *te bhoge rājāno vā haranti, ... aggi vā dahati, udakaṃ vā vahati* M I.86 “those riches either kings (will) seize, ... the fire burn or the water carry away”; *thusodakaṃ pivāmi* M I.77 “I drink gruel”; *andhakāre telapajjotaṃ dhāreyya* M I.512 “would hold a lamp in the darkness”; *kaṭṭhāni pāḷenti* Sn p.104 “chop wood”. [40]

a. The same external object may represent an abstract concept such as a mental state in which case we have an *abstract external object*. e.g., *Samaṇo Gotamo dhammaṃ deseti* M I.77 “The recluse Gotama preaches the doctrine”; *abrahmacariyaṃ pahāya* M I.345 “having abandoned immoral conduct”.

b. Some of these verbs of *influence* or *affecting* may permit of an etymological object. e.g., *āhāraṃ āhāreti* D I.166; II.203 “takes food”;

-*bhojanaṃ bhojīṃha* M I.367 “I ate a meal”; *manṭaṃ manṭeyya* D I.104 “would utter a charm”.

§32. [Object]

There are some other verbs which can be only in an abstract sense called verbs of *affecting*. Such are those of *seeing*, *knowing*, *perceiving*, *hearing* and the like. With these the actual effect of the action is more or less on the agent himself and the physical object is merely the cause for that influence. e.g., *satte passāmi* M I.504 “I see beings”; *dharmapariyāyaṃ sutvā* M I.83 “having heard the doctrinal system”; *jāṭisamudayaṃ pajānāti* M I.50 “knows the origin of birth”. Local grammarians denote this function by the term ‘*viṣayatva*’ or “the state of being the object of cognition”.⁵

§33. The Adnominal Acc. of Ext. Object.

In the above example the acc. is used *adverbally*, that is, the noun-concept is the object of a proper verb which is the predicate of the sentence or the clause. Corresponding to each of these we may have an *adnominal* construction, where the acc. represents the object not of an actual verb but only one implied by a verbal noun, agent-noun or a similar formation of a verbal character. In such cases there is the alternate construction with the gen. of the object (§143). Certain dependent (*tatpuruṣa*) determinative compounds which preserve the acc. of the first member (*aluk-samāsa*), such as *piyaṃ-vada* D II.163 “pleasant-speaking”, also belong to this class. In the adnominal construction too we may have all the logical

⁵ vide *Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar*, p. 199.

differences as were found in the adverbial such as the *concrete*, the *abstract* and so on. Here the second member [41] which is really the verb-concept or the predicative element though employed nominally may be either an agent-noun, verbal substantive, verbal adjective, or any other secondary formation such as those with the suffixes *-ka* and *-ika*. e.g.; Agent-noun: *samaṇaṃ vā brāhmaṇaṃ vā apasādetā* D III.44 “reproacher (of) recluse or brahmin”; *samagga-karaṇiṃ vācaṃ bhāsītā* D I.64; 154 “speaker (of) uniting speech”; *aññe samaṇabrāhmaṇe pucchitā* D I.51 “questioner (of) other recluses and brahmins”; *attānaṃ āvikattā* M II.125 “revealer (of) himself”; *pāṇaṃ jīvītā voropetā* M II.103 “depriver of life (of) being(s)”; Verbal noun: *Gotamaṃ dassanāya* D I.113 “for the purpose of seeing Gotama”; *dassana-kāmā hi mayāṃ taṃ Gotamaṃ* D I.150 “we are desirous of seeing that Gotama”. Here the expressions *dassanāya* and *dassana-kāmā* are almost infinitives of purpose (cp. PLS §77). Verbal adjective: *bhattaṃ bhuttāvissa* D II.127 “of one-who-has-taken (his) meal”; Secondary formations: *ārādhako hoti nāyaṃ dhammaṃ kusalāṃ* M II.197 “is one undertaking (accomplishing) the method, the law and what is good”.

§34. The Acc. of Internal Object.

When the noun-concept is represented as the result of an action and that result outlasting the process of the action exists separately, it is called the acc. of internal object (cp. KVG §561.2.). This is known as *nirvavṭṭya karman* according to orthodox grammarians. In an example like *ghaṭam karoti* “makes a pot” it is held that the pot is not logically supposed to have existence prior to the action, and, therefore, it is not strictly correct to take *ghaṭa* as an example of

karmakāraka.⁶ The contention appears to be reasonable when we consider the fact that it is actually not the pot which is made but the clay which is made into a pot. But this however does not affect the actual grammatical relation existing between *karoti* and the object. Naturally enough, therefore, the internal object is only found with such verbs as those of *making, building, constructing, creating* and the like, e.g., *nivāsanāni māpetuṃ* D II.87 “to build dwellings”; *Samīti yānakāraputto rathassa nemiṃ tacchati* M I.31 “Samīti the [42] cartwright(-son) fashions a *rim* for the chariot”; *app’ekacce uddhanāni khaṇanti* Sn p.104 “some dig out fireplaces”.

a. Just as in the case of the external object this can also appear in an abstract sense. e.g., *kopaṃ na pātukaroti* M I.125 “does not manifest anger”. Here the noun and the verb are frequently etymologically related. e.g., *udānaṃ udānesi* D II.186 “uttered a solemn utterance”; *anuttaraṃ sammāsambodhiṃ abhisambuddho* D II.140 “realized unsurpassed and perfect Enlightenment (*lit.* awoke to the highest Awakenment)”.

b. These constructions may occur *adnominally* as well. e.g., *na dhūmaṃ kattā hoti* M I.220 “is not a producer of smoke”; *pāpakaṃ cittaṃ uppādetā* M I.79 “producer (of) evil thought”.

§35. The Object of Contents.

The same internal object may represent a nominal concept that exists only during the verbal action. The noun put in the acc. thus denotes the process by which the action is manifested. Since it is contained

⁶ vide *Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar*, p. 218.

within the action it has been called the *object of contents* (KVG §561.2.b.). By their very nature of being simultaneous with the verbal process they consist generally of *cognate* uses. e.g., *vitakkaṃ vitakkessati* M I.122 *lit.* “will think a thought” i.e., “reflect”; *loka-cintaṃ cinteti* S V.447 “thinks a worldly thought”; *mā pāpakaṃ akusalaṃ cittaṃ cinteyyātha* S V.418 “do not think any evil, unmeritorious thought”; *dussutaṃ assumha* M II.185 “we have heard a bad thing (*lit.* a bad hearing)”; *vedanaṃ vedeti* M I.90 “he feels a sensation”; *sīhanādaṃ nadeyyaṃ* D III.23 “roars a lion’s roar”; *karuṇaṃ jhānaṃ jhāyati* D II.239 “he meditates (a meditation) on compassion”; *kumāra-kīlikaṃ kīli* D II.96 “he played children’s games”; *brahmacariyaṃ carivā* D II.208 “having lived the Higher Life”; *caratha bhikkhave cārikaṃ* D II.45,250 “wander forth, O monks, (*lit.* the wandering)”; *nāgāpalokitaṃ Vesāliṃ apaloketvā* D II.122 “having taken (*lit.* looked) a majestic (*lit.* elephant’s) look at Vesāli”.

a. Sometimes the verb used may not be the same as the radical element of the noun but may be *cognate* only in sense. e.g., *cetiya-cārikaṃ* [43] *āhiṇḍantā* D II.141 “travelling on pilgrimage”; *pahāraṃ dadeyya* M I.124 “would give a blow”; *seyyaṃ kappemi* M I.78 “I make my bed”.

b. To this class also belong certain compound verbs where the first member is the acc. singular of a substantive standing as *internal object*, in most cases *cognate*, to the verb *karoti*, which here does not contain the full meaning of “to do” or “to make” but merely expresses the cognate idea contained in the noun. e.g., *padakkhiṇaṃ katvā* D II.40,163 “having gone round to the right” (i.e. having paid his respects); *dukkhass’ antaṃ karonti* D II.252 “they make an end of

Sorrow”; *ātappaṃ akarūṃ* D II.256 “they made an effort”; *rajjam kāreyya* D II.140 “would administrate the government”; *kālam karissati* D II.93,140 “he will die”; in verse the acc. may appear after the verb, thus: *taṃ jano kurute piyaṃ* Dh 217 “him the people love”, which should normally stand as *taṃ jano piyaṃ kurute*; hence the Comy. glosses it by *piyaṃ karoti* (*vide* Dh Comy. III.286).

§36. Secondary Uses of the Acc. of Object.

Many uses of this acc. seem to border on the logical spheres of other cases. The following division may be admitted:

a. With verbs of *asking, begging, imploring, learning* etc. the *person* asked and so on is denoted by the acc.. Here the abl. as found used in Sanskrit (SS §95.5.) appears to be the more logical construction. e.g., *bhikkhate pare* Dh 266 “he begs (from) others”; *Bhagavantaṃ yāci* D II.104 “he implored the Blessed One”; *sakaṃ ācariyakaṃ uggahetvā* D II.104,105 “having learnt from his teacher”. With verbs of *fearing* the source of fear, if it is a *thing*, is optionally construed with an abl. (§122.e.) or a gen. (§150.c.), but if it is a *person* the acc. seems to be the more proper case. e.g., *bhāyasi maṃ samaṇāti* S I.207; Sn p.48 “do you fear me, recluse?”

b. The inst. is the usual case to signify the *person with whom* one *converses* or *talks* (§63.a.iv), but the acc. is used to denote the *person talked to*, implied by the prefix *ā-* (cp. Kac. 309). e.g., [44] *sace maṃ samaṇo Gotamo ālapissati ahaṃ pi taṃ ālapissāmi* S I.77 “if the recluse Gotama talks to me I shall also talk to him”. Other examples of such verbs taking the acc. will be given later (§58.c.). Logically

related to such uses is the acc. of the person addressed (cp. SS §42). e.g., *bhikkhū āmantesi* D II.90 “addressed the monks”.

c. Sometimes the acc. is used where the dat. is also admissible. With the verb *saddahati* “to have faith in or to trust” the normal idiom is the dat. (§94.a.) or the loc.(§166.c.) of the *person* trusted, but the acc. of the *thing*. e.g., *saddahati Tathāgatassa bodhiṃ* A II.66 “has faith in the Enlightenment of the Tathāgata”. With verbs of *teaching* the older idiom is the dat. of the *person taught* but the acc. is also found. e.g., *amhe vācessasi* S I.120 “you will teach us”. It has to be remarked here, however, that the verb has the causative form and the acc. may denote the original subject of the primitive verb, in which case the meaning will be “you will cause us to recite”.

d. In Pāli just as in Sanskrit (*vide* SS §42) certain verbs normally regarded as ‘intransitives’ occur with a different sense construed with the acc. denoting an object. The acc. with most of these seems originally to have implied *relation*. Such verbs are: *roceti* in the secondary sense of “approve of”. e.g., *kassa vā tvaṃ dhammaṃ rocesi* M I.170; S I.133 “whose doctrine do you approve of”; *cinteti* in the sense of “think about, reflect over, consider”. e.g., *diṭṭhigatāni cintayanto* Sn 834 “thinking about the heresies”; *rodati* in the sense of “cry about or at, lament over”. e.g., *matam vā amma rodanti ... kasmā maṃ amma rodasīti* Th 1. 44 “they weep for one dead ... why mother do you weep for me”; *arahati* in the sense of “be as worthy as”. e.g., *arahasi vā maṃ tvaṃ na vā maṃ tvaṃ arahasīti* D I.99 “are you held as worthy as I or are you not ... ?”; *gacchati* in the ‘transitive’ sense of “walk, traverse”. e.g., *maggam kho pana me gacchantassa kāyo kilamissati* D III.255 “of me going the way the

body will be tired”, which may logically be regarded as a cognate use. [45]

§37. The Acc. of Direction.

Verbs which imply motion *towards* any object which may be a person, place or condition take an acc. of such a noun-concept. This has been also called the *acc. of the aim* (SS §40). Verbs of this type are usually those of pure motion such as the following frequently employed in the Nikāyas: *gacchati* with or without the prefixes *upa-*, *anu-*, *adhi-*, etc.; *kamati* usually with *abhi-*, *ava- upa+saṃ-*; *yāti* with *abhi-*, *ni(s)-*, *ud-*, *abhi+ud-*; *eti* with *upa-*; *sarati* with *anu-*; *dhāvati* with *anu-*; *ruyhati* with *ā*; *gāhati* with *ava-*; *pajjati (pad)* with *ā-*, *ud-*, *paṭi-*, *upa-*; *visati* with or without prefixes; *vattati* with *pa-*; *kirati* with *ava-*; *vassati* usually with *abhi+ni-*. In most of these, especially in the last three examples, the acc. is usually regarded as being due to the prepositional force of the prefixes. But in the earlier language a verb of the type of *varṣati* was capable of taking the acc. even without any prefix (cp. SS 42). These prefixes are generally supposed to change the so-called intransitive verbs into transitives. According to this view the acc. with the above verbs when they occur with any of the said prefixes is due to its being the *object*. But in Old Indo-Aryan such indeclinables as *ā*, *adhi*, *anu*, *pari*, *pra* etc. are found both as prepositions and postpositions just as in Old Greek. In Indo-European the so-called prepositions were merely directional *adverbs* referring to an action but later came to attach themselves and ‘govern’ particular case forms of nouns like the acc., inst., abl., gen., and loc., thus losing their separate and independent existence as

help-words in the sentence.⁷ Their pre-verbal use is due to the peculiar syntactical relation they bore to the verb as adverbs. Classical Sanskrit shows fewer particles with a prepositional or postpositional employ than Vedic (*vide* VSS §§85 - 90). In Pāli they are hardly used as *adnominal* prepositions.

§38. The Acc. of the Aim.

Local grammarians consider the varied logical functions of the acc. with such verbs under the common category of *gati* i.e. *motion* (*vide* Kac. 302). Nevertheless according to the various [46] meanings implied by the verb, with or without prefixes, these uses differ from one another in the syntactical relations expressed.

a. The simplest use of this acc. is to denote the *person, place* or *thing to* or *towards* which motion is directed. This may be called the *terminal acc.* e.g., *pokkharaniṃ āgamissati* M I.76 “will go to the pond”; *so ālāhanaṃ gantvā gantvā* M II.60 “he having gone continually to the cemetery”; *dakkhiṇaṃ janapadaṃ gantvā* D I.96 “having gone to the southern country”; *khattiya-parisaṃ upasaṃkamitvā* D II.109 “having approached (*lit.* walked to) the assembly of princes”; *uyyāna-bhūmiṃ niyyāsi* D II.179 “went (*lit.* down) to the pleasure-ground”; *yaṃ paṭidhāveyyātha* M III.9 “whom you would run back to”; *maṃ Mithilaṃ paṭinetu* M II.80 “lead me back to Mithilā”; *na heṭṭhāpāsādaṃ orohati* D II.21 “he does not descend to the lower storey”; *pāsādaṃ āruyha* D II.39 “having ascended to the terrace”; *paṭhavikāyaṃ anupeti* D I.55,180 “goes to

⁷ vide S. Chatterjee, *Origin and Development of the Bengali Language*, Vol. II §509.

an earthly body”. Sometimes two accusatives of *aim* may appear with the same verb in the same sentence. e.g., *abhikkāmuṃ bhikkhūṇaṃ samitiṃ vanaṃ* D II.256 “they went to the meeting of the monks to the forest (i.e. in the forest)”. A similar double acc. construction is found with the stock phrase *saraṇaṃ gacchati*. e.g., *Bhagavantaṃ saraṇaṃ gacchāmi* A III.242; M I.290; D I.116 “I go to the Blessed One as refuge”; *saraṇaṃ taṃ upema* Sn 31 “we go to you as refuge”. Commenting on the frequent phrase *Buddhaṃ saraṇaṃ gacchāmi* Buddhaghosa makes the following observation:⁸ “In elucidation of the *gamana*-formula a critic has urged: In the phrase *Buddhaṃ saraṇaṃ gacchāmi*, he who goes to the Buddha for (*lit.* to) refuge, may go either to the Buddha or for (*lit.* to) refuge. In either case the (use) of one word is meaningless, because there is no double object for the action of *going*; nor do the grammarians find here a double object as in ‘*ajaṃ gāmaṃ neti*’ etc.. It is however (a) proper (construction) as in the case of ‘he goes to the east and he goes to the west’”. Thus he regards both as accusatives of *direction*.

b. Sometimes however the *termination* denoted by the acc. may be unspecified. In other words the mere direction may be [47] only implied, which is generally due to the indefinite nature of the noun-concept. e.g., *puratthimaṃ disaṃ pavattati* D II.172 “rolled on

⁸ “*Gamaṇīyadīpanāyaṃ codako āha: Buddhaṃ saraṇaṃ gacchāmīti ettha, yo Buddhaṃ saraṇaṃ gacchati, esa Buddhaṃ vā gaccheyya saraṇaṃ vā; ubhayathā pi ca ekassa vacanaṃ niraṭṭhakaṃ, kasmā gamaṇakiriyāya kammaḍvayābhāvato, na h’ ettha ‘ajaṃ gāmaṃ netīti’ ādisu viya dikammaḍakattaṃ akkharacintakā icchanti, gacchat’ eva pubbaṃ disaṃ, gacchati pacchimaṃ disanti ādisu sātṭhakaṃ evāti ce*” Paramatthajotikā I, pp. 17-18.

towards the eastern direction”; *nabhaṃ abbhussukkamāno* D II.183 “ascending to(-wards) the sky”.

c. With certain verbs of going having the prefix *abhi-* it denotes the person or party *against whom* one marches etc. e.g., *asurā deve abhiyaṃsu* S I.216 “the demons marched against the gods”; *rājānaṃ Pasenadiṃ Kosalaṃ abbhuyyāsi* S I.93 “he marched against King Pasenadī of Kosala”.

d. When they have the prefix *anu-* the acc. denotes the object or person that is *pursued*. This application may cover such English usages as “in the wake of” or “after”. e.g., *mā sandiṭṭhikaṃ hitvā kālikaṃ anudhāvi* S I.9 “do not leave the present and run after the future”; *phalaṃ anusarati* S IV.303 “follows up the result”. It is also found with the verb *anubandhati* where the original root (*bandh* “tie, connect”) is not one of pure *motion* but gains such an implication by the addition of the prefix *anu-* through the figurative sense of “start after”, hence “follow”. e.g., *Bhagavantam anubaddhā honti* D II.102 (cp. D I.1) “they were following (*lit.* started after) the Blessed One”.

e. When the prefix *adhi-* is added to the verb of *motion* the acc. logically borders on that of the *external object*. Such verbs are generally treated as ‘transitives’. e.g., *madhupiṇḍikaṃ adhigaccheyya* M I.114 “he would obtain a ball of honey (*lit.* come to)”; *kusalaṃ dhammaṃ adhigaccheyya* D I.224 “he would attain to something good”, *lit.* “he would come to or up to something good”.

§39. Acc. of Direction in Abstract Sense.

In certain metaphorical constructions we find the acc. used with similar verbs of *motion*, implying the aim in an abstract sense. e.g., *āgato imaṃ saddhammaṃ* M I.47 “come to this good doctrine”; *so yasaṃ paramaṃ patto* Sn 138 “he attaining to the highest glory”; *paṭhamajjhānaṃ samāpajji* D II.156 “attained to the first ecstatic state”; *uccāvacaṃ āpajjati* D II.283 “comes now [48] to the high now to the low”; *pallomaṃ āpadiṃ* M I.20 “came to (i.e. got) confidence”; *bhavaditṭhiṃ upagatā* M I.65 “come to the false doctrine of existence”; *gārayhaṃ thānaṃ āgacchati* D I.161 “comes to a blameworthy position”; *vuddhiṃ virūḷhaṃ ... āpajjissathāti* D II.63 “would attain to growth and magnitude”; *vosānaṃ āpādi* M I.196 “came to the end”; *visādaṃ vā pāpuṇāti* D I.248 “he comes to grief (*lit.* dejection)”. Various other nuances of the same use may be observed:

a. Certain other abstract uses of the acc. of *direction* consist of stereotyped idioms where it merely forms part of the verb. Such compound verbs generally have the implied sense of *considering* or *reckoning*. Logically they can be compared to the compound verbs with *karoti* (§35.b.). e.g., *saṅkhaṃ upeti* S III.93 “is reckoned as (*lit.* goes to the category)”; *saṅkhaṃ gacchati* D I.200 “is considered as”; *saṅgahaṃ gacchati* M I.184 “is considered as (within)”; *samodhānaṃ gacchati* M I.184; A I.234 “is included”.

b. The acc. construed co-ordinately with the inst. in idioms of the type of *kālena kālaṃ* also belongs to this group. e.g., *te kālena kālaṃ upasaṅkamitvā* D III.60 “they having come from time to time”, where the Comy. has ‘*kālena kālaṃ ti kāle kāle*’ (Sum.III.851). Even

in the following the acc. really belongs to the idiom *añkena añkaṃ* and is not necessarily the acc. of direction with the verb *pariharīyati* “is carried”: *añkena añkaṃ pariharīyati* D II.20 “is taken care of (or carried) from hip to hip”. But the normal sense of *pariharati* in the Nikāyas is generally the former, that is, “attends to, takes care of, etc.” (*vide* P.T.S. Dict. *s.v.*).

§40. The Acc. of the Goal.

The acc. may also denote the place or state *entered*, that is, the actual *goal into which* motion is implied. This is mostly found with verbs of *descending, entering, falling, throwing, being born into* and the like. It is only to be expected here that the loc. is, if not the more frequent, at least the concurrent construction (§165). e.g., *mātu-kucchiṃ okkamati* D II.108; III.103 “he enters into the mother’s womb”; *pokkharaniṃ otarituṃ* S I.123 “to descend into [49] the pond”; *ogahe te thanūdaraṃ* D II.266(V.) “I would enter into thine bosom”; *samuddaṃ ajjhogahetvā* D II.173 “having descended into the ocean”; *gehaṃ pavisante* M II.178; D I.83 “entering the house”; *vihāraṃ pavisitvā* D II.143 “having entered the monastery”; *upari-vehāsaṃ khitto* S II.184 “thrown into the sky above”; *aṅgārakāsaṃ papatissāmi* M I.65 “I shall fall into the pit of charcoal”. When the noun-concept in the acc. denotes a person the use is more or less *abstract*. e.g., *Tatra vata maṃ bhayaṃ vā sārappaṃ okkamissati* M I.72 “In that matter, fear or flurry will come upon me” (*lit.* enter into me).

a. With the verb *uppajjati* “be born”, the acc. and the loc. are promiscuously employed in the Nikāyas. Logically however the former’s application seems to be due to the original meaning of

“attain to” (*uppajj-* < Skr. *ud+pad* = step up) which develops into the sense of “be born into” (cp. Skr. *utpāda* = birth), and, the latter (loc.) is construed with it as denoting the *place where* one is born (§163.a.iii) according to this derived meaning of the verb. In any case the acc. here signifies *direction* in the wider sense. e.g., *Tusitaṃ kāyaṃ uppajjati* D II.14 “is born into the Happy Abode”; *Vessavaṇassa Mahārājassa sahavyataṃ uppajjāmi* D II.206 “I am born into the company of Vessavaṇa, the Great King”; *saggaṃ lokaṃ uppajjanti* D II.142 “they are born into the heavenly world”; *nirayaṃ uppannaṃ* D I.162; III.264 (cp. D II.208; A IV.75) “(him) born into hell”.

b. The acc. denoting the *surface on to which* motion is implied also comes under this category. It is found with verbs of the type of *abhivassati* “rain on to, upon” and *okirati* “scatter upon”. Here too the loc. can be optionally employed, e.g., *mahiṃ iva sūro abhivassaṃ* D III.160 “like the rain showering on the earth”; *sarītraṃ okiranti* D II.137 “fall on (to) the body” (*lit.* scatter).

§41. Secondary Uses of the Acc. of Direction.

With verbs having the sense of *bending towards, leaning, depending, hanging on, clinging on to* and *tending to* the acc. logically implies *direction* just as in the examples adduced in the preceding [50] paragraphs. Speyer puts such uses on the boundary between the acc. of *near object* and the acc. of the *aim* (SS §40). Though these verbs do not imply any motion in the fundamental sense, still, being of a dynamic character, they are capable of taking an acc. of the thing *on to* or *towards* which ‘influence’ (in the sense that Brugmann (KVG §560) uses the term) is meant by the action. Speyer (*loc. cit.*) says

that in Skr. the acc. can be used after the primary verb *śrayati* without any prefix in the sense of *bending towards*, e.g., *tvāṃ śrayati* “he bends to you”. But in Pāli it always occurs with prefixes, e.g., *Brahmaṃ ajjhosissāmi* M I.328 “I am attached to (*lit.* bent on) Brahma”; *dvayaṃ nissita* S II.17; III.134 “depending on both”; *vibhavadīṭṭhiṃ ajjhositā* M I.65 “holding on to the view of non-becoming”; *bhavadīṭṭhiṃ allīnā* M I.65 “clinging on to the view of becoming”; *kapisīsaṃ ālambitvā* D II.143 “hanging on to or leaning against the door post”; *sattā dhātum abhinivisanti* D II.282 “beings hold on to an element”. The primary verb *namati* however can take the acc. even without any prefix in the sense of “bowing”. e.g., *Tathāgataṃ namassantā* D II.20 “bowing (down) to the Tathāgata” (cp. Skr. *śrayati*, above). It is to be remarked that in the adnominal construction with *namo* it is not the acc. but the dat. that is commonly employed (§112). Even adverbally the latter is concurrently used (§96.b.). The verb *atthu* (imperative) in conjunction with nouns of blessing and greeting as well as their opposites may take an acc. of the person *unto* or *on* whom such a wish is meant to be conferred. e.g., *bhavaṃ atthu bhavantaṃ Jotipālaṃ mānavaṃ* D II.231 “May good fortune attend the honourable Jotipāla”. It is clear here that the acc. is due to the ‘direction’ implied in *atthu*, a construction parallel to the *dat. of advantage* which is elsewhere frequently applied in such connections (cp. Comy. ‘*bhoto Jotipālassa ... hotu ...*’ Sum.II. p.660). We may compare with this the usage *dhī-r-atthu mama jīvitam* Sn 440 “fie! on my life” where too the acc. is due to the ‘direction’ implied in *atthu* rather than to the force of the exclamatory particle *dhi* (cp. Skr. *dhik* c. acc., SS §417.2.). [51]

§42. The Acc. of Relation.

We have already referred to certain uses of the acc. with verbs of *speaking* etc., where it seems to have originally implied the idea of *relation* as denoting the thing or person referred to by the action rather than the *object* proper, (§36.d). Though this construction is undoubtedly pre-Indo-Aryan (cp. KVG §561.5., Latin Acc. of Respect), still in Skr. it had for the most part gone into disuse, the loc. being there the normal case for that function. Moreover, such verbs as those capable of being thus construed became ‘transitives’ owing to the addition of prefixes (§37), and the acc. came to be regarded as being due to their prepositional force rather than to the special character of the verb. In most of these instances Indian grammarians explain the acc. as being due to the *accented prefixes* (*karmapravacanīya* cp. Pāṇ.II.38). A striking example of this is found in the frequent passage *taṃ kho pana bhavantam Gotamaṃ evaṃ kalyāṇo kittisaddo abbhuggato* D I.87; M II.83 “to this effect has the good report arisen *concerning* that venerable Gotama”, which the *vutti* on Kaccāyana 301 takes as an instance for the construction ‘*kammappavacanīyayutte*’. But the same occurring at Sn p.103 the commentator (Buddhaghosa) styles as ‘*itthambhūtayoge*’ (*vide* Paramatthajotikā II.2. p.441).

a. The acc. of the *person referred to* with the verb *vadati* can therefore be regarded as originally denoting the person *concerning* whom a statement is made. The noun clause ending with *iti* consisting of that statement is here the actual object. e.g., *kulaputto ti bhikkhave Nandaṃ sammā vadamāno vadeyya* A IV.166 “one could, brethren, rightly say speaking *of* Nanda that he is the scion of a noble family”; that the *iti* clause is the actual object and not the noun

denoting the person, is shown by the use of *taṃ* in the following: *Sāriputtaṃ eva taṃ sammā vadamāno vadeyya* M III.29 “one could, rightly speaking, say this of Sāriputta”; *asammohasatto loke uppanno ... sukhāya devamanussānanti maṃ eva taṃ sammā vadamāno vadeyya* M I.21 “one could say this, rightly speaking, of me: that an undeluded being is born in the world ... for the happiness of gods and men”. [52]

b. With the verb *vyākaroti* the acc., though logically denoting the person *about* whom something is declared, can also be regarded as being the *external object* of that verb in the sense of “reveal”. e.g., *paricārake abbhatīte kālakate uppattīsu vyākaroti* D II.200 “makes declarations as to the rebirths of (*lit.* concerning) such followers as had passed away”; *iti maṃ jano jānātūti sāvake abbhatīte kālakate uppattīsu vyākaroti* M I.465 “makes declarations as to the births of such disciples as had passed away (saying): thus may the people know me”.

c. A more logical instance of an *acc. of relation* occurs in the following: *te aññamaññaṃ migasaññaṃ paṭilabhissanti* D III.73 “they receive the impression of a deer with respect to each other”; or *adnominally: aññamaññaṃ agāravā* Th 1.976 “disrespectful towards each other”. From these translations it becomes clear that the acc. here stands parallel to the loc. known as *nimitta-sattamī* (§177.a). This is supported by the v.l. *aññamaññaṃhi* at D III.73 “with regard to each other”, which also shows that it is unnecessary to consider the acc. *aññamaññaṃ* as an adverb.

§43. Acc. of Relation with Reflexive Participles.

An acc. is also found in the Nikāyas with certain *reflexive participles*, denoting originally an external object with the indicative forms of the verb but with the participles appearing as accusatives of *relation*. This is the exact counterpart of the Latin construction already referred to (cp. *manūs victus* = bound with respect to the hands). e.g., *cakkhundriyaṃ asaṃvutaṃ viharantaṃ* D I.170; A II.16 “dwelling unrestrained with respect to the sense of sight”, where the loc. is concurrently used (cp. *cakkhundriye saṃvamaṃ āpajjati*); *yaṃ pan’ assa khamati taṃ gathito mucchito ...* D III.42 “being fettered and infatuated as to that which pleases him”, where too the loc. is parallel (*vide* P.T.S. Dict. s.v.); *sīsamaṃ nahātassa* D II.160,172 “of him (who was) bathed with respect to his head”; *sīsamaṃ pārutamaṃ* S I.167 “covered as to the head”; here the v.l. *sasīsamaṃ* looks like an attempt to make the concinnity more normal regarding the acc. ending *-amaṃ* as *adverbial*. A similar acc. occurs with *puṭṭho* “asked”: e.g., *labujamaṃ vā puṭṭho ambaṃ* [53] *vyākareyya* D I.55,56 “inquired as to a gourd, replies about a mango”; cp. *yo atthamaṃ pucchito santo anathamaṃ anusāsati* Sn 126 “who being questioned (regarding) what is useful admonishes (regarding) what is useless”.

§44. Acc. of Extension in Space or Time.

This use of the acc. shows most clearly the original idea of the case, viz., to restrict the application of a verb or a noun to a certain length of *space* or *time*. With regard to the latter conception it is usually designated the acc. of duration of time, which Macdonell considered to be in origin only a special form of the cognate acc. (VGS §197.2.). He adduces such examples as *śataṃ jīva śarādo vārdhamānaḥ* “live

prospering a hundred autumns” (R.V. X.161⁴), where certainly the cognate sense is clear enough. But in the example *tásmāt sárván ṛtūn varṣati* “therefore it rains during all the seasons” no cognate idea is manifest, because the verb-concept *varṣati* has no semantic connection whatever with the noun-concept *ṛtūn*. This shows that the cognate acc. is not the only source from which the *duration* idea may have developed. Pāli grammarians call this *kāladhānamaccanta-samyoge dutiyā vibhatti*, “the second case applied to (denote) the extension in time and space”, (Kac. 300; Mog. II.3; cp. Pāṇ. II.3.5.).

a. Extent of Space

This may denote the space traversed or the range over which an action is executed. Here the acc. is clearly seen to *limit* the application of the verb. e.g., *yugamattañ ca pekkhati* M III.137 “he fixes his gaze within the range of a yoke”; *samantā yojanaṃ passati* D II.20 “he sees for a *yojana* on every side”; *metaphorically*, *sattaporisam pi mahāsamudde udakaṃ sañthāti* A IV.102 “there is water in the ocean to a depth of seven times the height of a man”; *adnominally*, *dvādasa yojanāni āyāmena* D II.146 “twelve leagues in breadth”. [54]

b. Extent in Time

This usually signifies the time during which an action continues or is carried on. e.g., *satipaṭṭhāne evaṃ bhāveyya satta māsāni* M I.63 “and so for seven months one should develop the bases of mindfulness”; *so cattāre māse parivasati* D I.176; II.152 “he dwells for four months”; *tiṭṭhatu Bhagavā kappam* D II.103 “may the

Blessed One live for an aeon”; *imaṃ rattiṃ dukkhaṃ sessati* S I.83 “he will lie in grief during this night”; *api pana tumhe āyasmanto ekaṃ vā rattiṃ ekaṃ vā divasaṃ ekanta-sukhiṃ attānaṃ sañjānāthāti* D I.194 “would ye, brethren, realize yourselves complete bliss for one night or one day?”; *bahu-d-eva rattiṃ dhammiyā kathāya sandassetvā* M I.354 “For the greater part of the night, having exhorted (them) with discourse on the Doctrine”. This use of the acc. is not far removed from its *adverbial* function as seen from the following examples: *ayaṃ vammīko rattiṃ dhūmāyati* M I.142 “this ant-hill smokes during the night or by night”; *tena hi bho muhuttaṃ āgametha* D III.20 “therefore, friend, wait for a moment”. [It is also found in certain *cognate* uses. e.g., *divā-vihāraṃ nisīdissāmi* D II.182 “I shall sit through the day’s sitting”.] In the following the conceptions of *time* and *space* are linked together: *dīghaṃ addhānaṃ sandhāvitaṃ* D II.90 “run through a long period”. It is used *adnominally* in *āyasmā Upavāno dīgharattaṃ Bhagavato upaṭṭhako* D II.139 (cp. D II.3) “the venerable Upavāna (was) the attendant on the Blessed One for a long period”; *kīvaciraṃ pabbajito si, āvuso Samiddhi? na ciraṃ, āvuso, tīṇi vassānīti* M II.207; D I.152 “How long have you been ordained, venerable Samiddhi? Not long, friend, three years”.

§45. Acc. of Place Where.

The acc. may also denote the place *where* something happens. The few examples found, however, seem to border on the sphere of the *adverbial* acc. (of place). e.g., *upasaṅkamtivā vehāsaṃ aṭṭhaṃsu* S I.23 “having approached they stood in the air (or *adv.* airily)”; *ekamantaṃ nisīdi* D II.91,102 “sat on a side (cp. *adv.* aside)”; *ekamantaṃ aṭṭhāsi* D II.112 “stood on a side or [55] aside”. These

two examples are clearly adverbial, the stem *anta-* being hardly used in the Nikāyas except in adverbs of a historical nature. It is not common either in Vedic or in Classical Sanskrit and Buddhaghosa commenting on the phrase *ekamantaṃ nisīdi* D II.55 says that it is either an adverbial use (*bhāva-napūṃsaka-niddeso*) as *visamaṃ* in ‘*visamaṃ candima-suriyā paharanti*’, or, is an acc. used in the sense of the loc. (*bhummatthe* – Sum. II. p.483). Similarly on *ekamantaṃ aṭṭhāsi* Sn p.13 he has the remark: *ekamantanti bhāvanapūṃsaka-niddeso, ekokāsaṃ ekapassanti vuttaṃ hoti, bhummatthe vā upayoga-vacanaṃ* (Pj. II. p.140). The loc. itself occurs in the Nikāyas though not very frequently. e.g., *ekamante tiṭṭheyya* D I.104 “would stand on a side”. The fact that *ekamantaṃ* is an adverbial use, however, does not preclude the possibility of it being at the same time an acc. of *place where*. It may even stand as an acc. of *direction*. e.g., *ekamantaṃ apanetvā* D I.221 “having led ... aside (*lit.* to a side)”, or any other logical type. Adverbial uses always arise from such original functions as these. It may be noted however that the fundamental notion underlying these various applications is the same, viz., the spatio-temporal conception.

a. There is also a class of accusatives denoting place *where* which had already assumed the role of adverbs in the earlier language. Local grammarians treat them as *indeclinables* or *nipātas*. Such are the accusatives in the constantly occurring phrase *uddhaṃ adho tiriyaṃ* D I.153,II.250 “above, below and across” (*vide* §2).

b. A similar acc. is found with certain verbs of motion like *carati* and *anucaṅkamati* where it denotes the space *over* which one wanders etc. Here it borders on the acc. of *extent in space* (§44.a). e.g., *gāmaṃ vā nigamaṃ vā piṇḍāya caranto* D III.255 “going out for

alms through (over) village and hamlet”; *Vesāliṃ piṇḍāya caritvā* “having wandered through Vesāli for alms”; *ekamantaṃ anucaṅkamamāno* M II.158 “walking up and down on a side”. The loc. is here the concurrent idiom (§164.b). [56]

§46. Acc. of Time When.

Just as the acc. of *place where* is connected to the idea of *extension in space*, so is the acc. of *time when* related to the notion of *extension in time*. Therefore the renderings “in” and “through” are both permissible in such instances as the following: e.g., *ye pi te bhikkhave ahesuṃ atītaṃ addhānaṃ arahanto sammāsambuddhā* D II.144 “whichever holy ones, perfectly enlightened Buddhas, there were during (or in) the long past”; *ye hi keci atītaṃ addhānaṃ samaṇā ... paccanubhosuṃ* D II.213 “whichever ... recluses experienced.. during the long past”; *yaṃ pi bhikkhave Tathāgato purimaṃ jātiṃ purimaṃ bhavaṃ purimaṃ nīketaṃ pubbe manussabhūto samāno ...* D III.145 “that the Tathāgata in (or during) a previous birth, existence or life, being then a human being”; *yaṃ nūnāhaṃ bhante aññaṃ jātiṃ kodhanā ahoṣiṃ* A II.204 “were I, Sir, in another birth (or during another life) irritable”; *purimāni bhante divasāni purimatarāni ... devā ... sannisinnā honti* D II.207 “some few days ago ... the gods ... were assembled” (*lit.* on or during some previous days ... etc.); *yañca Ānanda rattiṃ Tathāgato anuttaraṃ sammāsambodhiṃ anusambujjhati* D II.134 “in or during which night the Tathāgata realized unique and perfect enlightenment”.

a. In some other examples however the notion of *extension in time* is hardly implicit for they merely signify the *time when*. The most prominent employ of such an acc. is found in the stock phrase *ekaṃ*

samayaṃ occurring at the beginning of all *suttas*. Buddhaghosa commenting on this says it is only an acc. used to suit the sense determined by the context (*vide* Papan̄casūdanī I. p.9-10) and parallel to the more usual loc. (*bhummaṃ eva attho*, Sum. I. p.33). In the latter Comy. he discusses the use as follows: ‘*Kasmā pana ettha yathā Abhidhamme yasmiṃ samaye kāmāvacaranti ca, ito aññesu Sutta-padesu yasmiṃ samaye bhikkhave bhikkhu vivicceva kāmehīti ca bhumma-vacanena niddeso kato, Vinaye ca: Tena samayena Buddho Bhagavā ti, karaṇavacanena, tathā akatvā ekaṃ samayanti upayoga-vacanena niddeso kato ti? Tattha tathā idha ca aññathā attha-sambhavato*’. Then he goes on to say that in the first instance the loc. is used [57] to denote the state (*bhāva*); in the second, the inst. is employed because the time was itself the occasion (*tena samayena hetubhūtena karaṇabhūtena*) for laying down the precept; in the third, it is a peculiar use of the acc. of extension of time (*yaṃ hi samayaṃ Bhagavā imaṃ aññaṃ vā suttantaṃ desesi accantaṃ eva taṃ samayaṃ karuṇā-vihārena vihāsi tasmā tadattha-jotanatthaṃ idha upayogavacanāniddeso kato ti*). He is therefore quite aware of the logical connection between the acc. of *time when* and that of *extension*. But the following examples, as pointed out above, have purely the notion of *time when*; *atha kho Bhagavā pubbaṇhasamayaṃ nivāsetvā* D I.178; II.102,122 “thereupon the Blessed One having robed himself in the forenoon”; *pubbaṇhasamayaṃ abhiruhitvā* D II.174 “having ascended ... *in the forenoon*”. It is significant, however, that even in such applications Buddhaghosa sees the implication of *extension*. On *pubbaṇhasamayaṃ* Sn p.13, he makes the following observation: ‘*pubbaṇhasamaye ti attho ... pubbaṇhe ekaṃ khaṇanti vuttaṃ hoti, evaṃ accanta-samyoge upayogavacanaṃ labbhati*’ (Pj. II.139). Similarly: *rattiyā paccūsasamayaṃ paccuṭṭhāya* D II.203 “having

risen up early in the morning”; *imaṃ bhikkhave rattiṃ aññatarā devatā (maṃ) ... upasaṅkami* A IV.28 “this night, monks, a certain deity approached me ...”; *yañ ca rattiṃ parinibbāyati* D II.134 “whichever night.. (the Tathāgata) ... passes away”. The day *on which* something happens is also denoted by the acc. e.g., *atha kho sattamaṃ divasaṃ Kosinārakānaṃ Mallakānaṃ etad ahoṣi* D II.159 “on the seventh day it occurred to the Mallas of Kusinārā”; *Acela Korakkhattiyo sattamaṃ divasaṃ ... kālaṃ karissati* D III.7 “A.K. will die on the seventh day” (Comy. glosses it by ‘*sattame divase*’).

b. The acc. of certain compounds in which the first member is a past (passive or middle) participle and the second is *pubbaṃ* (acc.) occurs frequently in the Nikāyas denoting the *time when*. This is mostly found in the instance *bhūtapubbaṃ* which appears as an introductory remark in narration, e.g., *Bhūtapubbaṃ bhikkhave rājā ahoṣi Pacetano nāma* A I.111 “(It happened) in the past, there was a king by name Pacetana”; *Bhūtapubbaṃ Pūraṇo Kassapo anekasatāya parisāya dhammaṃ desesi* M II.3 “It [58] happened in the past that Pūraṇa Kassapa was preaching his doctrine to a crowd of many hundreds” (cp. D II.130,169); *sannisinna-pubbaṃ sallapita-pubbaṃ* D II.109 “met in the past, conversed in the past”. In Skr. *pūrvam* occurs in narration in the same sense instead of *atīte*. e.g., *Vārānasyāṃ abhūt pūrvam Brahmadattābhido nṛpaḥ*, Kathā-saritsāgara I.7 (cp. I.3). The compound *bhūtapūrvam* too is met with in the Mahābhārata and Kāvya literature (*vide* Monier Williams Dict. s.v.). In such instances the acc. *-pubbaṃ* is *adverbially* referring to what has been before.

c. There are also a few temporal accusatives of an archaic character used in the Nikāyas as *adverbs*. e.g., *āyatim pi evarūpena pañītena*

piṇḍapātena pariviseyyāti M I.369 “would treat again (*lit.* in the future) too with such excellent alms as this”; *sāyapātaṃ upaṭṭhānaṃ āgacchanti* D II.188 “they come for the purpose of attending (on him) morning and evening”.

§47. The Adverbial Accusative.

The acc. singular of substantives and neuter adjectives is copiously employed in the Nikāyas in *adverbial* sense. As in the other languages adverbs formed from adjectives predominate and it is only rarely that substantives are so used, most of them being treated by local grammarians as particles (*nipāta*), especially those stereotyped adverbial accusatives inherited from Vedic like *nāma* etc. (cp. §2). In their particular functions these adverbs admit of the usual classification into *local*, *temporal*, *modal*, *causal* and so on. On the whole Brugmann’s division as found in his *Greek Grammar* (§441) tallies with the distinctions that appear in the Nikāya prose. In the preceding paragraphs we have already referred to a few such uses. The following is a more exhaustive treatment:

§48. The Adv. Acc. of Time and Space.

The acc. as adverb of *time* and *space* is mostly found of adjectives and participles that imply these conceptions. The following are temporal uses: *sīghaṃ* A I.45 “quickly” (mostly [59] found in compounds where the ending *-aṃ* is dropped for euphony); *sanikaṃ* D II.333; M I.120; S I.82,203; *khippaṃ* A II.118; III.164 (cp. Sn 413,682,998) “soon”; *tuvaṭaṃ* (cp. Skr. *tvaritaṃ*) A V.342 “hurriedly”. The adverbial acc. of nominal stems is only found in one or two archaic instances. e.g., *yena samantā yojanaṃ passati*

divā c'eva rattīñca D II.20 “sees a yojana all around by day as well as by night”, where the use of the inst. *divā* side by side with acc. *rattim* proves beyond doubt that the latter is an adverbial usage (cp. Vedic *naktaṃ* “by night”; vide §2). The *local* use of this kind of adverb is not so frequent as the above in the Nikāyas since it is more liable to fall in with the adverb of *manner*. e.g., *rassaṃ assasāmīti pajānāti ... dīghaṃ assasāmīti pajānāti* M I.56 “*lit.* he knows that he breathes short ... he knows that he breathes long”. A similar acc. is found of nouns denoting the cardinal points. e.g., *uttariṃ Vesāliyaṃ* D III.10 “to the north (*lit.* northly) of Vesāli”. In the commonly found idiom *yena.. tad avasari* D II.126,156 “whither ... thither went” (§81.b.ii), it is almost certain that the acc. *tad* is a local adverb though the verb *ava-sari* is capable of taking the acc. of the *place entered* (§40). Another local use seems to be contained in the phrase (*taṃ*) *mūlaṃ chindeyya* A II.199, which is admitted as a textual variation of *mūle chindeyya*. Here, if the former reading is authentic, which is not unlikely, *mūlaṃ* would be an adv. acc. meaning “if one were to cut (it) by the root”.

§49. Adv. Acc. of Contents (internal object).

a. Some cognate accusatives are adverbially used parallel to the construction with *katvā* (§35.b.) as in the idiom *visuṃ karoti* “makes apart, scatters” etc.; almost all are adverbs of *manner*, e.g., *so taṃ thūṇaṃ khaṇḍākhaṇḍikaṃ chindeyya* A II.199 “he would cut the post into pieces (*lit.* piecemeal)”. Here the verb *chindeyya* contains the notion of “bits” or “pieces” which is the sense of the noun *khaṇḍa*. Local grammarians would paraphrase it by ‘*so taṃ thūṇaṃ khaṇḍākhaṇḍikaṃ katvā chindeyya*’.

b. Closely related to the above is a class of adjectival compounds used adverbially, its second member being the etymological [60] object of the verb following. The origin of this construction can be traced back to the Vedic dialect, where it is found with the privative particle *a-*. e.g., ‘... *lokān anapajayyām abhy ájayan*’ “unconquerably (i.e. irrevocably) conquered these worlds” (*vide* VGS §196.5.b.). In Pāli it occurs mostly with the particle *su-* “well”. e.g., *samaṃ suvibhattaṃ vibhaji* D II.166,235 “he divided (it) equally and well (*lit.* well-dividedly)”, where the parallel use of *samaṃ*, a pure adverb, shows that the latter too is employed in the same manner; *savinītaṃ vineti* D III.189 “he trains (him) well (*lit.* well-trainedly)”. There are a few instances where the first member is an adjective or a participle, e.g., *chinnapapātaṃ papatanti* D II.140 “falls prostrate on the ground (*lit.* falls a-fall- as-if-it-were-cut)”; *gāḷha-bandhanaṃ baddho* D I.245 “bound tightly (*lit.* by a strong binding)”. A similar cognate use is found with *yathā-*. e.g., *yathābhuttañca bhujjathāti* D II.173 “may ye eat as ye have eaten (before)”. In all these examples the inst. can be substituted for the acc. without any alteration of the meaning. In later Pāli the inst. is actually found in such places showing clearly how the original adverbial sense of the acc. is being gradually lost, the latter being superseded by the former (inst.) which becomes the commoner adverbial case after the model of Classical Sanskrit, though in Vedic, as mentioned above, the adverbial employ of the acc. is not unusual.

§50. Neuter Pronoun (acc. sg.) as Adverb.

a. Within this class of adverbial accusatives Brugmann includes the acc. sg. of neuter pronouns (interrogative, relative and demonstrative) used *adverbially* (*Greek Grammar*, §441.2.b.). This is

widely used in Pāli and Skr.. In the case of those derived from interrogatives, by virtue of their origin, they come to mean “how, why?” etc. and are therefore adverbs of *manner* or of *reason*. e.g., *kin ti me sāvaka dhammadāyādā bhaveyyum no āmisadāyādā ti* M I.12 “How now, do my disciples become the heirs of my Law and not of my possessions”; *kin ti te sutam* D I.104 “why, have you not heard?”; *kin ti te* D II.174 “how then?”; *kin nu kho āvuso* D II.8,131 “why, friends?” (but why, why in the world etc. *vide* [61] P.T.S. Dict. s.v.). This seems to be a development from the acc. of *relation*, implying originally “as to what.” (cp. Latin ‘*Quid ille me castigat?*’ “Why (*lit.* as to what) does he lecture me?”).

b. In similar contexts we find the acc. *taṃ* and *yaṃ* used to denote “therefore” and “wherefore” respectively, *yaṃ* is more frequent in this connection. e.g., *yaṃ sukho bhavaṃ taṃ sukhā mayaṃ, yaṃ dukkho bhavaṃ taṃ dukkhā mayaṃ* D II.233 “since (*lit.* wherefore) you are happy therefore we are happy, since you are sorrowful therefore we are sorrowful” [cp. Latin ‘*Quod non venisti, timebam*’ “because (*lit.* as to the fact that) you did not come, I was anxious”].

c. Related to this is the employ of the relative neuter pronoun *yaṃ* as *connective* between the principal sentence and subordinate clauses. This corresponds to *yad* in Skr. (cp. Monier Williams Dict, s.v.), which can stand either for the nom. or for the acc. according to the context, e.g., *yampi Bhoto Soṇadaṇḍassa yaso hāyissati samaṇassa Gotamassa yaso abhivaḍḍhissati iminā p’ aṅgena na arahati bhavaṃ Soṇadaṇḍo ... Gotamaṃ dassanāya upasaṅkamituṃ* D I.113 “since the fame of venerable Soṇadaṇḍa will diminish and that of the recluse Gotama will increase, because of this very fact it is not fitting that the venerable Soṇadaṇḍa should go to see him”;

kim-atthi-yaṃ āvuso samaṇe Gotame brahmacariyaṃ vussatīti S IV.51 “what (profit) is there, friend, now that the Holy Life is lived under the recluse Gotama?”; *aṭṭhānaṃ kho etaṃ mārisa anavakāso yaṃ ekissā loka-dhātuyā dve arahanto sammāsambuddhā apubbaṃ acarimaṃ uppajjeyyuṃ* D II.225 “It is not possible, friend, there is no chance, that in the same world-system two Holy Ones, perfectly enlightened Buddhas can arise at the same time”; Buddhaghosa calls *yaṃ* in this context ‘the nom. used in the sense of the inst.’ (*kāraṇatthe paccattaṃ*) and glosses it by ‘*yena kāraṇena*’ (Sum. II. p.659). It is however more likely that the form *yaṃ* here represents an acc. after the type of the adverbial accusatives discussed above. The following examples support the latter view: *Tasmā-t-īha Ānanda tuyh’ ev’etaṃ dukkaṭaṃ ... yaṃ tvaṃ ... na Tathāgataṃ yāci* D II.115 “Therefore, Ānanda, this mistake has been committed [62] by you ... that you ... did not implore the Tathāgata”; *nāhaṃ bhante etaṃ rodāmi yaṃ maṃ Bhagavā evaṃ āha* M I.389 “I do not grieve, Sir, over this, that the Blessed One has spoken to me thus”; *na hi sādhu yaṃ uttama-puggalassa sarīra-bhaṅge siyā sampahāro* D II.166 “it is not good that there should be a quarrel over the distribution of the relics (*lit.* the body) of the noblest man”; It may be remarked here that sometimes instead of the *connective* (nt. acc. sg.) the actual relative pronoun agreeing with the subject of the clause in number and gender is employed in similar constructions. e.g., *na kho me taṃ paṭirūpaṃ yo’haṃ ākiṅṇo viharāmi* D II.30 “it is not fitting for me that I should live crowded”; *ovadatu maṃ bhante Bhagavā anusāsatu maṃ bhante Bhagavā yaṃ mam’ assa dīgharattaṃ hitāya sukhāyāti* S III.1 “may the Blessed One advise me and admonish me that (*sci.* it = *taṃ*) may conduce to my benefit and weal for a long time”. The origin of this idiom may have been due to such contact as afforded by instances of the type: *yaṃ rūpaṃ aniccaṃ dukkhaṃ*

vipariṇāmadhammaṃ ayaṃ rūpassa ādīnavo S III.62 “that the form is impermanent, subject to grief and change, this is the danger of form”, where the proper *connective* ‘*yaṃ*’ accidentally agrees in gender and number with the subject of the subordinate clause, viz., *rūpaṃ*.

d. The acc. *yaṃ* is also used as a *temporal adverb* meaning “when”, usually introducing adverbial clauses or even in the temporal function of “since”, often to be rendered by English ‘that’, e.g., *ito so bhikkhave eka-navuto kappo yaṃ Vipassi Bhagavā ... loke udapādi* D II.2 “it was the ninety first aeon hence that the Blessed One Vipassi ... was born in the world”. Commenting on this Buddhaghosa says that *yaṃ* is found in four distinct uses: 1. *paccatta-vacane* “in the sense of the nom.”; e.g., *yaṃ me bhante devānaṃ ... sammukhā sutam ... ārocemi taṃ bhante Bhagavato ti*, where it is only the relative pronoun agreeing with the subject *sutam*. 2. *upayoga-vacane* “in the sense of the acc.”; e.g., *appucchimha akkittayī no aññaṃ, yaṃ pucchāma tad iṅgha brūhīti*, where too it is the relative pronoun acc. sg. agreeing with the object *tad*. 3. *karaṇa-vacane* “in the sense of the inst.”; e.g., *aṭṭhānaṃ etaṃ bhikkhave anavakāso yaṃ ekissā loka-dhātuya ti*, [63] where, as has been shown in the foregoing (c), it is the proper *connective* adverb. 4. *bhummi’ atthe* “in the sense of the loc.”, as in the context under discussion (*idha pana*; Sum. II. p.410). The commentator is therefore aware of the syntactical distinctions of the uses of *yaṃ*. Its purely temporal application is attested by many other examples, too. e.g., *Atha kho Bharaṇḍu Kālāmo Kapilavatthumhā pakkāmi, yaṃ Kapilavatthumhā pakkāmi tadā pakkanto va ahoṣi na puna pacchāgañchi* A I.278 “Then B.K. set out from Kapilavatthu and when he left it (then) it was never to return”, where the parallel use of *tadā* is proof of the temporal sense of *yaṃ*;

So kho Ānanda samayo yaṃ mahāvātā vāyanti D II.107 “That is the time, Ānanda, when great gales blow”; *bhavissati bhikkhave so samayo, yaṃ imesaṃ manussānaṃ dasavassâyukā puttā bhavissanti* D III.71 “there will be that time when these men will have sons who will (only) live up to ten years”, where the Comy. has ‘*yaṃ imesanti yasmim samaye imesaṃ ...*’; *hoti kho āvuso samayo yaṃ kadāci karahaci dīghassa addhuno accayena ayaṃ loko saṃvaṭṭati* D II.28 “there is a time, brethren, when at some time or other after the lapse of a long period this world will evolve ...”. All these examples go to show that the acc. in *ekam samayaṃ* occurring at the beginning of all *suttas* has its origin in the above-discussed temporal adverbial use.

§51. Adverbial Use of Acc. (nt. sg.) of Adjectives.

a. Adjectives denoting quantity or degree form corresponding adverbs. e.g., *atibālhaṃ paridevesi* D II.232 “he lamented very much”; *suññatāvihārenâhaṃ, Ānanda, etarahi bahulaṃ viharāmîti* M II.104 “mostly I spend my time now, Ānanda, in the (*lit.* by the) dwelling on Emptiness”; *etad eva bahulaṃ bhikkhūnaṃ dhammiṃ kathaṃ karoti* D II.123 “he speaks much to the monks on doctrinal matters”; *yo ciraṃ jīvati so vassa-sataṃ appaṃ vā bhiiyo* D II.4 “he who lives long lives a hundred years or a little more”.

b. Several acc. adverbs are formed from *comparatives* of adjectives in *-tara* (cp. VGS §196.5.). e.g., *yathā ahaṃ cirataraṃ [64] passeyyaṃ* D II.178 “that I may see longer”. The suffix may be added even to adverbial case-forms like *divā*. e.g., *Kālīdāsī divātaraṃ yeva uṭṭhāsī* M I.125 “the maid Kālī rose up later-on-in-the-day”.

c. Adverbs are also formed from adjectives denoting *priority* and *posteriority* of time. e.g., *sammāsambuddhā apubbaṃ acarimaṃ uppajjeyyūṃ* D II.225 “All-Enlightened Ones are born neither before nor after (the other, i.e. simultaneously)”; *tadanantaraṃ paṭisallīnā* D II.265 “meditating the meanwhile”; *na ciraṃ Tathāgatassa parinibbānaṃ bhavissati* D II.119 “ere long (*lit.* not long after) will take place the passing away of the Tathāgata”.

d. The acc. sg. nt. of the numeral adjective *eka* “one” is found in a peculiar adverbial usage in a passage of philosophic importance, viz., *ye te samaṇabrāhmaṇā ... ekaṃ attānaṃ damenti ekaṃ attānaṃ samenti ekaṃ attānaṃ parinibbāpentī* A II.68. To the student of syntax *ekaṃ* here clearly appears as an adverb meaning “once” (i.e. one time) and not by any means as an adjective qualifying *attānaṃ*. Accordingly the sense would be: “whichever recluses and brahmins ... once train themselves, again (*lit.* once) calm themselves and still again (*lit.* once) tranquillize themselves”; cp. *eka-* standing for *ekaṃ* (adv.) in *ekajaṃ vā dijaṃ vā pi* Sn p.21 “once-born or twice-born”; also *devo ca ekamekaṃ phusāyati* Ud 5 “and it rains drop by drop (*lit.* one by one)”. This adverbial use of *ekaṃ* is only a logical development from the adverbial acc. sg. of neuter ordinals such as *paṭhamaṃ* “firstly”, *dutiyam* “secondly” and *tatiyam* “thirdly” (cp. Latin *primum* etc.). e.g., *dutiyam pi ... tatiyam pi kho ..* D II.103 “secondly ... thirdly ...”.

e. The acc. sg. of certain nouns implying divisions of time like *khaṇaṃ* “a moment” is used adverbially to denote *frequency* or *continuity* with the prefix *abhi-*. e.g., *so abhikkhaṇaṃ ... dukkhaṃ patisaṃvedi* M I.308 “he experienced ... sorrow continually (i.e. moment by moment)”. The numerical adverbs in *-khattu* (Skr.

kṛtvah) denoting the *number of times* are also formed on the model of adverbial accusatives. e.g., *tikkhattuṃ padakkhiṇaṃ* [65] *katvā* D II.163 “having walked round to the right (i.e. paid respects) three times”.

§52. Acc. as Adv. of Manner.

a. A large class of adverbial accusatives play the part of adverbs of *manner*. These seem to have developed from the original *oppositional* accusatives (cp. VG §642.b.). They are either the acc. sg. of substantives, neuter pronouns, adjectives or adjectival compounds. e.g., from *substantives*: *dukkhaṃ sessati* S I.83 “will sleep miserably” (cp. A I.137; M I.192); *sukhaṃ seti* S I.212 “he dwells at ease (i.e. happily)” (cp. A I.136). A similar acc. is found in the following examples where it has the sense of ‘after the manner of’ or ‘like’: *udumbarakhādikaṃ vāyaṃ kulaputto bhoge khādatīti* A IV.283 “this clansman eats his wealth like a fig tree-glutton”; *ajaddhumārikaṃ vāyaṃ kulaputto marissatīti* (*ibid*) “this clansman will die like a starveling” (cp. E.M. Hare *Gradual Sayings* IV, 189); from *adjectives*: *samaṃ vibhaji* D II.166,235 “divided equally”; *sādhukaṃ manasikarotha* D I.63; II.2,255 “reflect well”; *sādhukaṃ uggahetvā* D II.119 “having learnt well”; from *adjectival compounds*: *puṇḍarikāni ... samodakaṃ ṭhitāni* D II.38 “white-lotuses ... standing at a level with the water”; *ime dhamme anavasesaṃ samādāya* D I.165 “having taken up these doctrines completely (*lit.* remainderlessly)”; *pasannacittaṃ anussareyya* M I.210,211 “would reflect over with a delighted heart (*lit.* delighted-heartedly)”. A class of compounds with *-upamaṃ* as the second member is used adverbially implying accordance. e.g., *kullûpamaṃ vo bhikkhave ājānantehi dhammā pi vo pahātabbā* M I.135 “according to the parable of the raft even the

dhammas should be discarded by you when you, brethren, attain to realization”.

b. To this category belongs a class of acc. adverbs formed from *descriptive-determinatives* where the first member is an adverb (inclusive of particles and prepositions) and the second is a noun or a past passive participle with substantival significance. Such compounds when employed thus as adverbs are treated by local grammarians as a special class called *abbayībhāva* (Skr. *avyayībhāva* [66] *samāsa*; cp. Kac. 321). e.g., *ajjhataṃ arūpasaññi* D II.112 “internally conscious of the formless”; *ajjhataṃ kāye kāyānupassī* D II.216 “internally he sees the body in terms of the body”; *paccattaṃ yeva parinibbāyati* D II.68 “attains *parinibbāna* individually of himself”; (Comy. *attanā*); *paccattaṃ veditabbo* D II.217 (cp D I.24) “should be known personally or individually”; *nivātañca vata ayaṃ ca Migāramātupāsādo ... asaṅkampi* S V.270 “even in the absence of a gale (without a storm) this mansion of Migāramātā trembled”; cp. archaic acc. *anuraho maṃ ... codeyyuṃ* M I.27 “they would accuse me ... secretly” (*vide* §2); *yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti* D I.162 “he knows according to reality” (cp. M I.91); *yathābhirantaṃ viharitvā* D II.94,126 “having lived as long as he desired (*lit.* according to fancy)”; *yathā-kāmaṃ* S I.227 “according to inclinations”; *yathā-sattiṃ yathā-balaṃ* D I.102 “according to energy, according to strength”; *yathāninnaṃ pavattamānaṃ* A II.140 “flowing downward according to the bent”; *yāva-jīvaṃ anatikkamanīyā* D III.133 “not to be transgressed as long as life (lasts)”; to this adv. acc. is related the peculiar use of *taṃ* in the stock phrase *yathā- taṃ*. e.g., *yathā-taṃ Mārena pariyaṭṭhita-citto* D II.103 “because (*lit.* according to the fact that) his mind is obsessed by the Evil One”; the Comy. has the characteristic remark *ettha tanti nipāta mattaṃ*; cp. *yathā-taṃ* D

II.264,269; III.8; M I.249; II.142 “because, accordingly as”; *tiro-kuḍḍaṃ tiro-pākāraṃ tiro-pabbataṃ asajjamāno gacchati* M I.69 “he goes without getting stuck through wall and mountain”. There are also to be found a few similar adverbial formations with the particle *sa-* which is the contracted form of either the sociative adv. *saha* or the prefix *saṃ-*. e.g., *sanidānaṃ samaṇo Gotamo dhammaṃ deseti* M II.9 “the recluse Gotama preaches the doctrine reasonably”; *sasīsaṃ pārupitvā* M II.16 “covering himself head and all (*lit.* with the head)”; cp. *sapadānaṃ piṇḍāya caramāno* Sn p.21 “going for alms (from house to house) uninterruptedly”.

c. The acc. sg. of certain other compound formations is used as *adverbs of reason*. e.g., *na ca maṃ dhammādhikaraṇaṃ viheṭhesi* M III.270 “he did not give me trouble by way of any [67] doctrinal point”; *tato-nidānaṃ hi so bhikkhave maraṇaṃ vā nigaccheyya* A IV.130 “by reason of that, brethren, he would either meet death ...”; so *tato-nidānaṃ labhetha pāmujaṃ* D I.72 “by reason of that he would obtain joy”. The inst. or the abl. is the more usual in this function.

§53. Acc. with Adverbs.

Certain adverbial formations, mostly the inst. or abl. sg. of older (Vedic) nominal stems (cp. VGS §197), take an acc. of the noun-concept which they qualify or ‘govern’. Here the abl. and the gen. are concurrent idioms (§§130 & 150). e.g., *uttarena Opasādaṃ* M II.167 “to the north of Opasāda”; *antarena Campaṃ* M I.340 “this side of Campā”; *antarā ca Sāvattiṃ antarā ca Sāketam* M I.149 “between Sāvatti and Sāketa”; *antarā ca Rājagahaṃ antarā ca Nālandaṃ* D I.1 “between Rājagaha and Nālandā”, where

Buddhaghosa observes that the acc. is used because it is construed with the word *antarā* (*'antarā saddena pana yuttattā upayogavacanam kataṃ'* Sum. I. p.35); *samantā Vesāliṃ* D II.98 “around Vesāli”; *santike nibbānām* S IV.74(V.) “near *nibbāna*”; *Bhagavantam sammukhā* D II.155; Sn p.100 “before the Blessed One”; *pacchā bhattam* D II.102,122 “after the meal”; *kiṃ paccayā* D II.31 “due to (*lit.* depending on) what?”; *ime ... dve paccayā* D II.207 “owing to these two (reasons)”. In the phrase *kiṃ kāraṇā ti?* D III.65 “due to what?”, it is clear, therefore, that the acc. (*kiṃ*) is due to treating *kāraṇā* as an adverb on the analogy of *paccayā* above, although a contamination of the two idioms *kiṃ kāraṇam* and *kasmā kāraṇā* has been suggested (*vide* P.T.S. Dict. -*kāraṇā*).

§54. Acc. with Prepositions.

The acc. is ‘governed’ by more prepositions than any other case in Pāli just as in the older language (VGS §197.c.). Most of these are adverbial prepositions. e.g., *ati*, “beyond”, *anu* “after”, *abhi* “towards”, *pati* or *paṭi* “against, near”, and *tiro* “across” (cp. VG §176.1.1). [68]

a. The only prepositions used *adnominally* in the Nikāyas are *pati* or *paṭi*, always found as postposition in *gāthā* literature, *tiro* and *anu* which are difficult to distinguish from those employed as first member of adverbial compounds of the type discussed in the preceding paragraph. e.g., *suriyass’ uggamanam pati* Th 1.517,628 “about, near, sunrise”; *utuveramaṇim pati* Sn 291 “(the time) about the cessation of menstruation”; *nadiṃ Nerañjaram pati* Sn 74 “near the river Nerañjarā”; *tiro dussam tena manteti* D I.103 “converses with him through a curtain”; *anvaddhamāsam saṅghamajjhe*

osaranti M II.8 “come into the midst of the Order every half-month (*lit.* after every half-month)”. There is a similar uncertainty with regard to the syntactical function of the adverbial prepositions *adho*, *paro*, *anu* etc. which too apparently occur only as the first member of *avyayībhāva* compounds. e.g., *adho-mukhaṃ* M I.132,134 “with head downwards, i.e., headlong”; *paro sahaṣṣaṃ* D II.16; S I.192 “over a thousand”; cp. *anuraho* M I.127.

b. Most of these prepositions, however, are only found in the Nikāyas *adverbally* i.e. as prefixes to verbs which in their normal form do not take an acc. of the object (cp. §37). e.g., *ati: te aññe deve atirocanti* D II.208 “they outshine the other gods”; *anu: padhānaṃ anuyuñja* D II.144 *lit.* “strive after exertion”; cp. *anuyogaṃ anuyutto* D I.167; II.223 ; *bhāsitaṃ anumodī* D II.279 “rejoiced in (*lit.* after) what was said”; cp. *anujāto Tathāgataṃ* Sn 557 “born after the Tathāgata”; *abhi: Bhagavato bhāsitaṃ abhinandi* D II.71,277 cp. 54,69 “rejoice at (*lit.* after) the speech of the Blessed One”; this verb *nandati*, however, could take the acc. even in its primitive form in the older language (cp. SS §42); *pa: savanaṃ pamajjati* A IV.24 “neglects the hearing.”; (*adhi+*)*ā: agāraṃ ajjhāvasati* D I.63; II.16 “inhabits the house”; *upa: (taṃ) upaṭṭhāti* M III.25; S I.167; A III.94 “waits upon him”; *paṭi: Vipassiṃ Bhagavantaṃ ... imā ... gāthā paṭibhaṃsu* D II.36 (cp. M I.79) “these verses dawned upon ... the Blessed One Vipassi”; *sādhu vata bhavantaṃ yeva bho Gotamaṃ paṭibhātu etassa bhāsitassa attho* D I.124 “well, may the meaning of what is said dawn upon the venerable Gotama himself”. The acc. in such examples, as has been mentioned earlier, is regarded by Indian [69] grammarians as being due to the *karmapravacanīya* or ‘*adjuncts*

to *sambandha* or relation between *kriyā* and *kāraka*⁹ (vide §42). The gen. is the alternate construction in this special instance. In *mamaṃ* (v.1. *mama*) *yeva sāvakā anusāsaniṃ paccāsimsanti* M II.10 “the disciples look to me for advice” the pronoun *mamaṃ* may be either acc. or gen..

§55. Acc. with Indeclinables.

A class of words which are treated as indeclinables by Pāli grammarians but which were originally the *gerunds* of certain verbs, usually with the prefixes *pa-*, *ud-*, *ā-* and *ni(s)-*, by virtue of being verbal formations take an acc. of the thing ‘governed’ i.e. the original object. Such are:

paṭicca (< *prati* + *itya*) “on account of”; e.g., *etaṃ paṭicca* M I.265 “on account of this”; *macchariyaṃ paṭicca ārakkho* D II.58 “on account of avariciousness care”; *katamaṃ ... atthavaṣaṃ paṭicca* D II.143 “on account of what ... matter?”; *ārabba* (< *ā* + *rabhya* or *rambh*) “beginning with, taking into consideration, (hence) referring to, about”; e.g., *bhikkhusaṅghaṃ ārabba* D II.100 “concerning the Order of monks”; *paricārake ārabba* D II.204 “about the followers”; *santiṃ ārabba* D II.157 “about peace”; also at D I.180; A II.27,301; *āgamma* (< *ā* + *gamyā* of *gam*) *lit.* “coming to, (hence) on account of”; e.g., D I.229; It 79; used as synonym for the above; *uddissa* (< *ud* + *diśya* of *diś*) “pointing out, (hence) with reference to, concerning”; e.g., *bhavaṃ Gotamaṃ uddissa* M I.16 “concerning venerable Gotama”, where *bhavaṃ* should be corrected to *bhavantaṃ*; it is mostly found in the developed sense of “for the sake

⁹ vide *Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar* p. 166.

of”. e.g., (*ahataṃ*) *devaṃ yeva uddissa* D II.80 “brought especially for the sake of the lord”; *kaṃ si tvaṃ āvuso uddissa pabbajito* M I.170 “on account of whom, friend, have you left home?”; where it comes to mean “following whom ... etc”. *nissāya* (< *ni+* *śrāya* of *śri*) “leaning on (cp. *bhittiṃ nissāya* D III.208), (hence) depending on, owing to”; e.g., *dhammaṃ yeva nissāya* A I.109 “owing to the doctrine”; *rājānaṃ nissāya* M II.185 “owing to the king”; its sense is further developed in [70] *Āḷarakālāmaṃ nissāya nissāya atikkamiṃsu* D II.130 “they went on keeping close to Āḷarakālāma” i.e. “followed Ā. closely”. *sandhāya* (< *saṃ* + *dhāya* of *dhā*) “putting together, (hence) considering, on account of”; e.g., *na kho āvuso Bhagavā sukhaṃ yeva vedanaṃ sandhāya sukhasmiṃ paññāpeti* M I.400 “the Blessed One, friends, does not lay down (a thing) as (part of) happiness just on account of the pleasant feeling”.

§56. The Accusative Absolute.

a. The *absolute* use of cases is generally connected with, if not directly inherited from, their *temporal* application. We have in the earlier paragraphs observed many temporal uses of the acc., which were syntactically parallel to the loc. of time. Similarly a few instances are found in the Nikāyas of the accusatives of substantives agreeing with some participle, making up an obviously *absolute* construction. The participle mostly found in this connection is *santa-*“being”, which is involved in a similar acc. *absolute* in Greek (Greek *on* = Skr. *san-*), the origin of which Brugmann traces to the *appositional* use of the acc. “this being so ...” (*Greek Gr.* §582). The construction being thus quite historical in I.E., the possibility of the ending *-aṃ*, in such instances as are found in the Nikāyas, being a restoration of the normal loc. sg. *-e* as a result of the confusion of *-e*

and *-o* in Prākṛt, seems to be precluded. Buddhaghosa too regards such accusatives as used in the sense of the loc. The following therefore may be reasonably regarded as acc. absolutes expressing the conditions during the permanence of which another event occurs. e.g., *santaṃ yeva kho pana paraṃ lokaṃ atthi paro loko ti 'ssa diṭṭhi hoti* M I.403 “there being a further world, he gets the notion that there is another world”; *santaṃ yeva kho pana kiriyāṃ atthi kiriyā ti paraṃ saññāpeti* M I.406 “there being action, he convinces others that there is action”. Here, just as in the case of the *loc. absolute* (§186), the adverb *evaṃ* can sometimes stand for the nominal member put in the loc.. e.g., *evaṃ santaṃ kho te Poṭṭhapāda aññā vā saññā bhavissati añño attā* D I.186,187 “it being so, Poṭṭhapāda, is perception one (thing) and the soul another”.¹⁰ On [71] the analogy of these constructions it seems not impossible that the acc. in the following is also *absolutely* employed though the verb *pajānāti* can take an external object when used in the sense of “perceive”. e.g., *santaṃ vā ajjhataṃ byāpādaṃ atthi me ajjhato byāpādo ti pajānāti* M I.60 “there being inward ill-will, he knows that there is inward ill-will”; *santaṃ vā ajjhataṃ rāgadosamoḥaṃ atthi me ajjhato rāgadosamoho ti pajānāti* S IV.140 “there being inward passion, hatred and delusion, he knows that he has them”.

b. There are also a few other constructions with different participles. It is however not quite certain whether they are legitimate *absolute* uses. e.g., *na bhikkhave mātā puttāṃ jīramānaṃ evaṃ labhati: ahaṃ jīrāmi mā me putto jīṭṭi* A I.179 “when the son is aging, monks, the mother does not find it possible (to say): let me decay but not my son!”. That the acc. here is not necessarily meant to be the object of

¹⁰ “Tattha evaṃ santā to evaṃ sante, bhummatthe hi etaṃ upayoga-vacanaṃ ...” Budg. cp Sum. II. p. 376.

labhati is shown by the similar ‘intransitive’ use of the latter in: *so ’haṃ na labhāmi: mā me bhonto atthakaraṇe nisinnassa antarākathaṃ opātentu* M II.122 “As such I do not find it possible (to say): do not interrupt me, friends, when I am presiding over the administration of justice”. Similarly, in the following, though Buddhaghosa regards the construction as elliptical, supplying “*ñatvā*” after the participial clause, the acc. may still be considered as used *absolutely*: *Atha kho Suppavāsā Koliyadhītā Bhagavantaṃ bhuttāviṃ onītapattapāniṃ ekamantaṃ nisīdi* A II.63; cp. D II.93; M I.393 “then the Koliya maiden Suppavāsā, when the Blessed One had eaten and taken out his hand from the bowl, sat on a side”. The nom. ‘*bhuktāvī ...*’ in the BSk. version (cp. Mhvs. III. p.142) further supports the suggestion that it might be an acc. absolute.

§57. The Acc. of Purpose.

Since the notion of purpose is only the metaphorical application of the idea of *direction*, both implying the *aim* in a general sense, it is not surprising to find the acc. employed as a case denoting *purpose*, a use which is evidently derived from the acc. of direction (§37). This is to be particularly seen in the case of the dat. in -*āya* which is preserved in Pāli only in its functions [72] of *direction* and *purpose* (§4). Hence many examples of the acc. of *direction* with verbs of *motion* have the implication of purpose at the same time and consequently appear to be used parallel to the dat. or infinitive of *purpose*. e.g., *upaṭṭhānaṃ gacchati* D III.188 “he goes for the purpose of (*lit.* to) attending on.”; cp. *upaṭṭhātum* “to attend” A V.72; *Sakkassa ... anucariyaṃ upāgami* M II.264 “he came for the purpose of waiting upon Sakka”, *lit.* “he came to the waiting upon Sakka”; *divā-seyyaṃ upagato* D I.112; M II.164 “gone for the day’s rest”;

Rājagahaṃ vassāvāsaṃ osaṭā M II.2 *et. seq.* “entered Rājagaha for the passing of the rainy season”; *vāsaṃ upagacchi* A V.29 “went for residence” i.e. “took up abode”; *janapadacārikaṃ pakkamiṃsu* D II.48 “they set forth on their mission of (*lit.* for the purpose of) tramping the country”; cp. ... *methunaṃ dhammaṃ nāssu gacchanti brāhmaṇā* Sn 292 “the brahmins did not go for sexual intercourse”, where the Comy. has: ‘*methunaṃ dhamman ti methunāya dhammāya; sampadānavacanappattiyā kir’ etaṃ upayogavacanam*’ (Pj. II. p.317). The acc. of *purpose* occurs only rarely with verbs other than those of *motion*. e.g., *divā-vihāraṃ nisinno* Ud 5 “seated down for the day’s rest”. The postposition *-atthaṃ* (acc.) is the usual periphrasis, often appearing in compound, like its dat. *-atthāya*, which takes the place of this construction. e.g., *parikkhāratthaṃ dānaṃ deti* D III.258 “he gives alms for the purpose of (obtaining) requisites”.

§58. Double Accusative.

a. Direct + Appositional Object

Just as in Vedic (VGS §198) and Classical Sanskrit (SS §46.a) so in Pāli a second acc. appears in *apposition* to that of the direct object with certain verbs. It usually defines or qualifies the latter and is placed side by side with it in the sentence. e.g., *maṃ hi bhante aññatitthiyā sāvakaṃ labhitvā* M I.379 “those of other sects having received me, Sir, as a disciple”; *upāsakaṃ maṃ bhavaṃ Gotamo dhāretu* D I.110; Sn p.25 “may the venerable Gotama accept me as a disciple”; *Sakyā kho pana Ambaṭṭha rājānaṃ [73] Okkākaṃ pitāmaṃ dahanti* (v.1. *dissanti*) D I.92 “the Sākyaans, Ambaṭṭha, claim (*lit.* put up, place; cp. Comy. ‘*ṭhapenti*’, Sum. I.258) king Okkāka as their ancestor”; here the abl. is the parallel idiom. e.g.,

mittato daheyya S III.113 “would consider as a friend”. On the analogy of these the acc. in the stock phrase *saraṇaṃ gacchati*, to which reference has already been made in another connection (§37.a), can also be regarded as an acc. used in *apposition* to the other one. e.g., *bhavaṇtaṃ Gotamaṃ saraṇaṃ gacchāma* M I.290 “we go to the venerable Gotama as refuge”; *Bhagavaṇtaṃ yeva tāṇaṃ gavesi* D I.95 “sought the Blessed One as protection”.

b. Direct + Predicative Object.

An acc. other than the direct object of the simple verb appears *predicatively* with verbs of *speaking* (in the sense of “calling”), *thinking*, *knowing*, *perceiving*, *making* and the like. This is closely related to the above *appositional* use. *With verbs of speaking*: This, however, is only found in the *gāthā* literature. e.g., *taṃ ahaṃ brūmi brāhmaṇaṃ* Sn 620 “him I call a brahmin”; *tatiyaṃ bhikkhunaṃ āhu maggajīviṃ* Sn 88 “the third monk they call ‘one living in the way’”; *etaḍ āhu vasuttamaṃ* Sn 274 “this they call the best gem”. In the Nikāya prose this construction has been superseded by that of the nom. with *iti* (§ 21). *With verbs of thinking*: e.g., *taṃ kiṃ maññasi Pukkusa* D II.131 “what do you think it (is), Pukkusa?”; *taṃ kiṃ maññatha bhonto devā Tāvatiṃsā* D II.213 “what do the honourable Tāvatiṃsa gods think it (is)?”. *With verbs of knowing*: e.g., *yadā te Bhagavā aññāsi kallacitte ...* D II.41 “when the Blessed One knew them to be (*lit.* as) of suitable disposition ...”; *bhāsamānañca maṃ na jānanti* D II.109 “they do not know me to be speaking”; *petamaṃ maṃ jānāhi* Pv II.9 “know me as a departed (spirit)”; cp. also *taṃ vā pi dhīrā muniṃ vedayanti* Sn 212 “him the wise know as a sage”. *With verbs of making*: *cittaṃ attano ujukaṃ akaṃsu* D II.254 “they made their minds straight”; *ekaṃsaṃ uttarāsaṅgaṃ karivā* D II.172 “(*lit.*)

having made the upper robe one-shoulder-covering” i.e. “having put the upper robe over the left shoulder”; similarly, [74] *ekamsaṃ cīvaraṃ katvā* D II.163. When the expressions such as *ekamsaṃ karoti* are regarded as compound verbs (cp. §35.b), however, the construction loses its original significance.

c. Direct object + acc. of person indirectly affected.

i. Beside the acc. of the *thing* said, which is the direct object, another is found denoting the *person* to whom the statement is made with verbs of *speaking*. e.g., *āyasmantaṃ Sāriputtaṃ etad avoca* M I.31 “he told the venerable S. this”; *Kāḷiṃ dāsīṃ etad avoca* M I.125 “she told this (to) the maid-servant Kāḷi”; *te nighaṇṭe etad avoca* M I.92 “he told the naked ascetics this”; as seen from these examples the idiom is only frequent when the direct object is *etad* (cp. also D II.102,165). With other verbs the dat. is employed.

ii. A similar double acc. construction occurs with the verb *pucchati*, where the *person* questioned is also put in the acc. e.g., *Bhagavantaṃ imaṃ paṭhamaṃ pañhaṃ pucchi* D II.76 “he asked the Blessed One this first question”; *samaṇaṃ Ānandaṃ ... phāsuvihāraṃ puccha* D I.204 “inquire (from) the recluse Ānanda his ease and comfort”; *yaṃ kiñci maṃ Subhaddo pucchissati* D II.150 “whatever Subhadda shall ask me”. This can be compared with the similar use of the double acc. with *yācati* often found in verse e.g., *pabbajjaṃ ayāci Buddhaṃ* Th 1.869 “asked ordination (from) the Enlightened One”; *pabbajjaṃ ahaṃ ayāciṃ sabbasattāna uttamaṃ* Th 1.624 “I implored the highest of all men for ordination”.

iii. A double acc. construction occurs also with verbs of *doing*, the second standing in place of the dat. of the person indirectly affected (§101). e.g., *kinti naṃ karosīti* A II.112 “what do you do (to) him?”; *taṃ enaṃ bhikkhave nirayapālā pañcavidhabandhanaṃ nāma kāraṇaṃ karonti* A I.141 “to him, brethren, the warders of Hell do the punishment called the ‘five-fold-binding’”; *Sakuludāyīṃ paribbājakaṃ antarāyaṃ akāsi* M I.39 “they did harm to (opposed) the wandering ascetic Sakuludāyī”. [75]

Yet with none of the said verbs is the double acc. of necessity, as Speyer points out (SS §47). In Pāli especially the variety of idiom and expression permits of other constructions which are quite as usual and sometimes even preferable. Thus verbs of *speaking* and *teaching* may take a dat. of the person spoken to; verbs of *asking* may take an abl. of the person questioned (*vide* §93.b).

d. Direct object + (original) agent of causative verb.

i. A second acc. occurs with the causative verb, if in its simple state it was ‘transitive’ to express the *agent*, i.e. the subject of the verb in the primitive or non-causative state, beside the acc. of the original affected object. This *agent* or the original subject can also be denoted by the inst. (*vide* §59). e.g., *ekamekaṃ Bhagavantaṃ vandāpessāmi* D II.148 “I shall make each in turn worship the Blessed One”.

ii. When the verb is ‘intransitive’ and denotes motion, the acc. of the *aim* (which, however, is never a person, in which case the loc. is used, cp. VGS §198.3f.n.2.) is preserved and the *agent* as before is put in the acc. e.g., *uppannuppanne pāpake akusale dhamme ...*

anabhāvaṃ gameti M I.11 *lit.* “the constantly arising, evil, unmeritorious thoughts ... he causes to go to non-existence”.

iii. The difference between these actual causative verbs and the *faded causatives* such as *vāceti* “teach” in the following example is an essential. For verbs such as those of *teaching* take the double acc. even in the older languages (cp. SS §47). e.g., *tīṇi māṇavakasatāni mante vāceti* M II.166 “he teaches the mantras to 300 young men”; *satta ca brāhmaṇamahāsāle satta ca nahātakasatāni mante vāceti* D II.236 “he taught the mantras to seven noble brahmins and 700 initiated students”. The person taught may also be expressed by the dat. (§93.e). We have probably a similar faded causative in the following where the acc. *kāyaṃ* may be alternately put in the loc.: *te imehi kāyaṃ balaṃ gāhenti* M I.238 “with these they infuse strength into their bodies”. [76]

§59. Accusative with Causative Verbs.

As has been shown in the preceding paragraph, the subject of the simple verb which would be expressed by the nom. in the original sentence is put in the acc. case denoting the *agent* with the causative. This is invariably the case if the simple verb was ‘intransitive’. e.g., *Atha kho Sakko ca devānamindo Vessavano ca mahārājā āyasmantaṃ Mahāmoggallānaṃ Vejayante pāsāde anucaṅkamāpentī anuvicarāpentī* M I.253 “Then Sakka, the lord of the gods, and the Great Regent Vessavana caused the venerable Mahāmoggallāna to walk and move to and fro in the mansion Vejayanta”. But if the simple verb be a so-called ‘transitive’ there is diversity of construction. In that case the inst. is also permissible to denote the *agent* (*vide* §88.d). This alternate idiom, though frequent in the

dialect of the Brāhmaṇas (VGS §198.3) and in Classical Sanskrit (SS §49), is, however, not so popular in the Nikāyas. Still it is enjoined by Pāli grammarians.¹¹ e.g., *Kosinārake Malle Bhagavantam vandāpesi* D II.148 “he made the Mallas of Kusinārā worship (pay their respects to) the Blessed One”. The original object of the simple verb is naturally preserved in the acc. e.g., (*taṃ*) *aññā khīraṃ pāyenti* D II.19 “others make (him) drink milk” i.e. “others suckle him”.

§60. Acc. with Passive Verbs.

In the case of verbs that admit of two accusatives, like *pucchati* etc., if in the passive construction the *person* is put in the nom. case as the grammatical subject of the passive verb, the logical subject being denoted by the inst. as the agent of the action, the *thing* questioned is preserved in the acc. case (cp. §43). e.g., *samaṇa-brāhmaṇā ... pañhaṃ puṭṭhā* D I.24 “the recluses and brahmins ... being asked a question”. In a similar way the passive past participle used actively (or the reflexive participle) may take an acc. of the thing or person that was the object in the primitive state. e.g., *tam enaṃ Paṇḍuputto ... paccupaṭṭhito hoti* M I.31 “Paṇḍuputta ... was attending on him (or was present by his side)”. The passive potential [77] participle (*-tabba*) used in the acc. nt. sg. as predicate of the clause in an indirect statement takes an acc. of its original object. e.g., *Tathāgate arahante sammāsambuddhe āsādetabbaṃ maññati* D II.24 “thinks that the Tathāgatas, the holy and perfectly enlightened ones should be *appeased*”. Buddhaghosa, surprised by this peculiar employment of the acc. with the passive potential participle and ignoring the

¹¹ Cp. ‘*gatibodhāhārasaddatthākammakabhajjādīnaṃ payojje*’ Mog II.4 et. seq.

possibility of a legitimate construction with the *impersonal* “-tabbaṃ”, says the ending -e stands for the plural and -tabbaṃ for -tabbe. The suggestion is at any rate syntactically plausible since the verb *maññati* is capable of taking the double acc. (§58.b.). But the reading need not be altered as it appears also in other places. e.g., *amhe ovaditabbaṃ ... maññati* M I.460.

Chapter III

The Instrumental Case

[78]

§61. [General Character]

The fundamental use of the inst. in Pāli as in the older languages is to denote the thing *with* which an action is performed. Hence Brugmann prefers to call this the *with-case* ('Mit-Kasus', KVG §540), because the *with*-idea may either signify *connection* or denote the *means by which* an action is done or something happens. Kaccāyana defines this (viz. *karaṇa-kāraka*) as "that by which an action is done"¹ and further lays down the rule that the third case-affix is to be employed to express the *karaṇa*,² while Moggallāna merely states that the third case denotes the agent or the instrument.³ We may observe in this connection that Indian grammarians are very careful to distinguish the logical function of cases which they call *kāraka* from the purely grammatical notion of cases. Pāṇinī meets this difficulty in much the same way. He first defines the *karaṇa-kāraka* as 'that which is especially auxiliary for the accomplishment of an action',⁴ a more comprehensive definition than that of the Pāli grammarian, and then adds the rule that in denoting the agent or the instrument the third affix is to be employed.⁵ It is interesting to note

¹ 'yena vā karīyate taṃ karaṇaṃ' Kac. 290.

² 'karaṇe tatiyā' Kac. 288.

³ 'kattu-karaṇesu tatiyā' Mog. II.18.

⁴ 'sādhakatamaṃ karaṇaṃ' Pāṇ, I.4.42.

⁵ 'kartṛkaraṇayo tṛtiyā' ibid. II.3.18.

that Kaccāyana has a separate rule for the agent,⁶ which is syntactically preferable to the others' treating them together.

§62. [Functions]

Modern grammarians⁷ regard the *inst. of agent* as only one aspect of the *inst. of means* in its widest sense (KVG §554). There is however a fundamental difference both grammatically and logically between the two. The *inst. of agent* is only applicable with the passive or the causative verb and virtually denotes the subject of the action; it is no mere 'auxiliary' as is implied in the designation 'inst. of means'. All Indian grammarians [79] regard *karṭṛ-kāra* and *karaṇa-kāra* as quite distinct in their logical functions.

This case seems to have had a varied and confused application even in early I.E., overlapping the uses of other cases, notably the abl. and the dat., and so lost its separate existence in some of those languages. Neither Greek nor Latin has any separate form for this case; in Greek the dat. supplies the want, in Latin the abl.⁸ This may perhaps explain why there is such a confusing similarity between the uses of the abl. and the inst. in Pāli (*vide* §§73.b,81,122). Speyer has drawn our attention to the fact that though the third case has been styled the instrumental after its most usual employment of expressing the *instrument* or *means* or *agent*, yet its starting point is rather the conception of *accompaniment* for which reason some call it the sociative.⁹ "Nor can there be any doubt", he says, "the suffixes, by

⁶ 'kattari ca' Kac. 290.

⁷ cp. M.W. Smith, *Studies in the Syntax of the Gāthās of Zarathushtra*, §14.

⁸ Buckland Green, *Notes on Greek and Latin Syntax*, §80.

⁹ View of Delbrück in his treatise *Ablativ, Localis, Instrumentalis*.

which the third case is made, viz., *-bhi* and *-ā* convey the meaning of accompaniment, simultaneousness and nearness” (SS §57). In Pāli, however, the inst. alone for the *sociative* is not very frequent being superseded by the constructions with prepositions like *saha* and *saddhiṃ* or *sa-* in compounds. But in principle even the inst. with such prepositions falls within the sociative class because it signifies the idea of accompaniment, association, concomitancy or mutual relations as the case may be. In addition to these uses *saha* may denote *simultaneousness* or even form an adverbial phrase with the substantive in the inst. case (§64), which functions are logically closely related to the idea of *accompaniment*, though perhaps not so directly as the rest.

§63. Inst. of Association or Accompaniment.

a. This is the *sociative* use proper; it expresses the person who accompanies the *agent* with verbs denoting *motion* and the like (cp. KVG §541). e.g., *āyasmā Ānando ... Cetakena bhikkhunā pacchā-samaṇena, yena Subhassa ... nivesanaṃ ten' upasaṅkami* D I.205 “the venerable Ānanda ... set out for the residence of Subha ... with the monk Cetaka as attendant [80] (-recluse)”. An extension of the same use is frequent in the Nikāyas to denote mutual relations between people:

i. It may express the person who is united with another. e.g., *mātaraṃ pi puttana samānetā ahoṣi* D III.160 “he was one who joined mother with son”; *missibhāvaṃ gato tayā* D II.267 (V.) “gone to union with thee”.

ii. Similar is the construction with verbs meaning to enter into talk or discussion. e.g., *kena sākacchaṃ samāpajjati* D III.38 “with whom will he enter into conversation?”.

iii. All verbs of *conferring, conversing, talking, discussing* etc. likewise take a similar inst. e.g., *Mahā-Govindo brāhmaṇo Brahmunā sākaccheti sallapati manteti* D II.237 “the brahmin Mahā-Govinda (Lord High Treasurer) converses, talks and deliberates with Brahmā”; *Ambaṭṭho māṇavo caṅkamanto pi nisinnena Bhagavatā kañci kañci kathaṃ sāraṇīyaṃ vītisāreti* D I.90 “the young Ambaṭṭha even while walking up and down conversed on various matters with the Blessed One who was seated”.

b. This same sociative inst. is used to express the thing with which or together with which another is presented and so on. e.g., *Tena kho pana samayena Aggika-Bhāradvājassa brāhmaṇassa sappinā pāyāso sannihito* S I.166 “At that time milk-rice was provided for the brahmin Aggika-Bhāradvāja together with clarified butter”; cp. *sālīnaṃ annaṃ paribhuñjamāno, sakuntamaṃsehi susaṅkatehi* Sn 241 “eating food made of (the best) rice with well-dressed fowl”. The *thing* thus denoted may express the idea of *accompaniment* in much the same way as the *person* who accompanies. e.g., *Atha kho Bhagavā yathā dhotena pattena Pañcasālāṃ brāhmaṇagāmaṃ piṇḍāya pāvīsi* S I.114 “Then the Blessed One entered Pañcasālā, the village of the brahmins, for alms with his well-washed bowl (i.e. taking his bowl)”. The parallel idiom in this case would be the acc. with the gerund *ādāya* “taking”, which is the prevailing construction in later prose. The gerund *ādāya* due to this employment came to be regarded as an indeclinable with prepositional force (c. acc.; *vide* P.T.S. Dict. s.v.). [81] The same is found used metaphorically in

verse, in which case it borders on the inst. of *attendant circumstance* or *characteristic*. This is similar to the construction *inst. + sampanna* which usually appears as compound. e.g., *nibbiṭṭhena carāmi sabbaloke* Sn 25 “with what I have gained I wander about in the world”. In spite of the various nuances in which this inst. is applied, the fundamental notion underlying all such uses is the same, viz. the sociative idea.

§64. Sociative Inst, with *saha*, *saddhim* & *sa-*.

All these instrumentals can be accompanied by *saha*, *saddhim* or *sa-* “with” which are prepositional adverbs according to Macdonell (VGS §199 B.3. cp. Vedic *sahá* and *sākaṃ*). Local grammarians too regard the inst. in such instances as being originally due to the prepositions *saha* and *saddhim*.¹⁰ It is however clear from the preceding paragraphs that the inst. alone can be used here without any such help word and that these adverbs were only later introduced probably to avoid syntactical confusion with other instrumentals such as those of *means* etc. and in certain cases for emphasis and precision. These uses can be illustrated under the various sub-headings of the *sociative* class, thus:

a. With the inst. of accompaniment and association; e.g., *mahatā bhikkhu-saṅghena saddhim* ... D II.90 “with a great multitude of monks”; *saha rājūbhi* D II.258 “with the kings”. The same construction occurs with *sa-* in compounds. e.g., *sadevake loke samārake sabbrahmake sassamaṇa-brāhmaṇiyā pajāya sadeva-manussāya* D II.12 “in the world of gods and men with its

¹⁰ ‘*sahādiyoge ca*’ Kac. 289.

Māra and Brahma, together with its hordes of recluses and brahmins, kings (*lit.* gods) and men”.

b. With the inst. expressive of mutual relations such as union, conversation, discussion etc.; e.g., *Bhagavatā saddhiṃ mantayamānassa* M I.205 “of him conferring with the Blessed One”; *evaṃ dutiyena saha mam’assa vācābhilāpo* Sn 49 “thus if I shall pass words with another ...” [82]

c. With the inst. expressing simultaneity; eg., *saha dassanen’ eva* A IV.213 “at the mere sight of (*lit.* with the very sight ...)”; *parinibbute Bhagavati saha parinibbānā* (§6). S I.159 “simultaneously with the passing away of the Blessed One”.

d. With the inst. denoting the accompanying circumstances; e.g., *saha viññāṇena* ... D II.64 “with consciousness ...”; *saha dhammena* ... D II.104 “with righteousness ...”; the second example is almost *adverbial* in employment and can be rendered “righteously” like an adverb of *manner*. Hence logically it comes to border on the inst. of *means*.

§65. Inst. of Attendant Circumstances.

Closely related to the above *sociative inst.* is the inst. used to express the *attendant circumstances*, that is to say, incidents, conditions, moods, feelings and manifestations that accompany or characterize the agent (cp. KVG §542). These may be broadly classed under the well known designations of *manner* and *quality*, parallel to the Latin abl. *modi et qualitatis* (cp. SS §63.II.31y, & §67). It has to be mentioned here, however, that by the term *manner* is not implied the

purely adverbial function of that case. Perhaps the former is better designated the *inst. of description*. In Pāli this inst. has an extensive use and in many instances borders, as has been observed in the foregoing paragraph (d.), on the inst. of *means* (§66), especially in the case of the inst. denoting the posture or mood. It has a logical relation to the absolute uses of the loc. and the gen. (§§182&158) just as some uses of the inst. of means (§68.c.). One can hardly fail to recognize the *absolute* nature of the inst. in such examples as: *atha kho pāpima āyasmā Vidhuro bhinnena sīsena lohitena gaḷantena Kakusandhaṃ yeva Bhagavantaṃ ... anubandhi* M I.337 “then O Evil One the Elder Vidhura, with his head broken and blood oozing, began to follow the Blessed One Kakusandha”. The following distinctions as to its general application may be noticed: [83]

a. i. The inst. denoting attendant circumstance or incident in the literal sense is seldom found in the Nikāyas. e.g., *kharassarena paṇavena rathiyāya rathiyaṃ ... (taṃ) ... parinetvā* D III.67 “having led (him) from street to street ... to the accompaniment of the harsh sound of a drum (*lit.* with a rough-toned drum)”.

ii. It may also denote a continued action which attends upon another (action). e.g., *kāya nu ’ttha bhikkhave etarahi kathāya sannisinnā* D II.1 “with (i.e. engaged in) what kind of talk were you seated (together) just now, O monks?”; *yāya mayaṃ etarahi kathāya sannisinnā* D I.178 “engaged in which talk we were seated just now”.

iii. Or it may signify a certain circumstance, such as a mark, sign or injury, temporarily characterising a person. Such, for instance, is the already cited semi-absolute employment. e.g., *Atha kho bhikkhave Kālī dāsī bhinnena sīsena lohitena gaḷantena paṭivissakānaṃ*

ujjhāpesi M I.126 “Then the maid-servant Kālī, with her head broken and blood oozing (therefrom), called to (*lit.* stirred up) the neighbours”. This however is not the same as the inst. of characteristic¹¹ which is illustrated by Pāṇinī with the example *jaṭābhiḥ tāpasah* “an ascetic by (the fact of his having) matted hair”, though it signifies a mark or sign characterising a person. This logically falls under the category of *cause* (§67).

b. Very similar to the above is the inst. used to express physical and mental attributes or manifestations. This may denote either *quality* (cp. SS §67) as in *mahāpurisalakkhaṇehi samannāgato* D II.16 “gifted with the signs of a super-man”, or *manner* as in *rājā niyyāsi ... rājānubhāvena* D I.49 “the king ... set forth ... in (*lit.* with) royal splendour”; cp. Vedic *ūt sūryo jyotiṣā devā eti* (KVG §542) “god Sūrya rises with splendour”,

c. It is also used to express conditions of body and mind which attend the agent engaged in an action. e.g., *rakkhiten’ eva kāyena ... gāmaṃ vā nigamaṃ vā piṇḍāya pavisissāmi* S II.271 “with my body guarded shall I enter village or hamlet for alms”; *dissamānena kāyena dhammaṃ desesi* S I.156 “he preached the [84] doctrine with his body visible”; *sucibhūtena attanā viharati* “he lives with his self (Comy. mind) purified”. cp. *ken’ attanā gacchati Brahmaloḥam* Sn 508 “with what body (*lit.* self) does he go to the Brahma-world?”.

d. The state of mind or mood (cp. KVG §542) in which one acts or exists is also denoted by this inst. e.g., *aññatarena samādhinā nisinno hoti* D II.270 “he is seated in a particular intent state of mind”;

¹¹ ‘*itthambhūtalakṣaṇe*’ Pāṇ. II.3.21.

anupādisesāya nibbāna-dhātuyā parinibbuto D II.109,140 “entered Utter Peace in that element of cessation wherein no basis (for rebirth) is left”.

e. It also denotes the posture in which one sits or lies. The parallelism with the Latin abl. *modi* is here very clear. e.g., *pallaṅkena nisīdeyya* D II.211 “would sit with legs cross-wise”; *dakkhiṇena passena sīhaseyyaṃ kappesi* D III.209 “he slept like a lion on his right side”; *ākāse pi pallaṅkena kamati* D I.78 “he travels cross-legged in the sky” (cp. Dial. II.89); *daṇḍo upari vehāsaṃ khitto aggena nipatati* S II.184 “the stick thrown up into the air falls with its top (down)”.

f. The same logical function as denoted by the inst. expressing *mood* (d.) is implied in a peculiar idiom which is used parallel to the cognate object. e.g., *santena vata bhante pabbajitā vihārena viharanti* D II.130 “those who have gone forth (into the Holy Life), Sir, indeed live in a peaceful manner (*lit.* dwelling)”; cp. *santena nūn’ajja Bhagavā vihārena vihāsīti* D II.205.

Out of the inst. of *attendant circumstances* has developed a peculiar idiom which closely resembles the dat. of *purpose* (§106), thus providing another instance of case contact. e.g., *Kosinārakā Mallā santhāgāre sannipatitā kenacid eva karaṇīyena* D II.47 “the Mallas of Kusinārā were assembled in the mote hall with some business (at hand)”. Here the notion of attendant circumstance is quite clear. The idiom appears accordingly to be on the borderline between “with a business” (attendant circumstance) and “for a business” (purpose). Similarly: *Campāyaṃ paṭivasanti kenacid eva karaṇīyena* D I.113,150 “they were [85] living at Campā on some business”; *Virūḷhakassa ... santike kenacid eva karaṇīyena* D II.207 “near

Virūḷhaka ... for (*lit.* with) some work”; The idea of *purpose*, however, is more marked with verbs of *motion*: e.g., *Dasamo gahapati Aṭṭhakanāgaro Pāṭaliputtaṃ anupatto hoti kenacid eva karaṇīyena* M I.349 “the householder Dasama Aṭṭhakanāgara had come to Pāṭaliputta for some business”. Hence it is not surprising to find the idiom *yena atthena* employed just like *yassa atthāya* to denote *purpose*, though the idea of attendant circumstance is not yet lost in the former. e.g., *yena atthena ... sannisinnā* D II.209 “assembled for which purpose”; *yena atthena devā sannipatitā* D II.225 “the gods ... met for which purpose”. It is also found in the *gāthā* literature. e.g., *yen’ atthena idhāgato* Sn 430 “come hither for which purpose”.

§66. Instrumental of Means.

In the category of *means* in its widest sense are included the instrumentals of *means* (in the ordinary sense), of *instrument*, of *way by which*, and even of *the agent* by some authorities.¹² But, as has been already pointed out (§62), the *agent* is better treated separately by virtue of its ‘independent character’¹³ in the conception and construction of the sentence. Pāli grammarians too preserve this distinction.¹⁴ The *inst. of means* has a varied use in the Nikāyas, extending by stretch of idiom and usage into other established categories. Its most frequent and essentially fundamental application is to express the *means* or the *instrument*, in the physical (narrow)

¹² cp. W.M. Smith, *Studies in the Syntax of the Gāthās of Zarathushtra*, §14.

¹³ ‘*svatantrya*’, as opposed to the other cases which are called ‘*paratantrya*’ or *dependent* by Skr. grammarians, especially, Patañjali; cp. *Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar*, p. 228.

¹⁴ Kac. 288 and 290.

sense of the term, by which an action is accomplished. e.g., *na musalena ... paṭhaviṃ khaṇati* M II.51 “he does not ... dig the earth with a tool”; *mahānaṅgalena kasanto* S III.155 “tilling with a large plough”; *varattāhi bandhitvā* D III.21 “having tied with straps”; *ekena cīvarena naṃ acchādehi* D II.133 “cover him with one robe”.

It may be mentioned here that the inst. of means can sometimes border on the inst. of *cause* or even of *relation* (§67 & 69), as in the following example where all these nuances seem [86] to be implied by it: *Mahā-Govindaṃ brāhmaṇaṃ dhanena sikkheyyāma* D II.245 “let us gain over the brahmin Mahā-Govinda by means of (through or in point of) money”. Or sometimes the substantive in the inst. may denote an idea contained in the verb, in which case we have a striking parallel to the cognate use of the acc. (§35). e.g., *agginā daheyya* A I.136 “would burn with fire”. Here *daheyya* alone would convey the necessary meaning. This inst. can also be used in abstract manner like the other cases. e.g., *aminā p’ etaṃ pariyāyena* S V.110 “by this method”. In the following instance the inst. *pāṇehi* seems to be more like a *sociative* (gone with their lives) though in a way it can be regarded as denoting the *means*: *Samaṇaṃ khalu bho Gotamaṃ anekāni deva-sahassāni pāṇehi saraṇaṃ gatāni* D I.116 “many thousands of gods gone to the recluse Gotama as refuge with their lives”. This is used parallel to the frequent phrase *yāvajīvaṃ pāṇupetaṃ saraṇaṃ gataṃ* M I.368.

a. This same inst. of means is invariably employed in expressing the part of body or limb exercised in accomplishing an action. e.g., *ubhoḥi hatthehi udakaṃ omasitvā* D II.176 “having touched water with both his hands”; *pāṇinā talaṃ āhacca* D II.262 “striking the earth with his hand”; *na sahatthā paṭhaviṃ khaṇati* M II.51 “does not

dig the earth with his own hand”; *sahatthā santappesi* M I.393; A I.274; D I.109; Sn p.107 “fed with his own hand”. In these examples the particle *sa-* (in *sahatthā*) has to be taken as meaning “his own”, corresponding to Skr. *sva* (*vide* §6; cp. *sadesa* “one’s own country” P.T.S. Dict. *s.v.*), and not as the contracted form of *saha* “with”, as suggested by Franke (Z.D.M.G. 1892 p.313). For *saha* + *inst.* never directly signify the means by which an action is done or the *instrument*, because *saha* is only a *sociative* adverb (*vide* §64) denoting either *accompaniment* or *attendant circumstance*. This is also supported by the fact that *sahatthā* can stand side by side with the pure *inst.* of *means* (instrument) as with *musalena* “with (by) a tool” in the cited context: *na musalena na sahatthā* ... M II.51. Moreover the Avestan *tā zastā* which Franke adduces as a parallel is also the *inst.* of *means*, *tā* being only “his”, the personal pronominal [87] adjective.¹⁵ Other examples which belong to this class are: *padasā yeva pavattesi* D I.107 “caused him to roll with his foot”; *sirasā vandati* D II.148 “worships with (bowed) head”; *samehi pādehi patiṭṭhahitvā* D II.15 “having stood firm with level feet”; *mukhena eva khādati* D III.6 “eats with the mouth”; *Bhagavato pādāni mukhena ca paricumbati* M II.120 “he kisses the feet of the Blessed One with his (*lit.* mouth) lips”. With certain verbs, such as those meaning “to take, bear, carry”, the *inst.* is interchangeable with the *loc.*, when the limb or part of the body *with* or *by* which such action is done implies at the same time that part *at* which the carrying etc. is made. Though this optional construction is logically permissible and is actually attested in Indian syntax (SS §74.8), in the Nikāyas the *inst.* seems to be the popular idiom even here (but cp. §§166.e. & 165.f.). e.g., *gabbhaṃ kucchinā pariharati* M I.266 “she bears the

¹⁵ cp. M.W. Smith, *loc.cit.* p. 100 (*yasna* 43.4 & foot-note).

embryo in (*lit.* with) her womb”; *aññā añkena pariharanti* D II.19 “others carry (him) about on their hips”; *añkena vāhitvā* M II.97 “having carried on the hip”; *vāmena hatthena bhīnkāraṃ gahetvā* D II.172; III.63 “having taken the jar with his left hand”.

b. The faculty exercised in feeling and perceiving is similarly denoted by the inst. e.g., *cakkhunā rūpaṃ divvā* D I.70 “having seen an object with the eye”; *kāyena paṭisaṃvedi* D II.186 “felt by the body”; *cetasā ceto parivitakkaṃ aññāya* D II.36 “having known the thought of the (other’s) mind with his own mind”; *manasā pi no aticarī, kuto pana kāyena* D II.176 “she did not behave faithlessly even in mind, how then in body?”

c. It is also used to denote the medium through which one communicates, converses etc. with another, *gāthāhi ajjhabhāsiṃ* M I.171; Sn p. 66 “I declared in verses”; *gāthāhi paccabhāsi* D II.39 “he said in verse”; *sāruppāhi gāthāhi abhitthavi* Sn p. 101 “he lauded in fitting verses”; *sarena viññāpeti* D II.202,211 “communicates (*lit.* convinces) by means of the voice”; *imāhi gāthāhi anumodi* D II.208 “gave benediction with these verses”. The medium or manner by which one’s assent or desire [88] is conveyed may be a mood or a particular attitude, in which case the construction plainly borders on the inst. of *attendant circumstance*. e.g., *adhivāsesi Bhagavā tuṅhībhāvena* D I.225; II.180 “the Blessed One acquiesced in silence” or “gave his assent by or with silence”. The name by which one is addressed is also denoted by this inst. e.g., *nāmena vā gottena vā āvuso-vādena vā samudācaritabbo* D II.154 “should be addressed by name, clan or the appellation of ‘friend’”.

d. Similar is the inst. used to express the means by which, especially the conveyance in which, one travels etc. e.g., *yāva nāgassa bhūmi nāgena gantvā* D I.50; M II.113 “as far as the ground was suitable for the elephant, having gone on (*lit.* by) the elephant”.

e. It is used with the *local* sense with words meaning path or door to express the *passage by which* a moving (exit or entry) takes place or the *way by which* one goes etc. e.g., *dakkhiṇena dvārena nikkhamitvā* D III.67 “leaving through the southern gate”; *uttarena dvārena nagaraṃ pavisitvā* D II.161 “entering the city by the northern gate”; *vātapānena rasmī pavisitvā* S I.103 “the rays having entered through the window”.

f. Just as in the case of the inst. of attendant circumstance, (§65.f.) here too we may have an idiom parallel to the cognate object. In most of these instances the inst. and the verb are etymologically related. e.g., *ovādena ovadati* S V.385 “he advises with an advice”; *antevāsābhisekena abhisittā* D II.152 “initiated with the initiation of a co-resident pupil”; *khattiyābhisekena abhisitto* A I.107 “anointed with the anointing of a prince”. Sometimes however they are not etymologically similar and the inst. is cognate only in meaning. e.g., *adhunābhisitto rajjena* D II.201 “newly consecrated with kingship”.

g. The *inst. of means* is also used in a *participial* sense; that is to say, it can be used parallel to the gerund in *-tvā*, which itself was originally the inst. sg. of the verbal noun in *-tu* (VGS §163.2). This is naturally restricted to verbal nouns or substantives with a strong verbal element. e.g., *nāhaṃ taṃ gamanena* [89] *lokassa antaṃ ... patteyyanti vadāmi* S I.61 “I do not say that by going (having gone = *gantvā*) I would reach the end of the world”; *saṃvāsena kho*

Mahārāja sīlaṃ veditabbam S I.78 “by living together, Great King, should right conduct be ascertained”.

h. The *inst. of means* can sometimes logically stand for an acc. of the external object. The syntactical difference in such cases is due to the difference in view-point and is idiomatical. e.g., *maṃ ... paṃsukena okiranti* M I.78 “they scatter down soil on me”, *lit.* “scatter me down with soil”; *saṃvibhajetha no rajjenāti* D II.233 “distribute the kingdom among us”, *lit.* “.. us with the kingdom”. Here probably the *inst.* is due to the influence of the prefix *saṃ-*.

§67. Instrumental of Cause.

The *inst. of cause* expresses the reason or motive for an action or an existing condition (KVG §550; VGS §199.3.). This use brings the *inst.* into close contact with the *abl.*, in view of which Sanskrit grammarians enjoin special rules in certain instances forbidding the employment of the *abl.* to avoid confusion. “The *abl.* is forbidden and the *inst.* is of necessity, if, firstly, the cause or motive be at the same time the agent; secondly, if it be an abstract noun of the feminine gender expressing a quality”.¹⁶ In Pāli the confusion is worse confounded by the fact that the old *inst.* in *-ā*, which Franke has definitely shown to survive in Pāli (Z.D.M.G. 1892) falls in with the *abl.* sg. in *-ā* from Skr. *-āt* (*vide* §6). Logically too there is ample scope for the two cases to come into contact (§122).

¹⁶ See §72.7 (Rem.) in Speyer’s *Sanskrit Syntax* where he cites the *sūtra* of Pāṇinī (II.3.25) ‘*vibhāṣā guṇe striyām*’.

a. The *inst. of cause* cannot be strictly separated from the *inst. of means* (§66.a.) because the idea of means with which an action is performed is not far removed from that of its cause. Indian Grammar, however, makes an important distinction between the two. Here there is an elaborate treatment of *hetu* and *karaṇa*. The argument may be summed up in the words of Chakravarti, thus: “The very conception of *kāraṇa* is intimately [90] related to that of cause (*kriyānimittam kāraṇam*). By *hetu* is meant the material cause. In the grammatical conception of *hetu*, we should remember, there is no room for action: *Karaṇa* or instrument, defined as a ‘cause associated with an action’ (*vyāpāravat kāraṇam karaṇam*), is intimately related to action. There is however no essential difference between *hetu* and *karaṇa*; it is only the association with action that makes the difference”.¹⁷ It is interesting to see from this discussion how far the ancient grammarians’ conception of syntax tallies with modern scientific notions.

b. Kaccāyana after Pāṇinī lays down the rule that the third case-affix is to be used in the sense of *hetu*, i.e., cause, reason or motive.¹⁸ The examples adduced are: *annena vasati*; *viḥṅgāya vasati*; *sakkārena vasati*; *dhammena vasati*. The last however does not strictly mean “he lives *by means of* the Law” or “he lives *by means of* righteousness”, but simply denotes “he lives righteously”, in which case we have here only an adverbial instrumental. Its logical import seems originally to have been the idea of *attendant circumstance* (*vide* §65.c, cp. §64.d) rather than one of *means*.

¹⁷ *Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar*, p. 45.

¹⁸ ‘*hetvatthe ca*’ Kac. 291; cf. ‘*hetau*’ Pāṇ. II.3.23.

§68. [Cause and Reason]

a. The commonest use of this inst. is to express the cause for the existence of a thing or for some happening. e.g., *dānena damena saṃyamena saccavajjena natthi puññaṃ* S III.209 “there is no merit in (*lit.* by reason of) giving, discipline, restraint and truthfulness”; *sakena lābhena attamano* S II.198 “he was pleased with his gain”. It may denote the *reason* for an *action*, in which case it almost implies the *means* though not the actual *instrument* as pointed out in the preceding paragraph. e.g., *kāyabalena gacchati* M II.137 “goes by reason of his bodily strength”. But such instances are very rare and in the following it merely signifies the *cause*: in the sense of *by way of*. e.g., *āhārena suddhīti* M I.80 “purity by way of food”; *udakena suddhiṃ pacceti* S I.182 “desires purity by way of water”; or in the sense of *on account of*, *due to*. e.g., *sabba-phāliphullā honti akāla-pupphehi* D II.137 in full bloom due to blossoms out of season”; *atthi bhikkhave* [91] *aññeva dhammā ... ye Tathāgato pavedeti, yehi Tathāgatassa yathā-bhuccaṃ vaṇṇaṃ sammā vadamāno vadeyyuṃ* D I.12 “there are, brethren, other things (doctrines) which the Tathāgata declares on account of which, speaking rightly, people extol the praises of the Tathāgata in keeping with facts”. It may also denote the disease *of which* one dies. e.g., *alasakena kālaṃ karissati* D III.7 “will die of diarrhoea”; *ten’ eva ābādhena kālaṃ akāsi* S I.150 “he died by that very disease”.

b. When it expresses the *motive* it is often to be rendered by *through* or *owing to*, e.g., *satthugāravena na puccheyyātha* D II.155 “were you not to ask through respect for the Master”; *attano paṭibhānena aññe pesale bhikkhū atimaññeti* S I.187 “he slights other amiable monks owing to his intelligence”; *ubhayena vata maṃ so Bhagavā*

atthena anukampi diṭṭhadhammikenā c' eva samparāyikenā cā ti S I.82 “considering both points of advantage (*lit. through* both motives) the Blessed One pitied me, for my benefit in this very life and also hereafter”.

c. This same use is extended to express quite another turn of idiom, which Macdonell calls the *inst. of accordance* (VGS §199 1.6), meaning *for the sake of* or *on behalf of* etc. e.g., *bhavantānaṃ vacanena gamissāmi* M II.148 “I shall go in accordance with your word (i.e. at your bidding)”; *mama vacanena ... Moliyaphaggunāṃ bhikkhuṃ āmantehi* M I.123 “call the monk M. in my name” (cp. D II.143); *mama vacanena samaṇaṃ Ānandaṃ appābādhaṃ ... phāsuvihāraṃ puccha* D I.204 “on my behalf inquire of the recluse Ānanda as to his health and convenience”.

d. There are a few instances where the *inst.*, though categorically coming under the causal group, still, by the peculiar viewpoint obtained in the idiom, approximates to an absolute use. Speyer mentions a similar *inst.* in Skr. (just as in Latin) which he calls the *semi-absolute* construction. He says that in all of them the *loc.* might have been used, corresponding to the Latin *abl. absolute* (SS §372). Here the *inst.* represents the action, expressed by the participle, as the *cause*, or *motive*, or *means* [92] of the main action. e.g., *evaṃ hi so bhante kakkāṭako sabbehi aḷehi saṃchinnehi ... abhabbo taṃ pokkharaniṃ puna otarituṃ* S I.123 “thus, Sir, (owing to the fact of) his limbs being broken ... the crab is unable to go back into the pond”; *so rūḷhena vanena saṃchavinā n'eva maraṇaṃ vā nigaccheyya na maraṇamattaṃ vā dukkhaṃ* M II.259 “with the closing up and healing of his wound, he neither dies nor comes to deadly woe” (cp. Dial. Vol. IV. Part II. p.149).

§69. Instrumental of Relation.

The *inst. of relation* has also been called the *inst. of the point* because it expresses the point in which a term is applied. Perhaps the designation *inst. of specification* is the more appropriate term (*vide* KVG §551). This *inst.* resembles very closely the *inst. of manner*, in a logical sense, and in many cases overlaps the uses of the *inst. of cause*. In fact it is justifiable to regard it as a division of the latter. Macdonell calls this use *inter alia* the *inst. of accordance* (VGS §199.1.b) because it denotes *that according to which* some other thing or person is named or distinguished. Pāṇinī says that “any mark, or attribute, by which is indicated the existence of a particular state or condition is denoted by the third case”.¹⁹ Moggallāna has merely followed the Sanskrit grammarian.²⁰ Kaccāyana has the rule that “the third case-affix is to be employed in qualification”²¹ and the *vutti* illustrates it by the examples: *gottena Gotamo* “Gotama by clan” and *tapasā uttamo* “best in asceticism”.

§70. The Inst. of Relation may express:

a. i. that by which (in accordance with or in point of which) some person or thing is qualified. e.g., *Vipassi bhikkhave Bhagavā khattiyā jātiyā ahoṣi* D II.2 “the Blessed One Vipassi, brethren, was a prince by birth”; ... *Koṇḍañña gottena ahoṣi* D II.3 “was (known as) Koṇḍañña according to his clan”. This is frequent in *gāthā* literature also. e.g., *Ādiccā nāma gottena Sākiyā nāma jātiyā* Sn 423 “according

¹⁹ ‘*itthambhūtalakṣaṇe*’ Pāṇ. 11.3.21.

²⁰ ‘*lakkhaṇe*’ Mog. II.20.

²¹ ‘*visesane ca*’ Kac. 294; also ‘*yen’ aṅgavikāro*’ 293.

to clan called Ādiccas [93] and according to birth Sākyans”; *kammanā vasalo hoti* Sn 146 “becomes a slave according to one’s deeds”. A few of these instrumentals are inherited from the older language as adverbs. e.g., *pakatiyā sīlavatī* D II.12; M II.99 “by nature virtuous”. The adverbial implication makes it border on the inst. of *manner* or *means*.

ii. The above uses depend on nouns (substantive or adjective) and are therefore adnominal uses. Similarly we may have adverbial uses where the inst. of relation qualifies the action denoted by the verb. e.g., *sīlena vaḍḍheyyuṃ* D III.164 “they would increase in virtue”; *abhivadanti aṭṭhādasahi vatthūhi* D I.13 “accuse in point of eighteen matters”. It may occur also with participles (potential or passive), in which case it closely resembles the inst. of *means*. e.g., *iminā dutiyena ṭhānena navā bhikkhū gārayhā bhavanti* M I.14 “in view of this (or by means of this) second point new disciples (*lit.* monks) become censurable”; *anupakuṭṭho jātivādena* Sn. p.115 “unreproached in point of birth”; *aniñjamāno kāyena* M I.94 “unmoving in (point of) body”; *kāyena saṃvuto* D I.60 “restrained in (or with regard to) body”; *vācāya saṃvuto* M I.93 “restrained in speech”; on the last two examples compare Kac. 317.

b. The point in which a comparison is made. e.g., *ye keci Soṇa samaṇā vā brāhmaṇā vā aniccena rūpena dukkhena vipariṇāmadhammena seyyo ’haṃ asmī ti samanupassanti* (also with *sadiso* and *hīno*) S III.48 “whatever recluses and brahmins, Soṇa, regard themselves superior in point of (this) impermanent body subject to grief and change”; *tesaṃ aggaṃ akkhāyati yadidaṃ mahantattena* M I.184 “is deemed the highest of them, that is to say, in point of grandeur”.

c. The *standard* by which multiplicity *etc.* is reckoned or the *dimension* in which extent is measured. e.g., *tena māsenā dvādasamāsiyo saṃvaccharo* A I.214 “a year consisting of twelve months in terms of that month”; *ekūnatimso vayasā* D II.115 “twenty-nine years (in point) of age”; *dvādasayojanāni āyāmena* D II.146,170 “twelve leagues in length”; *sattayojanāni vitthārena* D II.170 “seven leagues in width”. [94]

§71. Inst. in Special Connection with Verbs.

Most of the uses of the inst. described above are found with particular classes of verbs (KVG §546), and, since without the inst. such verbs generally appear incomplete in meaning the former is said to be ‘governed’ by the latter (cp. VGS §199). That particular distinction in sense by virtue of which the inst. is ‘governed’ is brought in the case of many verbs by the prefix *saṃ-* “co-”. But it cannot be maintained in all instances that the inst. is solely due to the prefix, for, as already remarked in the case of the acc. (§37), the case is not directly due to the prefix but the verb; the prefix only emphasizes the *direction* or the particular kind of action denoted by the verb.

a. The inst. taken by the great majority of verbs come within the *means*-group (in the wider sense; cp. KVG §546.2.). Such are verbs expressing *enjoyment* and *satisfaction*. e.g., *nandati* “delights in”; *abhavena assa na nandati* D III.187 “he does not delight in his ruin”; cp. *nandati puttehi puttimā* Sn 33 “he who has sons, delights in sons”. The opposite of *nandati*, viz. *socati*, admits of the same construction since logically the connection indicated is the same. So we have in the next verse in the Sutta-Nipāta: *socati puttehi puttimā* Sn 34 “he

who has sons grieves at sons”; *tussati* “is satisfied”: e.g., *santuṭṭho hoti kāyaparihārikena cīvarena* D I.71; M I.268 “he is satisfied with a robe to wear on the body”; cp. *santussamāno itarītarena* Sn 42 “being content with this or that”; *ramati* “rejoice at, delight in”: e.g., *ramati nacca-gētehi* D III.197 (V.) “he delights in dance and song”; here the loc. is the concurrent idiom (§177.b.) as the rendering “delight in” implies; *abhirama Tissa ahaṃ²² ovādena ahaṃ anuggahena ahaṃ anusāsaniyāti* S III.109 “rejoice Tissa, rejoice at my advice, at my favour, at my admonition”; *santappeti* “satisfies, pleases”: *khādanīyena bhojanīyena santappayivā* D I.109 “having treated (*lit.* satisfied) ... with hard and soft food”.

b. Similar is the use with verbs expressing *repletion* like *pūreti* “fills” and *pharati* “be congested with”. e.g., *pattaṃ odanena* [95] *pūretvā* S I.174 “having filled the bowl with rice”; *ayaṃ Jambudīpo ... phuṭo bhavissati manussehi* D III.75 “this land of Jambudīpa ... will be filled with people”. In such instances the gen. can be employed instead of the inst. (*vide* inst.-like gen. §149). In a way similar to that discussed above (a.), the opposite idea of *deficiency* or *emptiness* can also be denoted by the inst. or the gen. (§85).

c. With verbs expressing *purchase*, *exchange* and *bartering* such as *kiṇāti* “buys”, *dadāti* “gives for” and *icchati* “expect for”: e.g., *hiraññena kayakkayaṃ* Kh p.6 (V.) “bartering in gold” *lit.* “buying and selling in gold”; *Dehi je Ambapāli etaṃ bhattaṃ satasahassena* D II.96 “Come now, Ambapāli, give this (invitation for a) meal for a hundred thousand (gold-pieces)”; *appena bahuṃ icchati* D III.186 “for a little he expects much”.

²² The nom. form for the gen. *mama* (?).

d. Verbs expressing *subsistence, sustenance, or means of livelihood* such as *jīvati* “live by or on”, *yāpeti* “subsist on”, *vasanti*, *lit.* “dwell” but by stretch of meaning “live on” found only in verse: e.g., *micchājīvena jīvikam kappenti* D I.9 “make a living by (means of) wrong livelihood”; cp. *puṭhusippena jīvati* Sn 613 “lives by different arts”; *yena sippaṭṭhānena jīvikam kappenti* M I.85 “by whatever craft they make a living”; *yāva-jīvaṃ surā-maṃsena eva yāpeyyaṃ* D III.9 “I would subsist on liquor and flesh till life lasts”; *ekissā pi dattiyā yāpeti* D I.166,179; S II.142 “keeps going on a single offering (of food a day)”; *kolehi yāpema* M I.80 “let us sustain ourselves with beans”; *vasī Godāvarīkūle uñchena ca phalena ca* Sn 977 “lived on gleanings and fruits on the bank of the Godāvārī”.

e. Verbs expressing the *thing with which* one plays or sports such as *dibbati* and *kīḷati*: e.g., *akkhehi dibbanti* M II.106; D II.312 “play at (*lit.* with) dice”; *yāni tāni kumārakānaṃ kīḷāpanakāni tehi kīḷati* M I.266 “sports with whatever are toys for children”. This *inst. of means* is to be distinguished from the *sociative* use of the same case expressing the *person* with whom one plays or sports. Still, as may be seen from the above examples, the two conceptions are logically related however slight the connection may be. [96]

§72. [Cause]

With some other verbs the application falls under the *inst. of cause* discussed above (§67). It is as much related to the *inst. of means* as the independent use is to the same. It is generally found:

a. With verbs expressing *disgust, repulsion* etc. such as *aṭṭiyati* “be incommoded with, worried at”, *harāyati* “be ashamed of”, *jigucchati*

“be disgusted at or with”. This use brings the inst. into contact with the abl., gen., acc. and even the loc., for in Skr. *jugupsate* “to shrink from, shun, or despise” could be used with the abl. or the inst. as found in the archaic literature, and in the later works even with the acc. (*vide* SS §97 R). The similar verb *nibbindati* occurs in the Nikāyas with the loc. and the gen. (§166.d.ii). The inst. seems to be the most frequent case with such verbs. e.g., *iddhipāṭihāriyena aṭṭiyāmi harāyāmi jigucchāmi* D I.213; M III.300 “I am disgusted of, ashamed of and loathesome of displays of supernormal powers”; *ahaṃ pi brāhmaṇa jigucchāmi kāyaduccaritena* A IV.174 “I too, brahmin, am loathesome of evil conduct in body”. The Comy. interprets the inst. in the passage *jigucchati kammehi pāpakehi* Sn 215, which may be either abl. or inst., by the acc. (*muttagataṃ viya jigucchati*, Pj. II. p.266).

b. With verbs meaning to *be offended with*, *be busy with* and *be born of* such as *abhisajjati* etc. e.g., *imāya appamattāya abhisajjituṃ* D I.91 “to be offended with or at a trifle like this”; *kehici kehici kicca-karaṇṭyehi vyāvaṇṇo* D II.270 “engaged in (busy with) various duties”; *vande te pitaraṃ ... yena jātā 'si kalyāṇī* D II.265 (V). “I adore your father, ... O beautiful one, of whom you were born”.

§73. [Association]

With another class of verbs the inst. is used to denote *association*. Such instances belong to the *sociative* group (§63). This is mostly found:

a. With verbs expressing *union* and the like, which normally have the prefix *saṃ-* such as *samāgacchati* “come together, collide” and

samsandati “join with” etc. e.g., *na pi sakaṭena samāgacchāmi* [97] S V.369 “nor do I collide with a carriage”; *Gaṅgodakam Yamunodakena samsandati* D II.223 “the waters of the Ganges join with the waters of the Yamunā”. A similar inst. is found in the peculiar idiom *etena p’ etaṃ nakkhamati* D II.67 “this does not tally with that”.

b. With verbs having the sense of *contending*, *competing*, *contesting*, *fighting* and *quarrelling* such as *saṅgāmeti*, *vivadati*, *viggaṇhati* etc. e.g., *asurā devehi saṅgāmesuṃ* A IV.433 “the demons fought with the gods”; cp. (adnominally) *yadāpi āsi asurehi saṅgāmo* Sn 681 “when the battle with the demons took place”; *mātā pi puttana vivadati* M II.120 “the mother quarrels with her son”; *rājā rājūhi vivadanti* M I.120 “rulers contend with rulers”; *na kenaci loke viggayha* M I.108 “at strife with no one in the world”; *ahaṃ pi ñāṇavādo kho pana ñāṇavādena arahati ... iddhi-pāṭihāriyaṃ dassetuṃ* D III.12 “I am also a professor of supreme knowledge, and (as such) am indeed fit to display (in competition) my supernormal powers with another one who professes supreme knowledge”.

c. With verbs expressing *separation*. Here the abl. is the more logical construction (§126) but the use of the inst. is due to the psychological fact that underlying both *union* and *separation* there is the notion of *mutuality*.²³ e.g., *sumuttā mayaṃ tena mahāsamaṇena* D II.162 “we

²³ “Delbr. I.I. p. 71 ‘Der begriff *trennung* ist zwar logisch der gegensatz von *zusammensein*, liegt ihm aber deshalb psychologisch sehr nahe’. Or to speak more correctly, it is not the conception of separation that is expressed or signified by the inst., but the notion of *mutuality* underlying both union and separation find in its adequate expression”. Speyer SS p. 46 f.n.

are completely free from that great recluse”; *maraṇadhammā sattā maraṇena parimuccanti* S I.88; V.3 “beings subject to death are released from death”. In fact the inst. and the abl. occur co-ordinately in the same context. e.g., *na parimuccanti jātiyā jarāmaraṇena ... na parimuccanti dukkhasmā ti vadāmi* S I.24 “I declare he is not free from birth, decay and death”. Similar parallel employment is found even in the older language (*vide* SS p.47,f.n.).

§74. Instrumental as Adverb.

Many instrumentals, mostly of the sociative, means, causal, local and temporal classes, having more or less the character of *adverbs* (SS §77), have come to be applied in a purely adverbial [98] sense in the Nikāyas. These may be the inst. sg. of nouns, pronouns including numerals, adjectives usually of the positive degree, or of compound formations. Beside the numerous instances where the case-connection (or inflexion) appears to be normal, there is a group of older inherited inst. forms, mainly Vedic in *-ā*, of which already in the Ṛg-Veda the adverbial use is indicated not only by the sense but by a shift of the accent (VGS §198.6), and which have come to be regarded by local grammarians as mere particles or indeclinables (*nipāta-mattam*). Such are, for instance, *micchā*, inst sg. of *mithu* found as *mithuyā* in the Vedas and *mithyā* in the Brāhmaṇas and *divā* inst. sg. of *dyú* found as *dīvā* with shift of accent in the Vedas (VGS p.85, f.n.1 ;cp. §2 here). This adverbial use of the inst. being in most cases parallel to that of the acc. (§§47-52), it furnishes another striking instance of contact between the two cases. This is generally found in the case of modal, local and temporal adverbs formed from them.

§75. [Instances of Adverbial Usage]

The uses may be classified in the following manner with respect to their logical functions:

a. Some of these adverbs go back to the *inst. of means* and are therefore *modal* in character. e.g., *manasā pi no aticarī* D II.176 cp. M III.179; Sn 1024 “she did not transgress even mentally”; *api ca me satthā paricīṇṇo dīgharattaṃ manāpena no amanāpena* S IV.57 “however the Master has been worshipped by me during all this time willingly, not unwillingly”; *pharusenāpi vuccamāno* A I.284 “being spoken to harshly”; *saṅkhittena bhāsitassa evaṃ vitthārena atthaṃ ājānāmi* D II.281 “of that which has been concisely stated I know the meaning extensively (in detail)”; cp. the *inst. vitthārena*, occurring also at D III.241; S IV.92; A II.77,177,189, with abl. *vitthārato* having similar adv. sense, found in later works (*vide* P.T.S. Dict. *s.v.*); *somanassaṃ ... duvidhena vadāmi* D II.278 “I describe happy-mindedness two-foldly”, where the *inst.* stands for the usual idiom *duvidhaṃ katvā*; cp. adverbs from other adjectival formations mostly occurring in the *gāthā* literature: *virūparūpena* [99] *mathenti cittaṃ* Sn 50 “agitate the mind diversely (under their different aspects)”; *anekapariyāyena pakāsito* Sn 15 “declared multifariously”.

b. There is a smaller class of adverbial instrumentals denoting “in accordance with”. They do not connote any instrumental sense, as Macdonell has pointed out (VGS §199.1.b), but more or less border on the *relative* use of the *inst.* and possibly also on the *sociative* in the narrower sense of *attendant circumstance*. e.g., *atthe paṇāyati nāyena* D II.21 “he settles the cases legally” (i.e. according to justice); *dhammena bhoge pariyesāmi* Sn p.87 “righteously I pursue wealth”;

ete te Kassapa ubho ante anupagamma majjhena Tathāgato dhammaṃ deseti S I.20 “the Tathāgata, Kassapa, without going into either of the extremes preaches the Law medially (i.e. according to the middle way)”. We have already mentioned the example *pakatiyā sīlavatī* D II.12; M II.99 “naturally (by nature) virtuous” (§70) where the inst. clearly denotes *relation* but borders on the adverbial use at the same time (cp. VGS §199.1).

c. The inst. of *attendant circumstance* proper may itself appear in the role of an adverb, thus: e.g., *bandhanā mucceyya sotthinā avyayena* D I.72 “he would be released from bondage easily and without expense”; cp. *sotthinā* “safely, prosperously D I.96; II.346; M I.135; A IV.126; cp. *sukhena* Th 1.220, “happily” or “safely”, parallel to the adverbial use of the acc. in *sukhaṃ seti* S I.41; A I.136 and *sukhaṃ viharati* A I.96; III.3; *kicchena me adhigataṃ* D II.36 “acquired by me with difficulty”; cp. Skr. *kr̥cchrena* (SS §77) as adverb; *kasirena ghāsacchādo labhati* D I.251; M I.104; A I.107; S I.94 “one finds food and clothing with difficulty”. To this class also belong the old inst. adverbs of the type of *micchā* Sn 438,815 “falsely” (*vide* §74) and *uccā* (P.T.S. Dict. s.v.) “high”.

d. The inst. sg. of neuter pronouns is extensively used as adverb mostly in the sense of *reason*. e.g., *tena hi samma Ghaṭikāra muñca, gamissāmā ti* M II.48 “therefore friend Ghaṭikāra, let me off, we shall go”. This is usually found followed by *hi* with [100] verbs such as *suṇohi* and *suṇātha*, as for instance at D I.62; II.2; Sn p.21, and, as Buddhaghosa remarks, (*‘uyyojanatthe nipāto’* Sum. I. p.171), it has an exclamatory significance. The relative pronoun *yena* is mostly employed as *connective* corresponding to the acc. *yaṃ* already dealt with (§50.c). e.g., *appamattakaṃ etaṃ ... yena puthujjano*

Tathāgatassa vaṇṇaṃ vadamāno vadeyya D I.3 “this is just insignificant ... that (*lit.* whereby) a man of the world may say extolling the praises of the Tathāgata ...”; *ko nu kho bhante hetu ko paccayo yena mātugāmo n’ eva sabhāya nisīdati* A II.82 “what is the reason, Sir, what is the cause whereby a woman neither sits in the assembly ...”. The inst. sg. of the interrogative neuter pronoun forms a corresponding adverb with the sense of “how?”. e.g., (*gāthā*) *sorataṃ kena kathaṅca dantaṃ āhu* Sn 513 “how may they call him compassionate and how subdued?”. The form *etena* is once found with a sense similar to that of the connective *yena*. e.g., *yadeva ... pītigataṃ cetaso ubbilāvitattaṃ etena etaṃ oḷārikaṃ akkhāyati* D I.37 “inasmuch as ... (it consists of) joy and elation of mind, (thereby) is this called gross”.

e. Instrumentals with *local* and *temporal* sense may appear as adverbs of place and time respectively (cp. VGS §199.4&5).

i. *Local sense*: e.g., *antarena yamaka-sālānaṃ* D II.134,137,169 “between the pair of sal trees”; cp. Vedic adv. *ántarena* “within” (VGS §198.6). The majority of these are *regional* adverbs, being instrumentals of nouns denoting the cardinal points. e.g., *puratthimo vāto pacchimena saṃhareyya* S V.444 “the easterly wind would carry (it) westward”; *puratthimena nagarassa navaṃ santhāgāraṃ kārāpetvā* M I.343 “having caused a new mote hall to be built to the east of (*lit.* eastward of) the city”; *pacchimena ca puratthimena ca dvādasa yojanāni ahosi āyāmena* D II.146,170 “was twelve leagues in breadth on the west and on the east”; *uttarena Manasākaṭṭassa* D I.235 “northward of Manasākaṭṭa”. Adverbs of similar import are formed from the relative and demonstrative pronouns, viz., *yena* and

tena, frequently occurring in the coordinate construction “*yena ... tena ...*” which is discussed elsewhere (*inst. of place* §80.b). [101]

ii. *Temporal sense*: e.g., *adhunā kālakato* M II.243 “died recently”; *ādiken’ eva na byākāsi* M II.213 “... did not explain at the very start”; *literally* it would imply “initially”, in which case the *modal* character of these *local* and *temporal* adverbs is made clear. There is an elliptical use (?) of the inst. sg. of the demonstrative neuter pronoun, viz. *tena*, meaning “then”, possibly standing for *tena samayena*. e.g., *tena kho pana bhante ahesuṃ ...* D II.203 “then, Sir, there were ...”. On the analogy of these uses we may regard *kālena* in the following examples as an inst. of time employed adverbially: *kālena gamanaṃ* S V.78 “going at the (proper) time”; *lit.* “seasonably”; cp. *kālena dhammasavanaṃ* Sn 265 “listening to the Doctrine at the proper time”; *akālena* M III.48 “at the wrong time (*lit.* unseasonably)”; *nidhānavatiṃ vācaṃ bhāsita kālena* D I.64; III.106 “speaking (well-) grounded speech (i.e. words) at the proper time (*lit.* duly)”. A similar use of a time denoting word is *samayena* found only in verse. e.g., *samayena laddhā* Sn 388 “obtained in time”. A few archaic instrumentals also belong to this group. e.g., *divā ca rattī ca* D II.147 “by day and by night”. On the analogy of *divā* we are inclined to take *rattī* too as a Vedic inst. sg. of *-ī* nouns, analogous to *śúcī* (inst. sg. *vide* VGS p.80 & f.n.2). The reading in other places is, however, with the acc. *rattiṃ* (§2) or the archaic loc. *ratto* (§2).

f. There is one adverb of *quantity* formed from the compound stem *yebhuyya-*, corresponding to Skr. *yadbhūyas*, *ye* being the eastern pronominal form (§10). e.g., *yebhuyyena* D I.17,105; II.48 “mostly, for the most part (> usually)”; cp. Skr. *prāyena* “mostly”, adverb of *quantity*. In the following we have the inst. sg. of an *avyayībhāva*

compound used as an adverb denoting *manner*: *anupubbena parikkhayaṃ gacchati* M II.67 “decreases gradually”. Another similar inst. adverb from an irregular stem is *sabbatthatāya* D I.251; II.187; M I.38, A III.225 “on the whole”, which, as the v.l. *sabbattatāya* suggests, corresponds to Skr. *sarvātmanā* (>*sarvātmatāya*); vide SS. §77. [102]

§76. Instrumental of Time.

The *temporal* use of the inst. in Pāli has brought it into contact with many other cases, especially the acc. through the idea of *extension* and the loc. through the idea of *time at which* (KVG §545.b., SS §78, VGS §199.5). This latter construction is supposed by Speyer to be a peculiarity of Pāli and Jaina Prk. He suggests that in both these uses of the inst. the fundamental conception is that of concomitancy (SS §78).

The local grammarians too were aware of these divisions of the inst. in the temporal sense. Pāṇinī lays down the aphorism²⁴ that the third case-affix is to be employed after words denoting the duration of time and space when the accomplishment of the desired object is to be meant. e.g., *māsenānurvāko’ dhītaḥ* “he learnt the *anuvāka* in a month”. It is, however, significant of Kaccāyana’s method of paying more particular attention to the exceptional usages, mostly idioms that do not occur in Skr. but only in ‘Māgadhi’, that he lays down no rule parallel to the above but provides for the quite unexpected turn

²⁴ ‘*apavarge tṛtiyā*’ Pāṇ II.3.6.

of expression illustrated by *tena kālena* etc. with the observation that the inst. is used also in the sense of the loc..²⁵

§77. [Inst. of Duration]

a. Fundamentally, this inst. expresses the time *throughout, during, within* or *for which* an action extends. Since it denotes *duration* as much as the acc. Brugmann calls it *the prosecutive inst.* expressive, in this case, of extent in time (KVG §545.b). e.g., *mayā anupapannapubbā iminā dīghena addhunā* M I.82 “not already found by me during all this long period”; *iminā dīghena addhunā sandhāvitaṃ* S II.179 “coursed through all this long period”; *imehi kho pana te bhante tiṃsamattehi vassehi atthi koci vireso adhigato ...* S IV.300 “has any distinction ... been acquired by you, Sir, during these thirty years?”; *sakkā divasāvasesena gantunti* M II.119 “can be gone in the remaining part of the day”. Mention must be made of the prosecutive inst. denoting time *through which* found in the stereotyped adverbial phrase *kālena kālaṃ* which corresponds to the idiom “from (abl.) time to time”. e.g., *devo ca kālena kālaṃ sammā-dhāraṃ* [103] *anuppaveccheyya* D I.47 (cp. M I.277) “from time to time the heavens will send forth bountiful showers”; *kālena kālaṃ manasikātabbāni* M I.119 “should be pondered over from time to time (> time after time, i.e. continually)”.

b. Not rarely the above conception of time *within which* coincides with that of the time *after which* (cp. SS §78) or *before which* something is happening.

²⁵ ‘sattamyatthe ca’ Kac. 292.

i. *Time after which*: e.g., *Samvāseṇa kho Mahā-rāja sīlaṃ veditabbaṃ, tañ ca kho dīghena addhunā na ittaraṃ* S I.78 “Great King, right conduct can be known only by living together and that too after a long time, not by little (short) time”. This same nuance is expressed by the periphrasis *accayena* following the gen. of the time denoting word. e.g., *channaṃ māsānaṃ accayena saṅgāmo bhavissati* A I.111 “After six months (*lit.* on the lapse of ...) there will be a war”; cp. D II.140.

ii. Similarly the inst. may denote the time *by which* or *before which* an action is terminated, or *up to which point* continuity is implied. e.g., *etena upāyena paṭhamen’ eva yāmena Kosinārake Malle Bhagavantaṃ vandāpesi* D II.148 “in this manner by (or before the end of) the first watch of the night he had made the Mallas of Kusinārā pay their respects to the Blessed One”. The periphrasis spoken of above is used instead of this inst. also, e.g., *tassā rattiya accayena ... pañītaṃ khādanīyaṃ bhojanīyaṃ paṭiyādāpetvā* D II.97,127 “before the passing of that night ... having prepared excellent food both hard and soft”.

§78. Inst. of Time When.

Sometimes however the idea of extension or duration is not so apparent (cp. VGS §199.5), in which case the inst. assumes a syntactical function similar to that of the *loc. of time*. This is what Kaccāyana means when he says that “the inst. is used also in the sense of the loc.” (§76). As has been already referred to, the fundamental conception underlying this idiom is according to Speyer (SS §78) that of *concomitancy*. The fact, however, is open to criticism since the same claim can be made [104] for the adverbial

use of the inst. (§75). The logical connection between such adverbial phrases as *divā ca rattī ca*, *adhunā* and *ādiken' eva* and the inst. of time in *tena samayena* cannot be denied especially when the adv. *kālena* “at the right time, seasonably” seems to establish an intermediate link in the psychological development of the idiom. This is also supported by the fact that in Skr. there is no general use of the inst. parallel to the loc. of time, whereas its adverbial use is quite common (SS §77), but that it is widely used in later dialects like Pāli and Prk. Probably, therefore, this is an idiom of popular origin, evolved under the influence of such Vedic usages as *ṛtúnā* and *ṛtúbhiḥ* “in due season” (VGS §199.5). Incidentally, this is a further proof for Franke’s argument that Pāli and Skr. cannot have grown in the same region and that the former is derived from a Vedic dialect isolated for centuries from the group that produced (classical) Skr. (Z.D.M.G. 1892, p.315).

§79. [Inst. of Time When]

The most frequent employment of the inst. of time *when* or *at which* is found in the stereotyped phrase *tena kho pana samayena*. This however has not still completely lost the sense of *duration*, for, as context permits, it may be sometimes rendered “during that time”. e.g., *tena kho pana samayena āyasmā Nāgīto Bhagavato upaṭṭhāko hoti* D I.150 “during that time the venerable Nāgīta was the attendant on the Blessed One”. But the translation “at that time” can also be concurrently, and in some cases even preferably, used. e.g., *tena kho pana samayena Bhagavā divāvihāragato hoti paṭisallīno* S I.146 “at the time (or during that time) the Blessed One had gone to spend the midday in solitude”; *tena kho pana samayena rājā ... nisinno hoti* D I.47 “at that time the king ... was seated”. It is

significant of these examples that the narrative present *hoti* itself implies *continuity* of action, and so the inst. can hardly be said to have lost its original sense of *duration*.

a. It is interesting to find, however, that Buddhaghosa looks at the problem from quite a different angle. Commenting on *tena samayena* he says, probably echoing an earlier tradition, [105] that in the Vinaya texts it is used to signify *cause* or *reason* because the inst. here represents the time as the occasion for the Master to formulate any precept.²⁶ He makes the same observation on *tena kho pana samayena* Sn p.13, viz. “it has been said (*vuttaṃ hoti*) that the inst. is used because that specific moment was taken as the means (opportunity)”.²⁷ This clearly shows that he is representing an earlier tradition whereby all the different uses of the inst. were supposed to be connected to its fundamental notion of *means*.

b. Another idiom expressing an indefinite point in time, where the idea of extension is hardly found, is *aparena samayena* “at another time, later on”. e.g., *So aparena samayena tamhā ābādhā mucceyya* D I.72 “Sometime after he would be relieved of that ailment”; *So aparena samayena pabbajeyya* D I.60 “later on he would wander forth (into homelessness)”.

²⁶ ‘*Vinaye pana hetu-attho karaṇattho ca sambhavati ... tena samayena hetubhūtena karaṇabhūtena ca sikkhāpadāni paññāpayanto sikkhāpadapaññattihetuṃ ca avekkhamāno Bhagavā tattha tattha vihāsi. Tasmā tadatthajotanatthaṃ tattha karaṇavacanena niddeso kato*’. Papanācasūdanī I. p. 9.

²⁷ ‘*tena samayena karaṇabhūtenāti vuttaṃ hoti*’ Pj.II. p. 137.

c. Similar uses are found in the following where the space of time is so small that the idea of *within* or *during* is almost lost. They are very much like adverbs. e.g., *tena khaṇena tena muhuttena yāva brahmalokā saddo abhuggacchati* A IV.120 “that very moment (simultaneously) the sound rose up as far as the world of Brahmas”; *te ekena khaṇena ekena muhuttena ekamaṃsakhalaṃ – ekamaṃsapuñjaṃ karissāmi* M I.377 “in a moment, in a second, I shall reduce you to a mash, a heap of flesh”. Again, a subtle variation of meaning is found in *ekāhen’eva ... pakkamaṃsu* D I.48 “they went away at one and the same day ...” (cp. SS §78 R.1. Skr. *ekāhnā* “at one and the same day”).

§80. Instrumental of Place.

This corresponds logically to the above-described inst. of *time*. Some of these instrumentals have come to be regarded as adverbs. Most of them, however, still retain their independent character. A few of these imply *direction* or *route* by *which* and others are instrumentals with pure local sense, parallel to the loc. of place, just as the inst. of time is used for the temporal loc.. Still others approximate to a prosecutive inst. of the local [106] variety denoting the stretch of space through which an action progresses. Such is the inst. found in idioms like *vanena vanam* which originally meant “through forest to forest”. It is only later that this came to be regarded, probably due to the confusion of the ending *-ā*, as an inst. used for the abl. Of course the same can occur with the abl. instead of the inst. because psychologically “*through* one forest to another” is the same thing as “*from* one forest to another”. The idea *through which* can also be expressed by the loc. (§164).

§81. [Prosecutive Inst. of Place]

a. The prosecutive sense is most clearly expressed by the following examples where the inst. stands parallel to the abl. e.g., *vanena vanam gahanena gahanam papatati* M I.79 “gallops from (*lit.* through) forest to forest and thicket to thicket”; *rathiyāya rathiyam siṅghāṭakena siṅghāṭakaṃ (parinetvā)* M II.108; D III.67 “having led him from (along) street to street and junction to junction”; but in the following the inst. borders on the idea of *means* and implies *way by which* as much as *that through which*: *mā ekena (maggena) dve agamittha* D II.45 “let not two go along the same route”; *titthena eva gāvo pātaresi* M I.226 “caused the cows to cross (the river) at or by (*lit.* through) the ford”. (cp. KVG §545.a)

b. To this class also belongs the adverbial use of the inst. sg. of pronouns, mostly *yena*, *tena*, *aññena* and *ekena*, where the local sense is expressed either as *direction* or *place where*.

i. Of these there are many instances where inst. expresses *direction* in a general sense. e.g., *rājā Māgadho ... Pasenadī-Kosalaṃ abbhuyyāsi yena Kāsī* S I.83 “the King of Magadha ... marched against P. Kosala in the direction of Kāsī”; *yena kāmaṃ pakkamati* S V.149 “goes whither he likes”; *na yena²⁸ kāmaṃ gamo* D I.72 “unable to go whither he would”. This is sometimes found reduplicated. e.g., *yena yen’ eva Bhagavā gamissati tan ninnā va bhavissanti brāhmaṇa-gahapatikā* A IV.342 “whichever way the Blessed One goes, the brahmins and householders wend (are bent) that way”; *yena yen’ eva pakkamati ... [107]* D I.71; M I.268 “wherever he goes ...”;

²⁸ *gāmoti yena disābhāgena assa gantu-kāmatā hoti’* Sum.II. p. 212.

yena yen' eva deti ... D I.71; M I.180 “where it flies ...”; *yena vā tena vā palāyanti* S III.85 “flee this way or that way ...”; *idha pādaṃ karissāmīti aññena eva pādaṃ karomīti* M II.69 “(thinking) I shall point my step this way (*lit.* here) I actually place it in another direction”; *aññena sīsaṃ gacchati aññena kāyo gacchati* S II.231 “the head goes one way, the body another way”.

ii. The idiom ‘*yena ... tena ...*’ found generally with verbs of motion implies the *direction*, the *route by which* and sometimes even the *place where*. Of these the last nuance is the most marked. Buddhaghosa says that it is used in the sense of the loc. e.g., *yena*²⁹ *maṇḍalamālo ten' upasaṅkami* D I.2 “whither the circular pavilion was thither he repaired”; *yena Āḷāra-Kālāmo ten' upasaṅkami* D II.130 “where Āḷāra Kālāma was there he went”. In the following it implies mere direction: *yena Bhagavā ten' añjaliṃ paṇāmetvā* D II.37; Sn p.100 “pointing his clasped fists (in salutation) in the direction where the Blessed One was”. Sometimes when the place gone to and the person sought for are both mentioned the adv. *yena* may be repeated. e.g., *yannūnāhaṃ yena ... Mallikāya ārāmo yena Poṭṭhapāda paribbājako ten' upasaṅkameyyanti* D I.178 “it would be well if I go where the monastery of Mallikā is, where (lives) Poṭṭhapadā, the wanderer”. In the following it almost amounts to *route* along or by which: *yena so kālakato tena rathaṃ pesehi* D II.26 “where he has expired send the chariot that way”.

iii. Corresponding to the above we find the idiom ‘*yena ... tad ...*’ where the verb following *tad* is one such as normally takes the acc. of the place entered (§40). In *tad* therefore we have the adv. use of

²⁹ ‘*yenāti, yena disābhāgena so upasaṅkamitabbo. Bhummatthe vā karaṇavacanaṃ ...*’ Sum. I. p. 48.

the acc. of place corresponding to the similar application of the inst. of place discussed here. e.g., *yena*³⁰ *Icchānaṅkalaṃ ... tad avasari* D I.87 “where Icchānaṅkala ... was there he went (*lit.* entered)”; cp. M I.166, II.49 ‘*tad*’.

There is one local adverb of an historical character, viz. *chamā* “on the ground” (= Vedic *kṣamā*) M I.387; D III.6; cp. Th 2.112, where the Comy. has ‘*chamāyaṃ*’ (Th. A. p. 116). [108]

§82. Instrumental with Adverbial Prepositions.

In Pāli as in Skr. and Vedic (VGS §199.3) genuine prepositions are virtually not used with the inst. We probably find the influence of the adverbial prefix *saṃ-* “together with” in constructions like *mātaram pi puttana samānetā* D III.163 as pointed out above (§63.a.ii). But these instrumentals cannot be said to be directly due to *saṃ-* which only emphasises the fact of association. Even in the Ṛg Veda an independent use of *saṃ-* with the inst. is hardly perceptible (VGS *ibid*). But there are a few adverbial prepositions or prepositional particles (*nipāta*) which were originally adverbs used with the inst. in the Nikāyas. Such are *aññatra*, *alaṃ* and *vinā* (also possibly *tiro*).

a. The inst. with *aññatra* expresses the thing set aside or kept off in reckoning. The abl. is the alternate idiom (§130.d). e.g., *aññatra ekena* M I.483 “except one”; *aññatra tena Bhagavatā* D II.222 “except that Blessed One”; cp. D I.168; A I.35. The inst. in these

³⁰ ‘*yena disābhāgena Icchānaṅkalaṃ avasaritabbaṃ, yasmim vā padese Icchānaṅkalaṃ*’ Sum. I .243.

instances seems to be a logical necessity owing to the idea of *exclusion* or *comparison* contained in *añña-* “else, other than”.

b. With *alam* the inst. expresses a prohibition or an invitation to cease or to stop (SS §76.ii.) like *astu* and *kṛtaṃ* in Skr. and similarly means “enough”. In the Nikāyas it nearly always occurs with the emphatic particle *dāni* “now, verily!”. e.g., *alam dāni me attha-karaṇena* S I.74 “enough of this court-business for me!”; *alam dāni ajja uyyāna-bhūmiyā* D II.26 “enough of the pleasance for today!”.

c. (Perhaps) *vinā* “except, bereft of” is also to be included in this list. It occurs in Skr. as an adv. preposition with the inst. or the abl. in the sense of “without” and is there regarded as a *sociative* preposition like *saha*, of which *vinā* is the logical opposite (Macdonell *Skr. Gr.* §177.b.). It is however not usual in the prose Nikāyas and occurs but rarely in the *gāthā* literature. e.g., *ñātisaṅghā vinā hoti* “is bereft of the group of relatives” Sn 589; cp. *vinā daṇḍena* Vin II.132 “without a support”. In the former however *-ā* may be the inst. or the abl. sg. ending. [109]

§83. Idiomatic Uses of the Inst.

The inst. is used in many idiomatic expressions (cp. SS §§74 & 75), most of which logically fall under the categories discussed in the preceding paragraphs.

a. Such is the employment of the inst. with *kiṃ* meaning “what use or need is there of”. Here the inst. actually expresses the *means* with an implied verb such as *karissati* or *hoti*. In fact in the Vedas it is hardly

found without the verb (*karoti*) showing thereby that originally it denoted the *instrument* (cp. VGS §199.1.h). *kiṃ* is usually followed by *pana* in the Nikāyas. e.g., *kiṃ pana tena muṇḍakena samaṇakena diṭṭhenāti?* M II.46 “what is the good of seeing that shaveling of a recluse?” *lit.* “what (*sci.* shall I do) with that shaveling ... seen?”; *kiṃ pana āyasmato ... serivihārena ...* M I.469 “what is the good of an independent life to this elder ... ?”; *kinte iminā pūtikāyena diṭṭhena* S III.120 “what is the use of seeing this putrid body” *lit.* “what will you do with this putrid body seen?”.

b. Another set phrase similarly used is ‘*attho* with the inst.’ which means “to be in need of”, where normally *hoti* is to be understood. e.g., *Tato bhoto yāvatakena attho tāvatakaṃ āhareyyatanti* D II.245 “from it you may take away as much as you are in need of”; *sace bhante piṇḍakena attho ...* M I.380 “if Sir, there is a need of food ...”; cp. D II.176; S I.99; Sn 331. In the last instance we find the inst. with the phrase ‘*ko attho*’ which is parallel to Skr. ‘*kiṃ prayojanaṃ*’ (SS §75). Similarly like *attho* its derivative *atthī* (cp. Skr. *arthin* c. inst.) complies with the inst. e.g., *atthi*³¹ *pañhena āgamaṃ* Sn 957,1043 “I have come as one in need of (asking) a question”.

c. Another word employed in a similar manner is *karaṇīyaṃ* the verbal noun (nt. sg.) from the potential participle of *kar-*. It means “something to be done”; hence “necessity > need”. e.g., *roge hi sati bhesajjena karaṇīyaṃ hoti* M I.506 “when there is a disease, there is need for medicine”; *appamādena karaṇīyaṃ* S IV.125 “need for diligence”; *cetanāya karaṇīyaṃ* A IV.312 “need for will”; cp. P.T.S. Dict. *s.v.* *karaṇīyaṃ*. [110]

³¹ ‘*atthiko pañhena āgato ’mhi*’ Pj.II.2. p. 572.

d. The set phrase ‘*ko pana vādo*’, probably elliptical form of ‘*ko pana attho vādena*’, meaning “what (need to) talk of”, also is construed with the inst. e.g., *ko pana vādo aññatara-añña tarenāti* D III.45 “what need to talk of each in turn”, i.e. “not to talk of each separately”.

§84. [Phrases]

We have already had occasion (§80) to refer to the inst. used in the stereotyped adverbial phrase which consists of a prosecutive inst. followed by the acc. of the same word denoting the limit *ad quem*. There are, however, many other shades of the same idiom where the two cases seem to depend on each other so closely that the syntactical function of the one cannot be considered separately from that of the other. The idiom thus has a compound sense and is nearly always to be regarded as one adverbial phrase. e.g., *sabbena sabbaṃ*³² *sabbathā sabbaṃ* D II.57,58; M II.367 “completely (altogether, all in all) and everywhere”; *sabbena sabbaṃ sāsanam ājānanti* D II.251 “they know the message completely”; *aññena aññaṃ vyākāsi* D I.57 “he explained contradictorily”, *lit.* “one with or in terms of another (quite different)”.

³² Comy. ‘*sabbena sabbaṃ sabbathā sabbanti nipāta-dvayaṃ etaṃ, tassa attho: sabbākārena sabbā, sabbena sabhāvena ca sabbā jāti nāma yadi na bhavēyyā ti*’. Sum. II. p. 497.

§85. Adnominal Uses of the Inst.

Most of the uses of the inst. discussed in the preceding paragraphs are *adverbial*. Apart from such there is a distinct class of *adnominal* instrumentals (cp. KVG §548). The following logical divisions may be observed:

a. With nouns and adjectives like *nānākaraṇaṃ*, *viseso* and *adhippāyo*, meaning “difference, distinction, particularity”, the inst. is one of *comparison* (§86) and is used parallel to the corresponding abl. (§132.d). e.g., *Atha kiñcarahi te bhante puthujjanena nānākaraṇaṃ?* M I.392 “Then, Sir, where (is) your distinction (difference) from the common man?”; *ko viseso ko adhippāyo kiṃ nānākaraṇaṃ paṇḍitassa bālenāti?* S I.24 “what is the peculiarity, the distinction, the difference of the wise man (in comparison with *or*) from the fool?”; cp. S III.66; A I.267. [111]

b. The opposite of *difference*, viz. *equality* or *similarity*, is also expressed by the inst., as with the words *sama* (cp. VGS §199.B.2.a) and its reduplicated form *samasama*. Such adjectives also comply with the gen. (§151.b), just as in the older language (SS §61 & §129). e.g., *Āyasmataṃ Vidhurena samasamo hoti* M I.331 “he is quite equal to the venerable Vidhura”; *iminā pattena samatittikaṃ* M II.7 “equal to a whole bowlful”; cp. *na tena dhammena sam’ atthi kiñci* Sn 225 “there is nothing equal to (*lit.* with) this Doctrine”.

c. Adjectives denoting *fullness* and its opposite *emptiness* also comply with the inst. With *puṇṇa* (Skr. *pūrṇa*, KVG §548) “full” Pāli prefers the older construction with the *gen.* (§151.b.2.), but *suñña* “empty, void” is frequently found with the inst. e.g., *suññaṃ idaṃ*

attena vā attanīyena vā S IV.54; M I.297; II.263 “this is empty of a Soul or aught pertaining to a Soul”; *suññā ... paricārikehi* D II.202 “bereft of ... disciples”; *suññā parappavādā samaṇehi aññe* D II.151; M I.64 “other sects are void of recluses”. Similarly the inst. occurs with the noun *ūnaṃ* “deficiency”. It is apparent here that it borders on the inst. of *relation* (§70), for it may imply “deficient in respect of”. e.g., *sace te ūnaṃ kāmehi ...* D II.243 “if there be a deficiency to you (in point) of pleasures ...”.

§86. Inst. of Comparison.

From the preceding discussion it becomes evident that with adjectives denoting *equality* etc. and their opposites the inst. borders on the so-called *Ablativus Comparationis*.³³ That is why the rendering “in comparison with” is possible in such cases. The same construction is found with adjectives of the comparative degree. e.g., *na tena seyyo sadiso vijjati* D III.158 “there is no one greater than he or equal to him”; *dhanena seyyo* M II.73 “better than wealth”; *hīnataro khajjopanakena* M II.42 “weaker than a fire-fly”; *Rājā Māgadho ... sukhavihāritaro āyasmataṃ Gotamena* M I.94 “the King of Magadha ... is one who lives happier than the venerable Gotama”; *tena ca vedanā-sokhummena aññaṃ vedanā-sokhummaṃ uttaritaraṃ vā paṇītataṃ vā na* [112] *passāmi* A II.18 “I do not see a sense-pleasure nobler or sublimer than this exquisite feeling”; Thus it is seen that adjectives denoting all the three logical grades, viz. *inferiority*, *equality* and *superiority*, all comply with the inst.

³³ Even in early Skr. the inst. is found in this connection side by side with the abl. “... there are a good deal of instances proving that Skr. had, especially in the ancient dialect, an inst. of the thing surpassed of the same power as the so-called *Abl. Comparationis*”. Speyer SS §70.R.1.

§87. Instrumental of Agent.

According to Skr. grammarians the logical definition of *agency* (*karṭṛtva*) is that it is the substratum of action.³⁴ It is held that the *agent* is to be distinguished from other case-concepts (*kāraṅka*) by virtue of its independent character (*svātantrya*) and therefore, according to Patañjali,³⁵ the other cases are to be regarded as dependent on it (*pāraṅtantrya*). For this reason the *agent* is considered to be the '*kāraṅka*' *par excellence* and the others are called *upakāraṅkas*, i.e., auxiliary cases. This, however, as a logical difference, does not seem to have struck Pāṇinī forcibly for he summarily deals with both the instrumental and the agent by the same *sūtra* (§61), whereas Kaccāyana apparently maintains the distinction when he lays down two separate rules (*ibid*). But, as has been pointed out earlier (§66), according to modern writers, the agent and the instrument are both divisions of the wider category of *means* (§62).

§88. [Inst. with Verbs]

a. The fundamental use of the *inst. of agent* is to denote the original (logical) subject with passive verbs (KVG §547), the original object being expressed by the nom. e.g., *bhotā Gotamena anekapariyāyena dhammo pakāṣito* D I.110 "the Doctrine was preached by the venerable Gotama in manifold ways"; *taṃ me samaṇena Gotamena okāśakammaṃ kataṃ* Sn p.94 "permission was granted to me by the recluse Gotama". With the agent of participles and adjectives the

³⁴ '*kriyāśrayatvaṃ karṭṛtvaṃ*', *Philosophy of Skr. Grammar* p. 244.

³⁵ cited *Philosophy of Skr. Grammar* p. 229.

present participle *santa-* is sometimes found implying a continuous temporal sense, just as in the case of the nom. (§26.b); in a sense they border on the *absolute use*. e.g., *iti puṭṭhena satā, Ānanda, atthīti assa vacanīyaṃ* D I.175 “being thus questioned, Ānanda, you should answer him saying ‘there is’”. When *the inst. of agent* is used with verbs [113] implying association, it has a definite *sociative* sense. e.g., *tāya ... parisāya parivuto* D II.30 “surrounded by that following”. Sometimes the *agent* may be the logical subject of a p.p.p. forming the first member of a compound. e.g., *Mārena pariyaṭṭhita-cittā* D III.57 “with a mind obsessed by Māra”.

b. It is also used as the *agent* of the infinitive in *-tuṃ* which exhibits a passive³⁶ sense when employed with *sakkā, sukaraṃ* etc. (§19.c). e.g., *sakkā ca pana eso abhaviṣṣa ñātuṃ gahapatinā* D I.170 “would that be able to be known by a householder?”. Here the original object is put in the nom. (*eso*) being the grammatical subject in the passive construction. But there is at least one instance of it being preserved in the acc., unless we are dealing here with an eastern nom. nt. sg. *-e* of a co-ordinative compound, viz. *na dāni sukaraṃ amhehi*³⁷ *lābha-sakkāra-siloke paricajjituṃ* M I.52 “it is not easy for (*lit.* by) us to discard gain, esteem and praise”. In the following the form does not show whether it is nom. or acc.: *kallaṃ nu kho tena tad abhinandituṃ* D II.69 “is it fitting that he should like it?”; *na idaṃ sukaraṃ ... agāraṃ ajjhāvasatā ... brahmacariyaṃ carituṃ* D I.63 “it is not easy for one living at home ... to practise the Higher Life”.

³⁶ cp. ‘*Infinitivus cum Instrumental im Pāli*’ Franke, Z.D.M.G.1892.

³⁷ Franke disagrees with Ed. Müller that this is a dat. as the translation suggests and maintains that it is the inst. of agent. Z.D.M.G. 1892.

c. Similarly the agent is used with the impersonal construction (both for subject and complement) when the verb is the potential participle or the gerundive (nt. sg.). e.g., *āraññaken' āvuso bhikkhunā ... sabrahmacārisu sagāravena bhavitabbaṃ* M I.469 “a forest-dwelling monk, friend, should be respectful towards his co-celibates”; *na dāni tena raññā ciraṃ jīvitabbaṃ hoti* D III.64 “now that king cannot live longer”.

d. With the *causative* the subject of the original active verb is denoted by the *inst. of agent*. This is called the *hetu* (-*kattā*) by local grammarians (Kac. 284). The acc. is the more usual idiom here, especially when the verb is intransitive such as those denoting motion (§59). e.g., *te ... purisehi rakkhāpentī* D I.105 “they cause (themselves) to be guarded by men”; cp. *sādhū me bhante Bhagavā tapojigucchāya aggamaṃ yeva pāpetu* [114] *sāraṃ yeva pāpetūti* D III.48 “well, Sir, may the Blessed One make me attain to the summit, to the very essence, of ‘the disgust for asceticism’”; on the form *me* see §15.

e. The *inst. sg.* of the reflexive pronoun *attā* “self”, viz. *attanā*, is found in the Nikāyas used with active verbs, mostly in an emphatic sense “by himself, personally”. e.g., *upāsako attanā saddhāsampanno hoti* A IV.221 “the disciple is himself endowed with faith”; *so attanā matto pamatto pare mādetvā pamādetvā* S IV.307 “he being himself intoxicated and slovenly having made others (too) intoxicated and slovenly ...”; *attanā jāti-dhammo samāno* M I.161 “himself (personally) being subject to birth ...”. This use of the *inst.* seems to lie on the borderline between its functions of *means* and *relation*. e.g., *attanā va attānaṃ vyākareyya* D II.93 “(by means of) yourself explain yourself” (means); *attanā ca jīvāhi aññe ca posehi* D III.66

“live (by means of this money) *as far as you are concerned* and nourish others”. Whatever be its origin, *attanā* has come to be applied in the Nikāyas in an *adverbial* manner, as in the following where it refers to a plural antecedent: *yadā tumhe Kālāmā attanā va jāneyyātha* A I.189 “when you yourselves know, O Kālāmas”. cp. reflexive *svayaṃ* in Vedic and Skr. used adverbially in the sense of “spontaneously” VGS. §115.a.

Chapter IV

The Dative Case

[117]

§89. [General Character]

As fundamental characteristic of the dative case, to be particularly seen in its adverbial use, one may conclude that it denotes the thing with reference to which an action proceeds. It is the case of *participation* and *interest*. Brugmann remarks, with regard to all Indo-European languages, that in general this case does not have such a close connection with the verb as the acc. or the gen. (KVG §552). In Pāli, however, it is doubtful whether the gen. is in reality more *adverbial* than the dat., though, as he rightly claims, the latter preponderates with the personal, due, no doubt, to its implication of participation and interest. Speyer, on the contrary, seems to have believed that it is the idea of *destination* which is the underlying conception in all the varied uses of the dat. It is implied by him that such applications of it as to denote *participation* and *interest* or *purpose* are merely due to the fact that “in the great majority of cases the destination purported by the dat. has an acceptation more or less figurative” (SS §80). But broadly speaking it may be safely affirmed with Macdonell that “the dat. expresses the notion with which an action is concerned. It is either connected with individual words or is used more generally as a complement to the whole statement” (VGS §200).

§90. [Local Grammarians]

The local grammarians on the other hand emphasize the fact of *recipency* as the chief notion underlying the various semantical aspects of the dat., as its name *sampadāna* (Skr. *sampradāna*) implies.¹ Says Pāṇinī: “The person whom one wishes to connect with the object of giving is called the *recipient*”.² It is left to the *vārttika* to extend its use so as to embrace the idea of purpose, etc. It is significant that Kaccāyana does not [118] lay down a parallel aphorism as he does in other places but introduces the dat. by specifically noting that “the person to whom something is given, is pleasing, or is borne (held) is called the recipient”.³ As is customary with them, both Pāṇinī and Kaccāyana (cp. Mog. II.26 &27) proceed to lay down supplementary rules to compass the other notions signified by the dative. But their aphorisms can hardly be found to exhaust even the fundamental *adverbial* uses of that case in either language. This is of course due to the fact that their definitions are established on observations more philological than psychological. Nevertheless it must be said to their credit that their observations are at least accurate if not exhaustive and that syntactical functions are universally known to comply with no well-defined or absolute categories.

¹ cp. ‘dative’ from *dare* = to give in Latin.

² ‘*karmaṇā yam abhipraiti sa sampradānaṃ*’ Pāṇ. I.4.32.

³ ‘*yassa dātukāmo rocate dhārayate vā taṃ sampadānaṃ*’ Kac. 278.

§91. [Dative and Genitive]

Even in Skr. one cannot fail to observe a growing tendency for the uses of the dat. to fall in with those of the gen. (*vide* SS §§82, 84, 86). The origin of this interfusion can be traced back to Indo-European times. It appears primarily in the relation between the so-called *ethical* or *sympathetic* dative (implying *interest*) and the ‘possessive way of expression’ (i.e. the functional sphere of the gen.). Speaking of Vedic (Alt-Indisch), Havers makes the following observation: “We find observed with considerable exactness the rule that ‘with pronouns of the first and second persons the *sympathetic* dat. is employed. But the gen. with all other pronouns, nouns and participles’. This applies to the relation between the dat. and the possessive way of expression. This rule is also to be presupposed for Indo-Germanic” (HKS §11). According to him, this interfusion was at first confined to the enclitic forms *me* and *te*, and later on by logical development extended to the proper names and finally to the nouns. He also points out that the general tendency of Skr. is to replace every dat. by the gen. (*ibid*). To put it more plainly, Havers establishes a syntactical connection between the *sympathetic dat.*, which later on gave rise to the *dat. of possession* frequently occurring with *bhavati* (cp. KVG §553.5 & SS [119] §86.d), and the regular *gen. of possessor*. In Pāli the confusion is increased by the morphological identity of the two cases due to the replacement of the dat. by the gen. in all declensions as in Prk. (cp. Pischel *Prk. Gr.* §361) except in the singular of the *-a* declension (cp. §4).

§92. [Main Uses]

As in other cases the categories and the sub-categories into which the dat. can fall may be multiplied indefinitely. But a *prima facie* division into main classes seems admissible. Firstly, there is the *adverbal* and the *adnominal* dat. proper which is in close connection with the verb and the noun (or adj.) respectively. This dat. occupies a purely syntactical position in the sentence-unit and, therefore, may be called the *dependent* dat. Secondly, there is the so-called *loose dat.* which, as Macdonell says, is the complement to the whole statement (§89). Such, for instance, are the constructions going under the designations: *dativus commodi et incommodi*, i.e., the dat. of advantage or disadvantage, the *sympathetic* and the *ethical* dat., and the dat. of *orientation*, i.e., the dat. of the person from whose stand-point the statement is made. Brugmann includes under this category of *loose dat.* also the *dat. of agent*, which he regards as a dat. of the person participating, and the quite common *dat. of purpose* (KVG §554.3 & 5). All these constructions have their legitimate counter-parts in Pāli as well as a few quasi-legitimate or sporadic idioms (§114), mostly adverbial, which, since they do not fall clearly under any of the established categories, we have thought it advisable to discuss separately or in connection with those other idioms that bear close logical affinities to them. As regards the order of treatment, we have as far as possible tried to maintain a logical sequence after the manner of Brugmann and accordingly preferred to discuss first the dative in special sense and in special connection with verbs.

§93. The Dative in Connection with Verbs.

With a large number of ‘transitive’ verbs the dative denotes the person *in whose interest* or *on whose behalf* i.e. *for* [120] *whom*, the action is performed. Since that person (or party) is he who is ultimately concerned or interested in the act of the agent, it has been called the *dat. of concern* (SS §81). In other words, it expresses the so-called remote object with such verbs. In the Nikāyas it is used in special connection with the following verbs:

a. *give, offer* (KVG §553; SS §81.1.a); *dadāti* “gives”: e.g., *gāmvaram pi mayam āyasmato Ānandassa dadeyyāma* M II.116 “we would present to the venerable Ānanda a grand village”; *atha kassa cāham bho Gotama imaṃ pāyāsaṃ dammīti* Sn p.15 “then to whom, venerable Gotama, shall I offer this milk-rice?”. Psychologically connected to this is the *dat.* with *dhāreti* “owes” (cp. Kac. 279; Pāṇ. I.4.35). This is the so-called dative of the *creditor*. e.g., *na kassa kiñci dhāreti* A II.69 “he does not owe anything to anyone”.

b. *say, announce* (SS §81.1.c); *akkhāti, bhāsati, and āha* (old ‘perfect’): e.g., *yadeva te Brahmā āha* M I.327 “whatever Brahmā spoke to you”; *kante atthaṃ abhāsatha* D II.244 (V.) “what matter did he tell you?”. The verb *ujjhāpayati* is similarly used in the sense of “complain to”. e.g., *paṭi-vissakānaṃ ujjhāpesi* M I.126 “complained to (called to) the neighbours”; *reply, assent; paṭi+suṇāti*:⁴ e.g., *Bhagavato paccassosi* D II.90 “replied to the Blessed One”; similarly *paṭivacanaṃ-karoti*: e.g., *tesaṃ*

⁴ Kaccāyana gives *suṇa* as a root taking *dat.* (279) probably a confusion between the *dat.* with *paccassosi* and the original *gen.* of the source of sound.

paṭivacaṇaṃ-karissāmi D I.122 “I shall make answer to them”; *preach; deseti* (according to the *Vutti* on Kac. 279 the dat. with this verb and *vyākaroti* is used to show interest or regard (*sādaratthe*): e.g., *bhikkhūnaṃ dhammaṃ deseyya* M I.27 “would preach the Doctrine to the monks”; *explain; vyākaroti*: e.g., *evam-evaṃ ... Nigaṇṭhena samaṇassa Gotamassa byākataṃ* M I.374 “in this very way was it explained by the naked ascetic ... to the recluse Gotama”.

c. *show, demonstrate, reveal; dasseti*: e.g., *taṃ rañño dassesuṃ* D III.65 “they showed him to the king”; *āvi-karoti* “lay bare”: e.g., *te āvikaromi* Sn 84 “I (shall) reveal to you”; the dat. with this verb is used for the loc. according to the *vutti* on Kac. 279 [121] (*sattamyatthe*); *ācikkhati* “point out”: e.g., *mūḷhassa vā maggaṃ ācikkheyya* D I.85 “were to point out the way to one gone astray”.

d. *inform, communicate to; āroceti* (*ārocanatthe* ... Kac. 219): e.g., *Bhagavato āroceyyāma* D II.207 “we shall inform (this to) the Blessed One”; *sahāyakassa ārocetu* D II.155 “let him inform (it to) the friend”; *devatā pi me etaṃ atthaṃ ārocesuṃ* D III.15 “even the gods communicated this matter to me”.

e. *teach; vāceti*: (takes also the acc. as a faded causative §58.d.iii): e.g., *yo bhavantānaṃ mante vācessati* D II.248 “who shall teach mantras to you”.

§94. [Special Connection with certain verbs]

The dat. is used similarly in special connection with verbs having the sense of:

a. *have faith in, confide in; saddahati* “has faith” (KVG §553.3 & SS §86.c; cp. Latin *confido, fido, credo* with dat.): e.g., *Tathāgatassa assaddahamāno* D III.8 “without (having) faith in the T.”; *tassa mayhaṃ bhikkhave ye ... saddhātabbaṃ maññissanti* M I.227 “who think ... brethren, that they should rely on me”; *pasīdati* “gains confidence” or “believe, trust in”: e.g., *evaṃ pasanno*⁵ *ahaṃ bhoto Gotamassa* M I.240 “so much do I believe in the venerable Gotama”. The construction is more frequent in its *adnominal* use. e.g., ... *Bhagavato saddhāya gacchāmi* A IV.81 “I ... go out of faith for the Blessed One”.

b. *pay attention to, heed; sussūsati* “wish to listen to”: e.g., *tassa te sāvakaṃ sussūsanti* D I.230 “to you (as such) the disciples listen”; *ādiyanti* “pay attention to, (lit. take one’s word)”: e.g., *te (corā) n’ eva rañño Māgadhassa ādiyanti, na rañño Māgadhassa purisakānaṃ ādiyanti* D III.204 “they (the robbers) heed neither the King of Magadha nor his officers”; *suṇāti* “listen to”: e.g., *tassa mayhaṃ bhikkhave ye ... sotabbaṃ maññissanti* M I.227 “who think ... brethren, that they should listen to me”.

c. *pay homage to, respect; sakkaroti*: e.g., *aññe ca pañca dhammā, yehi mama sāvakaṃ sakkaronti* M II.9 “... owing to [122] which the disciples pay respect to me”, where the acc. is found side by side.

§95. [Dative of Possession]

The so-called *dat. of possession* is found with the verb “to be” (KVG §553.5). According to Speyer it is also used with substantives in Skr.

⁵ The loc. is more frequent here. e.g., *Buddhe pasanno* S I.34.

to denote the possessor (SS §86.d). e.g., *tass’ imāni satta ratanāni ahesuṃ* D III.59 “to him there were (*lit.* he had) these seven jewels”; *tesam pi Bhagavantānaṃ ... upaṭṭhakā ahesuṃ* D II.144 “to those Blessed Ones ... also there were attendants”. Sometimes the use is more figurative, the *possession* being not of any material thing but of a mental or emotional state. e.g., *amhākam pi ... atthi satthari pasādo* M I.64 “we also ... have faith in the Master”. Or it may be employed to denote one’s age or the time that has elapsed since, a certain incident in one’s life. e.g., *Tiṃsamattāni kho me gahapati vassāni pabbajitassāti* S IV.300 “It is about thirty years, house-holder, since I was ordained (*lit.* to me ordained)”. Owing to the presence of the participle in such constructions the dat. appears to have a semi-absolute character. When the enclitic personal pronoun (*me, te, vo* or *no*) is used it appears to be closer to the sympathetic dat. (§102). e.g., *Taṃ vo hotu* D II.180 “will you have this (*lit.* may it be for you i.e. yours)”.

§96. [Dat. of Destination]

a. With many verbs of *motion* the *dat. of destination* is employed (cp. SS. §79). It generally answers to the English *to, for, at*, or even *into*. This destination expressed by the dat. is more or less metaphorical; a real *going to* would be more preferably denoted by the acc. (§38) and a real *moving into* by the loc. (§165) or even the acc. (§40). But the justification for the dat. seems to be in the fact that the logical conception underlying the use is the idea of *going for* or *aiming at* (cp. KVG §553.6), though according to local grammarians the *aim*, reached, attained, is never put in the dat. (*vide* SS §79).⁶ The dat. in

⁶ cp. Patañjali I.448 *vārtt.4* on Pāṇ. II.3.12.

this function is found with such verbs as: *gacchati* or *āgacchati*; e.g., *tassa yā ratti vā divaso vā āgacchati* A IV.17 “whatever night or day comes to him”; *tassa mayhaṃ brāhmaṇa nisinnassa taṃ* [123] *bhayabheravaṃ āgacchati* M I.21 “to me thus seated, O brahmin, comes this terror!”; *appo saggāya gacchati* Dh 174 “few go to heaven”; *kamati* “come upon, i.e., affect”; e.g., *nāssa aggi vā visam vā satthaṃ vā kamati* A IV.150 “neither fire, nor poison, nor sword comes upon (affects) him” (cp. *Gradual Sayings* p.103 E.M. Hare); *okkamanāya nibbānassa* A IV.111 “faring to Nibbāna” (*ibid.* ‘faring to the cool’) *eti* “comes”; e.g., *etu me bho so puriso* D I.60 “let the man come to me!”; *pahiṇoti*⁷ “sends”; e.g., *Mallānaṃ dūtaṃ pāhesuṃ* D II.164 “they sent a messenger to the Mallas”; *tassa te ... rathaṃ pahiṇissāmi* M II.79 “to you (as such) ... I shall send a chariot”; *āneti* “brings” (metaphorically in the sense of marriage); e.g., *ahaṃ bhante Nakulapituno gahapatissa daharass’ eva daharā ānītā* A IV.61 “I, Sir, yet young, was brought (i.e. married) to the householder N. in his youth”; similarly with the compound verb *otāraṃ labhati* “gain access to”; e.g., *labhati tassa Māro otāraṃ* M III.94 “the Evil One will gain access to him”; *abhinibbattati* “come to being, evolve itself into”; e.g., *api nu kho nāma-rūpaṃ itthattāya abhinibbattissathāti* D II.63 “would name and form come to birth in (*lit.* evolve themselves into) this state of being (Comy. ‘*itthattāyā ti itthambhāvāya*’ Sum. II.502); *itthattāya* is the old dat. sg. of the abstract noun *itthattaṃ* (**itthattvaṃ*); cp. *itthattaṃ paññāpanāya* D II.64. On the strength of this conclusion it is evident that we have the same dat. sg. in the stock phrase ‘*nāparaṃ itthattāya*’ D II.68,153, which Rhys Davids rendered as “after this present world there is no beyond”. It should

⁷ According to *vutti* on Kac. 279 it denotes *regard* (*sādaratthe*).

rather be translated “there is no further (coming back) to this state of being”.

b. This dat. is also used with some verbs implying *direction*. As in the previous case the more usual construction is the acc. (§41). e.g., *appossukkatāya cittaṃ namati* M I.168 (cp. D II.36) “his mind bends (inclines, turns) to (-wards) inactivity”. A similar dat. is found with the compound verb *namo karoti* in the sense of “bow down to”. e.g., *namo karohi nāgassa* M I.145 “bow down to the serpent”. A further development of the notion of “bowing down to” in homage is found with *vandati* [124] where the dat. (of the person worshipped) borders on the idea of *propitiation* (cp. dat. or gen. with *vaj-* in Skr. SS §119.R) and the idea of *direction*. But this is only found in the older *gāthā* literature. e.g., *nīcamano vandi Tathāgatassa* Sn 252 “humble in mind he bent down to the Tathāgata (in homage).

§97. [Dat. of Advantage]

A quite frequent dat. in Pāli is the one found with verbs, denoting “happening or occurring to (someone)”. Logically it belongs to the class called *dativus commodi et incommodi* i.e. the dat. of advantage and disadvantage. Such verbs are:

a. *uppajjati* “arises, is born to”; e.g., *khattiyakumārena brāhmaṇakaññāya putto uppanno* D I.97 “a son was born to the brahmin girl by a youth of the warrior caste”. More often it is applied metaphorically. e.g., *na Bodhisatta-mātu purisesu mānaṣaṃ uppajjati* D II.13 “a love for (other) men does not arise in (*lit.* for) the mother of the Being of Enlightenment”; *brāhmaṇassa evarūpaṃ diṭṭhigataṃ uppannaṃ hoti* D I.224 “to the brahmin such a view as

this arose”; *mayhaṃ ... sati udapādi* D I.180 “to me arose ... mindfulness”. When the substantive denotes a group of people the idea is best rendered “among”; e.g., *atha kho sambahulānaṃ bhikkhūnaṃ dhammī kathā udapādi* D II.1 “then among many monks arose ... a doctrinal talk”. The same idiom is employed to denote something unfavourable happening to a person, e.g., *sutavān’ assa bhayaṃ udapādi* D III.17 “on hearing this fear arose for him”; *bhikkhuno uppanno hoti appamattako ābādho* D III.257 “a slight illness cropped up for the monk”; cp. D II.121. *jāyati* “be born” is similarly used with the dat. e.g., *pamuditassa pīti jāyati* D I.214 “joy is born to him who is gladdened”. In these examples the sense of “arise in someone” would permit the use of the loc. though such is hardly found with these specific verbs (cp. SS §§82,84).

b. Of similar syntactical significance is the dat. (of concern) found with verbs signifying *manifestation* and *meeting*. According to Kaccāyana⁸ it is here used in the sense of the loc. e.g., *pātu-bhavati* “appears to, manifests itself to”; e.g., [125] *yadā ... Sanaṃkumāro ... devānaṃ Tāvatiṃsānaṃ pātu bhavati* D II.210 “when ... Sanaṃkumāra ... appears to the gods of the T. heaven”; *kumārassa dibbaṃ cakkhuṃ pāturahosi* D II.20 “the divine eye arose to the prince”; *sammukhī-bhavati* “meet with (*lit.* be presented to)”; e.g., *sammukhū bhūto no Satthā ahosi* D II.155 *lit.* “the Master was presented to us, (i.e. we met the Master)”. The same idea is contained in the following dat.: *bahunnañca dukkhadhammānaṃ purakkhato hoti* D III.183 “he is exposed to many evil things”.

⁸ ‘... *sattamyatthe* ...’ Kac. 279.

c. An idiomatic and popular usage is the dat. of the person with the verb *hoti* (usually the aorist *ahosi*) used impersonally to mean “it occurred to ...”. e.g., *tassa purisassa etad ahosi* D II.130 “to that man it occurred: ...”; *āyasmato Ānandassa etad ahosi* D II.107 “to the venerable Ānanda it occurred: ...”; *tumhākaṃ evaṃ assa* D II.154 “it would occur to you thus: ...”;

§98. [Dat. of Interest]

a. Verbs implying *pleasure* (cp. Latin *placeo* c. dat.) or *satisfaction* take a dat. of the person *to whom* something is pleasing etc. This too is a *dat. of interest*. Such verbs are: *ruccati*⁹ “is pleasing to”; e.g., *na kho me taṃ bhante ruccati* M I.375 “this, Sir, is certainly not pleasing to me”; *tañca pana amhākaṃ ruccati* M I.93 “that too is pleasing to us”. *khamati* “seems good to or for”; e.g., *idaṃ me khamati idaṃ me na khamati* D III.42 “this seems good to me, that does not”; *khamati*¹⁰ *te idanti* D III.45 “does it seem good to you?”; *amhākaṃ ... khamati* M I.93 “it appears fitting to us”.

b. The same idea of “fitting or suiting” is denoted by the impersonal *sameti* which takes the dat. of the person *for whom* someone else (put in the inst.) is agreeable or favourable. This is closely related to the *sympathetic dat.* e.g., *tehi pi me saddhiṃ ekaccesu ṭhānesu sameti* D I.162 (163,247) “they agree with me on certain points (*lit.* to me in certain points it fits in with them)”; *sameti me akkhaduttehi* M II.107 *lit.* “to me there is agreement with the gamblers”. Sometimes both parties are denoted by the dat. and the sense of the verb is “agreeable

⁹ ‘yassa... rocate... vā ...’ Kac. 278.

¹⁰ *khamati* in the sense of *pardon* also takes the dat. (§99.f).

to”. [126] e.g., *tayidaṃ bho Gotama sameti bhoto c’eva Gotamassa amhākañca, yadidaṃ sabbena sabbanti* A IV.42 “this is agreeable to both you, venerable Gotama, and ourselves, that is to say, everything entirely”.

c. *kappati* (Skr. *kalpate* c. dat. SS §85) “be fit for, suitable to” similarly takes the dat., occurring usually in the negative phrase ‘*na kappati*’ “is not proper”. e.g., *na Tathāgatassa pāṇātipāto kappati* A II.113 “the taking of life is not proper for the T.”; *sace bhoto Udenassa na kappati* M II.163 “if it is not fit for the venerable Udena”; *na etaṃ āyasmato ... kappati* M II.116 “this is not suitable for the venerable ...”; cp. *na āmagandho mama kappatī ti* Sn 241 “the (smell of) raw flesh is not suitable for me”.

§99. [Dat. of Animosity]

With verbs expressive of *anger, jealousy, envy, and suspicion* the person *on, at or against whom* the feeling is exercised or directed, in other words the object of *animosity* (cp. SS §83.4 &5), is denoted by the dat. case. Of this kind are:

a. *dussati* “to hate”; e.g., *yo appaduṭṭhassa narassa dussati* Dh 125 “who hates the harmless man”; *dubbhati* (< **dubh-* which seems to be a contamination of Skr. *druh* “bear malice or seek to injure”, and Skr. *dabh* “injure, hurt or deceive”) “hate, seek to injure”; e.g., *yo pi me assa paccatthiko tassa pāhaṃ na dubbheyyaṃ* S I.225 “I would not seek to injure (plot against) even him who is my foe”. This verb is found with the loc. in later Pāli (cp. J. I.267; III.212, *vide* P.T.S. Dict. s.v.).

b. *pihati* (Vedic *sprhati*) “envy”; e.g., *akuppamāno kissa pihessati* M III.264 “being unirritable whom shall he envy?”; *so tesaṃ na pihemi* M I.504 “As such I do not envy them”; *hīnassa na pihemi* M I.505 “I envy not the mean”; *tassa me bahukā pihayanti* Th 1.62 “many envy me as such” (cp. S I.202,236). *maccharāyati* (denominative from *macchariya*) “be envious of”; e.g., *kim pana bhante Bhagavā arahattassa maccharāyatīti* D III.7 “what, Sir, does the Blessed One envy sainthood (in others)?”. [127]

c. *sapati* “to swear at, curse”; e.g., *sapassu ca me Vepacitti ...* S I.225 “curse me Vepacitti ... !”.

d. The compound verb *vādaṃ āropeti* “contend with or against” also takes the dat. of the *person opposed*; e.g., *Samañassa Gotamassa vādaṃ āropehi* S IV.323 “establish a contention against the venerable Gotama (i.e. draw the recluse Gotama into an argument)”.

e. *aparajjhati* “offend, do wrong to”; e.g., *pass’ Ambaṭṭha yāva aparaddhañca te idaṃ ācariyassa ...* D I.103 “See, Ambaṭṭha, how deeply your teacher ... has herein done you wrong” (Dial. II.128); *kim pana te Ambaṭṭha Sakyā aparaddhanti* D I.91 “but in what then, Ambaṭṭha, have the Sakyans given you offence?” (Dial. I.113).

f. Expressive as it is of a feeling psychologically opposite to those denoted by the above verbs, *khamati* in the sense of “pardon” takes a similar construction. Here it may be noted that Pāli is more likely to preserve the older idiom of construing it with the dat. rather than follow the later Classical Skr. construction of *kṣamati* with the gen. (§82 Speyer SS). e.g., *khamatu ca me āyasmā Ānando* A V.198 “may the venerable Ānanda pardon me”; *khamataṃ* (v.1. *khamatu*) *bhavaṃ*

Gotamo Ambaṭṭhassa mānavassā ti D I.108 “may the ven. Gotama forgive the young man Ambaṭṭha”.

With most of the above verbs local grammarians enjoin the employment of the dat. (cp. Kaccāyana 279; Pāṇinī I.4.39; Moggallāna II.27).

§100. The Loose Dative.

As has been already pointed out (§92), one of the two main functions of the dat. is to appear as a complement to the whole statement (cp. VGS §200). This however does not mean that the so-called *loose dat.* (KVG §554, explained as ‘the *less restricted dat.*’) has no relation whatever with the actual *import* of the sentence or what is logically implied therein. In fact the verb, denoting as it does the most ‘dynamic’ concept in the whole sentence, exercises a considerable amount of influence [128] on the character of this dat.; and, according to the manifold turns of expression envisaged by the predicative connection so implied, the *loose dat.* assumes several distinct roles: principally, that of the dat. of advantage and disadvantage (*dativus commodi et incommodi*), the sympathetic dat. with its secondary aspect of ethical dat., the dat. of orientation, the dat. of purpose and aim (*dativus finalis*), and finally, the dat. of the agent.

§101. [Dat. of Interest]

Of these the most frequent, in Pāli as well as in the older languages, is the *dat. of advantage and disadvantage*. It denotes the person or party *interested* in the action (*vide* KVG §554.1), *for whom* some

profit or loss is meant as a result of its accomplishment. Sometimes this is called the dat. of the person *indirectly affected*.

a. This is particularly true in Pāli of the dat. found with the verb *karoti* in both its meanings of “doing” and “making”. In fact here the acc. which is more usual to express the indirectly affected object is actually the parallel idiom (§58.c.iii). e.g., *te Tathāgatassa sarīra-pūjaṃ karissanti* D II.169 “they will do bodily homage to the T.”; *kiccaṃ nesaṃ karissāmi* D III.189 “I shall do service to them”; *kiṃ hi paro parassa karissati* D I.224,226 “what will (can) another do to one?” When *karoti* has the sense of “make or perform” the acc. is logically less admissible and the dat. seems to be the proper, if not the only, construction. e.g., *Etha tumhe bhikkhave gihīnaṃ odāta-vasanānaṃ uttari-manussa-dhammā pāṭihāriyaṃ karothā ti* D I.211 “Come now, brethren, perform a miracle of superhuman nature for (i.e. before) these white-clad laymen”. Compound verbs where the second member is a form of *kar-* follow the same construction. e.g., *okāsaṃ-karoti* “gives permission, grants leave”; e.g.; *karoti te Bhagavā okāsaṃ* D II.150 “the Blessed One grants leave to you”; *bhesajjaṃ-karoti* “give treatment, pay medical attention”; e.g., *tassa so bhisakko sallakatto*¹¹ *bhesajjaṃ kareyya* M I.511 “to him that medical-man, that surgeon, would give treatment”; it is also found *adnominally*; e.g., *tesaṃ antarāya-karo* D I.227 “doing harm to them”. This dat. is preserved even [129] when the verb is in the *passive*. e.g., *Channassa ... brahma-daṇḍo kātabbo* D II.154 “... the ‘highest punishment’ should be meted out to ... Channa”; similarly with the *causative*: *āyasmato ca Ānandassa pañca-sataṃ vihāraṃ*

¹¹ This is an irregular *-o* form of a *-r* stem (*vide* PLS §94.4) probably due here to the influence of the preceding *-o*.

kārāpesi M I.353 “he built a residence for the ven. Ānanda for five hundred”.

b. Various other verbs of a similar character are construed likewise with dat. They are mostly transitive and have the directly affected object in the acc. A few intransitive verbs however, are also found to comply with a dat. of this sort. Most of these bear a very close relation to the *sympathetic dat.* But the sense of *advantage* or *gain* is the principal notion underlying the use. e.g., *Kumārassa setacchattaṃ dhārayittha*¹² D II.19 “they held the white parasol (above) to the prince”; *attano sukhaṃ esāno* Dh 131 “searching happiness for himself”; *mama hi pahūtaṃ sāpateyyaṃ ... abhisāṅkhataṃ* D II.180 “much wealth ... was procured even for me”. The sense of *damage, harm* or *loss* is found in the following: *siyā kho pana Ānanda Cundassa kammarāputtassa koci vippaṭṭisāraṃ upadaheyya* D II.135 “would it be, Ānanda, that someone may stir up remorse for (i.e. in) Cunda”; *samaṇassa Gotamassa parājayaṃ (karissāmi)* D III.20 “shall bring defeat to the recluse Gotama”; *anattaṃ me acari* A V.150 “he did me injustice”; *aṭṭhahi bhikkhave aṅgehi samannāgatassa upāsakassa ākaṅkhamāno saṅgho pattam nikuḷḷeyya* A IV.344 “if the Order wishes, brethren, it may turn down the bowl to (i.e. boycott) the lay-follower who is possessed of these eight qualities”; *imassa daṇḍaṃ paṇetu* A I.138 “lay down a penalty for him”. The idiom is more involved when the verb is intransitive. e.g., *khattiyassa cepi ijjheyya dhanena vā dhañña vā ...* M II.84 “if it would prosper for the warrior-prince in wealth or corn ...”; *bhītaṃ saraṇaṃ hoti* D III.186 “he is a refuge to the frightened”. Sometimes it is found in the sense of “on behalf of ...” or “for my

¹² ‘yassa dātukāmo rocate dhārayate vā taṃ sampadānaṃ’ Kac. 278.

sake”. e.g., *abhivādehi me tvam ... Bhagavantam* D II.269 “you salute the Blessed One for me (i.e. on my behalf or for my sake)”. [130]

§102. The Sympathetic Dative.

Havers has established for the Vedic dialect a point of contact in meaning between the dat. and the gen. (HKS §11). He says: “We may state with considerable certainty that the forms *me*, *te* were originally pure datives”. As pointed out above (§91) these pronouns of the first and second persons were first employed to denote the person sympathetically participating in the action, apart from the use of the dat. to denote possession (cp. KVG §554.2; SS §14). In the Nikāyas, however, there is no strict line of demarcation between it and the *dat. of advantage and disadvantage* as both imply interest in the action on the part of some person (who is not the agent).

a. The enclitic forms *te*, *me*, *vo* and *no* are frequently found in such a role. e.g., *na hi te tāta dibbam cakka-ratanam pettikaṃ dāyajjam* D III.60 “indeed, child, the divine Gem of the Wheel is for you no paternal inheritance”; *atha ca pana me uttānakuttānako viya khāyati* D II.55 “even so to me it appears quite clear”; *so vo mam’ accayena sathā* D II.154 “for you on my passing away that will be the Master”; *Sathā ca no loke udapādi Sammā-Sambuddho* D III.122 “a Master arose for us in the world, a perfectly Enlightened One”; *mā vata no ahosi dīgharattam ahitāya dukkhāyāti* D III.10 “may it not be to us for (our) disadvantage and grief for a long time”.

b. This same *sympathetic dat.* may sometimes appear to be even more isolated in the syntactical scheme of the sentence. It is then very much like the so-called *ethical dat.* (in Greek), a mere particle hardly

entering into the main sentence-unit either grammatically or logically. It is more or less emphatic and is employed in connection with preceding particles like *kho* or pronouns usually of the first and second persons. e.g., *evaṃ santam pi kho te Poṭṭhapāda, aññā va saññā bhavissati añño va attā* D I.186 “even if it were so, Poṭṭhapāda, will perception be one and the Soul another?”. Here *te* is hardly necessary to translate; a slight implication, however, of *orientation* i.e., a point of view peculiar to the person, is noticeable. *Idan te* [131] *Mallike samaṇena Gotamena bhāsitam* M II.106 “this, (mark you) Mallikā, has been said by the recluse Gotama”; *passanti no bhonto devā* D II.213 “do you gods see?”; *abhiḥānāsi no tvam?* D II.205 “do you acquiesce?”; *tesaṃ no amhākaṃ kadāci karahaci dīghassa addhuno accayena rasa-paṭhavī udakasmim̐ samatāni* D III.90 “for us sooner or later after a long while the savoury earth had arisen over the waters” (Dial. Vol. IV. Pt.3. p.86). Here *no* is quite superficial beside *amhākaṃ*.

c. This assumes a different syntactical role when used with the verb *bhavati*, as we have seen before (§95). It is there considered as a *dat. of possession*. Sometimes the verb may be quite another but yet logically implying *being* or *existence*. e.g., *āsā ca pana me santiṭṭhati sakadāgāmitāya* D II.206 “there is a desire (in or for me) for the state of the Once-Returner”; *asītko me vayo vattati* D II.100 “I am 80 years old”.

§103. Dat. of Concern Bordering on An Absolute Use.

Very much similar to the gen. absolute is the construction often met with in the Nikāyas, where the dat. of the person ultimately concerned (in the action) is used with a participle denoting

contemporaneous action. The continuous temporal sense imparted by the participle gives a semi-absolute appearance to the construction. e.g., *ṭhānaṃ kho paṇ' etaṃ vijjati yaṇ te ariye cakkavattivatte vattamānassa ... dibbaṃ cakkarataṇaṃ pātubhavissati* D III.60 “there is a possibility however that to you conducting yourself in the noble way of the universal monarchs ... the divine Jewel of the Wheel will appear”; it may as well be rendered “... when you conduct yourself ...” etc.; *mā me bhonto atthakaraṇe nisinnassa antarā-kathaṃ opātentī* M II.122 “let not people cause interruption to me (as I am) seated at the administration of justice”; *maggam kho me gacchantassa kāyo kilamissati* D III.255 “to me walking the way (i.e. as I am going ...) the body will be fatigued”. All these examples have the enclitic form *te* or *me* denoting the person concerned and are, therefore, apparently connected with the *sympathetic dat.* [132]

§104. The Dat. of Orientation.

This denotes the person from whose *stand-point* the statement is made (cp. KVG §554.4). It is because of this notion of *stand-point* that we have preferred to call it the *dat. of orientation*. This is closely related to the datives denoting the person *interested* in the statement described in the preceding paragraphs and, therefore, Brugmann includes it among the so-called *loose datives* (*ibid.*). Local grammarians seem to have overlooked this use of the dat.; still one may see a connection between it and the function of this case called ‘*sādaratthe*’ by the *vutti* on Kac. 279. The employ, however, is not so rare as to be ignored. e.g., *te nāma-gottaṃ anussarato ayyaputtā Sakyā bhavanti* D I.92 “to one following up your lineage ... (it appears that once) your masters were the Sakyans”; *cetayamānassa me pāpiyyo acetaya-mānassa me seyyo* D I.184 “to me (while)

thinking (it appears that) it is inferior, and (while) not thinking better” (cp. Dial. II. p.251); cp. *dīghā jāgarato rattī* Dh 60 “to one awake the night is long”. The dat. of the person found with adjectives implying priority or posteriority in time or space is only a variation of the same idiom. e.g., *tesaṃ pacchimā janatā* A I.71 “the people posterior to them”. Here the dat. may be rendered by “in comparison with or compared to”, which indicates the close connection between the notion of *comparison* and that of *orientation*. Indeed it is doubtful whether *tesaṃ* is at all the dat., or the *gen. of comparison* (vide §§110 & 151.b). In many other such instances the two are indistinguishable. e.g., *purakkhato*¹³ *bhikkhusaṅghassa* D I.50 “seated in front of the order of monks”. Here the local adv. *puras* would prefer the gen. rather than the dat. (vide gen. with adverbs §153.b).

§105. Dat. of the Agent.

It has been found by observers of the earliest dialect,¹⁴ that of the Vedic mantras, that the dat. is used with *gerundives* (and also *infinitives*) as in ‘*vi śrayantāṃ prayāi devébhyaḥ*’ “let (the doors) open wide for the gods to enter”(vide VGS §200.o.) to [133] express the *agent* (KVG §554.3). It is a dat. of the person participating but it is at the same time the executor of the action and consequently can be classed with the other *loose datives*. In later classical Skr. it was superseded by the *gen. of the agent*. Says Speyer: “It is likely that the gen. had not encroached so much on the dative’s sphere of employment in the dialect of the brāhmaṇas and of ancient epic

¹³ Comy. ‘*parivāretvā nisinnassa purato nisinno*’. Sum I. p. 152.

¹⁴ Speyer (SS §86.a) citing Delbruck (K.Z., X.V.III. p. 81 etc.)

poetry as afterwards. In some cases the dat. is no more used in the classical language after having been employed so in the archaic dialect” (SS §86). In Pāli owing to the replacement of the dat. forms (except *-āya* in the sg. of *a-* nouns) by the gen., we are at a loss to find out exactly whether the case with the gerundives is the dat. or the gen. But the fact that the Nikāya dialect on the whole may be said to preserve the older archaic idioms and in general is more allied to Vedic as we have seen in the preceding pages, lends support to the conclusion that here we have the dat. and not the gen. which in Pāli seems only to be employed to express the agent with passive participles in *-ta* as *suta*, *vidita* etc. (§154).

It is the gerundive in *-anīya* that is usually involved in this construction in the Nikāyas. e.g., *sannipatitānaṃ bhikkhave dvayaṃ karaṇīyaṃ* M I.161 “for the assembled monks, brethren, there are two (things) to be done”; *ye pi’ ssa pitā atthe anusāsi, te pi Jotipālass’ eva māṇavassa anusāsanīyā* D II.231 “whatever matters were dispensed by his father, let Jotipāla the youth himself administer all such affairs (*lit.* those too are to be administered by -for- J. the young man)”. It may be mentioned that the gerundive in *-tabba* usually has the inst. to express its *agent* (§88.c.). But in the impersonal use the enclitic forms *me*, *te* and *no*, *vo*, which were originally datives (*vide* §102), are found employed for the *agent*. e.g., *evaṃ hi vo bhikkhave sikkhitabbaṃ* M I.127 “brethren, you should train yourselves thus”; *tatrāpi te Phaggunā evaṃ sikkhitabbaṃ* M I.123 “even in that matter, Phaggunā, you should learn this”. [134]

§106. The Dat. of Purpose.

Brugmann includes the *dat. of purpose* among the so-called *loose datives*. (KVG §554.5). But the fact cannot be overlooked that this *dat.* is as much logically connected with the action, denoted by the verb as the *acc. of motion* or of *purpose*. We have reason to believe with Speyer that the notion underlying the *dat. of purpose* is one of destination (SS §80), and that its sphere of application is that of the *dativus finalis* in Latin.

Local grammarians connect the idea of *purpose* with that of reciprocity and Pāṇini's rule '*karmaṇā yamabhipraiti sa sampradānaṃ*' (I.4.32) is supposed to provide for the former application also. It is said that the fourth case-ending not only denotes *sampradāna* but implies *uddeśya* i.e. *purpose* as well, this latter sense too being implicit in the expression '*yamabhipraiti*' in the rule already cited.¹⁵ Pāli grammarians include these 'final' uses under the designations *tadattha* and *tumattha* (*vide vutti* on Kac. 279), the latter term making it quite clear that even the older grammarians recognized the logically dative origin of the infinitive (*-āya* corresponding to *-tum*). The *dat. of purpose*, says Brugmann in the place already cited, especially of verbal abstracts, was from primitive Indo-Germanic times the main foundation of the infinitive. Considering how much of the power of an infinitive the *dat. of the nomen actionis* has in Indian syntax (*cf.* Speyer SS §87.II), one can quite understand the implications of the statement. On the function of the *dat.* in *-āya* in Pāli, Geiger makes the following observation: "Er dient zum Ausdruck der Richtung und des Zweckes

¹⁵ *vide Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar* p. 201.

... Er bekommt dann ganz infinitivische Verwendung”, i.e., “it serves to express direction and purpose ... then it assumes complete infinitival application” (PLS §77). That the form in *-āya* was restricted in Middle Indian to the above uses, viz., *direction* (or *aim*) and *purpose*, to the complete loss of such forms employed in other spheres of the dat., is supported by the fact that even Hemacandra, the Prk. grammarian, permits the employment of *-āya* (Prk. - ā a) only when it expresses an aim or purpose (cp. Pischel *Prk.Gr.* §361).
[135]

It has to be noted that this idea of *purpose* can be variously expressed in Pāli as much as in Skr. In the latter the *dat. of purpose*, the infinitive in *-tum*, and periphrases such as *-arthaṃ* and *-nimittaṃ* are concurrent idioms (SS §87.II). In Pāli we have also *-atthāya* and *-kāraṇā*. e.g., *seve senāsanaṃ bhikkhu paṭisallānakāraṇā* Th 1.577 “the monk resorts to the dwelling-place for the sake of (*lit.* through the reason of) solitude”; *dhanatthāya* J I.254 “for the sake of wealth”. Here the mere dat. *paṭisallānāya* and *dhanāya* would suffice. The form *atthāya* in the latter cannot be regarded as a *dat. of purpose in ipso* but only as an adverbial usage of that case (*vide* P.T.S. Dict. ‘*atthaṃ*’ and VGS §200.B.5) just as the abl. *-kāraṇā* in the former or the inst. *atthena*. *Atthāya* as a *dat. of purpose* should mean “for which good” or “for which purpose (business)”. e.g., *yāy’ eva kho pana atthāya* D I.90 “for which business you would come”.

§107. [Dat. of Aim]

a. It may express either *the thing or state wished for or aimed at or the action intended* to be accomplished. Of the former kind are usually the datives of nouns and abstract nouns. e.g., *Vesālim*

piṇḍāya pāvīsi D II.122 (D I.178) “he entered Vesālī for alms”; *vāñijassa vāñijjāya gacchato* M II.232 “of the merchant going for trade”; *gocarāya pakkamati* S III.84 “sets out for food”; *yassa atthāya pabbajanti* D II.153 “for the purpose of which ... they leave (home)”; *upasampādentī bhikkhu-bhāvāya* D I.176; II.152 “they ordain (him) for monkhood”. Other dative forms beside those in *-āya* are only rarely expressive of purpose; such, for instance, is the feminine *-yā* of *i-* nouns. e.g., *ekāyano ayaṃ bhikkhave maggo sattānaṃ visuddhiyā* M I.55 “certain, O monks, is this path for the purity (i.e. purification) of beings”.

In the latter case, i.e., when *an action is intended*, the *nomen actionis* itself is put in the dat. and looks very much like an infinitive (*cf.* SS §87.II). e.g., *samaṇaṃ Gotamaṃ dassanāya upasaṅkhamituṃ* D I.108 “to go (in order) to see the recluse Gotama”; *catuddisaṃ rakkhāya upagacchati* D II.12 “goes to guard the four quarters”; *na cāssa nāvā ... pāraṃ gamanāya* [136] M I.134 “and there would be no boat ... to cross over (to the other shore)”. The close relation to the infinitive is seen by the acc. (of object) preceding the dat. in these examples. The objective gen. may sometimes stand in place of this acc. e.g., *upamā kho me ayaṃ bhikkhave katā atthassa viññāpanāya* M I.117 “a simile has been given by me, brethren, for the vindication of the meaning”. Other similar datives of purpose are found in the following: *upasaṅkami divāvihārāya* M I.359 “came to spend the day”; *cīvaraṃ paṭisevati ... n’ eva davāya na madāya na maṇḍanāya na vibhūsanāya* M I.10 “he wears the robe ... not for sport, nor for pride, nor for ornament, nor for decoration”.

b. Though the dat. in these examples play a part *similar* to that of the infinitive still in most of them the infinitive in *-tuṃ* cannot be

substituted for the former without creating a marked difference in the idiom. But there are some instances, especially of the datives of *nomina actionis* or *nomina verbalia* used *purely* as infinitives.¹⁶ Here the dat. just as much as the corresponding infinitive grammatically and logically stands as a complement to the main verb of the sentence. Such verbs are *labhati*, *pahoti*, *arahati*, *sakkā* etc. e.g., *na mayam labhimhā pacchima-kāle Tathāgataṃ dassanāya* D II.147 (M II.131) “we do not ‘have the luck’ to see the T. in his last moments”; ... *labheyyāma ... dhammikaṃ kathaṃ savanāya* M I.160 (D III.80) “... would we get a chance to hear a doctrinal talk ...” (cp. Geiger ‘hat das Glück’ for *labhati*; PLS §204.3); *na sakkā gaṇanāya* D III.111 “not able to count”; *dassanāya ... pahoti* M II.131 “is able to see” (cp. Geiger ‘vermag zu sehen’ *ibid*); similarly with adj. *dullabha: n’ esā kathā Bhagavato dullabhā bhavissati pacchā pi savanāya* M II.2 “it will not be difficult for the Blessed One to hear this talk even later”; cp. *pubbe va natthi yadidaṃ yudhāya* Sn 831 “as before there is nothing (namely) to fight”, where *yudhāya* is an archaic dat. of *yudh* f. (*vide* P.T.S. Dict.). Such archaic dat. forms as infinitives are by no means rare in the *gāthā* literature (PLS §204 1.a.b.c).

c. There are some idioms, which though covered by the general description given above, are worth special notice [137] (cp. SS §88.1). Such are the datives, mostly of abstract nouns, expressing “to serve for, to conduce to, or tend to” usually making up the whole predicate, as for instance in: *idaṃ vo*¹⁷ *hitāya*, *idaṃ vo sukhāyā ti* D

¹⁶ “Endlich werden nicht selten Dative der Nomina verbalia als Infinitive verwendet”. Geiger PLS §204.3; cf. §77.2. *ibid*.

¹⁷ ‘vo’ here, as the other dat.-gen. forms in the following examples, is most probably the dat. Speyer notes that in the Vedas two datives in this manner are usual SS §88.R.

I.230 “this (will serve) for your good, this for your happiness”. Similarly we find the stock-phrase “*atthāya hitāya sukhāya devamanussānaṃ*” (e.g., D II.45,103) employed without a verb. But generally to this so-called *predicative dat.* is subjoined the *verbum substantivum* which is either the primary verb *bhavati* or others of correlated meaning such as *saṃvattati* (or *saṃvaṭṭati*) and *paṭipajjati*. e.g., *tesaṃ taṃ bhavissati dīgharattaṃ hitāya sukhāya* D II.142 “for them it will be for their good and happiness for a long time”; *sallekhāya subharatāya viriyārambhāya saṃvattissati* M I.13 “it will conduce to higher life, peace and exertion”; *mahato anattāya saṃvattati* A I.5 “it will tend to great harm”; *āhārupacchedāya paṭipajji* M I.245 “he tended (inclined) towards the stopping of food”.

d. Another use of the same dat. is to express the aim with verbs of *wishing, striving, endeavouring* etc. This is the true *dat. of the aim* (cp. SS §89; PLS §77). e.g., *ghaṭati vāyamati lābhāya* A IV.293 “exerts (himself) and strives for gain”; *na viriyaṃ ārabhissati tassa’ aṅgaṇassa pahānāya* M I.25 “does not make an effort for the destroying of that evil”. This construction is more prominent in its *adnominal* use with such nouns as *icchā* and *āsā*. e.g., *icchā lābhāya* A IV.293 “desire for gain”; *āsā ca pana me santiṭṭhati sakadāgāmitāya* D II.206 “there is a desire for me for the state of the Once-returner”; *ussukaṃ āpannāni honti āyasmato Mahā-Kassapassa piṇḍapāta-paṭilābhāya* Ud 4. “... eager for the obtaining of alms for the venerable Mahā-Kassapa”. Still in these examples the *aim* denoted by the dat. is only metaphorical. But sometimes it is used with verbs of *bending, turning* and *leading* implying actual *direction*, parallel to the *dat. of destination*. (§96.a). Here the idea of purpose is only very slightly implied. e.g., *tassa*

cittaṃ namati ātappāya M I.102 “his mind is inclined (*lit.* bends) to exertion”; *so niyyāti takkarassa sammā dukkhakkhayāyāti* M I.68 “it leads to the perfect ending of ill of the doer thereof”; *no hīnāya āvattati* D III.50 “he does not return to the low”. [138]

e. Finally, there is an important *adnominal* use of this dat. It is frequently found with *hetu* and *paccayo* denoting cause or reason. Usually the two nouns are linked together in the idiom. The logical justification for the dat. with these seems to lie in the fact that the notion implied is one of *aim*, denoting as it does *that* to which the cause leads. The same nuance is expressed by the English idioms ‘the reason for’ and ‘the cause for’. The form in *-āya* seems to be generally employed in this connection. e.g., *ayaṃ aṭṭhamo hetu aṭṭhamo paccayo mahato bhūmicālassa pātubhāvāya* D III.109 “this is the eighth reason, the eighth cause, for the appearance of a great earthquake”; (cp. D II.107 and Geiger PLS §77.2). The idiom however is not restricted to the older form. The ending *-ssa*, borrowed from the gen., is also found. e.g., *es’ eva hetu esa paccayo jarāmaṇassa* D II.57 “this itself is the reason, this the cause, for decay and death”.

§108. The Dat. of Suitability.

The dat. is also found with verbs, nouns (including adjectives) and particles (originally adverbs or prepositions) having the sense of *befitting*, *suiting* and *counterpoising* (cp. SS §87). Such are the verbs *kappati* and *pahoti* (cp. Pāṇ. II.2.13 & 2.16), nouns like *kālo*, *akālo*, adjectives of the sense of *paṭirūpa* and prepositions like *alaṃ*.

a. *Nouns*: e.g., *bhattassa kālo* M II.186 “(it is) time for dinner”; *etassa Bhagavā kālo ...* D II.2 “it is time for this O Blessed One ...”; Sometimes there is a double dat. with this construction, one of the *thing suitable* and the other expressing the person *for whom* it is so. e.g., *na dāni te tuṅhībhāvassa kālo* D I.95 “it is not the time for you for silence”. The negative *akālo* is as frequent: *akālo kho tāva Kassapa pañhassa* S I.19 “it is not yet the time, Kassapa, for questions”; *akālo Bhagavantaṃ dassanāya* D I.151 “it is not the time to see the Blessed One”. A different turn of the same idiom, occurs with the stereotyped phrase ‘*kālaṃ maññasī*’ used in polite request. e.g., *gaccha tvaṃ Ānanda yassa*¹⁸ *dāni kālaṃ maññasī* D I.85; II.104 “go now, Ānanda, (and attend to that) for which you think it is time”. [139]

b. *Adjectives*: The adj. *paṭirūpa* is similarly construed with the dat. of the person *for whom* something is fitting. e.g., *amhākaṃ paṭirūpaṃ* D II.180 “it is fitting for us”; *na kho etaṃ Phaggunā paṭirūpaṃ kulaputtassa ...* M I.123 “it is not fitting for you, a householder O Phaggunā ...”;

c. Sometimes the idea of *suitability* is expressed by the noun in the dat. without the help of any adj. meaning such. e.g., *yāva nāgassa bhūmi nāgena gantvā* D I.50; M II.113 “having gone on the elephant as far as the ground was (suitable) for the elephant”.

d. With *alaṃ* the noun in the dat. may either denote a *thing* or *state* in which case the dat. is parallel to the infinitive¹⁹ or a *person for*

¹⁸ Comy. ‘... *yassa idāni tvaṃ ... gamanassa kālaṃ maññasī, tassa kālaṃ tvaṃ eva jānāhī ti*’, Sum.I.p.237.

¹⁹ *vide* P.T.S. Dict. s.v. *alaṃ*.

whom something is *fit or proper*. Being originally an emphatic particle in affirmative sentences *alaṃ* in connection with a dat. does not really govern that case but the latter belongs to the syntax of the whole sentence (as dat. or infinitive absolute). It is mostly found with the dat. in *-āya*, which is closely related to that of *purpose* and *aim* dealt with in the preceding paragraphs. e.g., *nālaṃ sallāpāya* D III.38 “not fit to talk”; *alaṃ vacanāya* D II.64 “one must say ...”; *alañca te antarāyāya* M I.131 (II.257) “is certain to be for your harm”; *alaṃ vat’ idaṃ kulaputtassa padhānatthikassa padhānāya* M I.167 “quite ample for the nobleman striving for concentration”; *alaṃ attano no paresaṃ* A IV.330 “enough for himself but not for others”. A curious use of *alaṃ* is found in ‘*alaṃ me, rañño va hotū ti*’ M II.54 “it is as good for me as for the king”. Chalmers, rendering “I have nothing to do with the king” is entirely at variance with Neumann’s “Genug schon, dass es vom Könige kommt”. Here *me* is the dat. of *concern* and *rañño* appears to be a use parallel to that of the inst. with *alaṃ* (§82). It may be noted that in Skr. *alaṃ* with the dat. of the person sometimes denotes *competency*: “one is fit for or a match for another”(VGS §200.4; Macdonell *Skr. Gr.* §200.2.a).

e. With some adjectives denoting *competency* or *possibility* a similar dat. is found in the Nikāyas, used very much like the dat. (or even the gen.) in Skr. with words like *pariyāpta* and [140] *śakta* (SS §85). e.g., *bhabbo* “possible, fit”; *bhabbo abhinibbidāya, bhabbo sambodhāya* M I.104 “has the capacity for breaking away (from the world) and for enlightenment”; *bhabbo dukkhakkhayāya* S III.27 “has the capacity for destroying ill”; *abhabbo puna virūḥhiyā* M II.256 “impossible to grow again”; *abhabbo parihānāya* A II.40 “unlikely to decrease”. With these the infinitive is also found

showing that it is an infinitival dat. of the type discussed above (*vide* P.T.S. Dict, *s.v.*)

§109. Adnominal Uses of the Dative.

Corresponding to most of the *adverbial* uses described in the previous paragraphs, there are datives which bear close syntactical connection to substantives, adjectives and indeclinables etc. (KVG §555). The various constructions such as the datives of *advantage* and *disadvantage*, of *concern* and *interest*, of *destination*, *aim* and *purpose* etc. have their adnominal counterparts.

a. Such formations as *agent nouns* and *verbal nouns* derived from verbs originally complying with a dat. of the person *to whom* something is *given*, *owed* etc. retain that dat. e.g., *na dātā hoti samaṇassa vā brāhmaṇassa vā annaṃ pānaṃ ...* A II.203 “he is not a giver of food and drink ... to either recluse or brahmin”; In *gāthā* literature an adnominal use of the dat. of the *creditor* (§93) is quite frequent. e.g., *na hi te iṇaṃ atthi* Sn 120 “there is no debt to you”; *anaṇā dāni te mayaṃ* Th 1.138 “we are not indebted to you”.

§110. [Adnominal Dat. of Interest]

a. A dat. of *advantage and disadvantage* is adnominally found with nouns denoting *loss*, *gain*, *victory*, *defeat* and the like. e.g., *lābhā rañño Pasenadissa Kosalassa* M II.209 “a gain to king Pasenadi of Kosala!” (cp. D II.152); *lābhā vata bho Aṅga-Magadhānaṃ suladdhaṃ vata bho Aṅga-Magadhānaṃ* M II.2 “a gain for the people of Aṅga-Magadha, a lucky thing for the Aṅga-Magadhas”; *imassa jayo bhavissati, abbhantarānaṃ* [141] *raññaṃ parājayo*

bhavissati D I.10 “to this (one) there will be victory, for the internal kings defeat”; *tumhaṃ yev’ assa tena antarāyo* D I.3 “by that there would be harm (danger) to you yourselves”.

b. A dat. of *interest* (in the wider sense) is found with nouns implying *necessity, use* or *purpose*. The person *for whom* there is need or use of something is denoted by the dat. and that *thing* is put in the inst. (§83.b). e.g., *attho* “need”: *attho sace to bhante piṇḍakena* M I.380 “if, Sir, there is a need of alms for you (i.e. if you are in need of alms)”; *attho me gahapati hirañña-suvaṇṇena* D II.176 “there is a need of gold and wealth, householder, for me”; *na ca me attho tādīsena purisena* S I.99 “to me there is no use of such a person”. *kiṃ* “what (good, use)?”, in interrogative sentences; e.g., *kiṃ te samaṇa-bhāvena* Th 1.821 “what (good) to you by the state of a recluse? (i.e. what is the use of the recluse-state for you?)”; *kiccaṃ* “business or use”; e.g., *yaṃ vo kiccaṃ sarīrena* Th 1.719 “whatever use there is for you in the body”.

§111. [Dat. of Comparison]

With adjectives implying *superiority* or *inferiority* the usual case in the older language is the gen. of comparison (§151.b). This function too seems originally to have belonged to the dat., for logically the thing *from the point of view of which* something else is considered to be superior or inferior can be denoted by the dat. In fact such adjectives as *sādhāraṇa* can be optionally construed in Skr. with either the gen. or the dat. (*vide* Monier William’s Dict. s.v.). The connection generally is one of *relation*; hence even the inst. and abl. are used in comparison (§§86 & 132). Consequently it is quite probable that the ending *-ssa* in the following may represent a dat.

e.g., *atthi imassa saññāgatassa uttarim nissaraṇaṃ* M I.38 “there is (a place) of release superior to this conscious world”; *asādhāraṇaṃ aññesaṃ* Kh 7 “unequal to others”. This notion of *orientation* might have developed from the employment of the dat. with adjectives like *garu* as found in the following: *sathā no garu* M I.265 “the Master is venerable to us”; *avisaṃvādako lokassa* D I.4,63 “he [142] breaks not his word to the world, (*lit.*) of consistent speech to (from the point of view of) the world”; *vibhavadiṭṭhiyā te paṭiviruddhā* M I.65 “they are opposed to the theory of non-becoming”.

§112. [Dat. of Advantage]

With nouns and particles invoking *homage* or *adoration* (*namo*), *happiness* and *prosperity* (*bhaddaṃ*), and *blessing* or *welcome* (*sāgataṃ*) the dat. is employed to denote the person who is the *object* of such. e.g., *namo tassa Bhagavato* D II.288 “homage to that Blessed One ... !”; *bhaddaṃ tavāti* D II.180 “prosperity to you!”; *sāgataṃ bhante Bhagavato* D I.171; M II.2 “welcome to the Blessed One!”; *sāgataṃ āyasmato Ānandassa* M I.212 “welcome to the ven. Ānanda”. It may be observed that with *namo* the dat. is logically due to the idea of *direction* implied in the act of *bowing* (cf. §96.b). But with the rest it seems to be due to the sense of *advantage* conveyed by the terms *bhaddaṃ* and *sāgataṃ* (which were originally *exclamatory nouns* or *accusatives*, vide §28).

§113. [Dat. of Passage]

We have already (§96.b) mentioned the *adverbial* constructions involving the dat. of destination (cp. KVG §553.6; SS §79). An *adnominal* employment of the same is found with nouns like *magga*

“way” and *gamana* “going, journey”. e.g., *Samaṇo Gotamo Brahmāṇaṃ sahavyatāya maggaṃ jānātī ti* M II.206 “the recluse Gotama knows the way to the company of Brahmas”; *sagghassa maggaṃ ācikkhati* D III.187 “he points the way to heaven”; *Nāḷakāragāmassa maggaṃ* M II.206 “the road to the village of the basket-makers”; the noun *gamana* in this sense is however found only in the *gāthā* literature. e.g., *sagghassa gamanena* Dh 178 “by (the) going to heaven”. Here there is the possibility of it being the gen. corresponding to the original *acc. of destination* (cp. objective gen. §143.b.).

§114. Sporadic Uses of the Dat.

There are some uses of the dat, (at least of *-ssa* forms felt like datives) that seem to fall under none of the above established [143] categories. It is impossible to distinguish some of these from the gen. For instance, we find the dat. (*-ssa*) where we would have normally expected a loc. e.g., *bhikkhusaṅghassa nisinnaṃ* A IV.205 “seated among the order of monks”; where the v.1. *-saṅghe* shows that even earlier editors were puzzled by its irregularity. It is doubtful whether this is elliptical for such expression as *bhikkhusaṅghassa purato nisinnaṃ* or *-ssa purakkhato nisinnaṃ* (cp. §104). A similar sporadic instance of the *-ssa* form, probably for the loc. of *relation*, occurs in the passage: *akaraṇīyā ca bho Gotama Vajjī rañña ... Vedehiputtana, yadidaṃ yuddhassa, aññatra upalāpanā ...* A IV.20 “the Vajjīs, venerable Gotama, cannot be defeated (*lit.* done), that is to say in war, without diplomacy ...”. We may compare with the use of *yuddhassa* the actual dat. (*-āya*) found in later Pāli denoting *relation*. e.g., *muto’ si me ajja vadhāya* J VI.312: you are free today as regards death”. Similarly *yuddhassa* might stand for “in the manner of or as

regards war”. In the following *bhayassa* seems to denote *cause* or *reason* just as an abl. or an inst. (*bhāya* or *bhayena*): *bhayassa kiccaṃ karoti* D III.186 “he does the work for fear *or* owing to fear”, where the Comy. has ‘*bhaye uppanne*’ implying, probably, that *bhayassa* stands for the *gen. absolute* (§158) ‘*bhayassa uppannassa*’ or ‘*bhayassa sato*’. We may compare however such English usages as “he did not do it *for fear*’ or ‘he did not dare to cross the dry river-bed *for the dust*’. Similar is the use of *kissa* as an *adverb of reason*. e.g., *kissa pana me bhavaṃ Gotamo ādiken’ eva na byākāsīti* M II.213 “why did not the ven. Gotama explain this to me at the very beginning”. A dat. by *attraction* is a frequent phenomenon in the Nikāyas. e.g., *yassa taṃ paribhuttaṃ sammāpariñāmaṃ gaccheyya aññatra Tathāgatassāti* D II.127 *lit.* “for whom once eaten it would be digestable except (for) the T.”. Here *aññatra* would normally require an inst. (§82) or an abl. (§130.d); but the dat. is due to the preceding *yassa*. Similarly: *lābhā bhante Ghaṭikārassa kumbhakārassa ... yassa Bhagavā evaṃ abhivissattho ti* M II.54 “(it is) a gain to the potter G ... in whom the Blessed One has confided” (*lit.* that the Blessed One has confided in him). [144]

§115. [Derminative Dat.]

In Vedic (VGS §200.B.3) and classical Sanskrit (SS §92) the dat. is sometimes found denoting the *time to come*, when a limit is made in time for something to be done. It is parallel to the English ‘for’ in expressions like ‘we shall leave it for tomorrow’. So in Pāli the irregular old dat. form *svātanāya* is frequently found in the sense of “for the morrow”. This is what may be called the *terminative dat.* e.g., *svātanāya bhattaṃ* D II.95,125 “meal for tomorrow” (on the form *svātana vide* PLS §6.54). On the analogy of this we may regard

the form *uttarassa* in the following as a *terminative dat.*: *ajj' eva me dhaññāni jāyantu sv' eva gabbhiniyo hontu uttarass' eva paccantûti* A I.240 “may my corn grow today ... and ripen later”; v.1 *uttarasvevâti* (day after tomorrow). It may be observed that both are adverbial usages.

Chapter V

The Ablative Case

[146]

§116. [General Character]

The fundamental character of the abl. is to denote the *point starting from which* an action proceeds. Generally speaking it serves to denote the *whence*, and, according to Speyer, is therefore the very opposite of the dat. (SS §93). On the whole the difference between the abl. and the dat. seems to be similar to that implied between the English 'from' and 'for'. Speaking of the function of the former in Sanskrit, E.W. Hopkins¹ says that it "indicates primarily a 'then' and 'thence' idea, leading to a causal notion and almost to the designation of an agent. 'Thence' becomes 'because of' (e.g., *énasaḥ* because of sin), but it rarely assumes instrumental sense ...". This may be taken as true of the syntactical role of the abl. in Pāli as well but for the fact that in Pāli the morphological identity of the inst. and the abl., in the *-ā* ending of the singular and completely in the plural, has brought the two cases into closer connection and consequently established further points of contact between them.

§117. [Local Grammarians]

The abl. or the fifth Case (*pañcamī-vibhatti*) has been called the *apādāna-kāraka* by local grammarians. Pāṇinī lays down the rule that "the fifth case-affix is to be employed to denote *apādāna*".² This term literally means "a taking away from" (*apa* + *ādāna*), i.e.

¹ *J.A.O.S.*, Vol.38, "The Origin of the Ablative Case".

² '*apādāne pañcamī*' Pāṇ. II.3.28.

generally a withdrawal, thus bringing about clearly the contrast between it and the dat. which is called *sampradāna-kāraka* (Pāli *sampadāna*) wherein the underlying notion is that of *giving to*. “If there is a withdrawal, that which stays is *apādāna*” says Pāṇinī,³ implying thereby that what is meant is the *terminus a quo*. Kaccāyana gives a categorical definition of the scope of this *kāraka*. According to him, “that, from which there is a withdrawal (moving away), fear or a taking away, is denoted by the designation [147] *apādāna*”.⁴ In all these the fundamental notion is the same, viz., that of *whence*. Thus it is clear that ancient Indian grammarians were aware of the logical unity underlying the various uses of the abl. as much as modern writers on syntax.

§118. [Forms of the Ablative]

As regards form the abl. in Pāli presents more problems than any other case. We have already referred (§116) to the coinciding of the older inst. sg. of *a-* nouns, viz., the form in *-ā* which survives in such instances as *sahatthā* etc. (*vide* §6), with the ending *-ā* of the abl. sg. of *a-* nouns which corresponds to Skr. *-āt*. Beside this form, in all other declensions Sanskrit has *-as* for both abl. and gen. sg. which however is absent in Pāli. Here the forms *-smā* and its phonetic development *-mhā* borrowed from the pronominal declension appear beside the *-ā* form. But its employment is restricted to a few uses denoting *separation* in the general sense (*vide* §5.a) especially in connection with the verb *pabbajati*. The syntactical interfusion of the abl. and inst. in the older language (§116) has resulted in the loss

³ cp. Speyer SS §97, citing Pāṇ. Sūtra ‘*dhruvamapāya apādānaṃ*’.

⁴ ‘*yasmādapeti bhayamādatte vā tadapādānaṃ*’ Kac. 273.

of the original abl. ending which in Pāli is superseded by that of the inst. in the rest of the vowel declension (masc. and neut.). In the plural everywhere the two cases are formally identical, whereas in Skr. it is the dat. (plural and dual) which coincides with the inst. in spite of the contradictory syntactical conceptions (cp. SS §93).

The suffix *-to* which even in Sanskrit (*-taḥ*) is not considered as a proper abl. ending (cp. SS §105) is frequently used in the Nikāyas with all types of nominal stems (cp. PLS §77) mostly in an adverbial sense. The still older (non-case) suffix *-so* (Skr. *-śaḥ*) which is regarded in later Skr. as a distributive suffix is found here in purely adverbial formations and stands in most instances in the sense of ‘*vasena*’.

§119. [Different Kinds of Ablative]

The abl. in Pāli is on the whole an *adverbial* case, there being hardly any *adnominal* uses. Even the few to be met with in the Nikāyas presuppose some verb which has come to be omitted, probably for reasons of idiom, but still can be understood. As regards syntactical categories,⁵ we have placed the *abl.* [148] *of starting point* first and treated those of *origin* and *cause* as developments of the former. The second is the *abl. of separation*, third the *abl. of distance*, i.e. the abl. denoting the point from which distance is reckoned, and finally as fourth the *abl. of viewpoint*, under which heading have been discussed the *abl. of comparison* and the abl. implying ‘*on what side*’. Those ablatives which appear as pure adverbs and are, therefore,

⁵ Speyer (SS §93) gives four heads: I. Abl. of Separation, II. Abl. of Distance, III. Abl. of Origin and Cause, and IV. Abl. expressing ‘on what side’.

classified by local grammarians as ‘indeclinables’ have been dealt with separately though they could still be placed under one (or more) of the above headings according to their specific meanings. In all these categories, however, the unity of the fundamental conception is evident, and sometimes we may account for the same abl. in more than one way.

§120. The Ablative of Starting Point (origin).

We have said that the fundamental function of this case is to denote the *point*, whether it be a place, person or thing, *starting from which* an action proceeds (§116). This includes, therefore, such notions as origination, production, rising, issuing, birth etc. Accordingly the *abl. of origin* appears to be only one phase of the *abl. of starting point*. Again, that *from which* something originates can sometimes be regarded as the *cause* for the latter’s origin, for the idea of ‘from which’ can psychologically correspond to that of ‘through which’. Hence the *abl. of cause* is best included in the *abl. of origin*. In fact, as Speyer observes (SS §102), the abl. denoting *origin* is at the same time an *abl. of cause*. In Pāli as in Skr., however, the abl. expressing the *starting point*, in its literal or narrower meaning, is quite a common idiom. The adverbial form in *-to* seems to be rather frequent in this connection, though the *-ā* forms are by no means infrequent.

a. The abl. expresses *from what origin* there is a *rising* or *issuing* (cp. SS §100; KVG §533.3). It is found with such verbs as *jāyati*, *uppajjati* and *abhinibbattati*. e.g., *bhayāni ... bālato uppajjanti* A I.101 “fears arise from folly”; *mukhato jātā* D III.81 “born from the mouth”; cp. *kaṭṭhā have jāyati jātavedo* Sn 462 “fire (Agni) is born from wood”;

siyā nu kho tesam aggīnaṃ nānādāruto [149] *abhinibbattānaṃ kiñci nānākaraṇaṃ ...* M II.130 “would there be any difference ... between those fires kindled from various kinds of wood”. In the last two examples it is the idea of ‘kindling from’ that is implied though the verbs in both cases mean only “to be born” or “arise” . The abl. is therefore used to denote the *material from which* fire is kindled (cp. KVG §533.4).

b. The same abl. is also used to denote the former *state* or *shape* or *thing out of which* some other state etc. proceeds or is produced (cp. SS §100). It occurs with such verbs as *abhinimmināti* “create” and *karoti* “make”. Though psychologically this function of the abl. comes very close to the *instrumental* sense, Pāli, just like the older language (cp. §116) does not permit the construction with the inst. e.g., *so imamhā kāyā aññaṃ kāyaṃ abhinimmināti* D I.77; M II.18 “from this body he creates another body”; cp. *yathā pi puppharāsimhā kayirā mālāguṇe bahū* Dh 53 “as one would make many garlands from a heap of flowers”; it may even occur with the verb merely understood. e.g., ... *khīramhā dadhi, dadhimhā navanītaṃ, navanītamhā sappi, sappimhā sappimaṇḍo* D I.201 “from milk (*sci.* is obtained) curds, from curds butter, from butter ghee and from ghee cream”.

§121. [Origin and Cause]

As we have remarked in the preceding paragraph the *abl. of origin* is at the same time an *abl. of cause*. For the sake of illustration we may adduce the following example where the abl. *-samodhānā* can be rendered either as “from the contact and friction” implying *point of origin* or as “through the contact and friction” which points directly

to a *cause*: *dvinnam kaṭṭhānaṃ samphassa-samodhānā usmā jāyati tejo abhinibbattati* M II.242 “from the contact and friction of two sticks warmth arises and fire is kindled”. Even in most of the instances given in the previous paragraph the abl. implicitly contained the cause-idea. This connection between the causal abl. and that of origin was known to the ancient grammarians according to whom the fifth case-ending denotes not only *avadhi* or ‘limit of separation’ but also *janayatva* or ‘state of being that which produces’, as in ‘*dharmādutpadyate sukhaṃ*’ i.e. “from Dharma arises happiness”. “Here”, says a [150] modern Indian critic,⁶ “virtue (Dharma) is the *cause* that produces happiness as its effect. Sometimes it implies substratum and place of origination as in, ‘*vālmikāgrāt prabhavati*’ and ‘*Himavato Gaṅgā prabhavati*’”. What is significant here is the distinction; made between ‘to be born owing to’ and ‘to arise or spring from’.

§122. The Ablative of Cause.

This use of the abl. brings it into contact with the inst. which as we have seen elsewhere (§67) is also employed to denote *reason* or *cause*. Pāṇinī has two parallel rules to that effect⁷ and Kaccāyana lays down the same rule in both cases, viz. ‘*hetvatthe*’ (291 & 277 -hetu-). But according to Pāṇinī the *abl.* is forbidden and the inst. is of necessity, if, firstly, the cause or motive be at the same time the agent; secondly, if it be an abstract noun of the feminine gender expressing a quality (cp. SS §102). This distinction seems on the whole to be preserved in the Nikāya prose. Those forms in *-ā* of

⁶ Chakravarti, *Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar* p. 201.

⁷ ‘*hetau (ṛtīyā)*’ Pāṇ. II.3.23 & ‘*akartaryṅṇe pañcamī*’ II.3.24; cp. also following “*vibhāṣā guṇe ‘stīyām*’ ” II.3.25.

feminine nouns such as *assavanatā* D II.38; M I.168, and *saddhā* M I.16,123, are *instrumentals of cause* and not ablatives (*vide* §6 here, and Franke *Z.D.M.G.* 1892). They represent either the Vedic ending *-ā* of feminine nouns, as Franke has shown in the place cited, or a shortening of the usual feminine singular in *-āya*, as Geiger thinks, though there is no valid reason to object to the former view (*vide* PLS §80.1). And the *abl.* with the adverbial suffix *-to* found in such instances as *rājato vā duruttassa corato pīlitassa vā* Kh 7 does not denote *agent*, though the commentator glosses it by ‘... *corehi pīlitassa*’ (Pj. I. p.218), but as an *abl.* expressing ‘from what side’ as Sanskrit ‘*tvattaḥ*’ i.e. “from your side” (§131.d., cp. SS §101). Generally speaking the *abl.* of causality and the *inst.* of reason are interchangeable and not seldom are found side by side. But, as Speyer points out, if the efficient cause be some obligation or other binding motive by virtue of which (i.e. from which) some effect is produced, the *abl.* alone is to be employed (SS §102). This is so because it is the logical function of the *abl.* and *not* of the *inst.* to denote that *from which* something results as *consequence*. For instance, in an example like the following, the *abl.* is almost obligatory: *yā tā* [151] *honti āpadā aggito vā udakato vā rājato vā corato vā* A II.68 “whatever calamities there be from (i.e. due to, owing to) fire, water, kings or robbers ...”, the implication being that these *arise* from the mentioned sources. In general this *abl.* may express many different shades of the notion of *causality*.

a. It may denote the *cause* proper, in which case it can be rendered by such expressions as “from”, “through”, “as a result of” or “in consequence of”. e.g., *āsavānaṃ khayā anāsavaṃ cetovimuttiṃ upasampajja* A I.107; D III.102 “through the (*or* on the) extinction of the banes entering that emancipation of mind which is free from

such”; *atha aññataro satto āyukkhayā vā puññakkhayā vā ābhassara-kāyā cavitvā Suññaṃ Brahma-vimānaṃ uppajjati* D III.29 “then a certain being in consequence of the expiry of his span of life or his merits leaving the Abode of Radiance enters the Brahma-abode of Emptiness”; *sabbaso rūpasaññānaṃ samatikkamā, paṭighasaññānaṃ atthaṅgamā, nānattasaññānaṃ amanasikārā ... ākāśānañcāyatanaṃ upasampajja viharati* D II.112 “On the complete passing away of form-perceptions, on the expiry of all hateful thoughts, and through not dwelling on various (perceived) things ... he enters the sphere of infinite space and abides therein”. In all these examples the abl. conveys implicitly an idea of *time (after which)*. The construction is consequently parallel to the *locative absolute* (§183.d); hence the possibility of rendering the abl. in some of the above instances by a temporal phrase beginning with ‘on’. Here we may observe the temporal conception implied in the idea of causality. In the stock-phrase ‘*kāyassa bhedā paraṃ maraṇā.*’ it is the temporal sense that is pronounced, there being practically no causal implication. e.g., *sabbe te kāyassa bhedā paraṃ maraṇā sugatiṃ saggā-lokaṃ uppajjanti* D II.141; III.169 “all of them on the disruption of the body after death are born in a happy state in heaven.” The abl. *bhedā* here actually means “after the disruption.” (and not “as a result or in consequence of the breaking up ...”) and is very much like the inst. of *time after which* (*vide* §77.b). [152]

b. When the abl. is of an abstract noun in *-tta* (Skr. *-tva*), the idea of ‘*cause* as a consequence of which something else follows’ is less manifest and the abl. seems to be one of pure reason. e.g., *So tassa kammaṃ katattā upacittā ussannattā vipulattā ... sugatiṃ saggāṃ lokaṃ uppajjati* D III.169 “by reason of doing, collecting, accumulating and increasing of that action ... he is born into a happy

state, into heaven”; *rāga-dosa-mohānaṃ tanuttā sakadāgāmi hoti* D I.156 “through the attenuation of passion, ill-will and delusion he becomes a Once-returner”. However, the difference between ‘cause’ and ‘reason’ is not an absolute one. Sometimes the same abl. may contain both nuances, as for instance in, *Catunnaṃ bhikkhave ariya-saccānaṃ ananuvadhā appaṭivedhā evaṃ idaṃ dīgham addhānaṃ sandhāvitaṃ ...* D II.90 “Brethren, through the non-realization, through the non-comprehension, of the four Noble Truths this long period has been coursed ...”

c. Again, this abl. may express the *motive through which* an action is done. Only the ending *-ā* is employed in this function and is hardly distinguishable from the instrumental in *-ā*. e.g., *kodhā ca pana’ ssa esā vācā bhāsītā* M I.68 “these words were spoken by him through anger”; *pasādā kho tvam Ānanda vadesi* D II.155 “you speak out of faith, Ānanda”; *so upādāna-bhayā upādāna-parijigucchā n’ eva idaṃ kusalanti vyākaroti* D I.26 “out of fear for clinging (to existence), out of aversion for it, he does not proclaim that this is good”; *bhayā dānaṃ deti* “he gives alms from fear”; cp. inst. *saddhā* (feminine) *agārasmā anagāriyaṃ pabbajitā* M I.32 “left home for homelessness through faith”.

d. In the foregoing examples it is the abl. of noun itself that is employed to denote *cause*. But frequently we find the abl. sg. of words meaning cause or reason as periphrases replacing the direct construction. As regards Sanskrit, Speyer says “Nothing impedes concrete nouns to be put in the abl. of cause, but often they are expressed by periphrase, especially by means of *hetuḥ*” (SS §102). In the Nikāyas are found such forms as *hetu*, *kāraṇā* and *paccayā* used in this connection. Geiger considers the first as a postposition

corresponding to the old gen.-abl. in *-os* (PLS §83.2). [153] Local grammarians regard these also as genuine ablatives of cause⁸ and not as indeclinables (*nipāta*) as we would have expected. As periphrases they either appear in the role of postpositions or are construed as the second member of *dependent determinative* compounds where the gen. is implied as the first member. e.g., *avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā, saṅkhārapaccayā viññāṇaṃ* (etc.) ... D I.45 “through (or from) ignorance (arise) the constituents, from these consciousness ...”; *jātipaccayā jarāmaraṇaṃ* M I.261 “decay and death (occur) owing to birth”; *kusalānaṃ bhikkhave dhammānaṃ samādāna-hetu evaṃ idaṃ puññaṃ pavaḍḍhati* D III.59 “owing to the acquiring of good things, brethren, merit increases in this way”; cp. *attahetu*⁹ *parahetu dhanahetu* Sn 122 “because of himself, others or money”. But more frequently these abl. forms appear as separate words and the actual noun denoting *cause* is put in the gen. case. e.g., *issariyassa kāraṇā jīvitā voropesiṃ* D I.84, 85 “I deprived him of life through the motive of (obtaining) wealth” (*lit.* through the fact of glory); in this example, as well as in the *gāthā*-passage given above (with *-hetu*), the postposition conveys the meaning “through the motive of” and not “as a result of” as in the others, hence it approaches the *dat. of purpose* in sense “for the sake of” or “for the purpose of”. In the following however no such idea is contained: *yesaṃ kho ahaṃ saṃyojanānaṃ hetu pañātipātī assaṃ* M I.361 “owing to which fetters would I become one destroying life?”; *Taṃ kissa hetu?* D II.14 “what is this due to? (*lit.* this through the cause of what)”. There is no doubt, therefore, that the form *hetu* is the abl. sg. corresponding to Skr. *hetoh* which is used after the gen. of the actual noun denoting

⁸ *Vutti* on Kac. 277 gives *hetu* side by side with *hetunā* as abl. of cause.

⁹ Comy. ‘*attahetūti attano jīvitakāraṇā*’ Pj. II.179.

cause, as mentioned by Pāṇinī (II.3.26).¹⁰ He also allows the use of the inst. if the noun is a pronoun (*ibid* 27)¹¹ which the *vārttika* illustrates by ‘*kasya* (and *kena*) *hetunā vasati*’ (cp. Pāli *kissa*). Moreover the abl. *-bhayā* in the following proves beyond doubt that *hetu* to which it refers is also abl.: *taṃ kissa hetu? nindābyārosana-upārambhabhayāti* A II.31 “what is that due to? It is due to the fear of ...”; (on the phonetic change of *-oḥ* > *-u* see §13.). [154]

e. The abl. is also used to express the source of fear with the noun *bhayaṃ*. The more usual construction is the gen. expressive of the *source* of fear (§150.c); the acc. is also found with verbs of *fearing*, especially when the object of fear is a person (§36.a). The abl. is found in the Nikāyas only adnominally. e.g., *na kutoci bhayaṃ samanupassati* D I.70,172 “he does not encounter fear from anything”; cp. *papatanā bhayaṃ ... maraṇato bhayaṃ* Sn. 576 “fear from falling ... fear from death (i.e. fear of falling ...)”. The abl. *kuto*, originally “from which” gains the adverbial import of “whence” and is frequently found with *bhayaṃ* either separately as in *kuto bhayaṃ* Dh 212,271,862, or compounded with the latter as in *akutobhaya* “with nothing to fear from anything” S I.192; Th 1.510, 2.333; Sn 561.

§123. The Ablative of Separation.

As fundamental characteristic of the abl. we have mentioned in the previous chapter its function of denoting the point *from which* an action proceeds. Now, the psychological fact behind the conception

¹⁰ ‘*śaṣṭī hetuprayoge*’, illustrated by ‘*annasya hetor vasati*’.

¹¹ ‘*sarvanāmanastrīyā ca*’.

of *proceeding from* is the notion of *separation*. It is implied not only in the idea of *going away from* but also in that of *origination*. According to local grammarians it is the fundamental notion underlying all the primary uses of this case; hence the name *avadhi* (limit of separation). Chakravarti¹² regards the notion of origination (*janayatva*) itself as being contained in the conception of *avadhi*. In fact there is equal justification for either division to be regarded as the first because of the fundamental unity of conception. Speyer, probably following the older grammarians, places the *abl. of separation* at the beginning of his treatment of that case. (SS §93).

§124. [Starting Point]

The abl. accordingly is needed when wanting to express *from* or *out of* what place there is a *starting* or *moving* (cp. SS §94). In its proper sense it is employed with all verbs implying *going*, *coming*, *receding*, *approaching* etc. All the available abl. sg. endings are employed in this connection. [155]

a. i. With *gacchati* and *āgacchati*: e.g., *ahaṃ kho sakamhā gāmā amuṃ gāmaṃ āgañchiṃ* M II.20 “I came from my village to that one”; *dūrā var’ amhā āgatā* D II.139 “we are come from afar”, where *dūrā* is adverbial; cp. *Kosalānaṃ purā rammā agamā dakkhiṇāpathaṃ* Sn 976 “he went to the land of the South from the delightful city of the Kosalas”. With *nikkhamati*: e.g., *vihārā nikkhamma* D I.152 “going out of the monastery”; *gharā nikkhamati* S I.176; cp. Ud 22 “goes out of the house”; *Ātumāya* (v.l. *Ātumayā*) *mahājanakāyo nikkhamitvā* D II.131 “a great multitude of men

¹² *Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar* p. 201.

leaving Ātumā”; *nagaramhā nikkhamantassa* S I.211 “of one going out of the city”; With *yāti* (with prefixes *nī-* and *pa-*): e.g., *Bārāṇasiyā niyyāsi* M II.49 “he went out of B.”; cp. *niyyanti dhīrā lokamhā* Dh 175 “the wise go out of the world”; *Naṅgaramhā pāyāsi* M II.119 “he set out from Naṅgara”.

ii. The adverbial ending *-to* is also frequently used with such verbs. e.g., *gāmato ... paṭikkamati* M I.207, III.157 “he returns ... from the village”; *yato kuto ci naṃ puriso āgaccheyya* M I.284 “from whatever place (*lit.* whence-ever) a man may come to this (locality)”; *dūrato vā āgacchantaṃ* D II.162 “Coming from afar”.

iii. The pronominal form *-smā* is found particularly used with the verb *pabbajati* (*vide* §5.a); but the form in *-ā* too occurs with the same verb. e.g., *yasmā kasmā ce pi kulā agārasmā anagāriyaṃ pabbajito hoti* M I.284 “from whatever family one sets forth from-home-to-homelessness” (cp. M I.210); *Sakya-kulā pabbajito* D I.111 “entered (the Order) from a Sakyan family”.

b. Apart from the simple construction with verbs of *motion* the *abl. of separation* is found in its “manifold application to kindred conceptions” (SS §95). Of the kind are verbs implying:

i. *falling from, descending* and *ascending from*: e.g., *antalikkhā papatanti* D II.137 “fall from the intermediate space i.e. the sky”; *yānā paccārohitvā* D II.95 “alighting from the chariot”; *pabbatā orohitvā* D III.38 “descending from the mountain”. This *abl.*

according to local grammarians, is an elliptical construction instead of the acc. with the gerund in *-tvā*.¹³ [156]

ii. It is also found with verbs meaning to *shift, deviate, fall off, quit* and such like. e.g., *Tusitā kāyā cavitvā* D II.12 “passing from the Tusita-abode”; *tamhā kāyā cutā* D I.20 (cp. D III.146) “passing away from that body *or* quitting that body”; *maggā okkamma* D II.128 “deviating from the road”; *vokkamma Satthu sāsana* D I.231 “falling off (leaving) the religion of the Master”; *apakkamm’ eva imasmā dhamma-vinayā* D III.6 “he went away for good from this Doctrine and Training”.

iii. The causatives of verbs originally implying motion are construed similarly. e.g., *raṭṭhā vā nagarā vā pabbājeyyuṃ* D I.99 “they would exile (them) from country or town”. This is however comparatively rare as a construction in the Nikāyas. It is interesting to note that the *-smā* form occurs with the causative as with the original *pabbajati*. e.g., *raṭṭhasmā pabbājeti* D I.92 “he exiles (him) from the country”.

c. Verbs meaning to *appear, manifest (oneself), assemble, gather, break forth, arise, wake up* etc. take an abl. of the place or state *from which* the appearance etc. occurs. e.g., *antalikkhā pātubhavanti* D II.15 “appear from the sky”; *dasahi lokadhātūhi devatā ... sannipatitā* D II.253 “gods from ten world-systems being assembled”; *tamhā udakarahadā sītavāridhārā ubbhijitvā* D I.74 “fountains of cold water breaking forth (issuing) from that pond”; *āsanā vuṭṭhahitvā* D I.124 “rising from his seat”; *uṭṭhāy’ āsanā* D II.95 “rising from his seat”; *samādhimhā vuṭṭhahitvā* D II.27 “waking up from the trance”.

¹³ *tvā lope kammādhikaraṇesu’ vutti* on Kac. 277.

§125. [With Verbs implying Withdrawal]

a. The *abl. of separation* is also found with verbs denoting *taking, receiving, collecting, carrying, lifting up, pulling out* or *extracting*. Here the *abl.* is due not so much to any sense of motion implied in the verb as to the notion of *withdrawal* generally underlying such. e.g., *kāyamhā vāto cīvaram apavahati* M II.139 “the wind carries away the robe from the body”; e.g., *hatthato pattam gahetvā* Ud 29 “having taken the bowl from his hand”; *ito ca bhiyyo haratha* D II.180 “take away more from here also”; *te susānā vā saṅkarakūṭā vā pāpaṇikā vā nantakāni uccinitvā ...* M II.7 “having collected rags from the cemetery, dust-heap or shop.”; [157] *ghaṭṭiyā odanam uddharitvā* Ud 29 “taking out rice from the vessel”; *karaṇḍā uddhareyya* D I.71 “would draw out from the casket”; *puriso muñjamhā isīkaṃ pabbāheyya* M II.17 “as if a man would draw out a reed from the muñja-grass”.

b. Since the idea of ‘taking’ (cp. ‘conception’ from Latin *capio* = I take) is contained in such verbs as *learn* and *hear from*, the *abl.* is found with these denoting the person *from whom* one learns etc. e.g., *ito pana vā sutvā* S V. 110 “having heard from here (i.e. him)”; *Bhagavato sammukhā dhammikaṃ kathaṃ savanāya* M I.160 “to hear a doctrinal talk from the lips (from the presence) of the Blessed One”. In such instances the *gen.* can be used alternately (cp. SS §95).

§126. [With Verbs of Dissociation]

The *abl.* is also used with verbs of *separating* and *disjoining* to denote that *from which* there is a *dissociation*, i.e. generally a withdrawal (cp. SS §96). As we have seen elsewhere (§73.c) the *inst.*

is here the parallel idiom and perhaps even more widely used than the abl. The following examples illustrate the many shades of meaning expressed.

a. It is primarily found with verbs literally implying *disjoining*, *separating* and *dissociating*. e.g., *yo kho maṃ piṣuṇāya vācāya mittehi bhedeṃya* S V.355 “if one were to separate me from my friends with slanderous talk”; cp. *vīṇā kacchā abhassatha* Sn 449 “the lute slipped from (his) arm”.

b. It is also found with verbs meaning to *make loose*, *free*, *cleanse*, *release*, *save* etc. (cp. KVG §533.5; SS §96.b). e.g., *abhijjāya cittaṃ parisodheti* D I.71 “cleanses his mind of avarice”; *thīna-middhā cittaṃ parisodheti* D I.71 “cleanses his mind of sloth and torpor”; *na parimuccati dukkhamā* M I.8,65 “he is not freed from sorrow”; *āsavehi cittaṃ vimucci* D II.35 “the mind was purged of the banes”; *tamhā ābādhā mucceyya* D I.72; M I.275 “he would recover from that disease”; *bandhanā mucceyya* D I.72 “he would be released from bondage”; *tamhā dāsabyā mucceyya* M I.275 “he would be freed from that serfdom”. [158]

c. With verbs meaning *to be free of* or *from*, *be empty* or *vacant of*, *be aloof*, *desist*, *abstain from*, *removed* or *absent from* etc. e.g., *vivicca akusalehi* D II.186 (D I.37) “aloof (free) from evil (things)”; *dasahi saddehi avivittā* D II.170 “not free from (*lit.* separated from) the ten noises”; cp. its causative: *brāhmaṇaṃ etasmā pāpakā diṭṭhigatā vivecetū ti* D I.226 “may you free (*lit.* sever) the brahmin from this evil view”; *virato methunā gāmadhammā* D I.4 “abstaining from the vulgar matter of sex-intercourse”; *viratā adinnādānā* D II.12 “abstaining from taking what is not given”; *gaṇasmā vūpakaṭṭho* A

IV.435; M III.110; Ud 41 “aloof from the crowd”; *sakamhā gāmā vā nigamā cira-vippavuttho* M II.253 “long absent from his village or township”.

d. It is employed also with verbs having the sense of *deprive of* or *be bereft of* (cp. SS §96.d; KVG §533.7). e.g., *yasā nikkiṅṇo* D III.11 “bereft of glory” (Comy. ‘... *tato parihīno hutvā*’); (*pitaraṃ*) *jīvitā voropesiṃ* D I.84,85 “he deprived (his father) of life”; *atha naṃ ... jīvitā voropeyya* S III.113 “then ... he deprived him of his life”; *na koci kañci jīvitā voropeti* M I.517 “no one deprived another of life”.

e. The idea of *separation* is contained also in words meaning *disgust*, *revulsion*, *aversion* or *loathsomeness*. Consequently the abl. is found with such verbs as *nibbindati* “to get disgusted with *or* at”. Here the loc. is the parallel idiom (cp. c. loc. S I.124; II.94; IV.86,140; A V.3) or even the inst. (*vide sub nibbiṅṇa* P.T.S. Dict.). According to Speyer (SS §97 N.B.), in Sanskrit the verb *jigupsate* (Pāli *jigucchati*) “to shrink from” is found with the abl. (Pāṇinī *vārtt.* on I.4.24) in the archaic literature but with the acc. in classical Sanskrit. He says that *nirvidyate* (Pāli *nibbindati*) is construed with the abl. or the inst., sometimes even with acc. and gen. Accordingly the Pāli loc. seems to be a later development (probably from the close relation it bears to the *nimitta-sattamī*, §177.b), whereas the abl. seems to be the normal and earlier usage. e.g., *tasmā brahmacariyā nibbijja pakkamati* M I.519 “he gets disgusted with that higher life and goes away”; cp. *Māra nibbinda Buddhamhā* Th 1.1207 “Evil One, cease from molesting (*lit.* get tired of) the Enlightened One!” [159]

§127. The Ablative of Distance.

The point *from which* (i.e. whence) distance in space or time is counted or reckoned is expressed by the abl. case (cp. Speyer SS §98 II.). It denotes in other words the *terminus a quo*. One cannot fail to see here a logical connection between this one and the *abl. of separation*. For the point *from which* distance is reckoned may be looked upon as that *starting from which* the reckoning takes place. In fact the fundamental unity of conception underlying these, as well as the *abl. of origin* etc., can hardly be overlooked. Local grammarians consider the notion of *avadhi* as comprising all these uses; hence the logical importance attached to it as the designation of the fifth case. Kaccāyana provides for the various uses of the *abl. of distance* by the rule *dūrantikaddhakālanimmāṇa ... thokâkattusu ca* (277), which means that the abl. is to be used to denote the ideas of distance, nearness, reckoning in space and time and so on. The *vutti* explains it by ‘*dūratthe, antikatthe, addhanimmāṇe, kālanimmāṇe ... taṃ kārakaṃ apādāna-saññaṃ hoti*’.

§128. [Distance]

This abl. is frequently employed to express the place or limit *from which* a distance is reckoned (in a literal sense), the *terminus ad quem* being put in the acc. case (cp. §39. a&b). The following examples imply conception in space:

a. e.g., *ito ce pi yojanasate viharati* D I.117 “even if he lived (within) a hundred leagues from here”; *Kīvadūro pana samma Kārāyana Naṅgarakamhā Medaḷumpaṃ nāma Sakyānaṃ nigamo hotī ti* M II.119 “How far, good Kārāyana, is the township of the Sakyans,

named Medaḷumpa, from Naṅgaraka?”. This is also found adnominally with nouns like *magga* etc. e.g., *Kusinārāya Pāvamaḥ addhānamagga-paṭipanno hoti* D II.130 “he has entered upon the journey from (*lit.* road) Kusinārā to Pāvā”.

b. The same construction is applied to the allied notion in *time*. The distinction is maintained by Kaccāyana according to whom, as seen from the rule cited above, the point *from which* or *whence* distance in space is reckoned is the *addhanimmāṇa* and [160] in time is *kālanimmāṇa*. e.g., *ito ekunavute kappe* D II.2 “in the ninety first aeon from this”; *ito tiṅṇamaṃ māsānaṃ accayena* D II.106 “on the lapse of three months from now”.

§129. [With Prepositions]

While in the previous examples the *distance* is *definitely* expressed by some ‘measurement’ in time or space, more often this abl. appears with adverbs and prepositions denoting space or time *indefinitely*. Hence it joins such prepositions as *ā*, *yāva* and *pabhuti*. The indeclinable *ā* which originally was a Vedic postposition following the acc., loc., or abl., meaning “to, towards *or* from”, is preserved in Sanskrit (*vide* Macdonell *Skr. Gr.* §176.2.) but does not occur in the Nikāya prose. It is however found as preposition c. abl in the Jātakas in the sense of “upto, until, about, near” (*vide* P.T.S. Dict. *s.v.*). The preposition *yāva*, on the other hand, is quite common in the Nikāyas either with the absolute form of noun or adj. (base), or with nom., acc. or abl. (*ibid*, *sub yāva*). The acc. is frequently found with it as in *yāva tatiyakamaṃ* D I.95 “till the third (time)” or in the stock-phrase *yāva jīvaṃ* It 78 “till life (ends)” or “for life”, but the abl. is by no means rare. e.g., *yāva Brahma-lokā pariyesamāno* D I.223 “searching

up to the world of Brahma”; *yāva Brahma-lokā pi kāyena vasamvaṭṭeti* D I.78 “covers with the body (everything) up to the Brahma-world”; cp. A III.17; *yāva sattamā pitā-mahā-yugā* D I.113 “as far as the seventh line of ancestors”; *yāvad eva* (v.l. *yāvadeva*) *manussehi suppakāsitaṃ* D II.113,114,219; III.122, where the case is however doubtful (*vide* §9). What is significant in the case of both *ā* and *yāva* with the abl. is that, at least in the instances found in the Nikāya prose, the construction does not signify the *terminus ab quo* but the notion which is the very opposite of it, viz. the *terminus ad quem*. Thus we have here the same logical phenomenon as confronted us in the case of the inst. implying *mutuality* (i.e. both *separation* and *union*, *vide* §73.c.). Though the preposition *pabhuti* is derived from the Vedic *prabhṛti* (originally a fem. noun), it is hardly found in the Nikāyas as such. It occurs once in a compound, viz. *kuto-pabhutikā* D I.94 “dating from, coming from whence”. The original use is however restored in the Comys. (e.g., *tato pabhuti* Vv.A.158 “from that time”). [161]

§130. [With Adverbs]

With Adverbs. Many adverbs denoting space or time are joined to the abl. to express the point *from which* distance or extent is implied. The most frequent are those meaning “far” or “near”. But with derived adverbs of the type of *dakkhiṇato*, *uttarato* the gen. seems to be of necessity (cp. Pāṇ. II.3.30; *vide* §153.b.) and with those ending in *-ena* such as *antarena* mostly the gen. but sometimes also the acc. (§53). Pāṇinī (II.3.34) allows optional construing with all words meaning “far” or “near” (cp. SS §98.II.R.2).

a. This abl. has a wide application in the Nikāyas. e.g., *na yīto dūre Manasākaṭanti* D I.248 “M. is not at a distance (i.e. far) from here”; *āsanne ito Manasākaṭaṃ* D I.248 “M. is in the proximity of (*lit.* from) this (place)”. Similar is the abl. with *ārā* in sense more or less metaphorical: *ārā cittaṃ samādhimhā* M I.116 “remote is the mind from concentration”; cp. *ārā pamādamhā* Sn 27,156,157 “far from indolence!”. The derived form *ārakā* is also found with the abl. e.g., *ārakā va sāmāññā ārakā va brahmaññā* D I.167 “far indeed from recluseship as well as from Brahminship”; *ārakā’ haṃ ... vohārasamucchedā* M I.367 “I am far from ... violation of convention”; *ārakā te anuttarāya vijjācaraṇasampadāya* D I.99 “they are far from the blessing of knowledge and conduct”.

b. i. The *abl. of distance* with pure adverbs is no less frequent. In the following examples it is the notion of distance in *space* that is signified and the adverb is *local*. e.g., *uddhaṃ pādatalā adho kesa-matthakā* D III.104; M I.57; S IV.111 “upwards from the sole of the feet and downwards from the top of the (knot of) hair”; *bahi dvārakoṭṭhakā* Ud 52 “outside of (*lit.* from) the gateway”; *ito bahiddhā* D I.21; II.151 “outside of this (hence)”; *bahiddhā parisāya* D II.211 “out of the crowd”; *tiro raṭṭhā tiro janapadā* D I.1161¹⁴ “from beyond the kingdom, from beyond the country”.

ii. Similarly we find the *abl. of distance* with *temporal* adverbs and prepositions meaning “before” or “after”. e.g., *pubbe va sambodhā* S II.5; M I.17; II.211 “previous to enlightenment”; *ito pubbe* D I.184 “before this”; *tato pacchā* D II.269 “after that”. [162] The noun in the abl. may even be a person as marking off a period in time. e.g.,

¹⁴ cp. Comy. ‘*tiro raṭṭhāti para raṭṭhato, tiro janapadā ti para janapadato*’ Sum. I.286.

Ahesuṃ kho bhikkhu tayā pubbe samaṇabrāhmaṇā M I.327 “there were, monks, recluses and brahmins ... even before you”; *mayam pana amhā* (v.l. *asmā*) *pacchā uppannā* D III.29 “we were born after him”; *anantarā kho ... sadda-pātubhāvā* D II.206 “after the appearance of the sound ...” (cp. Skr. *anantaram* c. abl. Macdonell *Skr. Gr.* §177.c.2); *param* is the only proper preposition used with the abl., but its function here seems to be that of a temporal adverb. e.g., *param maraṇā* D II.68,141 “after death (*lit.* beyond *from* death)”; *tato param nānussarati* D I.19; III.30 “he does not remember beyond that”. The same applies to *oram* which however is only found in the Sutta-Nipāta. e.g., *oram vassasatā pi miyyati* Sn 804 “he dies on this side of (*lit.* from) a hundred years”.

c. Finally, we may consider the abl. usually found with the adverbial preposition *aññatra* or *aññattha* (< Skr. *anyatra* = elsewhere, beside, except) as one denoting the limit of exclusion, which conception is psychologically akin to that of underlying the *abl. of distance*. Originally in the Vedas the word *anyá-tra* was purely an adverb with a local sense like *atrá*, *viśvátra* etc. (cp. VGS §179.3). But in later Sanskrit it came to be employed as a prepositional adverb or pure preposition, through the development of the idea of ‘elsewhere’ into the notion of ‘apart from’ (cp. Macdonell *Skr. Gr.* §178.c.). In the Nikāyas we find the prepositional sense prominent with the abl. e.g., *na aññattha tava sāsana* D II.206 *lit.* “not elsewhere from your Order” (i.e. nowhere except in your Order); *nāññatra Tathāgatassa pātubhāvā* S V.14 “not apart from the appearance of the T.”; *aññatra adassanā* S I.29 “except from blindness”. Sometimes it occurs in the developed idiom “*kiṃ aññatra*”. e.g., *kiṃ aññatra avusittā* D I.90 “what else beside non-practice?”. In Pāli, but not in the earlier language (i.e. Vedic or later Skr.), the inst. can be used concurrently.

(§82.a.). This is probably due to the logical contact brought about by the comparative sense implied in *añña-* (Skr. *anya* = other) which is capable of taking the inst. (§86) or the abl. (§132.a.ii). [163]

§131. The Ablative of Side and View-Point.

Speyer has shown (SS §103.IV.) how Sanskrit, just as Latin, uses the abl. not only for the sake of signifying *from what side* (usually *cause*) but also *on what side*. Here, he says, the ending *-taḥ* (Pāli *-to*) is employed, it seems, by preference, at least in the case of indicating space and directing, sometimes it is concurrent with the loc. of point *at which*. In Pāli we find many instances of this abl. appearing in various functions some of which are, logically speaking, highly involved. Such, for instance, are the following:

a. *rukkhaṃ mūlato chetvā* M I.366 “having cut the tree from (*or at*) the root”; cp. *mūle chindeyya, mūlena chetvā* S II.88 (§172.a.); (*citakaṃ*) ... *pādato vivaritvā* D. II.163 “having opened ... (the funeral pile) from (*or on*) the side of the feet”; *mukhato ca nāsato ca kaṇṇato ca assāsapassāse uparundhiṃ* M I.243 “I stopped inhalation and exhalation from (*or at*) the mouth, nose and ears”. In its metaphorical application this so-called *ablativus partis* not rarely touches upon the *abl. of cause*. e.g., *rājato vā duruttassa corato pīlitassa vā* Kh 7 (VIII.2.) “harassed on the part of the king and molested on the part of thieves”, where the Comy. has ‘*corehi ... pīlitassa ...*’ (Pj. I. p.218), the ending *-ehi* probably representing the inst. of agency (§122).

b. In the preceding examples the *adverbial* force of the suffix *-to* is quite apparent. In fact most of these ablatives denoting ‘on what side’

have the character of adverbs. Such are the following ablatives (mostly in *-to* and a few in *-ā*), which according to the *vutti* on Kac. 277 are used in the sense of ‘direction in which’ (*disā-yoge*). These uses are mostly borrowed from Sanskrit (*vide* SS §103.IV.). e.g., *puratthimato nagarassa* D II.161 “on the east of the city”; *pācīnato Rājagahassa ... tassa uttarato* D II.263 “on the east of R. ... to the north of it”; *dakkhiṇato nagarassa sīsaṃ chindeyyuṃ* A II.241 “on the south of the city they would behead (him)”; *samantato dvādasa yojanāni* D II.39,139 “on all sides twelve leagues”; *parito parito janapadesu* D II.200 “round about on every side” (Comy. ‘*samantā samantā*’ Sum. II.637). The [164] ending *-ā* is also found, though not so frequently as the above suffix *-to*. e.g., *pāsādassa heṭṭhā* D I.198 “on the ground-floor of the mansion”; *samantā ca gocaragāmaṃ* M I.167 “all around the alms-village”.

c. Nearly all of the above adverbial ablatives signify *space*, the region *in which*, and are therefore, syntactically parallel to the loc. In the following examples the notion of *direction* rather than *locality* is emphasized. e.g., *mā me purato aṭṭhāsi* D II.139 “do not stand in front of me”; *Bhagavato purato nisīdi* D II.135 “he sat in front of the Blessed One”; *Bhagavato purato ṭhito* D II.138 “Stood in front of the Blessed One”. The *-ā* form is also found. e.g., *tesaṃ sammukhā na vyākāsiṃ* D I.222 “I did not declare it before them”; *Bhagavato sammukhā ... bhāsati* A I.163 “he speaks ... before the Blessed One”. Sometimes it can only be rendered by a pure adverb of manner as “personally” or “directly”. e.g., *sammukhā me taṃ bhante sutam* D II.115 “I have it, Sir, personally”; *na kho me mārisa so Bhagavā sammukhā diṭṭho* D II.268. “I certainly, friend, have not seen that Blessed One personally”. The repetitive phrase ‘*piṭṭhito piṭṭhito*’ is adverbially used to denote “continually at the back” or “wherever

behind”. e.g., *Bhagavato piṭṭhito piṭṭhito (aṭṭhāsi)* D III.73 “he stood at the back of (just behind) the Blessed One”. Sometimes it is more or less an adverb of *manner*. e.g., *Bhagavantam piṭṭhito piṭṭhito anubaddhā honti* D I.1 “they followed the Blessed One closely from behind”. A similar abl. is *dūrato* which means not “from afar”, at least not in the following example, but “in the distance”, being an adv. as the above and not an *abl. of separation*. e.g., *disvā ... Bhagavantam dūrato va āgacchantam* D I.179 “having seen ... the Blessed One coming in the distance (even when he was still far off)”.

d. Sometimes this abl. of ‘on which side’ when applied *metaphorically* comes to mean “with respect to” and thus approximates to an *abl. of relation*. In fact the notion of viewpoint which is the fundamental conception behind the *abl. of relation* can hardly be separated from that of the ‘side on which’. Such are: *ubhato sujāto putto mātito ca pitīto ca* D I.1,113,137; A III.151 “well-born on both sides, both with respect to the [165] mother and the father”; though it is primarily an adv. it sometimes appears as the first member of a compound in the role of an adj. e.g., *ubhato-bhāga-vimaṭṭham* D II.111 “polished on both sides”.

§132. Ablative of Comparison.

With comparatives the abl. appears not seldom, beside the inst., as a case denoting *comparison* (cp. KVG §535). According to Speyer (SS §105), it is the same abl. as the one expressive of the notion ‘on what side, with respect to’, described in the preceding paragraphs, that is frequently applied in comparisons to signify the thing compared with, provided there be superiority, inferiority or discrepancy. For, as we have seen earlier, in the case of identity, likeness, similarity or

equivalence the inst. (§85 & §86) or the gen. (§151.b.) is of necessity, and the dat. also in the case of counterpoise (§108; cp. §110.). This is due to the fact that the abl. has as its fundamental character the notion of separation which logically cannot be associated with the idea of identity etc., whereas the conception of superiority etc. implies *difference* and hence psychologically *separation*. It may be mentioned that in comparison it is only the legitimate ablatival ending (-ā < Skr. -āt) that is employed and the -to form is only found with pronouns. According to local grammarians this is called the *abl. of distinction* ('vibhatte' Kac. 277).

a. It is primarily found with comparatives of adjectives. e.g., *nirayā ... tiracchānayoṇi seyyo* M II.193 “animal-birth is better than the purgatory”; *koc' añño attanā piyataro* S I.75 “whoever else (is) more beloved than oneself?”; *amhehi abhikkantatarā ...* D I.216 “more beautiful than we”. Sometimes it occurs with the comparatives of adjectival compounds. e.g., *aññehi piṇḍapātehi mahapphalataro* D II.136 “having greater benefits than other alms”; *attanā vimuttiñāṇadassanasampannataraṃ* S I.139 “possessing greater insight and knowledge of emancipation than himself”; *alamattadassanataro c' eva pitarā* D II.231 “having more insight into profitable things than the father”. The suffix -to, as remarked above, is found only with pronouns. e.g., [166] *tato ca uttaritaraṃ* D I.16 “and nobler than that”; (cp. Dh 42); *ato mahantatarena avijjākhandhena* M II.131 “with a mass of ignorance greater than that”; *tato santataraṃ* M I.91 “more peaceful than that”.

b. Secondly it is found with words, other than pure comparatives of adjectives, expressing superiority or inferiority such as *varam* “better”, *ativiya* “in excess of, more than,” and *uttariṃ* (or *uttari-*)

“superior (*lit.* upper)”. e.g., *attadanto tato varam* Dh 322 “the self-tamed (i.e. one who controls himself) is better than they”; *paramāya vaṇṇapokkharatāya samannāgato ativiya aññehi manussehi* M III.176 “endowed with the highest bloom of complexion much more than other people”; *uttari-manussadhammā*¹⁵ *iddhipāṭihāriyaṃ* D III.12 “miracles excelling (those of) human nature (i.e. mundane)”; *uttari-manussadhammā alamariyaññadassanaviseso* S IV.300 “truly genuine knowledge and insight much above human things”.

c. Thirdly it occurs with all words meaning “other, different, changed” etc. such as *añña* (*itara, apara*), *nānābhāva*, *vinābhāva* and *aññathābhāva*. e.g., *tamhā nimittā aññaṃ nimittaṃ* M I.119 “a sign other than that (sign)”; *añño koci mayā upaṭṭhākatāro* M II.51 “any attendant other than myself”; *sabbehi eva piyehi manāpehi nānābhāvo vinā-bhāvo aññathābhāvo* D II.118 “(there is) a change, an alteration, a differentiation from all things lovable and pleasant”.

§133. Ablative of View-Point.

From the foregoing it is seen that the abl. generally expresses the *point of view*. It is the underlying unity of conception behind the various uses discussed above such as the ablatives denoting *on which side, relation, comparison* etc. The notion of *viewpoint* is also signified by a class of ablatives in *-to* (but never with the regular endings), the syntactical function of which seems to be closely related to that of the *abl. of comparison*. They have the sense of “in

¹⁵ It is quite clear that *-dhammā* is abl. sg. and the Comy, has ‘*pañcasīla-dasasīla-saṅkhātā manussadhammā uttari*’ Sum. III.812.

terms of” or “as”, and can be expressed by the periphrasis *vasena* as well. [167]

a. This is mostly found with verbs of *judging, considering, seeing* etc. e.g., *na mayam taṃ sārato pacchāgacchāma* M II.114 “we do not hark back to that as final” (*lit.* as essential); cp. *sārañca sārato ṅatvā* Dh 12 “having known the essential as essential”; *byākatañca me byākatato dhāretha* M I.431 “that which I have explained take as explained”; *na viññāṇaṃ attato samanupassati* M I.300 “does not consider consciousness as the Soul”; *accayaṃ accayato divā* D I.85; III.55 “seeing decay as decay”; *gottato pi anussarati ... sāvaka-yugato pi anussarati* D II.8 “remembers in relation to (*or* by way of) clan and the pairs of disciples”; *paṭhavitto na maññati* M I.4 “does not regard (it) as earth”; cp. *pamādaṃ bhayato divā* Th 1.980 “seeing indolence as fear”. In the above examples the abl. in some cases borders on the adverbial use. In the following example it is more like an adverb of manner than anything else: *evaṃ viśesato ṅatvā* Dh 22 “thus having known especially”.

b. In the above examples, as pointed out before, it is the suffix *-to* that is generally employed to denote viewpoint or relation. However, though the *-to* forms assume the role of the regular case-forms of the abl. in these and some other instances, still a full and complete identity between them can only be found in the pronominal declension, just as in Sanskrit (cp. SS §108). Pāṇinī gives a considerable number of rules about the use of this suffix, which show that its sphere of employment, though mostly coinciding with that of the abl. proper, is more often a different one.

c. A similar syntactical part is played by the suffix *-so* which is itself no case-ending at all, but belongs to the adverbs with non-case suffixes (*vide* KVG §580-585). It is however regarded as an ablatival form by Pāli grammarians. For instance, under the use designated ‘*pamāṇatthe*’, *vutti* on Kac. 277 gives such examples as ‘*dīghaso*’ etc. There is no doubt, therefore, that this ending *-so*, though not recognized by Pāṇinī as a regular case-form of the abl., came to be regarded in popular speech as an ablatival ending. In fact its similarity to the *-to* suffix in sense – for we can paraphrase *-so* with *-vasena* as well – brought about an almost complete identity with the latter. This too generally expresses the [168] idea of relation; thus e.g., *imam-eva kāyaṃ dhātuso paccavekkhati* M I.57 “he considers this very body in terms of the elements”; *dhātuso bhikkhave sattā saṃsandanti samenti* S II.154; III.65 “according to their natures, monks, beings unite and agree”. In these examples, especially in the second, the adverbial connotation can hardly be overlooked. But the original distributive sense of this suffix, viz. the meaning “into” or “in”, is not seldom found in the Nikāyas. e.g., *bilaso paṭivibhajivā* M I.59 “dividing into (so many) parts”; *Kosinārake Malle kula-parivattaso kula-parivattaso ṭhapetvā* D II.148 “keeping the Mallas of Kusinārā each family-circle separately in a group”.

§134. The Adverbial Ablative.

In the preceding paragraphs we have already referred to a considerable number of ablatives employed as pure adverbs and some even as prepositions (such as *ārā*). Beside these there are many other ablatives in *-ā* and *-to* (*-smā* occurring only with pronominal stems), and a considerable number of *-so* forms with ablatival sense,

used as adverbs. These may be dealt with according to the syntactical categories established in the previous chapters.

a. The abl. singular of *demonstrative, interrogative* and *relative pronouns* is frequently found as *adverb of reason* and *manner*. Logically they are ablatives of *cause*. e.g., *tasmā vedanā ti vuccati* M I.293 “therefore it is called ‘sensation’ ”; *tasmā etaṃ kallaṃ vacanāya* D I.168 “therefore it is fit to say ...”; cp. D II.283; *tato* “therefore, thence” D I.72,212; Pv. 1; *ettato* “therefore, by reason of this” S I.185. We may compare with these the adv. inst. *tena*. The Comys. treat them as adverbs of reason, cp. ‘*tasmā ti kāraṇa-vacanam*’ Pj. I.167. The interrogative and the relative are not so frequent. e.g., *kuto pana kāyena* D II.176 “how ... with the body ... ?”; *yato kho Kassapa bhikkhu diṭṭhe va dhamme ... upasampajja viharati, ayaṃ vuccati ...* D I.168 “wherefore, Kassapa, a monk in this very life attains to ... and abides therein, that is called ...”. But it is more often found in its original function of denoting “whence”. e.g., *yato ahaṃ pabbajito* [169] D II.151 “Since (or whence) I was ordained”, implying the limit of reckoning.

b. There are some other old forms mostly in *-ā* forming *temporal* and *local* adverbs. e.g., *catutthajjhānā vuṭṭhahitvā samanantarā Bhagavā parinibbāyi* D II.156 “having arisen from the fourth ecstasy the Blessed One passed away immediately”; *saññā paṭhamaṃ uppajjati pacchā ñāṇaṃ* D I.185 “firstly perception is born, afterwards knowledge”; *mā pacchā vippaṭisārino ahuvattha* D II.147 “do not be repenting later on”; *pacchā uppunnā* D I.18 “produced afterwards”. All these imply time. The local sense is expressed only by a few and most of them have gained prepositional force in Pāli. e.g., *samantā*

Vesāliṃ D II.98 “around Vesāli”; *antarā magge* D II.207 “midway on the journey”.

c. Similarly the ablatives *ettāvatā* and *kittāvatā* are used as adverbs of *quantity* and *degree*. e.g., *ettāvatā niruttipatho* D II.63 “thus far (is) the scope of language”; *ettāvatā sammā samucchinnō* D I.34 “so far well uprooted”; *ettāvatā tapo-jigucchā aggappattā* D III.48 “by so much (is) disgust for asceticism brought to the highest pitch”; *kittāvatā ca Ānanda attānaṃ paññāpento paññāpenti* D II.65 “how far do those who postulate a Soul do so?”

d. A large number of adverbs belonging to various logical categories are formed with the suffix *-so* and have the sense of ablatival adverbs. This is the original function of *-so*. e.g., *sabbaso jātiyā asati* D II.57 “there being no birth in every way (i.e. completely)”; *ādiso va aparaddhaṃ* D I.180 “at fault from the very start (initially)”; *antam-aso kumbhadāsīyāpi* D I.168,169; M I.286; III.127; A V.195 “even at least a water-maid”; *yoniso*¹⁶ *paññaṃ pucchitum* D I.118 “to ask a question wisely (*lit.* according to origin)”; *yoniso manasikaroti* D II.214 “reflects over wisely”; *sabba-lahuso* A IV.247 “as quickly as possible”. Similar is the abl. *-so* in the frequently occurring phrase *bhiyyosomattāya* (D II.11 etc.) “mostly”; *bhiyyo* < Vedic *bhūyas* adverbial acc. (cp. VGS §178.2). With the ablatival adverb *abhiñhaso* “frequently, always” S I.194 we may compare its acc. used adverbially, viz. [170] *abhiñhaṃ*. This shows how two cases even so apart syntactically as the acc. and abl. can meet in the adverbial use.

¹⁶ Comys. equate it to inst. adv. of manner, e.g., ‘*ayoniso ti anupāyena*’ i.e. “tactlessly” Sum. III.810.

§135. Quasi-Legitimate Uses of the Ablative.

a. We have seen earlier how the suffix *-to* forms adverbs with a simple *local* sense without any implication of separation but merely denoting *the side on which*. This suffix was originally (in I.E.) applied to pronominal stems to form *adverbs* of a general character. E.W. Hopkins (J.A.O.S. Vol.38) has pointed out the fact that Skr. ‘*ita ehi*’ does not mean “come *hence*” but “come *hither*”. We find this observation supported also by Pāli idiom. Here *ito* is found in an adv. sense of “here” or “hither” and not “from here”. e.g., *ito hi kho ahaṃ bhante āgacchāmi samaṇassa Gotamassa santikā* M I.373 “I come *here*, Sir, from the presence of the recluse Gotama”. Normally the case ought to be the acc. of *place gone to*. But since such a use of the acc. sg. of pronouns is inadmissible the same exists in English, for we cannot say ‘come to this’ but ‘come here’ - the adverbial form *ito* is employed instead. But once such a usage came to exist it did not stop with the pronouns, its legitimate sphere, but came to be regarded as a general construction and was applied to nouns as well. So we have the curious use of *paralokato* “to the other world” for the acc. *paralokaṃ*, in the Sutta-Nipāta (579): *tesaṃ maccuparetānaṃ gacchataṃ paralokato* “of those subdued by Māra going to the other world (*lit.* other-world-wards)”. Probably the influence of this confusion of the abl. and the acc. seems to exist in the stock-phrase ‘*anāvattidhammo tasmā lokā*’; “not liable to return *from* that world”, for the BSk. version has the acc. implying the place *gone to* as in “*tatra parinirvāyiṇyo (striyo) ‘nāgāmiṇyo’ nāvṛttikadharṃiṇyah punar imaṃ lokaṃ*” Divyāvadāna p.533 “... not liable to come back, to *this world*”.

b. The abl. and the inst. show striking similarities in usage and development. We have seen how the inst. forms with the acc. an idiom with various shades of meaning (*vide* §84). Parallel to this inst.-acc. construction, which we have regarded more or less as adverbial, we have in the Nikāyas an abl.-acc. construction also. e.g., *hadayā hadayaṃ maññe aññāya tacchati* M I.32 “knowing [171] heart to heart, methinks, he shapes the fellow” (cp. Further Dial. I.22 “his heart, methinks, knows my heart, as he shapes that fellow”) cp. *anubandhiṃ padā padaṃ* Sn 446 “he followed step to step” *lit.* (“from step to step”; if we are correct in taking *padā* as an abl. sg. and not as the old inst. sg. in *-ā*). In the *gāthā* literature again we find the *abl. of separation* with the *acc. of destination* used in this manner like the inst.-acc. found in *vanena vanaṃ* etc. (§84). e.g., *gabbhā gabbham tamā tamaṃ* Sn 278 “from womb to womb and gloom to gloom”; *te mayaṃ vicarissāma gāmā gāmaṃ nagā nagaṃ* Sn 180 “we (as such) shall wander from village to village and from hill to hill”. The two cases here are to be taken as one whole idiom having the character of an adverbial phrase.

Chapter VI

The Genitive Case

[172]

§136. [General Character]

The genitive or the sixth case (Pāli *chaṭṭhī* = Skr. *ṣaṣṭhī*) is on the whole a dependent case. It is used not only in connection with verbs and substantives but also with adjectives and adverbs (cp. VGS §202). But it is predominantly *adnominal* and in this respect appears in direct contrast to the acc. As the proper employment of the latter is to qualify the verb, so the gen. is normally used to qualify some other noun. It does so by assigning it to a particular class or description, or by distinguishing it as a part of a whole. So the fundamental notion expressed by it is to mark the *belonging to* or *being part of*. This *possessive* or *partitive* application admits of the almost universal rendering of the gen. in Pāli as in the older languages by the English *of*. Generally speaking, with substantives the gen. plays the part of an adj. as seen by the alternate constructions of either compounding it with the substantive qualified as *kammāraputta* D II.126; A V.263 “artizan-son” for *kammārassa putta* “son of an artizan”, or of using instead of it the derived adj. as *rājā Māgadho* M I.94 “the Māgadhan King” for *rājā Magadhānaṃ* “the King of the Magadhas”, and, *porisaṃ dhuraṃ* Sn 256 for *purisassa dhuraṃ*, or other adjectival formations such as those with the suffix *-ka*. As a qualifying word it expresses the most diverse logical relations between the two noun-concepts as in Skr. or even in Latin and Greek (cp. KVG §556 and SS §110).

The *adverbial* use on the other hand is not so diverse but presents sufficient interrelations between the noun- and the verb-concept to demand separate investigation. In all such uses the fundamental unity of conception appears to be the *partitive* notion. Says Brugmann: “As its fundamental character we may abstract (i.e. infer) that in the gen. the noun-concept (Nominal- [173] begriff) appears when the verb concept does not refer to its full range but when the former (noun-concept) is represented as a sphere which is only touched by the action” (KVG §529). We cannot discern the original relation between the adnominal and the adverbial uses. In spite of the unity of the principal notions expressed there are, at least in Pāli, a good many syntactical divergences.

§137. [Local Grammarians]

Owing to the predominance of the *adnominal* connection and its consequent remoteness from the action of the main verb, the local grammarians consider the gen. as falling outside the logical sphere denoted by the term *kāraka*. According to them, actual relations subsisting between the noun and the verb in a sentence are only expressed by the six genuine *kāraḥ*, viz., *karṭṛ*, *karman*, *karāṇa*, *sampradāna*, *apādāna* and *adhikarāṇa*. They divide the *vibhaktis* into two main classes *kāraka-vibhakti* and *upapada-vibhakti*, the former having a definite relation to the action (*kriyā*) and the latter having none. The *actions* are generally performed by various *agents* (*sādhana* = *efficient*) which are directly or indirectly related to the verb. The term *kāraka* is only applied to such. The gen., according to orthodox opinion, is not a *sādhana* and consequently does not

constitute a *kāra*.¹ It is however disputable whether this observation of the ancient grammarians can be, without reservation, extended to the whole sphere of the genitive's employment, especially to its *adverb*al function. On the whole their treatment of this case is not so clear-cut and exhaustive as of the others. In definition of the gen. Pāṇinī has only the loose aphorism 'ṣaṣṭī śeṣe' (II.3.50), which the *kāśikā* explains as meaning "in all other instances", i.e. if none of the other cases enjoined (II.3.1-49) be available, one should use the sixth case (*vide* Speyer, SS p.82, f.n.l.). Kaccāyana attempts a clearer definition when he lays down the rule 'yassa vā pariggaho taṃ sāmī' (235) i.e. "that which has possession is called *sāmī*" and supplements it later on by saying "that the sixth case-affix is employed in denoting *sāmī* (possessor)".² As for the other notions expressed by the gen. he gives only a few extra rules (305-310) which hardly compass [174] even the adnominal uses. This indifferent treatment of the gen. on the part of local grammarians is due to the fact, as we have pointed out before (§30), of their dealing with syntax solely from the point of view of the verb and not viewing the sentence as one psychological unit. The conception of *kāra* is only the logical outcome of such an outlook (cp. the meaning of *kāra* from *kr* "to do or make", denoting action).

§138. [Form]

As regards form, the gen. has on the whole preserved the older case endings. It has even outgrown its legitimate sphere, and, as we have seen earlier (§91), replaced the dat. both in the singular and in the

¹ Cakravarti *Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar* pp. 199, 215.

² 'sāmismīṃ chaṭṭhī' Kac. 303. Moggallāna has the somewhat abstract definition 'chaṭṭhī sambandhe' (II.41).

plural, the only surviving dat. form being the one in *-āya* of the *a*-declension (§4). The reason of this substitution of the gen. for the dat. in Pāli becomes apparent when we consider that even as early as in the dialect of the Brāhmaṇas the gen. (syntactically) had begun to encroach upon the proper sphere of the dat.³ In the Epics this replacement has gone even further and in the later classical language almost ousted it from its proper employ, but for a few fundamental uses (*vide* SS §86). In Prākṛt the dat. has become obsolete, a few traces of it being only found in the artificial dialect of the dramas (SS §100), and in the Aśokan inscriptions where a few *-hi* forms are preserved (§9). A further point of contact with the dat. is found in the *sympathetic* use of the enclitic forms *me, te* and *no, vo*, to which phenomenon we have already alluded (§102).

§139. [Sphere of the Genitive]

Thus in Pāli the sphere of the genitive includes many uses of the dat. in the earlier language. In the great majority of cases we can assign a gen. or dat. to a particular syntactical category only on the analogy of Vedic and Classical Sanskrit. The gen. has also come into contact with the abl., in its adverbial uses such as with verbs of *taking, hearing* etc. and with the loc. in the *partitive* and *absolute* uses. It has, moreover, close affinities to the acc. of *external object* as with verbs of *remembering* and *imitating*, and, to the inst. of *agent* especially with participles [175] and the inst. of *means* with such verbs as meaning to *fill* etc. Most of these uses overlap one another and such divisions as the gen. of *possession*, of *material*, of

³ cp. gen. with *śraddhā* and *dā* in the Aitareya and such uses as '*tasya ha putro jajñe*' (VGS §202.B.2.a).

distinction, and of *origin* or the *partitive*, *subjective* and *objective gen.* and others are made merely for the sake of convenience; they do not imply that absolute categories are possible. As we have remarked before, the unity of the logical functions of the various genitives remains unaffected (cp. SS §110).

§140. The Genitive with Substantives.

The Possessive Gen. represents the simplest syntactical function of that case, viz., of classifying a noun by naming its possessor. It is generally placed before the qualified noun as, for instance, in *sabbe Bhagavato puttā* S I.192 “all the Blessed One’s sons”. In verse or poetical prose, however, it is often found following the noun as, for instance, in *Puttā Buddhassa orasā* S III.83 “sons of the Buddha, self-begotten”. Though in this limited sense of denoting the *possessor* it is apparently a simple construction, what normally passes under the designation ‘possessive gen.’ is so varied in application that the most different logical relations may find expression by it (cp. SS §110). For instance, in such expressions as *Sundarikāya nadiyā tīre* Sn p.79 “on that bank of the river S.” and *brāhmaṇassa pada-saddena* Sn p.80 “by the sound of the footsteps of the brahmin”, the gen. properly speaking denotes no physical possession at all, the implication is more or less metaphorical. The latter, for instance, clearly means ‘*brāhmaṇena kata-pada-saddena*’ and consequently has a logical implication of *agency* rather than of *possession*. When the *qualifying* noun denotes a person and the *qualified* the result of some action on that person’s part, the notion of *agency* can hardly be overlooked. Thus e.g., in *pitu vacanaṃ* D III.181 “the father’s word”, the implied meaning is, like in the above, “*pitarā bhāsitaṃ vacanaṃ*”.

§141. [Various Realties]

We may notice the following other relations expressed by this gen.:
[176]

a. As in other I.E. languages the gen. in Pāli is capable of standing as the predicate of the whole sentence. e.g., *sakaṃ te Mahārāja!* D II.173 “all (is) *thine*, O Great King!”. Here there is no doubt that *te* stands for the gen. and not the dat. (*vide* P.T.S. Dict. *s.v.* *saka-*).

b. With the verb ‘to be’ (*bhavati*) in the sense of “becoming” it is always doubtful whether the case is dat. or gen. of *possession*. But we may reasonably regard the following as *genitives of possession* since similar uses exist in the earlier languages (KVG §558.2). e.g., *te rañño cakkavattissa anuyuttā ahesuṃ* D III.62 “they became dependents of the universal monarch”. This confusion is found even without the verb ‘to be’ in purely adnominal constructions. For instance, in *rogānaṃ āyatanam* D III.182 the word *rogānaṃ* can mean “a province *of* diseases” or better perhaps “a province *for* diseases”.

c. Such contact between the *sympathetic dat.* and the *possessive gen.* has already been noticed (§102). It is mostly found, as pointed out there, with the enclitic forms of the personal pronouns which, though originally pure datives, are however found as genitives even in Vedic (cp. HKS §11). In the following examples it is the possessive sense that is more marked: *dibbaṃ te cakka-ratanam ṭhānā cutam* D III.59 “your divine Gem of the Wheel has fallen from its place”; *yāva me idaṃ brahmacariyam na iddham ...* D II.114 “till this higher life of mine is not complete ...”; *yattha me assa chando vā ... tam mam’*

assa musā D I.25 “where there was desire for me ... that was false of me”. Here the parallel use of *me* (dat.) and *mama* (pure gen. form) side by side shows how far the syntactical confusion has gone.

d. With the *relative* pronouns the noun to be qualified may not immediately follow the *gen. of possessor*, which thereby assumes a role different from the above sense. e.g., ... *yassa kho pan’ assa Vāseṭṭha Tathāgate saddhā niviṭṭhā* D II.84 lit. “of whom would, O Vāseṭṭha, faith be placed in the T. ...”; *santi bhante devā yesaṃ na sakkā gaṇanāya vā saṅkhāto vā āyūṃ* [177] *saṅkhātuṃ* D III.111 “there are gods, Sir, of whom it is impossible either by reckoning or counting, to number the years (span of life)”.

§142. [The Subjective Gen.]

The *subjective Gen.* can also be regarded as an extension of the *possessive gen.* (cp. KVG §559) since the verbal noun qualified represents some action *of* the person denoted by the noun in the gen. (*vide* §140). But more particularly it denotes *agency* as shown by the following examples where the action is expressed by a p.p.p. in *-ta*: *imassa ca bhikkhuno duggahītaṃ* D II.124 “also a misconception of this monk”; *paraṃ subhāsitaṃ* D I.3 “good-speech (*lit.* well-spoken) of others”. We may observe from these examples that the gen. in such instances is interchangeable with the inst. of *agent* (§88). Orthodox grammarians are divided on the question whether these two constructions are universally interchangeable. According to Pāṇinī the inst. is of necessity if the verbal noun be attended by its subject and its object at the same time. This is understandable since otherwise the presence of two genitives would lead to confusion. Speyer considers that we may extend this observation to all such

instances as where the subjective gen. would be used together with some other sixth case (SS §114). But according to other Indian authorities the gen. of the subject is nowhere forbidden (*ibid*). On the whole the observation of Pāṇinī seems applicable to Pāli concinnity as well. In fact here the gen. even seems to be preferred with most participles of clearly nominal standing, and in the following example, coming as it is *after* the verbal noun, the gen. conspicuously possesses the agent sense: *na kho Tapassi ācinnaṃ Tathāgatassa daṇḍaṃ daṇḍanti paññāpetuṃ* M I.373 “it is not the practice of the Tathāgata, Tapassi, to lay down punishment as punishment”.

a. In such instances as those discussed above the gen. can be interchanged with the *inst. of agent* and implies *karṭṛ*, the agent of a passive (hence originally *transitive*) verb. But when the verbal noun is formed from an *intransitive* verb the gen. seems to denote not the *agent* to be expressed by the *inst.* but the [178] *subject* implying an original nom. e.g., *iti rūpassa samudayo* M I.61 “so the arising of form”; *paṭigha-saññānaṃ atthaṅgamā* D III.262 “by the disappearance of ideas of ill-will”; *catunnaṃ māsānaṃ accayena* Sn p.102 “on the lapse of four months”. In the first example, for instance, the idea implicit cannot be paraphrased by ‘*rūpena samudayo*’ as in *parehi subhāsitaṃ* for *paresaṃ subhāsitaṃ* but must be taken as “*iti rūpaṃ samudeti*”.

b. With other types of verbal nouns where there is no participial sense and the verbal element is less emphasized, neither the *inst. of agent* nor the *nom. of subject* can possibly be substituted. e.g., *idaṃ pacchimaṃ Ānanda Tathāgatassa Vesāli-dassanaṃ bhavissati* D II.122 “This, Ānanda, shall be Tathāgata’s last sight of Vesāli (*lit.* Vesāli-seeing)”; *raññaṃ niyyānaṃ bhavissati* D I.9 “there will be an

exit of kings”. Here the gen. being used along with the verb ‘to be’ has a strong possessive sense. The latter example clearly borders on the subjective and possessive gen.

§143. [The Objective Gen.]

The *Objective Gen.* is not so frequent as the above, since usually Pāli prefers to retain the acc. even with verbal nouns. e.g., *Bhagavantam dassanāya* M II.23,46; A I.121; III.381 “for seeing the Blessed One”. But the dat. of purpose *dassanāya* has greater verbal force than any other type of *nomina verbalia*, being more or less an infinitive (§107.a). Even in such instances, however, one not rarely comes across the *gen. of object*. e.g., *ariyānaṃ dassanāya* Dh 206 “for the seeing of the noble ones” (i.e. in order to see the noble ones); *mano-bhāvanīyānaṃ pi bhikkhūnaṃ asamayo dassanāya* D III.36 “it is not the time even for the seeing of self-composed monks”.

a. It is frequently found with primary nominal formations formed by adding such suffixes as *-a* to the root. In such cases the gen. is almost of necessity and qualifies the noun. e.g., *catunnaṃ bhikkhave dhammānaṃ ananubodhā ...* D II.122 “Brethren, owing to the non-understanding of four things”; *Tathāgatassa pūjāya* D II.137 “for the honouring of the T.”; [179] *lobho cittassa upakkilesa* D I.91 “greed is a defilement of the heart”.

b. With verbs of *motion* the normal construction is to retain the *acc. of destination* or the corresponding dat. But when the motion implied is towards a *person* the gen. is used similar to the *objective gen.* e.g., *upasaṅkamaṇaṃ pāhaṃ bhikkhave tesam bhikkhūnaṃ bahukāraṃ*

vadāmi S V.67 “even the approaching (going to) of those monks, brethren, I say is of advantage”.

c. With the so-called *nomina agentis* or agent-nouns the gen. and acc. are promiscuously employed, (*vide* §33). It must be stated, however, that with those formed with the suffix *-tr* (Pāli *-tā*) the acc. seems to be favoured, while the gen. is the commoner idiom with those having possessive sense such as *-vin* and *-in* (f. *-inī*). e.g., *Evaṃ opanāyikassa dhammassa desetāraṃ* D II.222,228 “the preacher of such a redeeming doctrine”; *ariyānaṃ adassāvi* M I.1 “a non-beholder of Noble Ones”; *lābhinī Bodhisatta-mātā hoti pañcannaṃ kāma-guṇānaṃ* D II.13 “the mother of the ‘Being destined for Enlightenment’ is receiver of the five-fold pleasures”.

§144. [The Partitive Genitive]

The Partitive Genitive proper denotes the whole, a part of which is meant by the qualified word as in *bhāgo maraṇassa* Sn 427 “a share of death”, *bhāgī āyussa* A II.80, III.42 “having a share of life” or *kiñcideva desaṃ vācāya* A V.39 “a certain portion of the speech”.

a. But the more frequent type of this gen. in Pāli is that which carries the notion of selecting or distinguishing *out of* a multitude, usually of persons but sometimes even of things. In this case it is interchangeable with the loc. of the persons *among whom* (§167). In fact the two cases occur side by side in the same context. e.g., *Kati jāgarataṃ suttaṃ, kati suttesu jāgarā* S I.3 (V.) “How many are the sleeping among the wake, how many are awake among the sleeping?”. From the following examples it may be observed that in Pāli as in Skr. (SS §116) the partitive gen. may not only attend

substantives but all kinds [180] of pronouns and adjectives. Such a gen. may also appear in various logical connections.

b. With certain adjectives and nouns it denotes the person or thing that is *distinguished* from the rest. e.g., *tvaṃ yeva nesam eko cakkhumā* D I.191 “you alone are the seeing among them”, or that which is *selected out of* many. e.g., *imesam tiṇṇam aṅgānaṃ jātim ṭhapayāma* D I.121 “of these three factors let us keep birth aside”.

c. With numerals grammatically denoted by substantives as *sataṃ*, *sahassaṃ* etc. the nouns qualifying are put in the gen. case. e.g., *bhiyyo naṃ satahassaṃ yakkhānaṃ payirupāsati* D II.256 “a hundred-thousand (of) yakkhas worship him”. Here the nom. of *apposition* is the parallel construction (§24.c.).

d. With indefinite pronouns such as *aññataro*, *aññatamo*, *eko* etc. it denotes *inclusion among* a group or class. e.g., *etesam vā aññatarena* D I.21 “or by one or the other of the same”; *aññataro ca kho pan’ āyasmā Kassapo arahataṃ ahosi* D I.177 “the Ven. Kassapa became one among the saints”; *tesam ahaṃ aññatamo* M I.17 “of them I am one”.

e. With substantives and adjectives denoting *mastery* and *power* it takes a slightly different turn of meaning and can be rendered by the English *over*. e.g., *evaṃ mahiddhiko kho bhikkhave sīho migarājā tiracchānagatānaṃ pāṇānaṃ, evaṃ mahesakkho ...* S III.85 “so powerful indeed, monks, is the lion, the king of beasts, over beings of the animal class, so majestic ...”; *Satthā devamanussānaṃ* M I.69 “The Master of gods and men”.

f. When option between two persons or things is intended the persons or things *considered* in making the comparison are put in the gen. case. Here it closely resembles the gen. of the persons regarding whom a statement is made (i.e. the gen. of *relation*, §156). e.g., *ko nu kho āyasmantānaṃ sukhavihāritaro rājā vā Māgadho ... āyasmā va Gotamo* M I.94 “of you two honourable ones, who is the more happy-living, the king of Magadha ... or the Ven. Gotama?”; *ayaṃ imesaṃ dvinnaṃ puggalānaṃ ... [181] hīnapuriso akkhāyati* M I.25 “he of these two persons ... appears as the lesser one”.

g. With *superlatives* or adjectives having superlative sense such as those meaning *first, last, foremost* etc. a similar gen. of the persons (or things) *of whom, from amongst* or *regarding whom* the statement is made, is frequently found. e.g., *khattiyo dvipadaṃ seṭṭho* S I.6 (V.) “the warrior is the best among bipeds (i.e. two-footed beings)”; *ye te ahesuṃ brāhmaṇānaṃ pubbakā* D I.104 “those who were the foremost of the brahmins”; *gimhānaṃ pacchime māse* M I.306 “in the last month of the summer (*lit.* of the warm months)”; *pañcannaṃ bhikkhusatānaṃ pacchimako bhikkhu* D II.155 “the last (monk) of the five hundred monks”.

h. Even with adjectives of *equality* and *identity* or those of *superiority* such as *sadiso* and *visiṭṭho* this gen. is commonly employed. This sometimes gives rise to a double genitive, for the gen. of *comparison* (§151.b.) may also appear side by side with it, as in the following example: *nāssa hoti koci paññāya sadiso vā visiṭṭho vā sabba-sattānaṃ* D III.158 “of all beings, there is no one who is equal to him or superior”. Of course *assa* here may as well stand for the dat. (§110), or may be alternately expressed by the inst. (§§85,86) or the abl. (§132).

§145. [The Gen. of the Material]

The Gen. of the Material may also be regarded as expressive of the partitive notion (cp. KVG §559). This is comparable to the gen. of *material* or *stock drawn upon*, found with verbs of *filling* and *lacking* in Latin and Greek⁴ and generally comes under the so-called *Gentivus Materiae et Originis* though in Pāli, just as in Skr. (SS §113), the pure gen. of *origin* is not very frequent. It is only found adverbally with the verb *pahoti* (Skr. *prabhavati* = originate) “to rise from”. (e.g., *yato cāyaṃ Gaṅgā nadī pahoti* S II.184 “whence arises the river Ganges”, where *yato* is the abl. representing more normal construction, whereas the gen. occurs only in instances of a metaphorical nature such as *sammādiṭṭhissa*, *bhikkhave*, *sammā-saṅkappo pahoti* M III.76 “right aspiration originates from (*lit.* of) right views”). In Pāli the gen. usually expresses the *substance* or *thing* of which [182] something else or some object is *made*, *consists of*, *full of* or is *laden with*. The following distinctions may be observed.

a. When the qualified noun denotes an artificial product, the gen. always expresses the *material* of which the former is made. e.g., *suvaṇṇassa pabhassarāni* Sn 48 “ornaments of gold”. This is, however, not found in prose; but the gen. denoting that of which something else consists occurs, though not frequently. e.g., *aṅgulīnaṃ mālaṃ* M II.98 “a necklace of fingers”.

b. When it is attended by the actual verb of *making* or *preparing* etc. the gen. seems to border on the inst. of *means*. It is then, so to speak,

⁴ cp. Buckland Green, *Notes on Greek and Latin Syntax*, §45.3.

half-way between the adnominal and the adverbial constructions. e.g., *sālīnaṃ odanaṃ (racayitvā)* M I.31 “having prepared a meal of rice”; *mahantaṃ hirañña-suvaṇṇassa puñjaṃ kārapetvā* M II.63 “having caused a great heap of gold and bullion to be piled up”; *pāñīyaṃ khādanīyaṃ bhojanīyaṃ paṭiyādāpetvā paṇḍumuṭikassa sālino ...* M II.50 “having prepared excellent hard and soft food (consisting) of the choicest golden rice”. That in such instances the verb is not of necessity and the gen. can be purely adnominal is shown by the example *udakassa dhārā* D II.15 “torrents of water”, where it borders on the *descriptive gen.*

c. When the qualified noun denotes a limited space to be filled, the gen. of the *material* is logically related to the gen. with adjectives and verbs of *filling* (§§151.b.ii. & 149). e.g., *uṇhodakassa kājaṃ* S I.175 “a pail of hot water” (i.e. a pail full of ...); *pañcamattāni taṇḍulavāhasatāni pāhesi paṇḍumuṭikassa sālino* M II.54 “sent about 500 cart-loads of the choicest golden rice”.

d. As partitive genitives, the above uses may be said to express logically the notion of *quantity*. Closely related to this is the *gen. of description* expressive of *quality*. This is generally known as the gen. of quality (KVG §559). It is however not so frequent in Pāli or Skr. as in Latin and Greek. e.g., (*kusāvatiyā*) *catunnaṃ vaṇṇānaṃ dvārāni ahoṣi* D II.170 “In Kusāvati there were doors of four colours”. This may also mean “there were [183] gates for the four castes”, in which case *vaṇṇānaṃ* would be the *dat. of interest*.

§146. [Abstract Usage]

It is not to be expected that the whole sphere of the adnominal genitive's use is included in the categories established in the preceding paragraphs. No divisions can be absolute or exhaustive in treatment. There are bound to be many other uses which may or may not fall within such categories. A most abstract use of the gen. is to be found in the construction with such *causal* postpositions as *hetu* and *kāraṇā*, which are both ablatives (cp. §122.d. & §73). There is however the parallel construction of compounding these (especially *hetu*) with the preceding noun, which would otherwise be put in the gen. (cp. §136). e.g., *atta-hetu* M III.48 “due to himself”; *vedanāhetu* M II.216 “due to sensation”; *cīvarahetu* A I.147 “for the sake of a robe”. According to Pāṇinī the sixth case-affix is to be employed in the construction with *hetu*.⁵ The *vārttika* illustrates this by ‘*annasya hetor vasati*’ “lives by reason of food”. Pāli follows the same usage with both *hetu* and *kāraṇā*. e.g., *issariyassa kāraṇā* D I.84 “by reason of glory” (i.e. for the sake of glory); *yāsaṃ ... hetu brahmacariyaṃ carasīti* M II.46 “owing to whom ... you live the Holy Life”; *accharānaṃ hetu* M II.64 “owing to heavenly damsels”; *puttadārassa hetu* M II.187 “for the sake of child and wife”. On the analogy of these examples we may not hesitate to place in this category the form *kissa* found in the frequent interrogative phrase *taṃ kissa hetu* D II.14; M I.1; A II.31, as a genitive qualifying *hetu*. Consequently *kissa* here is pronominal substantive and not adj. as in *kissa ... kamma* D II.185; it is not to be confused with the later adv. *kissa* “why?”.

⁵ ‘*saṣṭī hetuprayoge*’ (Pāṇ. II.3.26).

§147. The Gen. with Verbs.

Several classes of verbs are construed with a gen. Most of these adverbial uses correspond to the adnominal constructions discussed above. In the majority of instances the gen. in special connection with verbs appears concurrently for an acc., inst., or abl. and sometimes even for the loc. Generally speaking it [184] is the partitive notion that underlies such functions. One hardly meets with adverbial genitives expressive of the idea of possession in Pāli (of the Nikāyas) as found in Skr. with verbs of *owning* and *ruling* such as *prabhū*, *īś*, and Vedic *rāj* and *kṣi* (VGS §202). But there is a considerable number of verbs construed with the gen. having a sense analogous to that of the acc., but, with this difference: that unlike the latter it expresses that the action affects the object not as a whole, but only in part. It is used with verbs having the following senses:

a. *remembering, thinking of*; e.g., *nāgavanassa sumarati* Dh 324 “thinks of the elephants’ haunts”.

b. *imitating, following*; *taṃ tassa anugaṃ hoti* S I.72 “it follows him”; cp. *evaṃ gihī nānukaroti bhikkhuno* Sn 221 “so the householder imitates not the monk”. In such instances, however, the prefix *anu-* also favours construing with the gen. e.g., *dhammassa cānudhammaṃ vyākaraṇti* M I.368 “preach what is consistent with the doctrine”. A similar gen. is found with the verb *anumodāmi* in the sense of “appreciate”. e.g., *N’ eva kho tyāhaṃ brāhmaṇa anumodāmi na paṭikkosāmi* A II.36 “brahmin, I neither appreciate

you nor blame you”. Skr. grammarians are at a loss to explain these uses. They regard them as anomalies.⁶

c. It is also found with verbs having the sense of *desiring of, expecting of* etc. e.g., *yassa dāni devassa icchissati Brahmā Sanāṅkumāro* D II.210 “of whichever god the Brahmā S. now desires (anything)”. A similar construction is found with the gerundive *pāṭikaṅkhaṃ*. e.g., *Saddhassa hi Sāriputta ariyasāvakassa etaṃ pāṭikaṅkhaṃ* S V.226 “Of the faithful Aryan disciple, Sāriputta, this should be expected”.

d. In the *gāthā* literature are found a few verbs of *harming, robbing, plundering* and *conquering*, construed with a similar gen. e.g., *ahāsi me* Dh 3 “he robbed me”; *ālopati sahasā yo paresaṃ* Th 1.743 “who forcibly plunders others”; *uccāvaceh’ upāyehi paresaṃ abhijigīsati* Th 1.743 “by various means he (cheats, harms *or*) overcomes others”. As rendering of this rare verb Mrs. Rhys Davids has ‘cheat’ and Neumann ‘vernichten’. But [185] P.T.S. Dict, prefers ‘overcome’ or ‘covet’, after Comy. ‘*jinituṃ icchati*’ (on J. VI.193). It should, however, literally mean “desire to kill”, since it is the desiderative of *han*, normally reading ‘*jigīṃsati*’.

§148. [Gen. with *Jānāti*]

A peculiar idiom is found with the verb *jānāti*, which with a sense different from the usual “to know” (like *vid-*), seems to be construed with a gen.. According to Pāṇinī (II.3.51) *jñā* is to be employed in agreement with the gen. of the instrument (*karaṇa*); then *jñā* must

⁶ *vide, Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar* p. 220.

not be equivalent to *vid* but, says the *kāśikā*, must mean “to ween, fancy *or* have an opinion of”. In certain contexts in the Nikāyas *jānāti* construed with the gen. seems to exhibit this last sense, and, hence imply a *partitive* notion. e.g., *na tvam tāta Raṭṭhapāla kassaci dukkhassa jānāsi* M II.56 (cp. 60) “dear R., you know not of any sorrow”. Here, the Comy. points out, the exact meaning is “you have no experience *even of a little* of sorrow” (*‘appamattakam pi kālabhāgaṃ dukkhassa’*). In this example the gen. certainly expresses the thing *of* or *regarding* which there is knowledge, and is comparable with the English expression “to know of any sorrow”. But there are other uses of this verb, which, though similar in meaning to the above, are still logically different. e.g., *ko nu kho pana bho jānāti jīvitānaṃ* D II.233 (246) lit. “who indeed knows of the living”. Here the context shows that the meaning is “entitled to have an opinion of”, as the P.T.S. translation goes: “who indeed can answer for the (survival of) the living?” With *ājānāti* however the case is the dat. since the same is found in Skr. e.g., *Āmagandhe ... bhāsamānassa na ājānāmi* D II.242 “I do not understand you speaking about ... ‘the smell of raw flesh’”.

§149. [Inst.-like Gen.]

An *inst.-like gen.* is found with verbs having the sense of *fullness* and *satisfaction*, (cp. SS §123.6). Though these verbs *pūreti*, *tappati* etc. are often construed with a gen. the more logical construction seems to be with the *inst. of means*. e.g., *dvinnaṃ ... dhammānaṃ atitto ... mātuḡāmo kālaṃ karoti* [186] A I.78 “unsatiated with two ... things, the female dies”; cp. *puriso pāyāsassa tappati* J I.185 “the man is satisfied with the milk-rice”; *dhīro pūrati puññassa* Dh 122 “the wise man is filled with merit”; *nivesanāni ... nānādhaññassa pūretvā* Sn

305 “having filled the dwellings ... with various kinds of grain”. With verbal nouns, especially *nomina agentis*, formed from these roots, the gen. of filling falls into the category of the objective gen. e.g., *labhati lūkhassa vā paṇṭassa vā bhojanassa yāvadatthaṃ pāripūriṃ* D III.257 “he obtains satiety (*lit.* fulfilment) in (*lit.* of) gross or excellent food”. In such cases even the loc. is admissible.

§150. [Abl.-like Gen.]

The *abl.-like gen.* (SS §125) occurs with certain verbs where some notion of *separation* or *distance* or some such ablatival function seems to be implied. We have already referred to the gen. used with local adverbs such as *dakkhiṇato*, *uttarena* and *sammukhā* denoting the point from which distance or direction is reckoned (§130) and the *gen. of origin* employed instead of the corresponding abl. with the verb *pahoti* (§145). As Speyer points out (SS §125) the gen. is admissible in such instances when there is at the same time room for the conception of *belonging* to (being part of) and that of *proceeding from*.

a. With such verbs as *paṭigāṇhāti* the person *from whom* something is received is denoted by the gen. In the following example the presence of the participle gives a *semi-absolute* appearance to the construction: *paṭigāṇhāti ... na dvinnaṃ bhuñjamānānaṃ* M I.307 “he does not receive ... from two people at meals”. The same verb in its metaphorical sense of “accepting a confession” follows a similar construction (cp. SS §83.6 & Pāṇ. I.IV.41). e.g., *yo ca accayaṃ desetassa yathā-dhammaṃ na paṭigāṇhāti* S I.239 “who does not pardon (*lit.* accept of) one confessing a transgression, according to the Doctrine”; or with *semi-absolute sense*: *parassa kho pana*

accayaṃ desentassa yathā-dhammaṃ nappaṭigāṇhāti A I.103 “he does not pardon one confessing ...” etc. or “he does not accept *when* one makes a confession.” The verb *ādiyanti* in the sense of “taking the [187] word” (Comys. ‘*vacanaṃ na karonti*’ i.e. “obey”) may admit of a similar gen. e.g., *mahārājānaṃ na ādiyanti* D III.204 “they do not heed *or* obey the great kings”; later on the same page: *n’eva rañño Māgadhassa ādiyanti*. It is however not quite certain whether this is the gen. or the dat. with verbs of *listening to* like *sussūsati* etc. (§94.b.).

b. With verbs of *hearing*, especially *suṇāti*, the gen. seems to be the general construction, the abl. being hardly ever found in the Nikāyas (§125.b.). This may be regarded as a gen. expressive of the *origin of sound* or the source from which the perception comes. e.g., *āyasmato Sāriputtassa sutvā bhikkhu dhāressanti* M I.14,46 “having heard from (*lit.* heard of, i.e. learnt of) the ven. S. the monks will take (it) to heart” (cp. D II.2,148); *na aññassa samaṇassa vā brāhmaṇassa vā sutvā* A I.142; M III.186 “not having heard from another recluse or brahmin ...”; *Tesaṃ sutvā* D III.61 “hearing from them”. Even with passive forms of this verb the gen. is preserved. e.g., *tesañca sotabbaṃ maññissanti* A IV.16 *lit.* “they think it should be heard of them” i.e. “they think they should be heard”. In the above examples the gen. denotes the person from whom one learns or hears and is, therefore, logically parallel to the abl. But when the gen. is attended by participles of verbs denoting talking, sounding, howling, conversing etc. the construction not only appears to be *semi-absolute* but seems to be used in place of an acc. rather than an abl. though at the same time it expresses the *source of sound*. e.g., *assuttha no tumhe ... siṅgālassa vassamānassa* S II.271 “did you not hear the jackal howling ... ?”; *nāmāni me kittayato suṇātha* M III.69 “hear me

repeating the names” i.e. “listen *while* I am repeating ...” (absolute); *assosi kho āyasmā Anuruddho dāyapālassa Bhagavatā saddhim mantayamānassa* M I.205 “the ven. Anuruddha heard the Blessed One talking with the park-keeper”; *assosi kho āyasmā Sāriputto Sunakkhattassa Licchaviputtassa parisatiṃ vācaṃ bhāsamānassa* M I.68 “the ven. Sāriputta heard Sunakkhatta the Licchavi speaking these words among the rabble”. In such cases the Comys. supply the implied *object*, usually ‘*saddaṃ*’ [188] in their paraphrase. e.g., for *sutvā devassa vassato* Sn 30, the Comy. has ‘*vassato saddaṃ sutvā*’ (Pj. II. p.42). But the acc. of the object may not be always implied, since the verb *suṇāti* can occur with an intransitive sense, as for instance in: *kinti te suttaṃ brāhmaṇānaṃ ... bhāsamānānaṃ* D I.104 (cp. D II.237) “What! have you heard from the brahmins ... speaking”.

c. Similar to the above *ablative gen.* is that which is expressive of the *source of fear* with verbs of *fearing* such as *bhāyati* “fear”, *tasati* “tremble at” and *āsaṅkati* “suspect”. The abl. too is found in the Nikāyas, but only with noun *bhayaṃ* and never *adverbally*, (§122.e.). Here the local grammarians regard the abl. as the proper case. Kaccāyana’s rule *dutiyā pañcamānaṃ* (311) is interpreted by the *vutti* as meaning that the sixth case-affix is used *sometimes* (*kvaci*) instead of the second and the fifth, examples for the latter being those such as ‘*sukhassa bhāyāmi*’ etc. The acc. however is rarely found with the verb *bhāyati* as in *bhāyasi maṃhi samaṇā ti* Sn p.48 “do you fear me, recluse?”; it appears to be almost of necessity when the object to be feared is a *person* (§36.a.). Otherwise the gen. is the commoner *adverbial* construction. e.g., *kiṃ nu kho ahaṃ tassa sukhassa bhāyāmi* M I.247 “what! indeed, do I fear that happiness?”; *na bhāyitabbaṃ etassa sukhasāti vadāmi* M I.454; III.233 “I declare that one should

not fear this happiness”. In verse however the gen. is found even with personal nouns. e.g., *sabbe bhāyanti Maccuno* Dh 129 “all fear Death”, or *adnominally*. e.g., *kālassa meghassa bhayena tajjitā* Th 1.308 “oppressed with fear of the black cloud”. The verb *tasati* occurs only in verse in this construction. e.g., *sabbe tasanti daṇḍassa* Dh 129 “all tremble at punishment”. But *āsaṅkati* is found even in prose with the gen. e.g., *Tena khopana samayena rājā Māgadho Ajātasattu Vedehiputto Rājagahaṃ paṭisaṅkhārāpeti rañño Pajjotassa āsaṅkamāno* M III.7 “at that time Ajātasattu King of Magadha, son of Vedehi, was fortifying Rājagaha out of suspicions for King Pajjota”. In Skr. however *śaṅk* “to suspect” takes the gen. with the prefix *abhi-* and the acc. when it is used with *ā-* (cp. Cappeller’s Dict.) [189]

§151. The Genitive with Adjectives.

We have already referred to the gen. used with verbal adjectives implying ‘possession’ such as those ending in *-vin* (f. *-vinī*) and *-in* (f. *-inī*). When formed from transitive roots these agree with an *objective gen.* (§143.c.). A similar gen. is found with *upādāya* which, though a gerund in form, is still capable of qualifying a noun as much as an adj. e.g., *catunnaṃ mahābhūtānaṃ upādāya rūpaṃ* M I.185 “whatever form depends on the four great elements”. But apart from being used parallel to the acc., the gen. with some other adjectives appears in place of a loc., inst. or dat., at least from a logical point of view.

a. With adjectives of *knowledge*, *skill* and *experience* the gen. of the *thing in which* one is skilled etc. is logically akin to the acc. with transitive verbs (SS §124.III.). But the concurrent idiom is the *loc. of*

relation, owing to the fact that the noun in the gen. with such adjectives expresses that *regarding which* one is skilled etc. (§175.a.). Kaccāyana enjoins the use of the gen. in place of the loc. with such words by the rule ‘*chaṭṭhī ca*’ (310), which according to the *vutti* is to be taken as implying that the sixth case-affix is employed instead of the third and seventh (laid down in the previous rule ‘*tatiyā sattamīnañca*’ - 309) optionally (*kvaci*). It is found in the Nikāyas with such adjectives as: *kevalī* “perfected, expert”; e.g., *brahmacariyassa kevalī* A II.23 “perfected in the Higher Life” or “expert of the Higher Life”; *kusala* “clever, skilled”; e.g., *puriso kusalo bherisaddassa* A II.185 “a man clever in the tone of the drum”; *kusalo ahaṃ rathassa aṅgapaccaṅgānaṃ* M I.395 “I am skilled in the parts and accessories of the chariot”; *imesaṃ dhammānaṃ sukusalo* D I.180 “extremely gifted in these things”; *akusalā imassa lokassa* M I.225 “having no knowledge of (unversed in matters of) this world”; *kovido* “adept, proficient”; e.g., *yogakkhemassa pathassa kovido* Th 1.69 “proficient in the path of deliverance” *ariyadhammassa akovido* M I.1 “with no knowledge of the Noble Doctrine”. With *kovido* the gen. is logically quite similar to the *objective gen.*. But the concurrent construction [190] is with the loc. as seen by the corresponding gloss ‘*ariyadhamme akusalo*’ (Ps. I. p.22). The addition of prefixes (negative etc.) to these various adjectives does not necessitate the alteration of the construction, as may be seen from the above uses with *akovido*, *akusalo*, *sukusalo* etc.

b. With adjectives of *likeness*, *equality* and *similarity* and of *fullness* or *completeness*, the gen. is parallel to the inst., of *comparison* in the former case, and of *means* (in the narrower sense) in the latter case.

i. The notion of *comparison* can be diversely signified in Pāli as in Skr. In certain nuances the inst. (§§85,86) or the abl. (§132) of comparison is even preferred. With those denoting superiority or inferiority and even equality etc. the dat. is also perhaps used in the Nikāyas (*vide* §110). With such adjectives as *sadisa*, *sama*, *samasama* and *sādhāraṇa*, however, the case is more likely to be the gen., considering the popularity of this construction in Skr. (SS §§124.4. & 61). Here the inst., just as in the earlier language, is particularly concurrent, but the abl. cannot be applied as all these adjectives denote “similarity”, thus implying no “distinction” (*vibhatta*) for the latter to be permissible. e.g., *so mātu pi sadiso pitu pi sadiso* M II.153 “he is like his mother and also his father”; *assa ... sadiso* D III.158 “equal to him”; *attano samasamaṃ* D I.174 “equal to himself”. With *nīcataraṃ*, acc. adverb from the comparative stem, *nīcatara-*, it is either the dat. or the gen. that is used. e.g., *nīcataraṃ Bhagavato* S I.144 “lower than the Blessed One”. Here the abl. would be the more logical case, but the gen. is frequent with other local adverbs in the Nikāyas (§153).

ii. The gen. found with adjectives of *fullness* such as *puṇṇa* and *pūra* can be regarded as the *adnominal* corresponding to the *adverbial* use discussed above (§149). The parallel idiom with the inst., however, cannot be used with the *adjectives*, since these (not being verbs) do not imply *means*. e.g., *nagaraṃ ... puṇṇaṃ sāsapānaṃ* S II.182 “the city ... full of mustard”; *pūraṃ hiraññasuvaṇṇassa kumbhiṃ* D II.176 “a pot full of gold and bullion”; [191] *ayaṃ Aciravatī nadī pūrā udakassa* D I.224 “this river A. is full of water”; *pūrā añgārānaṃ* M I.365 “full of ambers”; *pūran nānappakārassa asucino* M I.51 “full of all kinds of filth”. This seems to be one of the oldest functions of the gen. in I.E. (cp. Latin gen. *c. plenus*).

c. We have already discussed the gen. employed with certain verbs derived from the root *jñā* prefixed by *anu-* or *ā-* (§148). A similar gen. is found with verbal adjectives belonging to the same root, especially with *samanuñña* “approving of” or “favourable to”. e.g., *na pāṇaṃ atipātayato samanunñho hoti* D III.48 “he is not approving of one taking life”; *samanunñho me Satthā* S I.1 “the Teacher is favourable to me”. The gen. in these cases, however, is not a certainty since even in Skr. the dat. is applicable with some verbs from *jñā*. For instance, with *ājānāti* “to learn or understand” the acc. of the thing, or the dat. or the loc. of the person, is quite frequent. (*vide* Cappeller’s Dict, s.v.). But the *thing* approved of is found in the Nikāyas with the loc. e.g., *samphappalāpe ca samanunñho hoti* A V.305 “he is approving of frivolous talk”; *adinnādāna veramaṇiyā ca samanunñho hoti* A II.253 “he is also approving of abstinence from taking what is not given”.

§152. Dative-like Genitive with Adjectives.

We have seen earlier (§138) how the gen. in the older language had encroached upon the syntactical sphere proper to the dat. and ousted it from many of its legitimate uses. The fact was noticed even by early Skr. grammarians (cp. Pāṇinī ‘*caturthyarthe bahulam*’ II.3.62). This replacement has proceeded in the adjectives on a wider scale. Speyer calls such uses in Skr., where the forms show the actual case unlike in Pāli in which the dat. and gen. are for the most part identical, the *dat.-like gen.* So with adjectives of *friendship* and *enmity*, *good* and *evil*, *fitness* and *unfitness* etc. we find a gen. (in Skr.) apparently for the dat.. Since there is no reason to suppose that Pāli retained the dat. with such adjectives, it seems not unjustifiable

to regard the following *-ssa* forms as genitives. The dat. if used in such cases would express the *point of view* (cp. KVG §554.4). [192]

a. It is especially the case with adjectives having the sense of *pleasing to*. e.g., *pitā puttānaṃ piyo hoti* D II.178 “the father is dear to (or beloved of) his sons”; *bahuno janassa piyo ahoṣi* D II.19 “he was beloved of many people”; so even with compounds where the first member is such an adj.: *piyadassino honti bahuno janassa* D III.167 “has a pleasing appearance for many people” (*lit.* has an appearance beloved of many people). With the enclitic pronouns it is very doubtful whether the case is gen. at all. e.g., *na kho me taṃ paṭirūpaṃ* D II.30 “it is indeed not fit for me” (cp. dat. §108).

b. With passive participles used as adjectives the gen. not only denotes the people concerned but borders on the function of *agency* (§154). e.g., *Samaṇo ... Gotamo rañño Pasenadī Kosalassa sakkato garukato mānito pūjito* D I.116 “the recluse ... Gotama is respected, honoured, revered and worshipped of King Pasenadī of Kosala”; *āvāha-vivāhakānaṃ apatthito hoti mittāmaccānaṃ paribhūto hoti* D III.183 “unwanted of those giving or taking in marriage and despised of friends and colleagues”; *sādhusammato bahujanassa* D I.47; II.150; Sn p.92 “well-revered of many people”; *ekesaṃ samaṇa-brāhmaṇānaṃ sāmāñña-saṅkhāta ...* D I.166 “regarded as compatible with recluseship of (i.e. by) some recluses and Brahmins”.

§153. The Genitive with Adverbs.

In connection with the *abl.-like gen.* (§150) we had occasion to mention its use with adverbs derived from nouns such as *dakkhiṇato* etc. where the gen. marks *that of which* a region or direction is

considered, thus psychologically coinciding with the ablatival notion of *that from which* direction or distance is reckoned. The use of the gen. in such instances is due to the slight *partitive* sense implied, whereas the abl. should be the more logical construction. However the local grammarians regard the gen. as of necessity in such cases, (*vide* Pāṇ. II.3.30), an observation supported by the fact that in the actual literature the abl. though logically proper is never found with these regional adverbs (whether in *-to* or *-ena*), the gen. being the only [193] construction. It is so even in the Vedas (VGS §202.D.) and the language of the Nikāyas is no exception.

a. Adverbs in *-to* are always construed with the gen. e.g., *dakkhiṇato nagarassa* D II.321 “on the south of the city”; *pācīnato Rājagahassa* D II.263 “on the east of Rājagaha”; With those ending in *-ena*, the *kāśīkā* on Pāṇ. II.3.31 allows optional construction with gen. or acc. (§53). But the former seems to be the more usual even here with those signifying *regions* or *quarters*. e.g., *puratthimena nagarassa* M I.343 “on (by) the east of the city”; *uttarena Manasākaṭassa* D I.235 “to (*lit.* by) the north of the Manasākaṭa”. But even with other adverbs in *-ena* the gen. is not unusual though the acc. is by far the more frequent. e.g., *antarena yamakasālānaṃ* D II.169 (134,137).

b. Pāṇinī allows optional construction with abl. or gen. of all words meaning *far* and *near* (II.3.34). Pāli grammarians permit the use of the abl. acc. or inst. (*vide vutti* on Kac. 277 ‘*dūratthe*’ and ‘*antikatthe*’). But the only cases attested in the Nikāya prose are the abl. and the gen., the former being restricted to pronominal forms (*ito* and *tato*, *vide* §131.b.) and the latter being used with all types of nouns. e.g., *Bhagavato santike* D II.152 “near the Blessed One (*lit.* in the proximity of the Blessed One)”; *Vedehi-puttassa avidūre* D I.94

“at no distance from the son of Vedehi”; *Anuruddhassa sammukhe* S V.294 “in the presence of A.”; *so nâtidûre nâccâsanne āsanassa parivattati* M II.138 “he takes his position neither at too great a distance nor in too close proximity of the seat”; *avidûre ambavanassa* M II.141 “in the vicinity of the mango-grove”.

c. Finally there is the gen. employed with adverbial prepositions such as *heṭṭhā* “below” and *upari* “above” (cp. VGS §202.D.). Here too the abl. is the concurrent idiom. e.g., *tassa eva pāsādassa heṭṭhā* D I.198 “below that storey”. In the post-canonical works this gen. is widely used to denote many turns of expression. With reference to *space* it is used in the sense of “on top of, on, upon” as in *kassa upari sāpo patissati* Dh A.41, or with reference to *time* as in *catunnaṃ māsānaṃ upari*. [194]

§154. The Instrumental-like Genitive.

We have seen how the *subjective gen.* can sometimes be used for the *agent* (cp. SS §§66;129.R.2) when the noun qualified is a p.p.p. (§142). When the participle has a predicative force, as is frequently the case in Pāli just as in Skr., the gen. is clearly used instead of the *inst. of agent*. This is found with all types of verbs. e.g., *Mayhaṃ kho bhikkhave ... anuttarā vimutti anuppattā* S I.105 “the highest emancipation, brethren ... has been attained by me”; *suto nu bhavataṃ Asito Devalo isī ti?* M II.156 “have you heard of the sage A.D.?”; *amataṃ tesāṃ bhikkhave aparibhuttaṃ yesāṃ kāyagatāsati aparibhuttā* A I.45 “immortality has not been realized by them, by whom full awareness of body has not been experienced”; *kodhā ca pana assa esā vācā bhāsītā* M I.68 “through anger were these words spoken by him”; *Tathāgatassa ... cattāro iddhipādā bhāvitā* D II.103

“the four bases of supernormal powers have been cultivated by the T.”; *Itthaṃ Bhagavā Sakkassa devānaṃ indassa pañhaṃ puṭṭho vyākāsi* D II.279 “in this wise did the Blessed One explain being questioned by Sakka, the lord of gods”; *viditaṃ hi bhante tassa purisassa ...* M I.365 “it is known, Sir, by that man ...”; *dīghaṃ addhānaṃ sandhāvitaṃ saṃsaritaṃ mamañc’ eva tumhākañcā ti* D II.90 “a long course (of lives) has been traversed and gone through both by me and you” (Comy. ‘*mayā ca tumehi ca*’ Sum. II). We may observe the following other idioms expressed by the *agent-like gen.*:

a. Its employment with participles used as adjectives denoting respect or the opposite has been referred to earlier (§152.b.). A similar gen. is frequently found with verbs (p.p.p.) denoting *praise, homage* and *salutation*. e.g., *Api ca āyasmā Maha-Kāccāno Satthu c’ eva saṃvaṇṇito sambhāvito ca viññūnaṃ sabrahmacārīnaṃ* M I.111 “Even so the ven. Mahā-Kaccāna is praised by the Master and esteemed by his co-celibates”; cp. *ye puggalā aṭṭha sataṃ pasatthā* Sn 227; Kh 6 “those eight people who are praised by the good”, where the Comy. has the inst. ‘*sappurisehi ... pasatthā*’ (Pj. I. p.182). [195]

b. The same gen. is employed with certain other participles which are not strictly *passives*. e.g., *ādiso va tesam aparaddhaṃ* D I.180 “they are at fault from the very start”; *yāva aparaddhañca te idaṃ ācariyassa ...* D I.103 “how deeply have you been wronged by your teacher ...”; *tuyh’ eva etaṃ dukkaṭaṃ* D II.115 “this is misdone by you”; *tumh’ evetaṃ aparaddhaṃ* D I.222 “by you yourself (it) has been wronged”. In the last three examples it is very much like the *subjective genitive*.

c. When the noun in the gen. is attended by another participle, the construction approximates to a semi-absolute gen. e.g., *aparāmasato c' assa paccattaṃ yeva nibbuti veditā* D I.22 (III.28) “by him (when he is) free from clinging tranquillity is realized”; *tadapi tesam bhavataṃ ... ajānataṃ apassataṃ vedayitaṃ* D I.40 “that too has been experienced by you as such even without knowing or seeing on your part”. Here the sense “even without your knowing ...”, of the participial phrase shows how closely related it is to the gen. absolute implying *disregard* (*anādara*, vide §158.a.), for “even without your knowing” can also be expressed by “in spite of your not knowing ...”. But the fact that the participles agreeing with *tesam bhavataṃ* merely qualify the ‘agent’ of the verb *viditaṃ* and are therefore strictly speaking not detached from the rest of the construction shows its difference from the actual gen. absolute.

§155. [Inst.-like Gen.]

This contact of the gen. and the inst. is not restricted to the agent-like gen. described in the preceding paragraph. The gen. is also used in certain other places where in the normal course of concinnity we would have expected an inst. denoting *means* or the *sociative* notion.

a. Thus the gen. is found in place of the inst. with certain nouns and verbs which logically must admit of an *inst. of means*. In such cases it seems to be used on the analogy of the subjective gen. e.g., *mantassa ājīvino* D III.65 “living (by means) of the mantras”; *sabba-cetaso samannāharitvā* D II.204 et seq. “having considered well with his mind”. Here the v.l. *cetasā* appears like an attempt at ‘correction’.

b. It may also appear, as remarked above, in place of the *sociative inst.*. It is even found with or ‘governed’ by the *sociative prep. saddhiṃ*. e.g., *mama saddhiṃ sammodiṃsu* D I.157 “they conversed with me”. The idiom ‘*sammukhī-bhāvaṃ gacchati*’ “comes face to face” or “meets with” would normally admit of an *inst.* of the *person met with* coming under the *sociative class* (cp. *missi-bhāvaṃ gato tayā* etc. §63.a.). In the following example the *gen. mama* can also imply *possession* in a metaphorical sense: *mama sammukhī-bhāvaṃ āgantūṃ* D III.13,19 “to come face to face with me” or “to come to my presence”.

§156. The Genitive of Relation.

In Pāli, as we have seen earlier, the notion of *relation (that concerning whom)* can be expressed by cases like the *acc.* or the *inst.*. The proper case however would be the *loc.*. There are however certain instances where the *gen.* too seems to be employed to denote the *person* concerning whom a statement is made. It is found both *adverbally* and *adnominally*.

a. *Adverbally* it signifies the *person regarding whom* something is said or meant. e.g., *Tañ ca kho sīlavato vadāmi no dussīlassa* D III.259 “I say it of the virtuous man, not of the evil”; The frequent phrase ‘*ko pana vādo*’ also ‘governs’ a similar *gen.* e.g., *Idha bhikkhave asappuriso, yo hoti parassa avaṇṇo taṃ apuṭṭho pi pātukaroti: ko pana vādo puṭṭhassa* A II.77 “Here, monks, an evil person even unquestioned discloses bad reports of others; what talk of (him when) questioned?” (i.e. how much more when questioned *or* what would you say about him if he is questioned); similarly, *ko*

pana vādo manussa bhūtassa M I.227 “what (use is there to) talk of the human being?” (i.e. not to mention the human being)

b. *Adnominally* it denotes the person to whom something is *attributed* or *of whom* some *qualification* is said to exist. Thus it resembles the *possessive gen.* e.g., *acchariyaṃ idaṃ āyasmato Kosiyassa* D II.270 “this is wonderful of (or regarding) the ven. K.”; *abbhutaṃ idaṃ āyasmato Janavasabhassa yakkhassa* [197] D II.206 “this is marvellous of the spirit, ven. J.”. A similar adnominal gen. is found with compound ‘*vutta-vādino*’, where the gen. can also be regarded as used instead of the agent with *vutta* (p.p.p. of *vac*). But the more likely explanation is that it denotes the *person regarding whom* something is said by the speaker (*vādin*). e.g., *kacci te bhoto Gotamassa vutta-vādino* D I.161 “what! are you true reporters concerning the ven. Gotama?” (*lit.* tellers of what is said); *vutta-vādī c’ eva Bhagavato homi* D III.115 “I am a true reporter (*lit.* a teller of what has been said) of the Blessed One”. There is one example of a similar gen. which (if it is not a nom. sg. formed from the dat.-gen. stem **bhikkhu-*) is to be regarded as a *gen. of relation*, viz. *Idha bhikkhave bhikkhuno cakkhunā rūpaṃ disvā na nimittaggāhī hoti nānuyyañjanaggāhī hoti yatvādhikaraṇaṃ eṇaṃ cakkhundriyaṃ asaṃvutaṃ viharantaṃ abhijjhādomanassā pāpakā akusalā dhammā anvāssaveyyuṃ* A II.16 “Here, brethren, (speaking) of a monk, he does not take an object (as a theme for reflection) having seen it, ...”.

c. A gen. is found with the idiom ‘*kittisaddo abbhuggato*’ “a report has been broadcast” denoting the person *concerning* whom something is reported. Comparing with the gen. found in the phrase ‘*ko pana vādo*’ discussed above, it may be regarded as denoting the person concerning *whom* the report is broadcast. But according to

ancient grammarians the gen. is due to the *accented prefix* (*karmapravacanīya*), viz. *abhi-* in *abbhuggato*, as much as the acc. which is concurrently used in such contexts (*vide acc. of relation* §42.). e.g., *Mayhaṃ kho ayyāya evaṃ kalyāṇo kittisaddo abbhuggato* M I.125 “Concerning (cp. English ‘of’) my lady such a good report has arisen”; *evaṃ te kalyāṇo kittisaddo abbhuggato* M I.394 “thus of you a good report has arisen”; *dussīlassa ... pāpako kittisaddo abbhuggato* Ud 86 “an evil report arose ... about the unvirtuous one”; *idaṃ me dānaṃ dadato kalyāṇo kittisaddo abbhuggacchati* D III.258 “about me ...”. [198]

§157. The Genitive of Time.

The gen. sg. of time-denoting words such as *cira*, *kāla*, and *divā* (§2) is used *adverbially* to denote *after what time* or *within or during what time* an action takes place. In the former, i.e. when it expresses *after what time*, the gen. is parallel to the abl. as found in *cirā* (Skr. *cirāt*) etc., but in the latter sense it is clearly concurrent with the inst. as in *kālena*, *cirena* and *divā*. In the Nikāyas however the abl. of these words is hardly found even in the sense of *time after which* (even *cirā* is not attested by *cirena*), for the inst. has replaced it in such functions. Though in Skr., therefore, it may be said that the gen. here “always stands on the ground of the abl.” (SS §128), the same cannot be stated for Pāli, where the gen. of time may be taken as standing for the inst. with the corresponding *temporal* sense (§76.a.).

a. The gen. sg. *cirassa* is only found in the negative phrase ‘*na cirass’ eva*’ and can be substituted for ‘*aciren’ eva*’. Similarly it has the sense of “not long after”. e.g., *na cirass’ eva kālaṃ akāsi* D II.195 “not long after he passed away”; cp. D I.177,202; II.11,35,153 (cp. Skr. *cirasya*

Macdonell *Skr. Gr.* §202.5). The compound form *sucirass' eva* is similarly found meaning “after a very long time”. e.g., *atha kho āyasmā Aññāsi Koṇḍañño sucirass' eva yena Bhagavā ten' upasaṅkami* S I.193 “then the ven. A.K. after a very long time came whither the Blessed One was”. The extended form *cirassaṃ* is frequently found in place of *cirassa* with the same sense. Here we have an interesting instance of the interplay of morphological and syntactical development, for it is certainly the result of a want felt in the mind of the Pāli speakers as regards the form *cirassa* (with an ending unusual for adverbs) to which they added the nasal (*-aṃ*) in order to bring it into uniformity with the adv. acc. on the analogy of forms like *ciraṃ* and *muhuttaṃ*, though the acc. is logically out of place here. e.g., *cirassaṃ kho bhante Bhagavā imaṃ pariyāyaṃ akāsi yadidaṃ idhāgamanāya* D I.179; S I.142 “It is a long time since (i.e. after a long time) the Blessed One has thought of coming this way”. [199]

b. The form *kālassa* is found in the sense of “early” very much like the inst. *kālēna* (§76.e.2.). e.g., *kālāss' eva vuṭṭhahanto* A V.263 “rising quite early (in the day)”; *Siṅgālako ... kālāss' eva vuṭṭhāya* D III.180 “Siṅgālaka ... having arisen early”.

c. As regards the term *divassa*, it is always found in the compound expression ‘*divā-divassa*’ which means “in the day”. The form *divā* is also an adverb from Vedic *divā* (§2). e.g., *Atha kho Sandhāno gahapati divādivass' eva Rājagahā nikkhāmi ...* D II.36 “then the householder S. set out from R. very early in the day”. On this passage the Comy, has ‘*divassa divā nāma majjhaṇhātikkamo*’ according to which it should mean “after the mid-day”. But our rendering fits in better with the context. Similarly: *Sāvaththiyā niyyāsi divādivassa* M

I.174 (S I.89) “he set out from S. early in the day”. The expression seems to be parallel to a reduplicated form *divā-divā* with an *intensive* sense [cp. *udagga-udagga* etc. W. Stede ‘Reduplikationskomposita im Pāli’ (*ZfB* Vol.6 (1925) p.89)].

§158. The Genitive Absolute.

The *absolute* use of the gen. in Pāli is restricted, just as in Skr. (SS §369), to a few standing phrases. Though it is sometimes concurrent with the *loc. absolute*, it is still far from possessing the general character of the latter. It has been observed with regard to Skr., by writers on syntax,⁷ that there are at least two principal conditions governing the use of the *gen. absolute*, especially with regard to the character of the subject- and predicate-factors that constitute the absolute clause. Firstly, the substantive is almost always the name of a person (or a personal pronoun), very rarely to be supplied. Secondly, the predicate must have a durative sense, that is, it may be either an ordinary present participle or an adj. or a verbal formation having the value of an adj.. Though there are not sufficient examples in the Nikāyas to make a detailed investigation, we may fairly observe that the above conditions are for the most part fulfilled even in Pāli. [200]

a. Strictly speaking, the construction seems to be limited to the expression of action going on *but not cared for* while performing the main action. Hence local grammarians denote this nuance by the

⁷ *vide*, *Grammaire Sanscrite* §226, by Louis Renou (Paris-1930) and Speyer §369 *Sanskrit Syntax*, both referring to the exhaustive treatise by F de Saussure ‘de l’emploi de genitif absolu en Sanscrit’.

term *anādara*, i.e. disregard.⁸ In describing the employment of the gen. Kaccāyana lays down the rule *anādare ca* (307) which the *vutti* explains as meaning that the sixth case-affix is employed to express the action not fully attended to while performing the main action or the seventh case (*anādare ca chaṭṭhi vibhatti hoti sattamī ca*). He is here relying on Pāṇinī *sūtra* (II.38) which says *ṣaṣṭau cānādare*, the conjunction *ca* being expressive of ‘option’ as this is primarily the province of the loc. absolute, which is enjoined by the preceding *sūtra* (37) viz. *yasya ca bhāvena bhāvalakṣaṇaṃ* (cp. SS p.287.f.n.2). As pointed out above it occurs but rarely in the Nikāyas, and, may be rendered by such expressions as “though, notwithstanding, in spite of” and the like. e.g., *So kho ahaṃ ... akāmakānaṃ mātāpitunnaṃ assumukhānaṃ rudantānaṃ kesamassuṃ ohāretvā ... agārasmā anagāriyaṃ pabbajim* M I.163 “despite the parents unwilling and crying I shaved off my hair and beard ... and set forth from home to homelessness”; *seyyathāpi brāhmaṇa puriso daliddo assako anāḷhiyo, tassa akāmassa bilaṃ olaggeyyuṃ* M II.178,181, “it is as (if there were) a poor, needy and destitute wretch and (they) in spite of his not wanting would drop him into a hole”. (Here the phrase ‘*bilaṃ olaggeyyuṃ*’ is of very doubtful sense. The P.T.S. Translation has ‘reserve a joint he does not want’, agreeing with Neumann’s ‘man nötigte ihm gegen seinen Willen einen Bissen auf: da hast du, lieber Mann, ein Stück Fleisch zu essen ...’. The reading too being doubtful (*vide* M II.178) either of the translations seems admissible). In the former example, we may notice, the predicate-factor is a present participle (*rudantānaṃ* etc.) but in the latter only an adj. (*akāmassa*).

⁸ This nuance is said to express ‘*garva rasa*’, Renou *ibid*.

b. But, as shown by the parallelism with the loc. absolute, in its simple temporal employment the *gen. absolute* denotes an action going on or a situation existing at the time when the action of the main clause intervenes. Then it may be rendered [201] by “while” or “as” or the participial construction in English (“this being so ...”). Instances of this are however rare in the Nikāyas, being superseded by the loc. absolute. e.g., *Tatra me brahmaṇa viharato mago vā āgacchati moro vā kaṭṭham pātetī* M I.20 “As I dwell there, brahmin, an animal may approach or a peacock cause a twig to fall”; *tesaṃ vo bhikkhave evaṃ samaññānaṃ satam evaṃ paṭiññānaṃ satam: yā samaṇa-sāmīcīpaṭipadā taṃ* M II.281 “When, brethren, you are so famous and acknowledged (for your recluse-ship), whatever right course of life there is for the recluses that ...”. Sometimes the notion of *anādara* is faintly implied (cp. SS §369R). e.g., *āturakāyassa me sato cittaṃ anāturaṃ bhavissati* S III.1 “even while I am sickly (in spite of my being sick) of body, my mind is not diseased”. Here the gen. can also be regarded as *possessive* (§159.c.).

c. In the above examples the predicative factor has the *durative* notion and is almost always a *present* participle. There is however one *past* participle (*pakkanta-*) involved in a similar *gen. absolute* construction. Logically it seems to be a development of the *gen. of time* already described (§157). Its purely temporal character and origin are to be seen from the fact that the same phrase occurs as a *loc. absolute* (§183.a.iv.). The only difference (from the simple gen. of time) is that the time-denoting term is not one word but an expression consisting of a personal noun and a participle. The implied sense, however, is fundamentally the same, viz. *the time after which* or *since which* (cp. SS §128.R.s). It occurs in the stock-phrase ‘*acira-pakkantassa ...*’ and the presence of the

time-denoting word *acira* (cp. *acirassa(ṃ)*) makes quite clear the parallelism with the simple ‘noun + participle’ construction as found in Skr. ‘*ciraḥ kālo maitrasya Vasantasenāyāḥ sakāśaṃ gatasya*’ (SS *ibid*). It occurs in the following passages: *atha kho te paribbājakā acirapakkantassa Bhagavato Poṭṭhapādaṃ sañjambhariyaṃ akaṃsu* D I.189 “Then those wandering ascetics, not long after the Blessed One had departed, began to tease P.”; cp. D II.8; M I.110; *atha kho āyasmā Ānando acirapakkantassa rañño Pasenadissa Kosalassa yena* [202] *Bhagavā ten’ upasaṅkami* M II.117 (cp. D I.86; S III.95) “then the ven. Ānanda, not long after King P. of K. has departed came where the Blessed One was”. The use of this *past* participle in the *gen. absolute* construction is a later development in Pāli and is contrary to the general laws prevailing in Skr. mentioned above.

§159. [Examples of Genitive Absolute]

The above usage shows, in fact, the transitional stage in the formation of the *gen. absolute*. Speyer points out that apart from the genuine *gen. absolute* Skr. upon the whole shows a preference for employing the *gen.* of participle either as *dat.*-like *gen.* or when depending on some substantive. This may also be said of Pāli where there are many instances of the ‘*gen.* + participle’ which seem to be only *semi-absolute* constructions (cp. SS §§370; Renou *Grammaire Sanscrite* §226.Note 1.). The logical relation between such genitives and the main sentence (or a word in the main sentence) “though not wholly wanting is very loose indeed”.

a. The following examples seem to border on the *dat.* of *concern*: *tesaṃ bhikkhave sattānaṃ evaṃ kāmānaṃ ... aniṭṭhā ... dhammā abhivaḍḍhanti* M I.309 “For such beings desiring thus ... unpleasant

mental states increase” or “notwithstanding their desiring thus ...”; *Imaṃ kho me somanassaṃ sevato akusalā dhammā parihāyanti* D II.278 “For me indulging in a state of mental ease evil things decrease”; *gocare bhikkhave carataṃ sake pettike visaye na lacchati Māro otāraṃ* D III.58 “To you wandering (or as you are wandering) in such pastures, your own paternal range, the Evil One will not find occasion to enter”.

b. It may even border on the *adverbial dat.*, as for instance, the dat. with verbs of *trusting* and *relying on* (having faith in). e.g., *ye kho pana bhikkhave Sunettassa Satthuno Brahmaloaka-sahavyatāya dhammaṃ desentassa cittāni na pasādesuṃ* A IV.135 “those who, monks, did not engender faith in their minds when the Master was (or in the Master) preaching doctrine (conducive) to the companionship in the Brahma-world”. [203]

c. Or it may have the possessive sense at the same time. e.g., *kittāvatā nu kho āvuso Satthu pavivittassa viharato sāvakā vivekaṃ nānusikkhanti* M I.14 “how far, friends, do the disciples of the Master living in seclusion not train themselves for seclusion (or whereas the Master lives in seclusion)”. A curious construction with the singular of the noun and the plural of the participle is found in the following where, contrary to the law prevailing in Skr., the gen. is of a common noun and not of a personal noun, though it is personified by the presence of *-rāja-*: *Sinerussa ca pabbatarājassa jhāyamānānaṃ dayhamānānaṃ acci vātena khittā yāva Brahma-lokā pi gacchati* A IV.103 “Of the King of Mountains, Sineru, (*sci.* from amongst those) burning and ablaze, the sparks shot forth by the wind go up as far as the Brahma-world”. Similar is the following: *jhāyamānassa pana sarīrassa, yaṃ ahoṣi chavīti vā ... tassa n’ eva chārikā paññāyittha na*

masi D II.164 “of the burning body (*or* while the body was burning) whatever was the skin etc ... of that there was seen neither soot nor ashes” (cp. last ex.§158.b.).

d. There are some other instances where the participle alone does duty for the whole construction. This happens when the personal pronoun is of the third person, which is usually dropped. e.g., *sabhāgatassa vacanaṃ na rūhati* D III.185 “Of him (*or* when he is) gone in the midst of an assembly the evidence is not valid”. The Comy. supports *absolute* idea. (*‘sakkhipuṭṭhassa sato’*).

e. Sometimes it borders on some other use of the gen. itself, as for instance the *gen. of origin*. e.g., *Seyyathāpi āvuso sakalikaggikassa jhāyamānassa aññā vā acci uppajati* A V.9 “just as, friends, from (a fire of) logs burning (*or* while logs are burning) another spark arises.”

f. Elsewhere (§144) we have referred to a *loc.-like gen.* denoting the persons *among whom* something happens, or takes place (cp. KVG §537.3). A similar gen. is found involved in a *semi-absolute* construction. e.g., *Purimāni bhante divasāni purimatarāni nānātitthiyānaṃ samaṇabrāhmaṇānaṃ kutūhalasālāyaṃ [204] sannisinnānaṃ sannipatitānaṃ, ayaṃ antarā kathā udapādi* M II.2 (D I.180) “In former days quite of yore, among the recluses and brahmins of various sects gathered together (*or* while they were gathered) in the hall of inquiry, this side-talk arose”; *atha kho Vāseṭṭha-Bhāradvajānaṃ jaṅghā-vihāraṃ anucaṅkamantānaṃ maggāmagge kathā udapādi* D I.235 “then while Vāseṭṭha and Bhāradvāja were engaged in a walk, (*or* between them engaged in a walk) this talk arose on the very way”.

Chapter VII

The Locative Case

[205]

§160. [General Characteristics]

The seventh case (*sattamī* = Skr. *saptamī*) or the loc. serves to denote the *where*, i.e., the scene of an action. But it is capable of expressing such nuances as are denoted by the English prepositions *in*, *on*, *at*, *among*, *with*, *by*, *near*, *over* or *about*. Moreover its employment is not restricted to actual space as normally understood by ‘where’, but extends into other spheres of thought (cp. SS §38.6) Consequently there are various uses of the loc. which can be classified as those denoting, for instance, the varying conceptions of *time*, of *circumstance*, of *motive*, (the *nimitta-sattamī* of local grammarians), of *relation*, the *loc. absolute* with its various subdivisions and so on. Though fundamentally the loc. denotes just *where*, i.e. the place where an action takes place and thus appears to express a static notion, it is nevertheless capable of having a dynamic import as when it signifies the *aim* reached with verbs of *motion* and allied meaning, being in most such instances parallel to the acc. But in spite of all these syntactical variations of application, logically the fundamental unity of conception underlying all its uses appears more markedly in the case of the loc. than with most other cases. Apart from these *adverbial* uses the loc. is also employed *adnominally* in the Nikāyas with a descriptive sense, but even here some verbal concept seems to be implied.

§161. [Local Grammarians]

The fundamental characteristic of the loc. according to local grammarians, is to denote that which is the (relevant) *basis* (*ādhāra*) for the action. Hence the designation *ādhāra-vibhatti*. The *place in* or *on* which something happens is, in their opinion, that which maintains the process implied by the main verb (*kriyā*). Says Kaccāyana: *yo' dhāro tamokāsaṃ* (280), meaning [206] thereby that which is auxiliary (to the action) is the *location* (space or opportunity); whereas Moggallāna's rule *sattamyādhāre* (II.34) is interpreted by the *vutti* as implying that “what is auxiliary to the action by way of supporting the agent and the object which are its co-efficients is called the seventh *kāraka*” (*'kriyādhārabhūta-kattukammānaṃ dhāraṇena yo kriyāyādhāro tasmim kārake nāmasmā sattamī hoti'*). These go back to the Pāṇinī sūtra *ādhāro' dhikaraṇaṃ*, which means according to the *vārttikā* that which is related to the action as the site where the action takes place is called *adhikaraṇa*. It is interesting to note that Kaccāyana does not employ the term *ādhāra* as the original notion of the loc., as the other two, but the word *okāsa* (*okāse sattamī* Kac. 304). This notion of *location*, according to the *vutti* on Kac. 280, is four-fold: '*svādhāro catubbhido: byāpiko opasilesiko vesyiko sāmīpikoti'* viz., 1. when it expresses *inhesion*, *inherence* or *concomitancy*; 2. when it implies *occupation* or *juxtaposition*; 3. when the notion of *residence* or *habitation* is meant; finally, 4. when it signifies *proximity* or *vicinity* or *neighbourhood*. Though this division is necessarily arbitrary and incomplete, it is to the credit of the writer that some of the fundamental logical connections of the loc. are touched upon.

§162. [Relation to other Cases]

We have already referred to the contact of the proper sphere of the acc. with that of the loc. (§§40 & 45). In Pāli, as in Skr., the former is not alone in bordering on the latter's employ since, as we shall see in the succeeding paragraphs, other cases like the inst., dat., gen., and even the abl. come into contact with it. These various points of contact seem to have been made very early in the history of I.E., for in special form the loc. is only preserved in Indo-Aryan and Balt.-Slav., having coalesced in Greek with the dat.-inst., in Latin with the abl.-inst., and in Germanic with the dat. (*vide* KVG §536). In Pāli the loc. form was more liable to preservation as already the inst. had coalesced with the abl. (completely in the plural and in the *-ā* ending of the singular) and the dat. with the gen. in both numbers. Nevertheless the original sg. ending *-e* of *-a* nouns [207] seems to have been superseded even in the older Nikāyas by the later form *-smiṃ* (*-mhi*) borrowed from the pronominal declension, though the replacement has not gone so far as in the case of the abl. (§5.b.). This has been extended even into other declensions such as those in *-i* and *-u* in the sg., but the plural is the same as that of the earlier language.

§163. The Locative of Place Where.

The fundamental function of the loc. is to express the *spot*, the exact *place*, *where* an action is done or takes place. Here we may observe the following distinctions (SS. §123A):

a. i. In its simplest form it conveys the notion of being *in* or *within*. e.g., *nirayamhi paccati* A V.75 “he is tortured in hell”; *Vesāliyaṃ viharati Ambapāli-vane* D II.94 “lives at (or near) Vesāli in the grove

of Ambapāli”. The construction in the latter is idiomatic. In such frequent instances where the verb of ‘being or living’ is placed between two locatives the former invariably denotes the *neighbourhood* in general (cp. Eng. ‘at’) and the exact spot, the actual *location*, is expressed by the latter which is almost always the name of a residence of some sort. Similarly: *so Vesāliyaṃ parisati evaṃ vācaṃ bhāsati* D III.13 “he speaks these words among the rabble at V”; *tesaṃ tiṅhāni satthāni hatthesu pātu-bhavanti* D III.73 “sharp weapons appear in their hands”; *tassa rukkhassa chāyāya nisinnaṃ* M I.74 “seated in the shade of that tree”.

ii. With the verb ‘to be’ complemented by a noun this loc. may sometimes be paralleled to the *gen. of description*. e.g., *amanussa-rājā divi homi* D II.206 “I am the non-human king in (or ‘of’) heaven”.

iii. With the verb *uppajjati* “be born” the loc. is used concurrently with the acc. (§40.a.) to denote the place *where* one is born or arises. When this verb has the sense of “attain to”, which should be the literal sense of *ud+pad* (or even *upa+pad*), the *acc. of direction* should be the more logical construction. There seems to be, however, a semantical confusion between the two [208] notions of “being born in” and “born into, attain to”. The context in most cases still shows that the loc. is properly used when the sense is “to be born in”. e.g., *Tathāgato loke uppajjati* D I.62 “The Tathāgata is born in the world”; *Padumake pana bhikkhu niraye Kokāliko bhikkhu uppanno* S I.152 “In the P. purgatory, O monk, the brother K. is born”. This confusion of the acc. and the loc. has left its mark in a curious construction where the *-e* form can also be regarded as the Māgadhi acc. sg. (*see* Eastern forms §10), unless it is an editor’s error, viz.,

paraṃ marañā sugatiṃ saggam loke uppajjanti A I.32 “after death they are born into a happy state in heaven”.

iv. Even when the prefixes *adhi-*, *paṭi-* etc. are added to verbs of ‘being’ or ‘living’, the loc. is maintained and the acc. is not used though we may expect the latter according to the tendency of such compound-verbs to become ‘transitive’; e.g., *tasmim sāle adhivatthā devatā* M I.306; S I.197 “the godhead inhabiting that sal-tree”; *Vesāliyaṃ paṭivasanti* D I.150 “live at Vesāli”; cp. *Nālandāyaṃ* M I.371, *āpaṇe* Sn 104.

v. The verbs *tiṭṭhati* and *vattati* (< *sthā* and *vṛt*) in the sense of *standing by* or *abiding by* are construed with a loc. (vide SS §138.3). Such idioms as ‘*ovāde tiṭṭhati*’ are not alien to Pāli concinnity though not exemplified in the Nikāyas. It is however quite frequent in the Jātakas; e.g., *ovāde thatvā* J I.153; IV.367 “abiding by the advice”. These verbs are construed with the loc. even when prefixes are added owing to their character as primary verbs of *location* like the above root *vas*. e.g., *mahā-paṭhavī udake paṭiṭṭhitā* D II.107 “the wide earth is established in the water”; *hīne kāye paṭiṭṭhitā* M I.327 “placed in a low body”; *nāma-rūpe paṭiṭṭhitā* D II.63 “established in name and form”.

vi. This loc. of *place where* may sometimes be used in a metaphorical sense in such expressions as “to sit at *or* preside over” and “to find *or* see something (quality etc.) in a person”. e.g., *rājā atthakaraṇe nisinno* D II.20; M II.122 “the king seated at the administration of justice (*or* presiding over the cases)”; *ime pañca-nīvaraṇe appahīne attani samanupassati* [209] D I.73 (cp. M I.367) “he sees the five hindrances undestroyed in himself”; *evaṃ paripuṇṇaṃ ...*

sīlakkhandhaṃ ... aññesu samaṇabrāhmaṇesu na samanupassāmi D I.206 “such a complete ... aggregate of virtues ... I do not find in other recluses and brahmins”; *na ca pana etaṃ amhesu saṃvijjati* D I.3 “this indeed does not exist in us”; *tesaṃ te kārā amhesu mahapphalā bhavissanti* M I.281 “those actions of theirs ensure to fruit and profit in ourselves”. The loc. in these examples denotes *location* however abstract it may be. In some of these the dat. or the gen. is admissible in place of the loc. especially when it is said to exist in a *person*; when however the noun in the loc. is not personal this option is less possible. e.g., *natthi kāmesu doso* M I.305 “there is nothing wrong in pleasures”.

§164. [Various Uses]

a. The surface trodden or touched *on, upon*, or the space *over, at*, or the thing *through which* motion is implied is denoted by the loc. e.g., *udake pi abhijjamāne gacchati* M II.18 “walks on the unbroken (surface of the) water”; *Vesāliyaṃ piṇḍāya caritvā* D II.102 “having gone for alms over Vesāli”; *abbhokāse caṅkamanti* M II.119 “they walk on the open ground (or in the open air)”; *suparikamma-katasmim dantasmim yaṃ yad eva ... danta-vikaṭim kareyya* D I.78 “as if he would make certain ornamentations on the well-levelled (surface of an) elephant’s tooth”; *ayokhīlaṃ hatthe gamenti* A I.141 “they send an iron spike through the hand”.

b. Or it may denote the dominion, territory or thing *on, in* or *at*. e.g., *nisīdi Bhagavā paññatte āsane* M II.2 “the Blessed One sat on the seat that was prepared”; *aṅke nisīdāpetvā* D II.20 “having made (him) to sleep on the lap”; *pallaṅke nisīdi* D II.210 “sat on the

couch”; *pupphaṃ iva udumbaresu* Sn 5 “like flowers on the fig trees”. This is called *opasilesiko-ādhāro* by the *vutti* on Kac. 280.

c. It may also denote the thing or place *near, on, about, at*, in short, *proximity (samīpattha)*. e.g., *aññatarasmim rukkhamūle nisīdi* D II.162 “he sat near *or* at the foot of the tree”; *Ukkaṭṭhāyaṃ*¹ *viharati Subhagavane* M I.1 “lives at or near Uk. in the Subha [210] grove” (cp. remarks under a.i.). This sense is also brought about by placing *anu-* before the noun in the loc. as adnominal prefix. e.g., *anutīre*² *Mahiyā* Sn 18 “near *or* along the bank of the river M.”.

d. This loc. also denotes the people *among whom* one lives or something happens. (cp. KVG §537.3; SS §133.e.). The partitive gen. denoting a group of people out of whom some are selected can sometimes psychologically coincide with this loc. (§144.a.). e.g., *Bhagavā Sakkesu viharati* D II.253 (cp. *Kurūsu*³ D II.55) “the Blessed One lives among the Sakyans”; *Kosalesu cārikaṃ carati* M II.45 (140 Videhesu) “he sojourns among the Kosalas”; *vāseṭṭha-Bhāradvāja Bhikkhūsu parivasanti* D III.80 “Vāseṭṭha and Bhāradvāja reside among the monks”; *devesu Tāvatiṃsesu pātur-ahosi* Ud 22. “he appeared among the T. gods”; *Suddhāvāsesu devesu antarahitā* S I.26 “disappearing (from) among the S. gods” (*vide* abl.-like loc. §173.c.); *te Nigaṇṭhesu pabbajantīti* M I.93 “they enter (the homeless life) among the naked ascetics”.

e. In certain constructions, especially with verbs of *living* and others implying *co-residence*, the person *under, with or in the company of*

¹ Comy. ‘*samīpatthe bhummavacaṇaṃ*’ Ps.I.12.

² ‘*anutīreti tīrasamipe*’ Pj.II.28.

³ ‘*tasmim kurūsu janapade*’ Sum.II.481.

whom one stays is expressed by the loc. case. This seems to have originated in such earlier usages as the Vedic ‘*sā hāsmīn jyoguvāsa*’ “she lived with him” (cp. KVG §539), and the loc. of the person *with whom* one stays is a frequent idiom in Classical Skr. (cp. SS §137.2). This may be called the *sociative loc.* e.g., *Bhagavati brahmacariyaṃ caranti* D I.155; II.208 “they practise the Holy Life under or with the Blessed One” (cp. *Sugatasmīṃ* ... D II.208). It may occur *adnominally*: *samaṇe Gotame brahmacariyavāso* M I.524 “Higher Life (is) with the recluse Gotama”. Similar is the following *gāthā* idiom: *Vesiyāsu padissati ... dissati paradāresu* Sn 108 “he is seen in the company of harlots ... and others’ wives”. A periphrasis for this construction is *-santike* which itself is a *sociative loc.* e.g., *alatttha ... Bhagavato santike pabbajjaṃ* D II.153 “he received ordination under the Blessed One”. This also borders on the abl. like loc. found with verbs of *receiving* (§173.a.) [211] and may be rendered “received ... from the Bl. One”. Syntactically related to this sociative loc. is the one found in the stock-phrase *cittaṃ vase vatteti* A IV.34 “keeps the mind under control”. Sometimes periphrastic turns of expression such as *majjhe*, *visaye*, *antare*, *antaram*, *passe*, *samīpe* etc. are used for the loc. (either with the gen. of the noun or as the second member of a compound). e.g., *saṅghamajjhe osaranti* M I.469, II.8 “come into the midst of the Order of monks”; *Māravisaye (pakkhanno)* Th. 1.253 “falls into the realm of Māra”; also in the *gāthā* literature post-positions ending in other case-suffixes, particularly the acc. of place *where*, are used as periphrases for the loc. e.g., *susaṃvutatto visikhantaram caraṃ* Th 1.1119 “walking in the streets well-restrained in body”. It is however not clear (as far as the Nikāya language is concerned) whether these periphrases always make the meaning of the loc. more precise as Speyer seems to think (cp. SS §133.e.).

§165. The Locative of Place Whither.

As has been already pointed out the loc. not only expresses the place *where* something takes place but also the *spot whither* (*into which*) motion is directed. This construction exists in Vedic and Classical Skr. just as in Latin and Greek, especially with verbs of *falling*, *throwing* and *casting* (cp. VGS §204.1.b.; SS §§134.B. & 134*). It is quite common in Pāli and in most instances concurrent with the *acc. of the goal* (§40-). Kaccāyana refers to the loc. used for the acc. (312) but the *vutti* gives only examples, of the type ‘... *bhikkhusu abhivādenti*’ and none with verbs of *motion*. The following distinctions are to be observed:

a. The place *into* or *to* which one moves, is carried or betakes oneself: e.g., *Sāvattthiyaṃ agamāsiṃ* D II.270 “I came to S”; *ekante attānaṃ upasaṃharitvā* D II.212 “having betaken himself to one side”; cp. *ye Padume niraye upanītā* Sn 677 “who are carried into Paduma hell”.

b. The place or spot one enters or descends *into*: e.g., *Vesāliyaṃ piṇḍāya pāvisiṃ* D II.102 (III.16) “he entered (into) V., for [212] alms”. Here however the reading is not quite settled. The P.T.S. text reads ‘*Vesāliṃ piṇḍāya pāvisi*’ D II.102 and continues ‘*Vesāliyaṃ piṇḍāya caritvā*’ but Feer (Sd) has ‘*Vesāliyaṃ piṇḍāya pāvisi, Vesāliyaṃ piṇḍāya caritvā*’ with the loc. in both places. In the other passage (D III.16) the P.T.S. also has ‘*Vesāliyaṃ piṇḍāya pāvisiṃ*’. Syntactically, it is not necessary to alter any of the MSS. since the loc. as well as the acc. is permissible. The loc. in *saṅghamaṃ osaranti* also belongs to this class (cp. end of para. 164.f.), and the acc. is actually found with this verb *osarati*. e.g., *gāmaṃ osara-* M

I.176 “enter- the village”. Similarly the passage: *mātu-kucchismiṃ okkamati* D III.231 “enters into the mother’s womb” occurs with the acc. *-kucchiṃ* at D II.63.

c. The place or spot *into* which one *falls*: e.g., *na cāssa kānici phalāni bhūmiyaṃ patitāni* M I.366 “none of its fruits are fallen on (onto) the ground”. Similar is the construction in *pakkhanno Māraṅgissa* Th 1.253 (cp. end §164.f.).

d. With verbs having the sense of *submerging* and *sinking into* or *in*: e.g., *paṭhaviyāpi ummujja-nimmujjaṃ karoti seyyathāpi udake* D I.78 “he dives into the earth and emerges out of it as in water”.

e. With verbs of *throwing, casting* and the like to denote the place or spot *on, onto* or *into which*: e.g., *kālakatañ ca naṃ ... susāne chaḍḍhessanti* D III.8 “they throw him (when he is) dead into the charnal ground”; *tela-doṇiyā pakkhipivā* D II.142 “having put into an oil-vat”; cp. *thale khitto* Dh 34 “thrown on the land”.

f. With verbs meaning to *keep, place on, over, across* etc.: e.g., *samaṃ pādaṃ bhūmiyaṃ nikkhipati* D III.146 “he places the foot horizontally (i.e. flat) on the ground”; *rittam pi pattam sīse nikujjeyyūṃ* D III.203 “they would place an empty bowl over his head”. Similar is the use of the loc. with the verb *karoti* (cp. SS §133 R.1). e.g., *aṃse katvāna cīvaraṃ* Th 1.197 “having put the robe over (across) the shoulder”; *taṃ hatthe karitvā* D I.76; II.13; M II.17 “having taken it in(to) his hand” (*lit.* having put it on his palm). A metaphorical turn of the same idiom is [213] found in the compound verb ‘*manasi-karoti*’. e.g., *sādhukaṃ manasi karotha* D II.2 (204) “take it well into your head” (i.e. reflect well in your mind).

g. With verbs of *striking* and *hitting* the *spot at or on which* the blow is dealt: e.g., *āyasmato Vidhurassa sīse pahāraṃ adāsi* M I.336 “he gave a blow on the head of the ven. Vidhura”; cp. *sīse pahāraṃ adāsi* M I.126 “gave a blow on the head”. But the *person to whom* the blow is given is naturally denoted by the dat. case. e.g., *bhikkhunīnaṃ pāṇinā pahāraṃ dadeyya* M I.123 “would give a blow with his hand to the nuns” (i.e. would strike the nuns with his hand).

h. With the idiomatic phrases ‘*saṅgahaṃ gacchati*’ and ‘*samodhānaṃ gacchati*’ the loc. denotes that *within which* something is comprised or included or *into which* something fits. e.g., *yāni kānici jaṅgamānaṃ pāṇānaṃ padajātāni sabbāni tāni hatthipade samodhānaṃ gacchati* M I.184 “whatever footprints there are of walking animals, all those go into an elephant’s foot” (i.e. are comprised within or included within an elephant’s foot); *ye keci kusalā dhammā sabbe te catusu ariyasaccesu saṅgahaṃ gacchanti* M I.184 “whatever good things there are, all those are comprised within the four Noble Truths”. A similar loc. is involved in the elliptical construction: *Brahmuno pakati-vaṇṇo anabhisambhavanīyo so devānaṃ Tāvatiṃsānaṃ cakkhupathasmiṃ* D II.244 “For Brahma’s usual appearance is not (sufficiently) materialized as to appear (fall within the scope of or) in the Tāvatiṃsa gods’ vision”. That some such infinitive as *patitum* is to be understood is made clear by the Comy. which has ‘*anabhisambhavanīyo ti appattabbo*’ (Sum. II.640). The P.T.S. translation has “not sufficiently materialized to *impress* the vision of the Thirty Three gods”. The loc. here can also be regarded as denoting *relation* (§174).

§166. The Locative with Verbs.

The loc. also appears in special connection with certain classes of verbs. Here it seems to express notions allied to the fundamental conception of *place where*. Such are: [214]

a. Verbs denoting the thing touched in *binding* etc. (cp. SS §139.4). For instance, it may signify *that around which, to which* or *at (by) which* the action of tying is performed. e.g., *sīse sīsa-veṭhanaṃ bandheyya* M II.193 “he would tie the turban around his head”; *daḷho thambhe vā khīle upanibaddho* M II.232 “tied to a stout pillar or post”; *asurindaṃ kaṅṭhe ... bandhanehi bandhitvā* S I.221 “having tied the lord of the asuras at (or by) the neck with strings”.

b. Verbs of *sticking, adhering, attaching, clinging, hanging on, depending on* etc. e.g., *rajojallaṃ kāye na upalippati* M II.136; D III.158 “dust and dirt do not stick to his body”; *pāvaḷā su nāma te pīṭhakasmiṃ allīnā* D III.19,21 “your buttocks are sticking to the chair”; *kāyasmīṃ allīnā* M II.139 “clinging to the body”; *kaṅṭhe āsattena* M I.120 “hanging on his neck”; cp. *vāto va jālamhi asajjamāno* Sn 71 “like the wind not sticking in (on to) the net (i.e. caught in the net)”; *nāmarūpasmīṃ asajjamāno* Dh 221 “not clinging to name and form”.

c. Verbs of *relying, trusting, having faith in* etc. e.g., *Evaṃ pasanno ahaṃ samaṇe Gotame* D II.149 “I have such faith in the recluse Gotama”; *Sele brāhmaṇe abhippasanno* Sn p.105 “extremely pleased (or confident) in the brahmin Sela”; *Tathāgate saddhaṃ paṭilabhati* D I.63; M I.179,267,344; III.33 “conceives faith in the Tathāgata”. The dat. is here the parallel case (§94.a.).

d. Verbs having just the opposite sense, of *doubting*, *being unsettled* or *not*, *clear in mind*, *suspecting* and *being disgusted*. Here as well as in the above type (c.) the loc. is expressive of *relation*, i.e. the thing *regarding which*. e.g., i). *dvīsu mahā-purisalakkhaṇesu kaṅkhati vicikicchati nādhimuccati na sampasīdati* M II.135 “he doubts, hesitates to believe in, is not settled with regard to, two signs of the Super-man”; *cattār’ imani bhikkhave bhayāni udak’ orohante pāṭikaṅkhitabbāni* M I.459 “these four dangers (*lit.* fears) should be expected (*lit.* suspected) in (the case of) one going into the water”. The gen. is also employed with this verb (§147.c.). ii). With *nibbindati* the loc. appears concurrently with the abl. or the inst. (§126.e.). e.g., *sutavā [215] ariyasāvako rūpasmiṃ nibbindati* M II.20 “the learned disciple is disgusted in (i.e. with, of) form”; cp. *nibbindati bhavagata* Th 2.522 “gets disgusted of what is given to becoming”.

e. Verbs of *catching*, *taking*, *seizing* agree with a loc. of *that* (usually a part of the body) *by which* one is caught, the person being denoted by the acc. e.g., *taṃ enaṃ dve balavanto purisā nānābhāsu gahetvā* M I.365 “him as such two strong men taking by the arms (in various ways)”; *taṃ bhikkhuṃ bhāyamaṃ gahetvā* D I.221; A IV.206; Ud 52 “having taken that monk by the hand”; *pādesu gahetvā* Sn p.32 “taking by the legs”; *eḷakaṃ lomesu gahetvā* M I.228 “having caught the ram by its hairs”; *dubbalataraṃ purisaṃ sīse vā gahetvā khandhe vā gahetvā* M I.121 “taking a weaker man by the head or the body”; *kesesu parāmasitvā* M II.47 “seizing by the hairs”. The inst. of means is not used in this connection, for it is expressly employed to signify that limb or part of the body of the *agent with which* (by which) the action is done (§66.a).

f. With verbs meaning to *fall at one's feet* (SS §139.4.), to *kneel down* or *prostrate oneself before*, the person *before whom* such an act of obeisance is done is denoted by the loc. Here the dat. may also be optionally used, implying the person *to whom* obeisance is done (§96.b.). e.g., *atha ca pana samaṇe Gotame evarūpaṃ nipaccakāraṃ karoti* S I.178 “even then he performs such low acts of obeisance before the recluse Gotama”; *mayi nipaccakāraṃ karonti yathā Bhagavati* M II.124 “they fall prostrate before me as before the Blessed One”; cp. *Bhagavato pādesu sirasā nipatati* Vin. II.192 “he falls (prostrate) with his head before the (or at the) feet of the Blessed One”; *karonti kho Vāseṭṭha Sakyā raññe Pasenadimhi Kosale nipaccakāraṃ abhivādanaṃ ... sāmīcikkammaṃ* D III.83 “the Sākyaans, Vāseṭṭha, certainly do obeisance and perform acts of greeting ... before King P. of K.”.

§167. The Partitive Locative.

We have seen that the gen. which is the proper case for expressing the *partitive* notion is capable of denoting not only [216] *the whole of which* a part is meant but also the multitude of persons or things *out of which* a selection is made (§144; cp. SS §116). With this latter function of the gen. is logically connected the notion of *persons (from) amongst whom* some are specified, and this is denoted by the loc. case. Hence in this connection the gen. and the loc. are interchangeable (cp. SS *ibid*). So Kaccāyana has the rule that in expressing *specification* (i.e. selection or separation) the loc. or the gen. can optionally be used.⁴ This loc. is therefore in origin different

⁴ ‘*niddhāraṇe ca*’ Kac. 306, enlarged by the *vutti* as ‘*niddhāraṇatthe ca chaṭṭhī vibhatti hoti sattamī ca*’.

from that which expresses the persons or multitude *amid* or *among whom* something (event etc.) takes place or an action is performed (§164.e.). With pure adjectives of the comparative or superlative degree the gen. seems to be preferred (§144.d. & e.), but the loc. is by no means rare with such words as *aññatara* and adjectives prefixed by *bahu-* etc. implying comparison.

a. i. When the multitude is denoted by a noun in the plural the loc. is used parallel to the gen. e.g., *etad anuttariyaṃ bhante padhānesu* D III.103,106 “this, Sir, is unique among the exertions”; *imesu pañcasu kāmagaṇesu aññatarasmiṃ* M III.114 “in one among these five kinds of pleasures”; *samaṇesu vā samaṇasammata* D II.185 “those held in esteem as recluses among the recluses”; cp. *suttesu bahujāgaro* Dh 29 “much awake among the sleeping”; *suttesu jāgarā* S I.3 (V.) “those awake among the sleeping”.

ii. When however the word denoting the multitude is a collective noun (sg.) the loc. is of necessity and the gen. is logically ruled out. e.g., *tassaṃ parisāyaṃ koci* D II.210 “a certain one among the assembly”; cp. *khattiyo seṭṭho jane tasmiṃ ye gotta-paṭisārino* M I.358 (V.) “the warrior is the highest among those people who rely on lineage”.

§168. [Partitive Notions]

The above mentioned option in the use of the loc. or gen. has extended even to other partitive notions. Just as the gen., as pointed out before, is capable of denoting the whole of which a part is meant (by the qualified word), so the loc. may sometimes express *that in which* (i.e. of which) something else constitutes [217] a part. It is

usually found with verbs having the sense of: i). *declaring, saying, calling*; ii). *thinking, considering, deeming*; and iii). *assigning, defining and laying down*. In general the loc. with these denotes *the thing as part of which or as coming under which* something else is characterized, thus:

i. With verbs of *declaring* etc. e.g., *idaṃ assa musāvādasmiṃ vadāmi* A I.206 “I say this is part of his falsehood”; *idaṃ kho ahaṃ Udāyi iñjitasmiṃ vadāmi* M I.454 “I declare this, Udāyi, as part of (his) movement”; *vuttaṃ kho paṇ’ etaṃ bhikkhu mayā yaṃ kiñci vedayitaṃ taṃ dukkhasminti* S IV.216 “It has been declared by me, monk, that whatever is known by feeling comes under sorrow”; *idaṃ ahaṃ tesam ... sammohavihārasmiṃ vadāmi* M I.21,251 “this I declare as part of the complete delusion in which they ... live”. Here the Comy. paraphrases the loc. with the acc. (*-vihārapariyāpannaṃ vadāmi*’ Ps) treating it as being parallel to the complementary acc. found in the double acc. construction with verbs of speaking, thinking, considering etc. (*vide* §58.b.). The loc. here can reasonably be regarded as a *predicative loc.*

ii. With verbs of *considering* etc. e.g., *nibbānasmiṃ na maññati* M I.4 “he, does not think (consider) it as (part of) *nibbāna*”; *paṭhaviyā na maññati* M I.4 “he does not think (it as part of) earth”. The P.T.S. translation of this passage has “in the earth” for *paṭhaviyā*, which would be syntactically untenable according to the above explanation.

iii. With verbs of *assigning* etc. e.g., *tañca sukhasmiṃ paññāpeti* S IV.228 “he lays it down as (part of) happiness”; *na kho āvuso Bhagavā sukhaṃ yeva vedanaṃ sandhāya sukhasmiṃ paññāpeti* M

I.400 “the Blessed One, friend, does not rank (a thing) as (part of) pleasure just because of pleasant feeling”.

b. In all these examples, it may be observed, the loc. being used parallel to the *predicative acc.* (of apposition) in fact plays the part of a complement to the main verb of the sentence. The loc. here, as pointed out above (a.), is a part of the predicate. [218] When the main verb is a form of *bhū* “to be” the construction appears as a proper *predicative loc.*

i. e.g., *idaṃ pi assa hoti sīlasmiṃ* D I.63 “this is (part of) his goodness”; *idaṃ pi ssa hoti caraṇasmiṃ* D I.100 “this too is part of his conduct”. Commenting on the former, Buddhaghosa has ‘*idaṃ pi assa bhikkhuno pāṇātipātāveramaṇī sīlasmiṃ ekaṃ sīlaṃ hoti*’ which clearly shows that he regarded the locative as *partitive* (*niddhāraṇatthe*). He too points out that it is employed in the sense of the nom. in its complementary role as predicate.⁵ The construction accordingly borders on the *predicative* and *partitive* notions.

ii. Sometimes the same is found without the verb. Then it forms the actual predicate of the sentence. e.g., *idaṃ pi me tapasmiṃ* D III.44 “this too part of my asceticism”;⁶ *kiñca bhikkhave bhikkhuno āyusmiṃ* D III.77 “what is (the purpose in) life to a monk?”. With this latter we may compare the gen. used with the phrase ‘*ko pana vādo*’ (§156.a.).

⁵ ‘*paccatta-vacanatthe vā etaṃ bhummaṃ, Mahā-Aṭṭhakathāyaṃ hi idaṃ pi tassa samaṇassa sīlanti ayaṃ eva attho vutto ... idaṃ assa hoti sīlasmiṃti idaṃ assa sīlaṃ hotīti attho*’ Sum. I .183.

⁶ Comy. ‘*idaṃ pi kammaṃ mama eva tapasmiṃ; paccatte vā bhummaṃ idaṃ pi mama tapo ti*’ Sum.III.838.

iii. This same use is sometimes found in more abstract idioms. e.g., *yathā taṃ bhikkhave avisayasmiṃ* M I .85 “because, monks, it does not come within the scope (of ...)”; *idaṃ tesam hoti asanasmīṃ* D II.208 “this is the nature⁷ of their sitting (i.e. the order of their seats)”. In the former the syntactical nature of the loc. is not far from its simple local sense, while in the latter it borders on the *loc. of relation*.

§169. The Adnominal Locative.

Most of the adverbial uses described in the preceding paragraphs find their logical counterparts in the *adnominal* application of this case. (cp. KVG §539; SS §135). Of these the great majority are descriptive in sense and stand parallel to the usual *gen. of description* (§144.d.), to which however the analogy is not restricted. The loc. appears *adnominally* in the sense of *place where, place gone to* and the like; in fact it can stand for any of the adverbial uses with a few exceptions. But this does not detract from the validity of the general observation that the [219] loc. is fundamentally an *adverbial* case, though its psychological connection with the verb is not so clearly defined as in the other cases. For the loc. is more *auxiliary* (*ādhāraka*) to the progress of the action (*kriyā*) than *instrumental* (*sādhaka*).

a. Primarily it is found qualifying a person or thing as the loc. of *place where* or *time at which* implied with the notion of *living* or *being* conveyed by some such verb understood. e.g., *parito gāmesu*

⁷ Comy. ‘*Idaṃ tesam catunnaṃ āsane* (v.l. *āsanam*) *hoti*’ Sum.II.639. Here the v.l. shows the syntactical confusion of the loc. and the nom. in predicative sense.

manussā evaṃ āhaṃsu D II.264 “people (living) in the villages all around said thus: ...”; *dasasu lokadhātusu*⁸ *devatā sannipatitā* D II.139,255 “gods (living) in ten world-systems being assembled”; *vigatavalāhake deve abhido majjhantika-samayaṃ suriyo* M II.42; D II.182 “(like) the heavenly sun in a cloudless sky at noon time”.

b. In the above examples the gen. can be substituted for the loc.. In the following the gen. appears even preferable, though in such instances the loc. is frequently used: *Pakati esā Kassapa lokasmiṃ* D I.168 “This (is), Kassapa, the nature of (*lit.* in) the world”; *cakkhum loke antaradhāvissati* D II.140 “the Eye of the World will disappear”; *na c’ assa kāye balamattā* D I.72 “he has no strength at all of (*lit.* in) body”; *loke vivattacchaddo* D II.17 “one who has lifted the veil of the world”. In the last example the loose position of the loc. outside the compound would make the rendering “with regard the world” (taking the loc. as denoting *relation*) more plausible. But at any rate all the above locatives have the general character of qualifying the nouns to which they are applied.

c. The above observations hold good in the case of the following examples as well, where the loc. is clearly parallel to the *gen. of possession* though in a markedly abstract sense. We may compare such English usages as ‘the good in ...’ or ‘the fault in’. e.g., *nekkhamme ānisaṃsaṃ* D I.110; II.41 “the advantage of (*lit.* good in) renunciation”; *iddhipāṭihāriye ādīnavaṃ* D I.212 “the evil in the performance of miracles”; *kāmesu ādīnavaṃ* D II.274 “the evil in pleasures of the senses”; *jātidhamme ādīnavaṃ veditvā* M I.162 “having seen the evil of what is subject to birth”. [220]

⁸ cp. v.1, ‘*dasahi lokadhātūhi devatā sannipatitā*’ (abl.) D II.283.

d. Apart from such uses, the loc. sometimes may stand for other logical connections as in: *sīlesu paripūrakārino* D II.202, where the loc. seems to be used for the inst.-like gen. (§149) with verbs of *filling*, or denotes pure *relation*. Another *adnominal* use directly derived from the *adverbial* construction is found with nouns (substantives and adjectives) having the sense of *faith, confidence*, and their opposites *disgust, doubt, hesitation* etc. (§166.c. & d.). There again the notion of *relation* is quite conspicuous. e.g., *Buddhe aveccappasādena* D II.93 “with inviolable faith in the Buddha”; *Āḷāre Kālāme ulāraṃ pasādaṃ* D III.131 “Great faith in Āḷāra Kālāma”; *mayi kaṅkhā* D I.105 “doubt in me”; *kaṅkhā vā vimati vā Buddhe vā dhamme vā saṅghe vā paṭipadāya vā* D II.154 “doubt or perplexity concerning the (or in the) Buddha, the Doctrine, the Order or the Path”.

§170. The Dative-like Locative.

We have seen earlier how the loc. sometimes expresses the person or thing *towards* which an action is directed (§166.c. & f.). Pāli, just as Sanskrit (*vide* SS §145), extends that idiom to many kindred conceptions, and thus the loc. comes to be employed in such nuances as would otherwise be construable with a dat.. It may stand parallel to such constructions as the dat. of *remote object*, of *advantage* and *disadvantage*, of *concern* and *viewpoint*, of *possession* or the *dativus finalis*. With some of these conceptions as, for instance, *possession*, the gen. is capable of being used parallel to the dat..

a. It is concurrent with the dat. of the *remote object* when used with such verbs as those of *giving, bestowing, conferring, devolving* and the like. Kaccāyana provides for these and similar uses by the rule

sampadāne ca (313), whereby he means that the loc. is also permissible in certain functions of the dat.. Why this optional construction is possible can easily be understood when we consider the psychological relation between such English idioms as ‘give something *to* a person’ (dat.) and bestow or confer something *upon* a person’ (loc.). e.g., *Tathāgate* [221] *arahante sammā-sambudde dānaṃ deti* M III.254 (cp. *āyasmante Sāriputte* M III.263) “gives alms to (*lit.* bestows on) the T., the Saint, the perfectly Enlightened One”; *Saṅghe Gotamī dehi* M III.253 “give, Gotamī, to the Order”. This construction is adnominally found with nouns and participles derived from the root *dā*. e.g., *nigaṇṭhesu pi dāne samādapeti* M I.379 “he makes (me) give even to the naked ascetics”; *anupāṇīte dinnaṃ* M II.154 “what is given to one uninitiated”. It may also stand for the dat. of *remote object* in the double acc. construction with compound verbs having *karoti* as the second member (§58.c.ii). e.g., *karonti rañṇe ... nipaccakāraṃ ...* D III.83 “do obeisance to the king ...”, where the actual verb is *nipaccakāraṃ-karoti*; *na me tesu bhikkhusu anusāsanī karaṇīyā ahoṣi* M I.124 “there was no advice to be given to those monks by me”.

ii. With verbs such as *saṃvidahati* “bestow, provide for” and *samavossajjati* “devolves, confers, on or upon”, the loc. is the more appropriate construction logically though the dat. is not ruled out. e.g., *Govinde brāhmaṇe sabba-kiccāni samavossajjitvā* D II.267 “having devolved all duties on G. the brahmin”; *rakkhā-varaṇaguttiṃ saṃvidahati khattiyesu ... miḡapakkhīsu* A I.110 “he bestows (confers) protection, safety and shelter upon warriors ... and birds and beasts”.

b. It can also stand for the *dativus commodi et incommodi*. Here in many instances the construction borders on the loc. of *relation*. e.g., *abhūtaṃ vacanaṃ ca tasmim̐ rūhati* D III.183 “false reports too arise against (or about, regarding) him”; *no ca kumāre bhavissati antarāyo* Sn 691 “whether there would be any harm to (on) the prince”; *api nu so puriso evaṃkārī tasmim̐ kulle, kicca-kārī assa* M I.135 “But would he in doing so be doing the right thing for (with regard to) the raft”; *attānaṃ āvikattā satthari vā viññūsu vā brahmacārisu vā* M II.128 “discloser of himself to the Master, to the wise and the holy”.

c. We discussed elsewhere (§163.a.vi) the abstract use of the loc. as denoting the *person in whom* something (trait, virtue, fault etc.) is said to exist, with verbs like *saṃvijjati* etc.. Closely related to it is the loc. found with or implying verbs *bhavati* and [222] *atthi*, which, denoting as it does the thing or person to whom something is attributed, coincides logically with the *dat.* or *gen. of possession*. e.g., *cattāro’ me bhikkhave acchariyā abbhutā dhammā Ānande* D II.145 “there are, monks, these four wonderful and marvellous qualities in (to or for) Ānanda” (i.e. *he has* these four ...); *tayidam (domanassaṃ) Ghaṭṭikāre kumbhakāre natthi na ca bhavissati* M II.51 “that too is neither in G. the potter nor will be” (cp. v.l. *Ghaṭṭikārassa* etc.); *n’atthi c’etaṃ amhesu ...* D I.3 “this too is not in us” (i.e. we do not have this also).

d. In several instances the loc. may even stand as a concurrent idiom for the so-called *dativus finalis*, especially, as Speyer points out with regard to Skr. (SS §146), for the infinitive-like *dat.*. It is found:

i. With verbs of *wishing, desiring, resolving* etc. and nouns denoting *longing, eagerness, anxiety* etc. *jīvite apekhaṃ karohi* D II.191

“quicken thy longing after life” (P.T.S. Translation); cp. *kāme nāpekkhate cittaṃ* Sn 435 “the mind does not long for pleasure; *guttīsu rakkhāvaraṇesu ussuko* D III.148 “anxious for the protection and sheltering ...”.

ii. With verbs of *inducing, inciting, rousing, directing* and *training*: e.g., *sakaṃ parisāṃ uyyojesi Bhagavati brahmacariye* M I.524 “roused his group for the Higher Life under the Blessed One” (i.e. “urged them to practise the Higher Life ...”); *ananulomike kāyakamme samādapetvā* A I.106 “having directed (him) to improper bodily action”; *dāne samādapeti* M I.379 “induces to give ...”; *kumāraṃ rajje samanūsāsati* M II.75 “he exhorts the prince ... for kingship”; *yannūnāhaṃ Rāhulāṃ āsavānaṃ khaye vineyyaṃ* M III.277 “well would it be if I were to train Rāhula for the destruction of the banes”; cp. parallel idiom with dat. *vinayāya sikkhati* Sn 974, and with acc. (of purpose or direction) *nibbānaṃ sikkhati* SN 940,1061.

iii. With verbs of *employing, ordaining, enjoining, anointing* etc. e.g., *kammante payojeyya* D I.71 “he would employ (invest) that for business” (*lit.* in business); *Govindiye abhisīncissāmi* [223] D II.232 “I shall anoint (him) for the Chief-Stewardship” (or appoint to ...); these uses are very much like the simple loc. of *place where* (the matter *in which*) and in the following it implies *location* quite plainly: *pettike taṃ ṭhāne ṭhapayissāmi* D II.232 “I shall install him in his paternal office”.

§171. The Instrumental-Like Locative.

The various nuances expressed by the loc. in Pāli just as in Skr., bring it into contact not only with the dat. but even with other cases, especially the inst. Kaccāyana lays down (312) that the loc. is used sometimes in the sense of the inst., the *vutti* illustrating it with such examples as ‘*pattesu piṇḍāya caranti*’ and ‘*pathesu gacchanti*’. There are a good many instances of the loc. concurring with an inst. of *means* in general, including such divisions of it as that of *instrument*, *cause* and even of *agency*.

a. e.g., *sīhassa migarañño vighāse*⁹ *saṃvaḍḍho jara-sigālo ...* D III.24 “the wretch of a fox fattened on (by) the broken meat of the lion, the king of beasts”; *sabbesu dhammesu anuppalitto* M I.171 “unsmeared by all things”; *upamāyaṃ idh’ ekacce viññūpurisā bhāsītassa atthaṃ ājānanti* A V.194 “by a simile some wise people in this world understand the meaning of what is said”; *so cakkhunā rūpaṃ disvā piyarūpe sārājati appiyarūpe byāpajati*¹⁰ M I.266 “seeing an object with his eye he is pleased with the pleasant and irritated by the unpleasant”; *pāde*¹¹ *pādaṃ acchādāya* M I.354; D II.137,190 “covering (*ā* + *chād*) one foot with the other”; *apadāne sobhati paññā* A I.102 “wisdom shines through (in) character”.

b. The loc. also has more or less the instrumental sense of “according to” (*vide inst. of cause* §68.b.) with words denoting *restraint*, *training* or *conducting oneself* and with the verb *naccati* “dances”. In the former case it expresses the *code* or *precept* according to which (*lit.*

⁹ cp. Comy: *c. inst. ‘vighāseti vighāsenā’* Sum.III.827.

¹⁰ Usually with the inst. (*vide* P.T.S. Dict. *vyāpajati*).

¹¹ *pādena* at D II.137,190.

in which, cp. Eng. ‘to be trained in’) one is trained etc. and in the latter denotes that (music, band, orchestra etc.) to the accompaniment of *which* one dances, sings [224] etc. e.g., *pāṭimokkhe saṃvaro* D II.50 “restraint in (i.e. according to) the Higher Discipline”; *sikkhati sikkhāpadesu* D I.63,250 “trains (himself) in the precepts”; *ariyadhamme avinīto* S III.42 “not trained according to the Noble Law”; *carissāma Govindassānusāsane* D II.244 (V.) “we shall conduct ourselves according to the advice of Govinda”; *turiye naccati naṭṭakā* Th I.267 “the dancing-girl dances to the (accompaniment of) instrumental music”.

§172. Locative Parallel to the Instrumental-Ablative.

We have seen that in a good many categories there is no actual line of demarcation between the syntactical spheres of the inst. and the abl.. The logical relations expressed by the inst. of *separation*, of *comparison* and so on, for instance, properly belong to the logical scope of the abl.. Such points of contact of these two cases find their expression even in their common parallelism with the loc.. In the following instances the loc. is logically concurrent with the abl. but there is at the same time nothing to prevent the substitution of the inst. for the latter. Most of them border on the loc. of *relation*.

a. In denoting *separation*: *tassa taṃ cittaṃ hīne vimuttaṃ* D III.258 “his mind freed from low things”; cp. inst. with *vimutta* (§73.b.); *ko su nāma dāni maṃ imasmiṃ kule paribhindi* A IV.87 “who indeed estranged me (broke me away) from this family?”. Here, it may be remarked, the loc. seems to be preferred to the abl. because the noun expressing the thing from which *separation* is implied denotes a *place*. If it were a *person* the abl. or the inst. would be given

preference. Similarly we find such constructions as *kulesu sakkariyamānaṃ* D III.44 “being respected in (or by) the families”, where the *inst. of agency* would preferably be used if the noun were personal. Similarly: *so taṃ rukkhaṃ mūle chindeyya* A I.204 “he would cut that tree at (by, from) the root”. Here the abl. is actually found. e.g., *taṃ rukkhaṃ mūlato chetvā* M I.366 “having cut that tree from the root”, where the abl. borders on the notion of *side on* or *at which* and that of *point from which*. It is significant of the syntactical [225] fusion of these cases that the *inst.* too occurs, this time coordinately with the *loc.* in similar context. e.g., *so taṃ rukkhaṃ mūle chindeyya, mūlena chetvā ...* S II.88 “he would cut that tree at the root and having cut it by the root ...”.

b. In denoting *cause* or *means* (process through which): e.g., *Taṃ pi Bhagavā na manasākasi yathā taṃ anuttare upadhi saṅkhaye vimutto* S I.125 “The Blessed One did not even ponder on this, being emancipated through the destruction of the bases of becoming”. Here *saṅkhayā* would be the usual construction or rarely *saṅkhayena*, i.e., the abl. or the *inst. of cause*. These varied uses of the same idiom show the futility of attempting to treat of syntax according to absolute categories. The same relation may be expressed in many different ways according to the context, mostly determined by the principal verb of each sentence. This goes to support the observation that the laws governing syntactical change are psychological and not merely logical.

§173. The Ablative-Like Locative.

Apart from the above uses where the *loc.* can be explained either by the abl. or the *inst.*, it is frequently employed in some other functions

properly belonging to the abl.. Most of these uses too border on the loc. of relation and some even on that of *cause* (*nimitta*).

a. It is chiefly found with verbs of *receiving* and *obtaining* such as *labhati*, and those of *expecting*, *seeking*, *learning* such as *paccāsiṃsati* and *uggaṇhāti* (cp. KVG §538.1.). e.g., *Atha kho Raṭṭhapālo kulaputto mātāpitūsu pabbajjaṃ alabhamāno* M II.57. “Thereupon, Raṭṭhapāla, the householder’s son not obtaining permission to leave home from (*lit. at*, i.e. at the hands of) his parents”; *api nu so labhetha brāhmaṇesu āsanam vā udakam vā ti* D I.98 “would he receive a seat or water (for washing the feet) from the brahmins (at the hands of the brahmins)”; *kiṃ pana ... bhikkhu-saṅgho mayi paccāsiṃsati* D II.100 “what indeed ... does the Order of monks expect from [226] (of) me”. The prefix *pati-*, it may be observed, being a *karmapravacanīya*, should normally be construed with the acc., gen. or the abl. (*vide* Pāṇ. II.3.11). The abl. however is not found in the Nikāyas. The gen. (or the acc.) occurs side by side with the loc. e.g., *na ... sāvakesu anusāsaniṃ paccāsiṃsāmi mama* (v.l. *mamaṃ*) *yeva sāvakā anusāsaniṃ paccāsiṃsanti* M II.10 “nor ... do i seek instruction from my disciples, it is they who seek instruction from me”.

b. The loc. is also used with verbs and nouns of *fearing*, *trembling* etc. to show the *source from which* fear is anticipated (or *in which* it arises). Here the abl. as well as the gen. can be concurrent. The loc. in these instances too can be regarded as denoting *cause* or *relation* (*nimitta-sattamī*). The construction however is mostly found in verse. e.g., *etaṃ bhayaṃ maraṇe pekkhamāno* S I.2 “anticipating this fear from (*lit. in*) death”; *marāṇe me bhayaṃ natthi* Th 1.20 “I have no fear from (*lit. in*) death”; *anumattesu vajjesu bhayadassāvī* D I.63

“seeing fear (danger) even in the smallest vices”; *sīho va saddesu asantasanto* Sn 71 “not trembling at sounds like the lion”; *asantasaṃ jīvitasañkhayamhi* Sn 74 “not trembling at (the prospect of) the end of life”.

c. Pāli grammarians regard the loc. found with verbs of *disappearing* etc. as being used instead of the abl. of *separation*. Kaccāyana, by the aphorism *yena vā ’dassanaṃ* (276), allows optional construing with the abl. or the loc. such words as *antarahito*. But the loc. can be regarded in such examples as expressive, abstractly no doubt, of the place *in which* the action of *disappearing* or *vanishing* takes place. Here we have one more instance of a syntactical change brought about by a difference in viewpoint which is psychological. e.g., *bodhirukkhāmūle antarahito* D II.4 “disappearing from (*lit.* at) the foot of the tree of Enlightenment”; *evam evaṃ brahmaloke antarahito Bhagavato purato pāturahosi* S I.137 “in this wise disappearing from the world of the Brahmas he manifested himself before the Blessed One”. [227]

§174. The Locative of Cause and Relation.

It has been shown earlier, especially with regard to the adnominal and the abl.-, inst.- and the dat.-like locatives, that the loc. in those instances usually borders on the abstract notion of *place where* and that of *relation* (the thing concerning or regarding which). In some instances, such as the inst.-like loc., the ‘relation’ expressed even implied *cause*. In fact there is no real boundary-line separating the *nimitta-sattamī* the name given to the loc. denoting *cause, motive* or *purpose* by local grammarians – and that denoting *relation*. The former seems to be but a division of the latter’s sphere of

application. The following distinctions are made merely for the sake of convenience and do not affect the logical unity underlying all such uses.

a. *The Loc. of Relation* in Pāli has a pronounced employment as compared with its almost negligible occurrence in the older language (cp. Speyer SS §141.6). Speyer refers to it only in its narrow sense of ‘the point in which’. In most instances it can be rendered by the Eng. phrases such as ‘concerning, as regards, in the matter of, with regard to’ and the like. The *relation* expressed is usually with regard to the whole statement, in which case the loc. is *adverbal*. e.g., *Iti-h-idaṃ Sakuludāyissa paribbājakassa parisā Sakuludāyiṃ paribbājakam antarāyam akāsi Bhagavati brahmacariye* M II.39 “In such wise did the wanderer Sakuludāyi’s company oppose him in the matter of (practising) the Higher Life under the Blessed One”; *pubbe ananussutesu dhammesu cakkhuṃ udapādi* D II.32 “insight arose regarding previously unheard of things”. In some instances, while the notion of *relation* is not lacking, the loc. may be rendered by ‘on’ or even ‘in’. e.g., *ekaccesu thānesu sameti* D I.162 “there is agreement on (i.e. concerning) certain points”; *ālokite vilokite sampajānakāri hoti* M I.57 “he acts mindfully with regard to (*lit.* in) looking forward or sideways”; *abhikkante ... sampajānakāri* D II.95 “acting mindfully in going ...”. In the last two examples the loc. being of present participles has also the temporal sense of “when”.
[228]

b. But sometimes the ‘relation’ implied may be only with regard to a particular thing expressed by *one word* in the sentence, in which case it is *adnominal*. e.g., *indriyesu gutta-dvāro* D I.63 “having guarded doors with regard to the senses”; *kāmesu micchâcārā* D II.13 “wrong

conduct with regard to the pleasures of sense”; *aparapaccayā satthu-sāsane* D II.14 “independent of others as regards the message of the Master”. In such instances the loc. can be even translated by the Eng. ‘in’, but nonetheless it is expressive of *relation* rather than of the notion where, however much abstract it may be in sense. To this class also belongs the loc. attending on the phrase ‘*ko pana vādo*’, denoting the person *with regard to* or *about whom* the speaking is implied. We have referred to its use with the gen. earlier (§156.a). e.g., *ko pana vādo manussabhūte* A I.161 *lit.* “what talk about a human-being?” (*implying* “it is unnecessary to talk *about* a human-being or *in the case* of a human-being”).

§175. [Further Uses]

There are many other modifications of the same idiom too varied to be treated exhaustively. The following division serves a practical purpose:

a. In the *adnominal* use this loc. seems to border on the gen. on the whole. It is found with such nouns (substantives and adjectives) of *ability* and *skill* as *kusala*, *kevala*, *kovida*, *katāvī* etc. which we have earlier discussed under the gen. (§151.a). Kaccāyana enjoins the promiscuous use of the two cases with such words.¹² The loc. however is not so copiously attested in the Nikāyas as the gen.. The former seems to be employed only when the notion of *relation* is conspicuous. e.g., *hatthasmiṃ pi katāvī assasmiṃ pi katāvā* ... M II.69 “experienced with regard to (the riding of) the horse as well as the elephant”.

¹² ‘*sāmissarādhīpati-dāyādasakkhi-ṇaṭṭhū-pasutakusalehi ca*’ (305).

b. The same loc. is sometimes found employed, as in Skr. (cp. SS §141.6.), to denote the *quality, art, etc.* in which one *excels, is weak, equal or unequal*, or that *in point of* which one is *distinguished* as pure, defiled etc. e.g., *añño samaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā Bhagavato bhiyyo ’bhiññataro yadidaṃ sambodhiyaṃ* D III.99 “another recluse or brahmin much more penetrating in point of enlightenment [229] than the Blessed One”; *evaṃ so tasmim̐ ṭhāne parisuddho hoti* D III.46 “thus as regards this point he is pure”.

c. With various verbs of *speaking, explaining, preaching, asking, disputing, conversing* etc. the loc. denotes the topic or subject *on, about, over* or *regarding* which the speaking etc. is done. This seems to border on the *nimitta-sattamī* more than any other loc. of *relation*, especially in its application with verbs of asking. e.g., *Bhagavā dhammaṃ deseti kusalesu dhammesu* D III.102 “the Blessed One preaches the Doctrine with regard to the good things”; *Bhagavā dhammaṃ deseti padhānesu* D III.103 *et. seq.* “the Blessed One preaches (the Doctrine) on (the subject of) exertions”; ... *uppattīsu vyākaroṭi* D II.201 “makes declarations as to (regarding) the births ...”; *pucchāmi Brāhmāṇaṃ Saṇaṃkumāraṃ ... paravediyesu* D II.241 “I question the Brahmā S. on matters others would fain know”, where the loc. is used in place of the usual acc. in the double acc. construction with *pucchāmi* (§58.e.); but sometimes this loc. of relation occurs with the double acc. e.g., *Tatra maṃ aññataro tāpasa brahmacāri Nigrodho nāma adhiḥijucche pañhaṃ pucchi* D I.176 “there a certain ascetic-student named Nigrodha asked me about ‘the higher forms of austere scrupulousness of life’ (P.T.S.)”; *ko nu kho pahoti samaṇena Gotamena saddhiṃ asmim̐ vacane paṭimantetuṃ* M II.147 “who can dispute with recluse G. on this topic?”; *abhisaññā-nirodhe kathā udapādi* D I.177 “the talk fell on the (*lit.*

arose concerning the) higher cessation of perception”. Similar is the loc. with *anusāsati* “instructs”. e.g., *khattiye ... rajje anusāsi* D II.236 “instructed the princes ... on kingship”.

§176. The Locative of Reason and Motive.

From the last two paragraphs it may be observed that the loc. in some instances not only denoted *relation* (the thing regarding which) but even implied a *causal* notion at the same time (the thing on account of which). It is curious how the local grammarians while overlooking the wider category of *relation* – Kaccāyana¹³ only mentions specifically the loc. with words like [230] *sāmi* but does not seem to have grasped the fundamental unity of conception as we understand by the notion of *relation* – had observed and provided for the comparatively rare use which they call the *nimitta-sattamī*.¹⁴ We do not agree with Speyer (SS §148) in his inclusion of the *loc. of reference* (i.e. relation) in the *nimitta-sattamī* of the Indian grammarians. On the other hand the conception of the orthodox school merely constitutes a division of the wider category of *relation*. But he is undoubtedly justified in postulating a logical connection between the *dat.-like loc.* and the so-called *nimitta-sattamī*. The former denotes the spot *towards which* there is movement and this may be applied broadly to signify the person or thing *towards* whom or which some action is directed in other terms, that *on account of which* something is done. He adds: “Speaking exactly, the *dat.-like loc.* is but a consequence of this general faculty to denote that *about which* one is engaged” (SS §147.IV.). The

¹³ ‘*sāmissarādhipati-dāyādasakkhi-paṭibhū-pasutakusalehi ca*’ (305).

¹⁴ ‘*kammakaraṇanimittatthesu sattamī*’ Kac. 312.

conventional examples¹⁵ of the grammarians, which Speyer himself follows, do not however occur in the canonical literature. In its simplest form it signifies the *cause* for some action as, for instance, in: *sarīrabhaṅge*¹⁶ *siyā sampahāro* D II.166 (V.) “there would be a quarrel over the distribution of the relics”; *mama sāvakā adhisīle sambhāventi* M II.9 “the disciples respect me for my higher virtue” (cp. *adhīpaññāya* M II.10); *idha khattiyā khattiyaṃ kismicid eva pakaraṇe*¹⁷ *khuramuṇḍaṃ karitvā* D I.98 “the princes having inflicted the punishment of shaving off the head on one (of their fellows) for some offence or other ...”; *kismiñci-d-eva karaṇe ... jīvitā voropesuṃ* A IV.65 “killed (him) ... for some offence (matter) or other”.

§177. [Further Uses]

a. With words denoting *love, hatred, sympathy, antipathy, friendship, enmity, anger, pity, compassion* and *jealousy* etc., Pāli just as Skr. (SS §148) employs a loc. similar to the *nimitta-sattamī*. The sense of “towards, against, for” is here quite conspicuous. e.g., *atthi me tumhesu anukampā* M I.12 “I have pity on (towards) you”; *sattesu kāruññataṃ paṭicca* D II.38 “owing to (his) compassion for beings”; *sabrahmacārīsu kupito* [231] A V.80; M I.101 “angered with (against) the co-celibates”; *purisesu mānasaṃ* D II.13 “a love for (other) men”; *aññamaññaṃ cittāni padūsentī* D I.20 “set their hearts at enmity against each other”; *paralābhasakkāragaru-kāramānanavandanapūjanāsu issati upadussati issaṃ bandhati* A

¹⁵ ‘*dīpi cammesu haññate*’ and ‘*kuñjaro dantesu haññate*’ common to both Skr. and Pāli grammarians; *vide* Kāś. on Pāṇ. II.3.36 and *vutti* on Kac. 312, Mog.II.35.

¹⁶ Comy. ‘*sarīra-bhaṅga-nimittaṃ dhātu-koṭṭhāsa hetu*’ Sum.II.60.

¹⁷ Comy. ‘*kismicid eva dose*’ Sum. I .267.

II.203 “he is jealous for, angered against and breeds envy towards the gain, honour, respect, worship and homage that others receive”.

b. Under the *abstract* use of the loc. (vide §163.a.vi.) we may also place the following where the loc. though capable of being rendered by the Eng. ‘in’, is still syntactically far removed from the pure *local* or *temporal* function: *porohacce rame* D II.243 “I delight in the office of chaplain”; *tasmā ’haṃ na gehe rame* D II.243 “therefore I do not delight in (life at) home”. Here the inst. is the concurrent idiom (§71.a). When, however, it occurs with the past participles of such verbs as *ramati*, *yuñjati* and others like *niviṭṭha*, *gathita*, *giddha* and even pure adjectives of the type of *piya* and *manāpa*, the loc. logically borders on the *nimitta-sattamī* (cp. SS §148). e.g., *ucchepake vate ratā* M II.7 “devoted to (engaged in) the vow of eating the leavings”; *amussā itthiyā sāratto* M II.224 “attached to this woman”; *abhirato paviveke* D I.60 “devoted to solitude”; *adhicitte yuttaṃ* M I.451 “attached to (engaged in) higher thought”; *hatapahate niviṭṭho* M I.286 “given to killing and slaying”; *pañcakāma-guṇe gathitā* D I.246 “intoxicated with the five-fold pleasure of sense”; *kāmesu giddho* D III.107 “avaricious for pleasures of the sense”. All these are included in the general category of *relation*.

§178. [Loc. of Disposition]

In general the loc. may denote a *disposition* or *behaviour* towards somebody (cp. SS §149). Then it is synonymous, as Speyer points out, with the construction *paṭi* + acc. (cp. Pāṇinī example ‘*Devadatta sādhuṃ mātari* or *mātaraṃ prati*’, corresponding to which Moggallāna gives ‘*sādhu Devadatto mātaramabhi*’ II.10). In the Nikāyas the most conspicuous use of this idiom is with the verbs

paṭipajjati and some other compounds of the same root. e.g., *kathaṃ mayā bhante mātugāme* [232] *paṭipajjāmāti* D II.141 “how shall we, Sir, conduct ourselves towards the women-folk?”; *tathārūpāsu (kaññāsu) cārittaṃ āpajjitā hoti* M I.268 “he commits misbehaviour even towards such (girls)”. But this loc. is not restricted to such verbs alone. It may occur wherever the notion of *towards someone* is implied by the predicate. Such idioms as ‘*cittaṃ āghātetī*’, ‘*samannesanaṃ karoti*’ and ‘*daṇḍaṃ nidahati*’ are always construed with a loc. of the person, perhaps with the exception of the first where the dat. is not an unlikely alternative. In the other two the loc. is actually due to the sense of the noun and not to any peculiarity of the verbs *karoti* and *nidahati*. e.g., *Sāriputta-Moggallānesu cittaṃ āghātetvā* S I.151 “having incited his heart to hatred against Sāriputta and Moggallāna”; ... *Tathāgate samannesanā kātabbā* M I.317 “... a search should be directed towards the Tathāgata”; cp. *sabhesu bhūtesu nidhāya daṇḍaṃ* Sn 35 “having laid aside the weapon against all beings”.

§179. The Locative with Local and Temporal Sense.

a. *The Loc. of Distance.* The loc. may denote not only *place where* but also the *distance at which* one thing or fact is from another (cp. SS §144.9). According to orthodox grammarians the loc. or the acc. can optionally be used to denote *distance*¹⁸ but if an *interval of time* is to be signified the loc. alone is to be used. In denoting *space* the loc. can stand not only for the Eng. ‘at’ but also for ‘within’. e.g., *yannūnāhaṃ imāsu tālantarikāsu dhanu-sate dhanu-sate pokkharanīyo māpeyyaṃ* D II.178 “well would it be if I were to cause

¹⁸ vide Speyer SS §144.R.1. citing Patañjali I. p. 455.

ponds to be constructed in the spaces between these palms at every hundred bow-lengths”; *suneyyāma taṃ Bhagavantam dasasu yojanesu* M II.90 “if we could but hear that Blessed One within or at (a distance of) ten leagues (*sci.* from here)”. In this idiom the point *from which* distance is counted is denoted by the abl. and the loc. marks the *intervening space* implied between the two limits of reckoning *ab quo* and *ad quem*.

§180. [The Loc. of Time]

The Loc. of Time. This is, generally speaking, only a narrow division of the broader conception of the loc. of [233] *circumstance* which also includes the *absolute* use. Logically no strict line of demarcation can be drawn between the idea of *time at which* and that of *circumstance under which* something happens. So even Kaccāyana has one rule for both functions, viz., *kālabhāvesu ca* (315) which the *vutti* explains as meaning that the loc. should be employed to signify the time (*kāla*) in which or the circumstance (*bhāva*) under which the agent performs the action.¹⁹ Since the latter includes under this loc. such examples as ‘*pubbaṅhasamayē gato*’ and also others of the type of ‘*gosu duyhamānāsu gato*’ (absolute) and ‘*duddhāsu āgato*’ (circumstance), it is clear that according to the orthodox tradition the loc. *absolute* and that of *circumstance* were regarded as distinct variations of the same loc. of *time*. This last denotes such notions as the *time in* or *at which* or *within which* and is the logical counterpart of the loc. of *place where* for it similarly expresses *when* an action takes place. The acc. is here the concurrent idiom (§46). e.g., *tāyaṃ velāyaṃ imaṃ udānaṃ udānesi* D II.136 “at that time the Blessed

¹⁹ ‘*kālabhāvesu ca kattari payujjamāne sattamī vibhatti hoti*’.

One uttered this solemn utterance”; *yasmiṃ samaye uppajjanti saññī tasmiṃ samaye hotī ti* D I.180 “at which time the perceiving arise at that time it exists”; cp. ... *tāsu tās’ veva jātisū* D II.91 (V.) “in various births ...”

§181. [The Loc. of Circumstance]

The Loc. of Circumstance, as pointed out before, is the general conception under which the notions of *time at which* etc. are included. In the case of the *temporal loc.*, as may be seen from the foregoing examples, the word in the loc. is always one that denotes time such as *samaya*, *velā*, *kāla*, *jāti* etc., but when implying circumstance it is not necessarily so. Generally it denotes the *circumstance* (accompanying the prevailing event) under which the action comes to pass (cp. Speyer SS §143.8). e.g., *tathārūpāsu āpadāsu bhogehi pariyodhāya vattanti* A II.68 “In such (times of) distress they safeguard themselves by means of the wealth (in reserve)”; *app’ ekadā nimantane pi bhuñjāmi sālīnaṃ odanaṃ ...* M II.7 “at other times I partake of the meals of rice ... at the invitation (of someone else)”; *etarahi vā mamaccaye vā attadīpā viharissanti* S V.154 “now or on my [234] demise they will live as islands unto themselves”. In the last two examples the loc. is interchangeable with the inst.. In fact the second *accaye* has as v.l. the form *accayena* which is regularly employed elsewhere. Sometimes this borders on the loc. of *relation*. e.g., *Dutiye ca ... antānantaṃ lokassa paññāpentī* D I.22 “Even in the second case ... they maintain that the world is finite or infinite”; cp. *kasmā na paridevesi evarūpe mahabbhaye* Th. 1.706 “why do you not lament at (in time of) such great danger”; *maṇasmīṃ na socati* Th. 1.712 “he does not grieve (in time of or) over death”. Under this loc. Speyer places the word *kāle* “in due

time” which occurs in Pāli only in *gāthā* as the concurrent idiom for *kālena* which is usually found in prose. e.g., *annañca laddhā vasanañca kāle* Sn 971 “having received food and raiment in due time”.

§182. The Locative Absolute.

The absolute construction of any case plays the part of a subordinate clause to the principal sentence. As regards the origin of this employment there is diversity of opinion. We have seen that the absolute use of the gen. does not represent an isolated construction but there is a logical connection between it and the main sentence. It is either *temporal* or has the sense of *notwithstanding* or *in spite of* (§158). In the case of the loc. too the *temporal* idea seems to be the main significance of the *absolute* construction. Macdonell thinks that it started from the ordinary use of the loc. (VGS §205.1). Combined with a *participle* it came to be regarded as a temporal or qualifying (i.e. adverbial) clause where the noun alone could not be employed. But Speyer traces the origin of the *absolute* notion to the *participial* employment (SS §365). According to him, the loc. of the participle is the essential factor in it and the nominal portion is just accessory. The fact, however, seems to lie midway between these two views. The fundamental function of any absolute case is, broadly speaking, to denote an *attendant circumstance* (*vide* inst. of *attendant circumstance* bordering on an *absolute* use §68.d.). It differs from the simple *temporal* [235] or *modal* use of a case only in the predicative character of the participle. Since the latter’s presence makes it virtually a clause separate from the main sentence having a predicate of its own, it is regarded as freed or detached (*absolutus*) from the construction of the rest of the sentence. But there is always

a logical connection between the two. Logically it is parallel to the *adverbial* use of the case involved and as such may be temporal, modal, conditional, hypothetical, causal or concessive. It may be remarked that the participle thus construed is either a *present* or a *past passive* one. The future participle is never employed in this connection nor others which lack the *adjectival* quality such as the active past participle, since these cannot agree with the substantive put in the oblique case (cp. SS §365). These two factors of the absolute construction are called its *subject* and *predicate*. The *loc. absolute* is a frequent idiom in Pāli and appears in various nuances, some of which are syntactically much involved. We may notice the following distinctions:

§183. [Examples of Loc. Abs.]

a. In its simple *temporal* sense, it does not vary much from the *loc. of time* except in the presence of the participle. e.g., *Atha kho Pañcasikho Gandhabba-putto abhikkantāya rattiyā ... yena Bhagavā ten' upasaṅkami* D II.220 “Thereupon Pañcasikha, the (son of the) heavenly musician, when the night was far spent ... came whither the Blessed One was”; *idha pana bhikkhave bhikkhu rattiyā nikkhantāya divase paṭihite iti paṭisaṅcikkhati ...* A IV.321. “Here, brethren, a monk, when the night is over and the day has set in, reflects thus ...”; *tasmim̐ tasmīṅca kālakate Tathāgataṃ upasaṅkamitvā ...* D II.93 “when this or that person is dead he approaches the Tathāgata ...”.

b. While having the temporal sense, especially with the present participle, the *loc. absolute* may denote the *circumstance* that attends on or accompanies the main action. e.g., *ukkāsu dhāriya-mānāsu Rājagahamhā niyyāsi* D I.49 “he set out from R. while torches were

being held” (or with torches being held ...). Such clauses are usually rendered in English by the participial clause ‘torches being held, he left R.’. Similarly: *imasmiṃ ca pana* [236] *veyyākaraṇasmīṃ bhaññamane sahaṣṣī loka-dhātu akampittha* D I.46; II.288 “while this explanation was being delivered a thousand world systems shook”; cp. *setamhi chatte anuhīramāne sabbā ca disā viloketi* D II.15 “he looked on all the regions while a canopy was held over him”; *saṅghasmīṃ bhijjamānasmīṃ nāññaṃ bhiyyo amaññatha* M III.154 (V.) “the Order (i.e. the Church) being in (the course of) disruption they did not think of others”. The *absolute loc.* denoting *simultaneity* may also be included under this group. e.g., *Parinibbute Bhagavati saha parinibbānā bhūmicālo ahoṣi* D II.156 “Simultaneously with the passing away of the Blessed One there was an earthquake”; *ossatṭhe ca Bhagavato āyusaṅkhāre mahā-bhūmicālo ahoṣi* D II.106 “with the renouncing of his vital element (i.e. when he shook off the sum of his remaining life) by the Blessed One there was a great earthquake”.

c. In the last two examples the *absolute* phrase represents an action or process *immediately* preceding that of the main sentence and may be rendered “as soon as, no sooner than” etc. Hence the *loc. absolute* is used in a general way to denote the time *since* or *after which* some action is supposed to take place. It is frequently found with such formations as ‘*acira-pakkante*’ etc. where a time-denoting word is compounded with the participle, in which case it is completely identical with the *gen. absolute* in its *temporal* function (§158.c.). e.g., *Atha kho Bhagavā acirapakkante Vajjiyamāhite gahapatimhi bhikkhū āmantesi* A V.192 cp. D II.204; M I.192 “Thereupon, not long after the householder V. had departed, the Blessed One addressed the monks”; *Ekaṃ samayaṃ āyasmā Ānando Sāvaththiyaṃ viharati ... aciraparinibbute Bhagavati* D I.204 “Once the ven.

Ānanda was living at S. not long after the Blessed One had passed away”; *aciraparinibbutesu Sāriputta-Moggallānesu* S V.163 “not long since S. and M. had passed away”; *sattāha-pabbajite ... rājisimhi dibbaṃ cakkaratanam antaradhāyi* D III.60 “seven days after the Royal Sage had left home, the divine Jewel of the Wheel disappeared”; *sattāha-jāte Ānanda Bodhisatte Bodhisatta-mātā kālāṃ karoti* D III.14; M III.12 “seven days after the Bodhisatta is born, Ānanda, his mother dies”. [237]

d. Sometimes when the main sentence is a negative statement the subordinate clause expressed by the loc. absolute construction may denote “even when, i.e. in spite of *or* notwithstanding” as much as the gen. absolute expressive of *anādara* (§158.a.). e.g., *deve vassante deve gaḷagaḷāyante vijjutāsu niccharantīsu asaniyā phalantiyā n’ eva passeyya n’ eva saddaṃ suṇeyya* D II.131 “even when the rain is falling, torrents are pouring, lightning is issuing and thunder is pealing he would not see or hear a sound”; *evaṃ pi kho āyasmā Ānando Bhagavatā oḷārike nimitte kayiramāne ... nāsakkhi paṭivijjituṃ* D II.103 “even when a material (ample) sign was made by the Blessed One, the ven. Ānanda was not able to realize ...”; *evaṃ pariyāya desite kho Ānanda mayā dhamme ye aññamaññassa subhāsitaṃ sulapitaṃ na samanumaññissanti* S IV.225 “those who, Ānanda, do not respect the well-spoken words of each other even when the Doctrine has been methodically preached by me”. In these examples the sense of *anādara* is emphasized by the presence of *eva* or *evaṃ*, just as the *temporal* sense is supplemented in the following by the insertion of *atha* at the beginning of the main sentence: *Asmīti kho pana bhikkhave adhigate atha pañcannaṃ indriyānaṃ avakkanti hoti* S III.46 “when (the thought) ‘I am’ is conceived, *then*, there is the appearance of the five sense-organs”.

§184. [Non-Temporal Meaning of the Loc. Abs.]

As pointed out above the temporal notion is not the only idea expressed by the *loc. absolute*. It includes many other shades of meaning.

a. For instance, it may stand for an adverbial clause denoting *cause* as those which in English begin with ‘because, as a result of, since’. e.g., *Mā kho tvam tāta dibbe cakka-ratane antara-hite anattamano hoti* D III.60 “do not be disheartened, dear one, because the divine Jewel of the Wheel has disappeared”; *ettakamhi vā dukkhe nijjiṇṇe sabbaṃ dukkhaṃ nijjiṇṇaṃ bhavissati* M I.93 “as a result of so much sorrow being exhausted all grief comes to an end”; *Govinde brāhmaṇe kālakate rājā Disampati paridevesi* D II.231 “when (*implying* because) the brahmin G. [238] died King D. lamented”; *evaṃ h’ etaṃ Mahāli hoti bhikkhuno puratthimāya disāya ekaṃsa-bhāvite samādhimhi* D I.153 “Thus it occurs to the monk, Mahāli, as a result of self-collectedness being developed with regard to the eastern quarter”.

b. It may also signify a *condition* that exists or should exist for the fulfilment of the main action, which may be rendered by such expressions as ‘if, on condition, provided that’ etc. This construction is not logically very different from the above (cause).

i. e.g., *Bhave kho sati jāti hoti* D II.31 “when (if, on condition that) there is becoming, there is birth”; *kimhi nu kho asati jarāmaraṇaṃ na hoti* S II.7 “which being absent (if what is absent) is there no decay and death?”; *kismiṃ sati piyāppiyaṃ na hoti* D II.277 “what being present is there no (difference of) pleasant and unpleasant?”.

ii. When the main sentence is interrogative the subordinate clause represents a *hypothetical condition* as those with ‘supposing, now if’ etc. in English. e.g., *dassane Bhagavā sati katham paṭipajjītabbam* D II.141 “supposing there is seeing how should we behave?”; *tasmim akaraṇīye kayiramāne ko ādīnavo pāṭikaṅkho ti* A I.57 “supposing something that should not be done is committed (by him) what (consequence) should be expected?”.

iii. In this stereotyped absolute construction with *sati* not rarely we find in the Nikāyas a plural subject made to agree with the singular participial predicate (*sati*). This is grammatically due to the fact that *atthi* is not seldom found in Pāli just as in Skr. used with plural subject, (cp. *s.v. atthi* P.T.S. Dict.). e.g., *pādesu sati abhikkama-paṭikkamo paññāyati* S IV.171 “when there are feet, movement (*lit.* going and coming) appears”; *tesu ākāresu tesu liṅgesu ... asati ...* D II.62 “were there no modes, features ...”. This use of the singular predicate for plural in the (loc.) absolute construction is, however, more than a mere grammatical peculiarity. It exists even in other I.E. languages.²⁰

§185. [Loc. Abs. with Adjectives]

In the examples discussed in the preceding paragraphs the loc. absolute construction without exception consisted of the subject-part which can be either a noun substantive or pronoun (or even a noun clause as in ‘*asmi ti kho pana bhikkhave adhigate ...*’ S III.46), and the predicate-part which is usually a participle. It is however not

²⁰ Otto Jespersen points out in his ‘Philosophy of Grammar’ that there is such a construction in Spanish (p. 129).

necessary that the predicate of the absolute loc. should be always a participle. Just as a noun (adjective or substantive) can stand as predicate of an independent clause or sentence, so in the absolute construction some such word with a predicative force may stand for the verbal element. Nearly always it is an adjective or, as in some of the examples referred to, a participle used as an adjective (cp. *samāhite, nijjīṇṇe* in a.). Adjectival compounds are frequently employed in this role. e.g., *pañca-vassa-satâyukesu bhikkhave manussesu tayo dhammā vepullaṃ agamaṃsu* D III.70 “when men were of five hundred years life-span three things increased”; *te atīra-dakkhiṇiyā nāvāya tīra-dassiṃ sakuṇaṃ muñcanti* D I.222 “when the ship is so far that the shore is not visible they let free a bird that finds the shore”. In most cases, however, the predicate is incomplete without some such loc. of a participle as *sati, ṭhite* etc.. But this want is not always felt. e.g., *bahukamhi thokaṃ denti pañtamhi lūkhaṃ denti* A IV.10 “there being much they give little, and there being excellent (food) they give gross (food)”.

§186. [Loc. Abs. in Stick Phrases]

Occasionally the subject-part of the absolute construction is to be understood. This is especially so in the case of the stock-phrases *evaṃ sati, evaṃ sante* etc. (cp. acc. absolute: *evaṃ santaṃ* D I.186; vide §56). e.g., *evaṃ sante tassa purisassa appāṭihīrakataṃ bhāsitaṃ sampajjati* D I.193 “when this is so that person’s talk appears (*lit.* becomes) foolish”. But it is not seldom found with other participles usually of ‘intransitive’ verbs. e.g., *Evaṃ vutte te bhikkhū Bhagavantaṃ etad avocaṃ* D I.1 “when (it) was said thus those monks replied to the Blessed One”. A similar construction is found in: *Saṅghe Gotami dehi, saṅghe te dinne ahañc’ eva pūjito*

bhavissāmi saṅgho ca M III.253, where the second ‘*saṅghe*’ is just loc. of *person given* [240] to (§170.a) and not the loc. of the absolute construction. In the following example the loc. sg. ‘*vimuttasmiṃ*’ also appears to be employed absolutely: *ariyasāvako ... virāgā vimuccati, vimuttasmiṃ vimuttaṃ iti ñāṇaṃ hoti* M I.500 “the noble disciple ... is freed through detachment, when free he obtains the knowledge that there is freedom”; cp. *avijjāsavā pi cittaṃ vimuccati, vimuttasmiṃ vimuttaṃ iti ñāṇaṃ hoti* M I.184; III.20.

a. When the participle which is the predicate of the absolute construction is passive it may be sometimes attended by the *agent*, i.e., the logical subject of the verb represented by the participle, the grammatical subject being either put into the loc. or not expressed at all. e.g., *yo bhikkhave Tathāgatena evaṃ ācikkhiyamāne ... na passati* S III.139 “who (ever), monks, does not see ... when it is being thus pointed out by the Tathāgata”; *vandite²¹ ca pana āyasmatā Mahā-Kassapena ... sayam eva Bhagavato citako pajjali* D II.164 “when worshipped by the ven. Mahā-Kassapa ... the funeral pyre of the Blessed One blazed forth by itself”. In the last example the loc. (*vandite*) can not be strictly regarded as *absolute* for the construction can stand even if it were the nom. (*vandito*). Here we have an interesting link in the development of the absolute use from the participial construction (cp. Speyer SS §365). The loc. here is used with a temporal significance (*when* worshipped). Such *temporal* employment of the locative sg. of participles is not unusual in Pāli. e.g., *supinante pi nāgamā* Sn 293 “he did not come even in a dream

²¹ Here ‘*vandite*’ refers to *citako* which is the subject of the principal sentence. Such agreement is not idiomatic. Nom. ‘*vandito*’ would be better. Cp. Apte ‘Guide’ p. 81 footnote.

(*lit.* even in *or* while dreaming” where the Comy. has ‘*supinenâpi na agamâsi*’ (Pj. II.318).

b. Sometimes it is very doubtful whether the construction is *absolute* or whether the loc. involved is just *temporal* or *local*. This is especially the case when the words in the loc. are such as denoting time or place. e.g., *samvattamâne loke yebhuyyena sattâ ābhassara-samvattānikā honti* D III.28 “when the world is evolving *or* in the evolving world the beings on the whole tend to be radiant”; *Seyyathâpi nāma saradasamaye viddhe vigatavalāhake deve ādicco ... bhāsate ca tapate ca virocate ca* S I.65 “Just as in autumn when the sky is clear and free from [241] clouds (or in a clear, cloudless sky) the sun shines bright, warm and brilliant”.

§187. The Adverbial Locative.

a. Many locatives, especially of words denoting *time* and *space* (place), have acquired the character of adverbs (cp. SS §150). In the sentence they are mostly found as separate elements qualifying the action as denoted by the main verb.

i. The most frequent adverbial locatives in the Nikāyas are those of *proximity* or the opposite, generally denoting *where*, such as *santike*, *avidūre* and *sammukhe*. As pointed out before (§150), these usually agree with the gen. of the preceding noun which limits the sense of the adverb. e.g., *Bhagavato santike imaṃ gāthaṃ abhāsi* D II.254 “he uttered this verse in the presence (*lit.* proximity) of the Blessed One”; *Atha kho Brahmāyussa brāhmaṇassa avidūre ambavanassa etad ahoṣi* M II.141 “then this thought occurred to the brahmin B. (when he was) not far from the mango-grove”; *Anuruddhassa sammukhe*

pāturahosi S V.294; D II.206 “appeared in front of Anuruddha”. These adverbs can be used even with verbs of *motion* denoting the *place gone to*. e.g., *pahiṇeyyāsi tvam Ānanda Vaggumudātiriyaṇaṃ bhikkhūnaṃ santike dūtaṃ* Ud 26 “send (you), Ānanda, a messenger to the (presence of) V. monks”.

ii. The above sense of *place gone to* is mostly expressed by the pronominal forms *kuhiṃ*, *kahaṃ*, *yahiṃ* etc. derived from *kasmiṃ*, *yasmiṃ* etc. These are used exactly like *kutra*, *yatra*, mostly with verbs of *motion*. e.g., *kuhiṃ gamissasīti* D II.343 “where will you go?”; *kahaṃ nu kho ... bhavaṃ Gotamo viharati* D I.150 “where does the ven. Gotama live now?”; *yahiṃ yahiṃ tantaṃ Tathāgato sukhasmiṃ paññāpeti* M I.400 “in relation to whichever (thing) the Tathāgata lays down this or that as part of happiness”.

iii. A peculiar use of the adverbial loc. is found in *-agge* (Skr. *agre* “at the head”; cp. SS §150) which in Pāli has acquired the sense of “since”. It is mostly found as the second member of [242] an adverbial compound. e.g., *ajjatagge pāṇupetaṃ saraṇaṃ gataṃ* M I.368 “taken refuge for life from today (i.e. from now on till life lasts)”; *yadagge ahaṃ Mahāli Bhagavantaṃ upanissāya viharāmi na ciraṃ tīni vassāni* D I.152 “it is not more than three years, Mahāli, since I have lived under the Blessed One”. The forms *yadagge* and *tadagge* are found coordinately in the sense of “from ... till ...”. e.g., *yadagge ahaṃ Bhagavati abhippasanno ... tadagge kho pana* D I.93 “since I gained reliance in the Blessed One, from that time onwards ...”.

iv. A few archaic forms of original locatives are found in the Nikāyas with the *causal* and *modal* sense. Such are *āvi* and *raho* (§2)

which though originally meaning “in the open” and “in secrecy” have come to signify the adverbial notions of “openly” and “secretly” (manner). e.g., *āvi ca eva raho ca* M I.321.

b. i. At other times however these adverbs are found not, as separate words in the sentence but as words qualifying some adjective and limiting its application. This is found in the instance when the adverb is compounded with the adjective as the first member of an *aluk-samāsa* both together constituting an adjectival compound (*bahubbīhi*). e.g., *majjhe-kalyāṇaṃ (dhammaṃ)* D I.62; D III.76 “(the doctrine) good-in the middle”; *pubbe-nivāsa-paṭisaṃyuttā dhammī kathā* D II.1 “doctrinal talk regarding previous (*lit.* before) lives”. But more often the adverb is left outside the compound. e.g., *pubbe ananussutassa dhammassa* D II.32 “of the doctrine not heard before”.

ii. This kind of compound can also be formed from the peculiar adverbs of the class of *kuhiṃ* etc. the second member usually being a derivative form of some verb of motion. e.g., *kuhiṃgāmī bhavissati* M I.8 *lit.* “whither-going shall he be”.

Appendix

Case	Affix	Pāṇ.	Kac.	Mog.	Buddhaghosa
Nom.	paṭhamā prathamā				paccatta-vacana S I.183; II.659
Voc.		āmantraṇa sambodhana	ālapana	āmantaṇa	kathā-savana-yutta- puggala-vacana Ps I.13
Acc.	dutiyā dvitiyā	karman	kamma	kamma	upayoga-vacana Pj. II.140, Sum. II.410
Inst. (agent)	tatiyā tṛtiyā	karaṇa (kartṛ)	karaṇa (kattu)	karaṇa (kattu)	karaṇa-vacana S I.33, Sum. II.410
Dat.	catutthi cathurthi	sampradāna	sampadāna	sampadāna	sampadāna-vacana Pj. II.317
Abl.	pañcamī pañcamī	apādāna	apādāna	avadhi	nissaka-vacana Pj. II.395
Gen.	chaṭṭhī ṣaṣṭhī	sambandhana	sāmi	sambandhana	sāmi-vacana Pj. II.210
Loc.	sattamī saptamī	adhikaraṇa	okāsa	ādhāra	bhumma-vacana S I.33; Sum. II.41

General Index

[references are to page numbers in the original edition
which are marked in square brackets in this edition]

[245]

Abbayībhāva (avyayībhāva) 65, 68, 101.

Ablative, 146ff.; fundamental character 146, 154; - of abstract nouns 152; - of cause 149f.; - of comparison 165, 166; - of distance 148, 149; - of motive 152; - of origin 148, 154; - of reason 152; - of relation 164f.; - of separation 7, 147, 154ff.; - of starting point 147ff.; - of time 151; - of viewpoint 148, 163, 164ff.; declensional peculiarity of – 147; suffixes 147, 163, 165ff.; adverbial use of – 147, 164, 167, 168; quasi-legitimate use of – 170f.; - with adverbs 161, 192; with causatives 156; - with comparative adj. 165; with prepositions – 160; periphrasis as – 152; - and shades of causality 151; - and acc. 169, 170, 171; - and inst. 143, 146, 147, 149, 150, 151, 158, 170, 224; - and dat. 15, 143, 146; - and gen. 152, 158, 174, 183, 186, 188; - and loc. 158, 174, 210, 222, 224, 225, 226f.; - and loc. absolute 151, 164.

Absolute constructions, 236ff.

Accusative, 38ff.; of aim 45f.; 229; - of direction 45, 46, 47ff.; 55; - of external object, 39f.; 47, 52; - of internal object 41f.; - of object of contents 42f.; - of extension 53f.; 58f.; - of goal 48f.; - of motion 134, 179; - of place where 54f.; - of purpose 71, 134; - of relation 51f.; - of time when 56f.; - pl. ending 10; - absolute 70f.; appositional – 65; cognate – 22, 43, 53, 59; double – 46, 72ff.; terminal – 46; adverbial uses of – 38, 40, 54, 55, 58ff.; secondary uses of – 43; temporal archaic uses of – 58; - with adv. 67; - with agent nouns 179; - with causative verbs – 76; - with passive verbs 76; - with indeclinable 69f.;

- with prepositions 67f.; - with reflexive participles 52; predicative – 217; - and inst. 43, 48, 57, 59, 143, 170, 171; - and dat. 44, 40, 72, 122, 136, 143; - and abl 169, 170, 171; - and gen. 175, 183, 184, 189; - and loc. 49, 52, 55, 56, 70, 207, 211f.; 232, 233.

Ādhara vibhatti, see loc.

Adjectives, 139; comparative adj. 165.

Adverbs, archaic adv. 3; demonstrative – 23; directional – 45; pronominal adv. 7; adv. acc. 58ff.; adv. abl. 164; adv. gen. 183; adv. phrases 171; - in *to* 155; - in *khattu* 64; - of manner 3, 28, 167; - of place 3; - of reason 143; - of time 3.

Agent, 38.

Anādara, 200f.; 237.

Apādāna-kāraka, 146.

Ardha-Māgadhi, 14, 19. [246]

Avadhi, 149, 154, 159.

BRUGMANN, on acc. 38, 50, 58, 60, 70; on inst. 78, 102; on dat. 117, 118, 132, 134; on gen. 172f.

BUDDHAGHOSA, 35f.; 46, 51, 55, 56, 61, 70, 77, 100, 104, 218.

CAKRAVARTI, 89, 154.

CHALMERS, 9.

Chaṭṭhi, see gen.

Clauses, participial – 23, 34; relative – 25.

Compounds, adj. - 59; Coordinative – 6; determinative – 40; dependent determinative – 153; dvanda – 5.

Dative, 117ff.; - of advantage & disadvantage 118, 128, 130, 140; - of agent 119, 128, 132, 133; - of aim 137; - of concern 120, 124, 131ff.; - of destination 122; - of interest 125, 141; - of orientation 118, 127, 131; - of possession 122, 131; - of purpose 118, 134, 153; - of suitability 138f.; dependent – 118; ethical or sympathetic – 118, 125, 128, 129, 130f.; 176. loose – 118, 127f.; 132, 133, 134; terminative – 144; adnominal use of – 118, 140f.; adverbial use of – 117; predicative use of – 137; sporadic uses of – 143ff.; - pl. 12f.; - by attraction 143; - with verbs 119ff.; - in *āya*, *assa*, 134, 138, 143; - in Pāli 117, 133; in Prk. 174; - and acc. 44, 50, 72, 122, 136; - and inst. 84, 143; - and abl. 15, 143; - and gen. 6, 15, 118, 130, 133, 136, 141, 174, 191, 202, 220, 221; - and loc. 122, 124, 143, 220, 221.

Declensions, consonantal – 1, 17; diphthongal – 1, *r* - 1; pronominal – 7; *a* & *ā* – 15, 20; vowel – 2, 15.

Descriptive determinatives, 65.

Dialect (Prākritic), vii.

Dual forms, 4ff.

DUROISELLE, 33.

Eastern forms, 6, 13f.; 208.

Enclitic forms, 130, 131, 133, 176, 192.

FRANKE, R.O., vii, 3, 9, 86, 89, 104, 150.

Gāthā literature, vii, 1, 7, 10, 21, 68, 73, 92, 98, 108, 136, 140, 142, 171, 184, 210, 211.

GEIGER, 134, 150, 152.

Gender, change of – 2.

Genitive, 172ff.; fundamental character of – 172; case ending of – 174; - of description 207, 218; - of distinction 175; - of material 175; - of origin, 175, 203; - of possession [247] 17ff.; 172, 175, 219; - of relation 196f.; - of time 198f.; 201; objective – 175, 178; partitive – 175, 179f.; 182; subjective – 177, 194, 195; adj. use 172, 184; adnominal – 172, 183, 196ff.; adv. use of – 172f.; 183, 188, 190, 196; - of with adj. 180, 181; - with agent nouns 179; with numerals 180; - with pronouns 180; - with substantives 175ff.; - with superlatives 181, 216; - with verbs of motion 179; - absolute 195, 199ff.; - and acc. 172,

174, 183, 184, 189; - and inst. 95, 175, 177, 185f.; 190, 195; - and dat. 6, 15, 118, 130, 133, 141, 174, 176, 191, 202, 220, 221; - and loc. 179, 203, 207, 216, 218, 219, 220.

Gerund, in *tvā* 23, 155; - with dat. 132, 133; - with demonstrative pronouns 23f.; - with nom. 35.

Grammarians: ancient – 149 (abl.) 173, 197 (gen.); Indian (= Skt) 33 (nom) 38, 51 (acc.), 78, 89, 92, 112 (inst.), 230 (loc.); local - (= Pāli) 29, 35 (nom.); 38, 48, 76 (acc.); 78, 89, 113 (inst.); 117, 122, 134 (dat.); 146, 148, 153, 155, 159, 165, 167 (abl.); 173, 192, 193, 200, (gen.); 205, 226, 229 (loc.).

HAVERS, 118, 130 (dat.).

Hetu, (kattā), 113.

HOPKINS, E.W. 146, 170 (abl.).

HULTZSCH, 34 (nom.).

Impersonal construction, 23.

Indeclinables, 3, 45, 55, 69ff.; 153.

Indian languages, 31.

Indo-European, vii.

Infinitive, 25f.; 132, 135, 136.

Inflexional terminations, 6f.; 10.

Instrumental, 78ff.; - of attendant circumstances 82f.; 99; - of agent 112; - of cause 89ff.; - of comparison 110, 111f.; - of means 9, 82, 85ff.; - of place 105f.; - of relation 92f.; 99; - of time 102f.; adnominal use of – 110f.; adverbial use of – 97ff.; idiomatic use of – 109f.; - with adv. prepositions 108f.; - with *saha* 7, 81f.; with *saddhiṃ* 81f.; - sg. in ā; - pl. in 10f.; - in special correction with verbs 94ff.; Inst. acc. construction 171, 171; sociative – 10, 79f.; - and dat. 11, 84, 95; - and abl. 15, 79, 84, 170; - and gen. 95, 175, 177; - and loc. 87, 104, 223, 224.

Kaccāyana, viii, xiii; 9, 35 (nom.), 38f., 45, 51, 53 (acc.); 78, 90, 92, 102, 103, 112 (inst.); 117f.; 124, 134 (dat.); 146f.; 150, 159, 165, 167, 220 (abl.); 173, 188, 189, 200 (gen.); 205f.; 211, 216, 220, 223, 226, 228, 233 (loc.).

Kāraka, 173.

Karaṇa 90; see also Inst. [248]

Karmapravacanīya, 226.

Kartṛ, 22.

Kātantra, 30.

Chapter VII, The Locative Case – 320

Locative, 205ff.; fundamental characteristics 205, 219; - endings 206ff.; - of cause & relation 227ff.; - of circumstance 205, 232, 233, 235; - of distance 232; - of motive 205, 209; - of place 207ff.; - of relation 189, 196, 205, 213, 218, 221, 227, 233; - of time 205, 232, 235; - of wither 211ff.; abstract use of – 231; adnominal use of – 205, 210, 218, 220, 221, 228; adverbial use of – 205, 227, 241f.; - with local & temporal sense 232ff.; - absolute 199, 205, 232, 233, 234ff.; - and gen. absolute 236; partitive 215ff; 218; predicative – 217f.; sociative – 210; - with verbs 213ff.; - and collective nouns 216; - and acc. 207, 211, 232, 233; - and inst. 223ff.; 227, 231, 233; - and dat. 220ff.; - and abl. 210, 224, 225, 227; - and gen. 207, 219, 221, 226.

MACDONELL, 53 (acc.); 91, 92, 99, 108 (inst.); 117, 118 (dat.); 160, 162 (abl.); 234 (loc.).

Middle Indian, 5, 15, 134.

Moggallāna, viii, xiii; 29, 35 (nom.); 38f.; 53 (acc.); 78, 92 (inst.); 206, 231 (loc.).

MONIER-WILLIAMS, 13, 33, 61.

Nimitta-sattamī, 29, 230, 231; ef. loc.

Niruttidīpanī, 33.

Nominative, 22ff.; def. 29f.; - of address 35f.; - of opposition 31; - of exclamation 36ff.; - of subject 22ff.; - absolute 33; adnominal – 29; predicative – 26f.; - with *iti* 28f.; - with passive verbs 25f.; - in

Chapter VII, The Locative Case – 321

elliptical clauses 32; - after adv. *yena* 32; absolute use of – 29; adverbial use of – 28, 29; label use of – 29ff.; 36.

Object, affected – 25; direct (near) – 38; grammatical – 38; logical – 25, 38; - of content 42; - and subject 22; - and verb 38.

Pāli, - declension 5; - idiom 24, 170; - inflexion 1, 2; - and Prkt. 4, 14; - and Skt. 10, 108, 146, 147, 148; Dual form in – 4, 5; infinitive in – 26; nom. in – 22f.; acc. 38ff.; 60; inst. in 78ff.; 82, 85, 102, 104; dat. in – 4, 72, 117ff.; 118, 119, 124, 127, 128, 133; abl. in – 146ff.; gen. in – 172ff.; 176, 179, 181, 191, 196, 198f.; loc. in – 205ff.; 211, 220, 223, 227, 230, 235, 238, 240.

Pañcamī vibhatti, 146.

Pāṇinī, vii i, xiii; 167 (n suffix *to*), 29, 35 (nom.) 38f.; (acc.); 78, 83, 90, 92, 102, 112, 177 (inst.); 117, 134 (dat.); 146, 150, 153, 158, 159, 193 (abl.); 173, 183, 185, 191, 193, 200 (gen.). 206, 231 (loc.).

Participial construction, 240.

Particles, 3, 45, 130. [249]

Patañjali, 39 (acc.) 112 (inst.).

PISCHEL, 134.

Post-positions, 45, 153.

Prakrit, vii, viii, 7.

Prefixes, 45, 46, 47, 50, 51, 94.

Prepositions, 3. 45. 67ff.; 108f.; 160, 162, 169.

Pronominal declensions, 7, 10, 114, 18ff.

Pronominal endings, 7f.

Pronouns, demonstrative – 23; indefinite – 180; interrogative – 27; neuter – 27; personal – 176; relative – 20, 25, 176; reflexive – 21, - *to* 23; - as subject 27; - with gerund 33.

RHYS DAVIDS (Mrs.), 184.

Sampadāna (=Sampradāna), 117, 134, 146, see dat.

Sanskrit, (Classical) viif.; xiii; 1ff.; 6, 33, 44, 51, 58, 76, 102, 104, 108, 162, 199, 202, 206, 210, 211, 220, 222, 223, 228, 230, 238.

Sattamī, see loc. & nimitta sattamī.

Saurasenī, 18.

SPEYER, 28 (nom.) 50ff.; 75 (acc.) 79, 91, 103 (inst.); 117, 122, 127, 133, 134 (dat.); 146, 148, 150, 154, 158, 159, 163, 165 (abl.); 173, 177, 186, 191 (gen.); 222, 230, 231, 234, 240 (loc.).

Chapter VII, The Locative Case – 323

Stems, *a* – 6f.; *an* – 2, 3; *ata* – 3; consonant -1; *in* – 2, 3; *nt* – 3; pronominal – 170; radical – 2; root – 2; *s* – 2; *n* – 1; vowel – 1.

Subject, grammatical – 22; logical – 22, 25; nominal – 24; - of clauses 23ff.; - and agent 38; - and object 22; - and verb 22.

Vedic, viif.; xiii, 4, 9.

Verbal nouns, 15.

Verbs, active – 25; passive – 25, 128; causative – 24, 128, 156; intransitive – 22, 45, 128, 177; - 'to be' 122; - of motion 7, 25, 55, 122.

Verbum substantivum, 26f.

Vibhakti, 30, 173.